than other lands in the city.1 Nor will it prevent foreign and domestic corporations being classified separately for purposes

of taxation.2

South Carolina. Under the provisions of the constitution for the uniform assessment of property by value, an act of legislation which provides that every railroad shall pay a tax to the county, for the use of the state, in proportion to the length of its track, is void because not laid on property in proportion to value.3 The requirement that municipal taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same is not violated by the taxation of business as such, nor by the classification of different kinds of business for different taxation,- no personal distinctions being made.

Tennessee. A constitutional provision that "all property shall be taxed according to its value," and that "no one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any species of property of equal value," has no reference to the taxation of privileges, and such taxation is in the discretion of the legislature. It is therefore competent to authorize a town to levy license taxes on the various occupations carried on therein. The provision applies to local as well as to general levies, and forbids exemptions except as the constitution in express terms allows them, and for the purposes of local taxation it will preclude a railroad being assessed as an entirety, and the valuation apportioned among the municipalities in proportion to the length of road within them.8

1 Roup's Case, 811 Pa. St., 211.

6

2 Germania L. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. St., 513. As to equality of taxation in general, see Weber v. Reinhardt, 73 Pa. St., 370.

3 State v. Railroad Corporations, 4 S. C., 376.

State v. Columbia, 6 S. C., 1.

Adams v. Somerville, 2 Head, 363; State v. Crawford, 2 Head, 460. See State v. Schlier, 3 Heisk., 281; Apperson v. Memphis, 2 Flip., 363.

6 Taylor v. Chandler, 9 Heisk., 349.

7 Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. State, 8 Heisk., 663; Chattanooga v. Railroad Co., 7 Lea, 561.

8 Chattanooga v. Railroad Co., 7 Lea, 561, overruling Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. State, 8 Heisk., 663, in this particular.

Texas. The constitutional provision that "taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state" is not violated by a statute for the levy of special local assessments; nor by graduating a tax on business by the population of the town in which the business is carried on," or according to the business done.3

Virginia. The requirement that taxation shall be equal and uniform does not preclude the state from authorizing a county to levy a tax on a county office, nor does it require the license taxes on privileges or occupations to be equal or uniform as between different occupations, though they must be as between those following the same occupation. The constitution is not violated by allowing a city to tax for a railroad purpose the property within half a mile of the city limits."

West Virginia. Under constitutional provisions that all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed, "but property used for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes, and public property, may by law be exempted from taxation," it is not within the power of the legislature to exempt the property of a railroad corporation from taxation, and an exemption until the profits of the corporation shall reach a certain percentage is void. The provision that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state, and that all property, real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to

1 Roundtree v. Galveston, 42 Tex., 612.

2 Texas Banking, etc., Co. v. State, 42 Tex., 636; Blessing v. Galveston, 42 Tex., 641.

West. U. Tel. Co. v. State, 55 Tex., 314.

4 Gilkerson v. Frederick Justices, 13 Grat., 577. See, also, Gordon's Executor v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 231. Compare Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Hillegas, 18 N. J., 11; Same v. Commissioners of Appeals, 18 N. J., 71, and Gardner v. State, 21 N. J., 557, in which a provision in a charter that the corporation should pay a certain tax, "and no other tax or impost shall be levied or assessed" upon it, was held to apply to county and town taxes, as well as those imposed for state purposes.

Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Grat., 767.

6 Ex parte Thornton, 4 Hughes, 220. See, for some discussion of the constitutional provision, Va. & Tenn. R. Co. v. Washington Co., 30 Grat., 471. 7 Langhorne v. Robinson, 20 Grat., 661.

Chesapeake & O. Co. v. Miller, 19 W. Va., 408.

value," has no application to local assessments.1 Insurance companies cannot be made a special class by themselves for the purposes of taxation, and taxed differently from other corporations.2

Wisconsin. The constitutional provision that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform" extends to taxation by cities, towns and counties, as well as that levied by the state. It does not preclude license taxes under the police power. And the state

having for a long period been in the practice of collecting specific taxes from corporations in lieu of the taxes on property levied generally, it was decided, but against the opinion of the judges as to what the rule should be, that such specific taxes were not in violation of the constitutional requirement of uniformity. The provision is not violated by an act which exempts from taxation for a term of years the lands which have been granted in aid of public improvements, or by an extension of such exemption for a further term thereafter." Nor is it violated by permitting real and personal estate to be assessed as of different days. But it is necessary under this provision that all kinds of property not absolutely exempt shall be taxed alike, by the same standard of valuation, equally with other taxable property, and co-extensive with the district; and therefore the levy of a tax for a public improvement which is restricted to real estate is unconstitutional and void.

1 Douglass v. Harrisville, 9 W. Va., 162.

2 Franklin Ins. Co. v. State, 5 W. Va., 349. Contra, Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 1 Woods, 85; Hughes v. Cairo, 92 Ill., 339, and many other cases. 3 Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock Co., 9 Wis., 410; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis., 599; Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 610.

4 Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis., 298 (dog license); Tenney v. Lenz, 16 Wis., 566; Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis., 136.

Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis., 454, overruling Attorney-General v. Plankroad Co., 11 Wis., 35.

6 Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co., 52 Wis., 37. There is a very full discussion of the subject in the light of previous Wisconsin decisions in this

case.

7 Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Lincoln Co., 57 Wis., 137.

8 Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 610. See Kittle v. Shervin, 11 Neb., 65; Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga., 93. In Winter v. Montgomery, 65 Ala., 403, the levy of a tax to pay railroad aid bonds on real estate exclusively was held to be an irregularity merely, which the parties concerned ought to have

The rule of taxation must be uniform within the district for which the tax is laid; but the constitutional requirement of uniformity may be violated as well by evasion or disregard of duty on the part of officers as otherwise; and if this occurs to an extent that defeats general equality and uniformity in the assessment, it cannot become the foundation for a valid tax.2

The general right to make exemptions. Having now given some of the constitutional provisions which have a bearing upon exemptions, we proceed to consider the rule on that subject when the constitution is silent, or at least has failed to cover the subject fully.

3

The general rule on the subject is familiar, and has been too often declared to be open to question. The right to make exemptions is involved in the right to select the subjects of taxation and apportion the public burdens among them, and must consequently be understood to exist in the law-making power wherever it has not in terms been taken away. To some extent it must exist always; for the selection of subjects of taxation is of itself an exemption of what is not selected; but the power to exempt even from among such subjects is more likely to be restricted than to be altogether prohibited. Pertaining as it does to the sovereign power to tax, the inferior municipalities of a state are not possessed of it, and they cannot therefore make exemptions except as expressly authorized by the state. And it would obviously not be within the compe

had corrected by mandamus if necessary, and that they were not entitled, after paying the tax, to sue and recover back. The query is suggested, whether, under statutory authority to levy the tax on real and personal estate, the city might not legally confine the levy to one species of property. 1 Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co., 52 Wis., 37.

2 Marsh v. Supervisors, 42 Wis., 502. See Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor Co., 52 Wis., 37.

3 Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa. St., 448. See People v. Colman, 4 Cal., 46; State v. North, 27 Mo., 464; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St., 243; State v. Parker, 33 N. J., 312; Indianapolis v. Sturdevant, 24 Ind., 391; Wells v. Central Vt. R. R. Co., 14 Blatch., 426; Scotland County v. Railroad Co., 65 Mo., 123; Probasco v. Moundsville, 11 W. Va., 501; Williamson v. Massey, 33 Grat., 237; Savings Bank v. Rutland, 52 Vt., 463; Wis. Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor County, 52 Wis., 37.

4 State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 75 Mo., 209; State v. Gracey, 11 Nev., 223. Authority to commissioners of taxes and assessments to remit or reduce taxes does not empower to make exemptions. They can remit no tax

tency of legislation to confer a general power to make exemptions, since this would be nothing short of a general power to establish inequality. Exemptions when properly made must be determined in the legislative discretion; but even this is not untrammeled; it is not an arbitrary discretion, and there must underlie its exercise some principle of public policy which can support a presumption that the public interest will be subserved by the exemptions which are allowed.

Customary Exemptions. Some of the customary exemptions are in themselves so reasonable that they readily receive universal assent as proper and politic. Such are the exemptions of household furniture, tools of trade, etc., to a moderate amount,2 and of the personal property of those who by reason of age, infirmity or poverty are unable to contribute to the public burdens. Sometimes a homestead of limited value is exempted.* For the encouragement of manufactures, exemptions have also been made in some cases, but on very doubtful grounds."

except for legal cause. They cannot therefore remit the tax on a medical college and hospital which is not exempt by law. People v. Campbell, 93 N. Y., 196. In Georgia municipalities are held to possess the power to make exemptions. The point is not reasoned. Athens v. Long, 54 Ga., 330; Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga., 93. See Cutliff v. Albany, 60 Ga., 597. A city, it seems, may make an exemption from taxation a part of the consideration for a water company supplying it with water. Grant v. Davenport, 36 Ia., 396. Contra, New Orleans v. Water Works Co., 36 La. An., 432. See Nebraska City v. Gas Light Co., 9 Neb., 339.

1 Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me., 62; Farnsworth v. Lisbon, 62 Me., 451. The legislature cannot confer a general power to remit taxes upon a board of supervisors; this being equivalent to a general power to make exemptions. Wilson v. Supervisors of Sutter, 47 Cal., 91. See Dubuque v. Illinois, etc., R. Co., 39 Ia., 56; New Orleans,v. Sugar Shed Co., 35 La. An., 548; Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio St., 590.

2 See Smith v. Osburn, 53 Ia., 474.

3 When officers have power by law to make exemptions in special cases, if they refuse to make one, the party concerned is without remedy unless an appeal is given by law. Clinton School District's Appeal, 56 Pa. St., 315. Such a power is only admissible where an examination into facts is essential in order to determine whether the case is within the general rule of exemption prescribed by law. See Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me., 62.

4 When it is, the sale of the tract which includes the homestead is void. Penn v. Clemans, 19 Ia., 372; Stewart v. Corbin, 25 Ia., 144. See Oliver v. White, 18 S. C., 235, for construction of a homestead exemption.

5 See Gardiner, etc., Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Me., 133; Columbian, etc., Co. v. Vanderpoel, 4 Cow., 556; Jones v. Raines, 35 La. An., 996; State v. Assess