houses,' and a statute for the exemption of factories will not be applied to such as were erected previous to its passage.2

Local Assessments. The most striking illustration of the rule of strict construction of exemptions is seen in the case of special assessments for local improvements, such as the paving and repair of streets, etc. It is almost universally held that a general exemption from taxation will not extend to such assessments. In the leading case, the words of the exemption were that no church or place of public worship "should be taxed by any law of this state." Upon this the court remarked: "The

Academy v. Philadelphia, 22 Pa. St., 496. The exemption from taxation of the property of soldiers in actual service will not exempt from a tax actually imposed before the soldier enlisted. Tobin v. Morgan, 70 Pa. St., 229.

2 Baugh v. Ryan, 51 Ala., 212.

3 Matter of Mayor, etc., of New York, 11 Johns., 77; Bleeker v. Ballou, 3 Wend., 263; Chegaray v. Jenkins, 3 Sandf., 409; People v. Roper, 35 N. Y., 629; Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y., 506; Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 Pa. St., 104; Crawford v. Burrell, 53 Pa. St., 219, 220; Second Universalist Society v. Providence, 6 R. I., 235; Matter of College St., 8 R. I., 474; Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385; State v. Robertson, 24 N. J., 504; State v. Newark, 27 N. J., 185; State v. Mills, 34 N. J., 177; State v. Newark, 35 N. J., 157; S. C., 10 Am. Rep., 223; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush, 508; S. C., 8 Am. Rep., 480; Alexander v Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383, 396; Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517; Le Fevre v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 586; Kendrick v. Farquar, 8 Ohio, 189, 197; Armstrong v. Treasurer of Athens County, 10 Ohio, 235; Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio, 110; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H., 138; Seymour v. Hartford, 21 Conn., 481; Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn., 255; First Presbyterian Church v. Fort Wayne, 36 Ind., 338; S. C., 10 Am. Rep., 35; Palmer v. Stumph, 29 Ind., 329; Trustees of Church v. Ellis, 38 Ind., 3; Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 Ill., 53; Canal Trustees v. Chicago, 12 Ill., 403; Chicago v. Colby, 20 Ill., 614; McBride v. Chicago, 22 Ill., 574; Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill., 351; Pleasant v. Kost, 29 Ill., 490, 494; Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kan., 525; Orange & Alexandria R. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176; Crowley v. Copeley, 2 La. An., 329; La Fayette v. Orphan Asylum, 4 La. An., 1; Rooney v. Brown, 21 La. An., 51; St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo., 468; Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo., 155; S. C., 11 Am. Rep., 412; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20 (sewer tax); Emery v. Gas Co., 28 Cal., 346; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 240; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis., 599; Seamen's Friend Society v. Boston, 116 Mass., 181; Agricultural Society v. Worcester, 116 Mass., 189; Allen v. Galveston, 51 Tex., 302; Roosevelt Hospital v. New York, 84 N. Y., 108; State v. Newark, 38 N. J., 478; State v. Jersey City, 42 N. J., 97; Harvey v. South Chester, 99 Pa. St., 565; Railroad Co. v. Wright, 68 Ga., 311.

Some of the exemptions in these cases seem very strong and comprehen

word taxes means burdens, charges or impositions put or set upon persons or property for public uses, and this is the definition which Lord Coke gives of the word talliage, 2 Inst., 232; and Lord Holt in Carth., 438, gives the same definition in substance of the word tax. The legislature intended by that exemption to relieve religious and literary institutions from these public burdens, and the same exemption was extended to the real estate of any minister not exceeding in value $1,500. But to pay for the opening of a street in the ratio of the benefit or advantage derived from it is no burden. It is no talliage or

sive, but they were generally applied only to the customary taxes. The following instances may be given: In Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517, an exemption from "any tax or public imposition whatever" was held to apply only to "taxes or impositions levied or imposed for the purpose of revenue," and not to relieve the cemetery from "such charges as are inseparably incident to its location in regard to other property;" e. g., an assessment for paving the street in front. In Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y., 506, where the cemetery was by law exempt from "all public taxes, rates and assessments," it was held not exempt from a paving assessment. Folger, J., says: "We think that the current of authorities in this and some of the sister states runs to this result: that public taxes, rates and assessments are those which are levied and taken out of the property of the person assessed, for some public or general use or purpose, in which he has no direct, immediate and peculiar interest; being exactions from him towards the expense of carrying on the government, either directly and, in general, that of the whole commonwealth, or more mediately and particularly through the intervention of municipal corporations; and that those charges and impositions which are laid directly upon the property in a circumscribed locality to effect some work of local convenience, which in its result is of peculiar advantage and importance to the property, especially assessed for the expense of it, are not public but are local and private so far as this statute is concerned." The same holding as to a sewer assessment. Olive Cemetery Co. v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St., 129. In Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385, the exemption was from “taxes, charges and impesitions;" but it was held not to extend to an assessment for grading and paving a street. In State v. Newark, 27 N. J., 185, the exemption was from "charges and impositions," and the same ruling was had. In Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo., 155, exemption from "taxation of every kind" was held not to extend to an assessment for street improvements. Compare Dunlieth, etc., Bridge Co. v. Dubuque, 32 Ia., 427; Brightman v. Kirner, 22 Wis., 54. In Bridgeport v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 36 Conn., 255, the railroad company paid a tax which, by its charter, was to be "in lieu of all other taxes;" but the company was, nevertheless, held liable to a street assessment.

A covenant by a lessce to pay "the taxes of every name and kind that should be assessed on the premises" will not cover an assessment for bene

tax within the meaning of the exemption, and has no claim upon the public benevolence. Why should not the real estate of a minister as well as of other persons pay for such an improvement in proportion as it is benefited? There is no inconvenience or hardship in it, and the maxim of law that qui sentit commodum debet sentire onus, is perfectly consistent with the interests of science and religion." And yet these assessments are a legal exercise of the taxing power, and can only be justified on that ground.'

Railroad Exemptions. Cases of the exemption of railroad property from taxation furnish many illustrations of the rule of strict construction, but they depend so much upon their special facts that little can be done here beyond making general reference. For the most part these exemptions are in the nature of commutations, the railroad company paying some

fits accruing from street improvements. Beals v. Providence Rubber Co., 11 R. I., 381. See Love v. Howard, 6 R, I., 116; and compare Blake v. Baker, 115 Mass., 188; Cassady v. Hammer, 62 Ia., 359.

revenue.

These cases show that the general inclination has been to confine the application of all such general language to the taxes imposed for ordinary But in Massachusetts it has been held that an assessment for altering a street is a civil imposition within the meaning of a college charter exempting the college property from "all civil impositions, taxes and rates." Harvard College v. Boston, 104 Mass., 470. An exemption from "taxes and assessments" will exempt from local assessments. State v. Newark, 36 N. J., 478; reversing Same Case, 35 N. J., 157. See Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385; Codman v. Johnson, 104 Mass., 491.

In Pennsylvania a general exemption from county and city taxes is held to exempt from special assessments. Olive Cem. Co. v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St., 129; Erie v. First Univ. Church, 105 Pa. St., 278.

1 People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y., 419; Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Patterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J., 385; State v. Fuller, 34 N. J., 227; State v. Newark, 35 N. J., 168, 171; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 242; Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich., 495; Baltimore v. Cemetery Co., 7 Md., 517; Glasgow v. Rouse, 43 Mo., 479, 489; McComb v. Bell, 2 Minn., 256; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa. St., 69; Walsh v. Mathews, 29 Cal., 123; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal., 497; Yeatman v. Crandall, 11 La. An., 220; Matter of Opening of Streets, 20 La. An., 497; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio St., 333; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan., 186.

The case of People v. Brooklyn, in 4 N. Y., is somewhat questioned in Dalrymple v. Milwaukee, 53 Wis., 178, in which "tax certificates" in a limitation law was held to embrace a certificate on a sale for local assessments.

prescribed tax as a consideration for exemption from all other taxation. But the rule of strict construction is nevertheless

1 Construction of a railroad exemption of right of way, etc. Richmond, etc., R. Co. v. Commissioners, 84 N. C., 504. As to whether change in name, etc., of company deprives it of the exemption. Cheraw, etc., R. Co. v. Commissioners, 88 N. C.,,519. An exemption of the road-bed, etc., of a railroad does not preclude the taxation of the franchise. Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Commissioners, 87 N. C., 129. Construction of exemption of transportation companies from local taxation. Railroad Co. v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St., 70; Erie County v. Transportation Co., 87 Pa. St., 434; Northampton County v. Lehigh, etc., Co., 75 Pa. St., 461; Wayne County v. Del. & Hud. Canal Co., 3 Harr., 351.

Exemption of the stock of a railway company from taxation held to include all property necessary and proper for the purpose of laying, building and sustaining the road. Ordinary of Bibb County v. Central R. R. Co., 40 Ga., 646. As to when an exemption from taxation to a railroad company will be held not to apply to an investment in another road, though paid for out of its profits, see Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 87 N. C., 414. As to taxation of a railroad company which has succeeded to the rights of a canal company, see Nichols v. New Haven, etc., Co., 42 Conn., 103.

A specific state tax on a railroad company held to preclude taxation of its property by valuation. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 18 N. J., 11. And see State v. Cook, 32 N. J., 338; Cook v. State, 33 N. J., 474; Douglass v. State, 34 N. J., 485.

A railroad company paid the state a specific tax under a law which provided that it should not 'be assessed with any tax on its lands, buildings or equipments." Held not to preclude municipal taxation. Orange & Alexandria R. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176. Compare this with Richmond v. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 21 Grat., 604, where an exemption from "any charge or tax whatsoever" was held to cover municipal as well as state taxes. See, also, Southern R. R. Co. v. Jackson, 38 Miss., 334; Neustadt v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 31 Ill., 484; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J., 557.

A branch road to procure gravel held liable to ordinary taxation. State v. Hancock, 33 N. J., 315. Compare State v. Hancock, 35 N. J., 537; Atlantic, etc., Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla., 637. A provision in a railroad charter was that "all machines, wagons, vehicles or carriages belonging to the company, with all its works and all the property which may accrue from the same, shall be vested in the respective shareholders forever, in proportion to their respective shares, and shall be deemed personal estate, and exempt from any charge or tax whatever." This makes all the property of the company, owned and used for its purposes, personal estate and exempt. A city in which the company owns property cannot dispute this exemption on the ground of its lessening its power to pay its debts. Richmond v. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 21 Grat., 604. General exemption of the property of a corporation from taxation construed to include the franchise. Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264; Raleigh, etc., Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 269; State v. Berry, 17 N. J., 80; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Hillegas, 18 N. J., 11; Same v. Commissioners of Appeal, 18 N. J., 71. See Nichols v. New Haven, etc., Co., 42 Conn., 103.

applicable, though perhaps with less force than when the exemption is total.

A street railway company exempt from ordinary state taxation will nevertheless be liable to a dog tax. Hendrie v. Kalthoff, 48 Mich., 306. An exemption to a railroad company of "all machines, wagons, vehicles er carriages belonging to the company, with all their works,” etc., held to apply to their real estate as well as to their rolling stock. Richmond v. Richmond & Danville R. R. Co., 21 Grat., 604, citing Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 288. A provision that a certain tax on the capital and debts of railroad companies should "take the place of all other taxes on railroad and horse railroad property and franchises," held to exempt property whether used for railroad purposes or not. Osborn v. N. Y. & N. H. R. R. Co., 40 Conn., 491. And see in general, The Tax Cases, 12 G. & J., 117.

A general exemption of railroad property from taxation has been said to be co-extensive with the right of the railroad company to take property for its use by condemnation, and that the limit of such right is the limit of the exemption. State v. Hancock, 33 N. J., 315; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis., 271; State v. Western, etc., R. Co., 54 Ga., 428; Same . Same, 66 Ga., 563; State v. Baltimore, etc., Co., 48 Md., 49.

If a railroad company is exempt from taxation on its franchises and cap-. ital stock, it is exempt from taxation on gross receipts. State v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 48 Md., 49. If the capital stock of a company is exempted from taxation forever, and its road, fixtures, appurtenances, etc., for only twenty years, the latter may be taxed after the time limited has expired. Railroad Companies v. Gaines, 9 U. S., 697. See Railroad Co. v. Loftin, 98 U. S., 559; Same v. Same, 105 U. S., 258. The act incorporating the Illinois Central Railroad Company provides as follows: "The . . stock, property and asseta belonging to said company shall be listed by the president, secretary, or other officer, with the auditor of state, and an annual tax for state purposes shall be assessed by the auditor upon all the property and assets of every name, kind and description belonging to said corporation. Whenever the taxes levied for state purposes shall exceed three-fourths of one per cent. per annum, such excess shall be deducted from the gross proceeds or income herein required to be paid by said corporation to the state, and the said corporation is hereby exempted from all taxation of every kind except as herein provided for." Held, that this exemption did not apply to a wharf boat and to a steamboat used principally in conveying the passengers and freight from the terminus of the road to the terminus of another railroad, thus making connections. Illinois Central R. R. v. Irvin, 72 Ill., 452. The lands of this company are exempt where it has given a contract for their sale but the contract has been declared forfeited for non-performance. Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Goodwin, 94 Ill., 262. But the exemption ceases when the contract has been performed, though no deed has been given. Champaign Co. v. Reed, 100 Ill., 304.

The effect of the consolidation of railroads upon exemptions or privileges in respect to taxation previously existing in one of the roads has been considered and passed upon in many cases which are so different in their facts