Corporate Stock and Property. An exemption of the corporate stock of a corporation is an exemption of the shares.1 But

as to render useless anything more than a citation in this place. See Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall., 460; Charleston v. Branch, 15 Wall., 470; Bailey v. Railroad Co., 22 Wall., 604; Delaware Railroad Tax Case, 18 Wall., 206; Branch v. Charleston, 92 U. S., 677; Central Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 92 U. S., 665, reversing 54 Ga., 501; Chesapeake, etc., R. Co. v. Virginia, 94 U. S., 718; Railroad Co. v. Maine, 96 U. S., 499; Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S., 359, affirming 55 Ga., 312; Railroad Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S., 711; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S., 465; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 22 Fed. Rep., 81; State v. Railroad Co., 45 Md., 361; Wright v. Southwestern R. R. Co., 64 Ga., 783; State v. Northern Central R. Co., 44 Md., 131; Atlanta, etc., R. Co. v. State, 63 Ga., 483; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S., 244; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush, 43; Quincy Bridge Co. v. Adams County, 88 Ill., 615; State Treasurer v. Auditor-General, 46 Mich., 224; Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla., 637; Central, etc., R. Co. v. State, 54 Ga., 401; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Auditor-General, 53 Mich., 79. According to the principle of those decisions (Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S., 217; Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U. S., 417; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S., 244), the exemption from taxation must be construed to have been the personal privilege of the very corporation specifically referred to, and to have perished with that, unless the express and clear intention of the law requires the exemption to pass as a continuing franchise to a successor. This statutory rule of interpretation is founded upon an obvious public policy, which regards such exemptions as in derogation of the sovereign authority and of common right, not to be extended beyond the exact and express requirement of the grants, construed strictissimi juris.” In this case a railroad exempt from taxation had attempted to transfer its franchises to another corporation, which therefore claimed the exemption and filed its bill to restrain taxation. The bill was dismissed. Memphis R. R. Co. v. Com'rs, 112 U. S., 609.

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An exemption of railroad property from taxation on payment of a percentage on gross earnings was held not to be personal, but to attach to the property, in State v. Nor. Pac. R. Co., 32 Minn., 294, citing State v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 30 Minn., 311; First Div., etc., R. Co. v. Parcher, 14 Minn., 297.

Giving to a municipality the power to tax railroads does not of itself authorize it to tax a railroad running through it, which, by its charter, is exempt. Elizabethtown, etc., R. Co. v. Trustees, 12 Bush, 233.

The statute withdrawing an exemption from taxation may or may not empower municipalities to levy local taxes on the property previously exempt. Compare Bailey v. Magwire, 22 Wall., 215, with Savannah v. Jesup, 106 U. S., 563.

· Railroad Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S., 697; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S., 679; Bank of Georgia v. Savannah, Dudley, 130; Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired., 516; Johnson v. Commonwealth, 7 Dana, 338; State v. Tunis. 23 N. J., 516; Citizens' Bank v. Bouny, 32 La. An., 239; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 22 Fed. Rep., 75. An exemption of the "stock" of a corporation is

exemption is not a franchise, and therefore could not pass as such to a purchaser of the corporate property.1

A general or qualified exemption of the capital stock or property of a corporation is generally held not to extend to property which the corporation may become owner of, but which is not needed for corporate purposes, and is only held or used for the profit of its members. But the question in every case is one of legislative intent, and the cases cited in the margin will abundantly show that the exemptions made are so far diverse in their terms as to raise many troublesome controversies.2

an exemption of its gross income also, it being but an accessory to the stock. State v. Hood, 15 Rich. Law, 177. An exemption of the stock and property of a corporation held to preclude a privilege tax. Grand Gulf, etc., Co. v. Buck, 53 Miss., 246, citing Railroad Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264; Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. Moseley, 52 Miss., 127. Exemption of corporate stock exempts corporate property. Scotland County v. Railroad Co., 65 Mo., 123. Where the property of a corporation and the shares therein are exempt, it cannot be taxed in any way. Worth v. Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 89 N. C., 291. See Worth v. Petersburg, etc., R. Co., 89 N. C., 301.

Where the shares of stock in a corporation were exempt from taxation, the property of the corporation was held to be exempt also. Baltimore v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 6 Gill, 288. See State v. Branin, 23 N. J., 484; State v. Wilson, 52 Md., 638; Frederick County v. National Bank, 48 Md., 117; County Commissioners v. Annapolis, etc., Co., 47 Md., 592.

1 Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S., 217; Railroad Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S., 697. See Railroad Co. v. Hamblen Co., 102 U. S., 273; Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U. S., 417; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S., 244; Memphis R. Co. v. Commissioners, 112 U. S., 609; Alexandria, etc., Co. v. Dist. Col., 1 MacA., 217; Railroad Co. v. Commissioners, 103 U. S., 1; Detroit City S. R. Co. v. Guthard, 51 Mich., 180. Compare Gonzales v. Sullivan, 16 Fla., 791; Atlantic, etc., Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla., 637.

Exemptions may in general be waived, but a corporation cannot waive its exemption as against its bonds previously issued. Hand v. Savannah, etc., R. Co., 17 S. C., 219.

Exemption of unpatented mines held not to extend to their property. Hope Mining Co. v. Kennon, 3 Mont., 35. For a discussion as to whether an exemption is a contract, see International, etc., R. Co. v. Anderson Co., 59 Tex., 654.

2 Where a canal is exempt from taxation the toll house is not taxable. Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Commissioners of Berks Co., 11 Pa. St., 202. Where a railroad is exempt, this will cover its water stations and depots, but not warehouses, coal lots, coal shutes, machine shops, wood yards, etc., which are only necessary to the profits to be made by the company. Railroad Co. v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St., 70. See Lehigh Co. v. Northampton, 8 W. & S., 334; Wayne Co. v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 15 Pa. St., 351, 357,

Invidious exemptions. An exemption, it would seem, in order to be admissible, ought to be either made on the basis of

where the subject is considered at length; N. Y. & Erie R. R. Co. v. Sabin, 26 Pa. St., 242; West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester Co., 30 Pa. St., 232; Lackawana Iron Co. v. Luzerne Co., 42 Pa. St., 424; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Crawford, 29 Wis., 116; Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 34 Wis., 271; Orange, etc., R. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Grat., 176, which does not allow the implied exemptions; Vermont Cent, R. R. Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt., 193; Souhegan Nail, etc., Factory v. McConihe, 7 N. H., 309; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J., 557; State v. Mansfield, 23 N. J., 510; State v. Flavell, 24 N. J., 370; State v. Blundell, 24 N. J., 402; State v. Betts, 24 N. J., 555; State v. Newark, 25 N. J., 315; State v. The Collector of Newark, 26 N. J., 519; State Treasurer v. Somerville & Easton Railroad Co., 28 N. J., 21; State v. Elizabeth, 28 N. J., 103; State v. Leester, 29 N. J., 541; State v. Hancock, 33 N. J., 315; Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo., 550; State v. H. & St. Jo. R. R. Co., 37 Mo., 265; Boston & Me. R. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush., 237; Wilmington R. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall., 264, 268, per Davis, J.; State v. Western R. R. Co., 66 Ga., 563; Railroad Co. v. Wright, 68 Ga., 311.

An exemption from taxation of "property necessarily used in operating the railroad," held to apply to an inn used exclusively by persons arriving and departing on the railroad. Milwaukee, etc., R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Crawford County, 29 Wis., 116. See Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Crawford, 48 Wis., 666; State v. Baltimore, etc., R. Co., 48 Md., 49.

For other cases of special exemption, see State Bank v. Madison, 3 Ind., 43; Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind., 86; Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Conn., 116; State v. Haight, 35 N. J., 40; Rex v. Calder, 1 B. & Ald., 263; State v. Minton, 23 N. J., 529; Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bayless, 2 Gill, 355; State v. Norwich & Worcester R. R. Co., 30 Conn., 290; Armstrong v. Athens Co., 16 Pet., 281.

An exemption of the "road, rolling and live stock" of a street railway company is not an exemption of its lots used for shops, stables, etc. Atlanta St. R. Co. v. Atlanta, 66 Ga., 104.

A provision that the payment of certain fees by life insurance companies shall be "in lieu of all fees and taxes whatever, except that they may be taxed upon their paid-up capital stock the same as other property in the county for county and municipal purposes," will not prevent the taxation of other property owned by companies over and above par value of capital stock. St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 56 Mo., 503.

An exemption of the stock of stockholders in corporations taxable on their capital has no application to stockholders in foreign corporations taxable only on their property in the state. Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S., 511. See Worth v. Ashe Co., 90 N. C., 409. A tax deed given on a sale of exempt lands is void. The question whether the exemption has not been forfeited cannot be raised in an action between individuals based on such a deed. Mackall v. Canal Co., 94 U. S., 308.

Where a bank charter provided that the bank might "purchase and hold a lot of ground for the use of an institution as a place of business," and

contract, in which case the public is supposed to receive a full equivalent therefor, or it ought to be made on some ground of public policy, such as might justify a pension or a donation of the public funds on some general rule of which all who come within it may have the benefit; or such as, at least, makes the public at large interested in encouraging or favoring the class or interest in whose behalf the exemption is made.' It is difficult to conceive of a justifiable exemption law which should select single individuals or corporations, or single articles of property, and, taking them out of the class to which they belong, make them the subject of capricious legislative favor. Such favoritism could make on pretense to equality; it would lack the semblance of legitimate tax legislation. It is certain that municipal bodies or taxing officers have no authority to make such exemptions unless expressly empowered by legislation; and to make any would render invalid the whole tax roll on which the exempted property or person ought to have appeared. The motives of the exemption or the beneficial purposes expected to be accomplished by it can make no difference. No man is obliged to be more generous than the law requires; each may stand strictly on his legal rights, and refuse to submit to any exaction that purposely is made more burdensome to him than the rules of law permit. The legis

also hold such property as might be conveyed to it to secure debts due the institution, and that it should pay to the state an annual tax of one-half of one per cent. on each share of capital stock, "which shall be in lieu of all other taxes," held, that so much of the bank building as was not used for its business was taxable. Bank v. Tennessee, 104 U. S., 493. See De Soto Bank v. Memphis, 6 Baxt., 415.

Where the property of a bank is exempt from taxation, the purchase of land by the bank does not divest existing tax liens. State v. Ewing, 11 Lea, 172.

1 See, on this subject, what is said by Robertson, Ch. J., in Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana, 28, 31. Also Morrison v. Larkin, 26 La. An., 699.

Per Paine, J., in Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis., 242, 263. The case was one of an exemption of a block in the city of Milwaukee on which a hotel was about to be constructed; the common council directing it to be made "in view of the great public benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to the city." Compare Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St., 1; Adams v. Beman, 10 Kan., 37. In Southern Hotel Co. v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo., 134, the exemption of a hotel from taxation for ten years was enforced without question of the right.

In Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 460, a tax list was held void on two grounds: "1. The plain and obvious requisitions of the statute in regard to making

lature is equally powerless if the constitution has prescribed a rule of equality which forbids exemptions. Such a rule, it has been seen, is prescribed by the constitutions of some of the states, which, in terms or by necessary implication, require all private property in the state to be taxed in proportion to its value.2

Accidental omissions from taxation. It has been decided in a number of cases that accidental omissions from taxation, of persons or property that should be taxed, occurring through the negligence or default of officers to whom the execution of the taxing laws is intrusted, would not have the effect to vitiate the whole tax. The reasons for this conclusion are summarized in one of the cases as follows: "The execution of these laws is necessarily intrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes of fact, and errors of judgment. If such errors on the part of those who are attempting in good

up were disregarded, both by important and essential omissions, and by arbitrary additions without even the color of right or legal warrant. If this may be done and still the list be regarded as legal, so might it with equal propriety if the entire real estate in town were omitted or inserted wholly at random without even the form of an appraisal." See State v. Branin, 23 N. J., 484; Hersey v. Supervisors, etc., 16 Wis., 185; Crosby v. Lyon, 37 Cal., 242; Primm v. Belleville, 59 Ill., 142; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis., 454; Smith v. Smith, 19 Wis., 615; People v. McCreery, 34 Cal., 432. Including in the assessment persons who are not liable, and against whom a tax cannot be enforced, does not invalidate the tax against the rest. Inglee v. Bosworth, 5 Pick., 498. See Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass., 547.

An illegal exemption by the common council of one man from a sewer tax will not authorize another to have his tax enjoined where it appears that his payment is not increased by the exemption. Page v. St. Louis, 20 Mo. 136. The principle is that no one is to be heard to complain of that which works no injury to him. See Sanford v. Dick, 15 Conn., 447; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich., 12.

1It is not competent to lay a tax for a general public purpose exclusively on one species of taxable property. Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510. See Sinclair v. Learned, 51 Mich., 335. Or on the property of only one section of the taxable district. Dyar v. Farmington, 70 Me., 515. Compare Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind., 223; Primm v. Belleville, 59 Ill., 142. In assessing by benefits the tax will be void if it appears that exemptions are made of property which should be taxed. Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill, 383, 390. Compare Page v. St. Louis, 20 Mo., 136.

2 See ante, pp. 177, 180, 195. Lands owned by the state were omitted in laying local assessment, though they were expressly made assessable. Held to vitiate the roll. Hassen v. Rochester, 67 N. Y., 528. See Same Case, 65 N. Y., 516. Also Clark v. Dunkirk, 12 Hun, 181.