But this principle has no application to a case where the municipal authorities have assumed to act and to issue negotiable securities without any legislative authority,' nor to a case where the securities on their face show a failure to comply with a statute requirement.2 Securities issued under such circumstances cannot be validated by any act of the officers.

Voting taxes in popular meetings. Many taxes are required to be voted by popular assemblages composed of all the voters of the municipality to be taxed, or, in some instances, of certain classes of the voters, supposed to be specially interested in the tax. It is consistent with the practice of early days that this method shall be adopted in all districts whose population is not too great to render it impracticable; and we find it general in school districts, and to a large extent, also, in towns, villages and even some small cities. And though in the larger districts, like counties, as well as in the cities generally, the authority is most commonly intrusted to representa

petition from tax payers is the foundation of the proceedings, mere technical defects will not be regarded. Scott v. Hansheer, 94 Ind., 1; Jussen v. Board, etc., 95 Ind., 567. As to the necessity of compliance with preliminary conditions, see further, Lamoille V. R. R. Co. v. Fairfield, 51 Vt., 257; Hawkins v. Carroll, 50 Miss., 735.

In Georgia county levies are for most purposes recommended by the grand jury (see Couper v. Rowe, 42 Ga., 229); but for certain necessary purposes the ordinary and county commissioners may lay taxes. See Waller v. Perkins, 52 Ga., 233; Solomon v. Tarver, 52 Ga., 405; Walden v. Lee County, 60 Ga., 296; Arnett v. Griffin, 60 Ga., 349; Spann v. Commissioners, 64 Ga., 498. When a statute requires a petition for a township levy to specify the amount sought to be appropriated, but not to exceed two per centum of the taxable property, a petition which states that it is desired to raise "the sum of $2,800, or a sum equal to two per centum of all taxable property in said township," is good. Williams v. Hall, 65 Ind., 129. See Wilson v. Hamilton County, 68 Ind., 507. Where local overseers authorized to levy a tax with the approval of two justices proceeded without, their action was held void. Kitchen v. Smith, 101 Pa. St., 452.

1 Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S., 120.

2 Bissell v. Spring Valley, 110 U. S., 162.

3 In Illinois it is held that where, by statute, it is provided that it shall not be lawful for a school district to lay a tax for a specified purpose without a vote of the people ordering it, a contract of the district for such a purpose, without a vote, is void, and a tax therefor will be enjoined. School Directors v. Fogleman, 76 Ill., 189; Thatcher v. People, 93 Ill., 240; Watts v. McCleave, 16 Ill. App., 272.

tives of the people, it is sometimes required, even in such cases, that the sense of the people shall be taken upon a proposed corporate debt or tax. The method of doing this must then be to submit distinct propositions, which can be voted upon by ballot. A proposition to levy a tax for county buildings is required by the constitutions of several states to be thus submitted. A vote is void if it is taken before there is legislation authorizing it;1 and it is void, also, if, under the law as it then exists, there is no provision under which a portion of the municipality concerned can take part in the election.2

The repeal of a law under which a municipality was authorized, on a favorable vote of its electors, to lay a tax for a public work, will take away the power, even though the vote has been had, if any corporate act remains to be done to render the vote effectual.3

Submission to Tax Payers Only. In some special cases statutes have provided that the question of contracting a debt or levying a tax shall be submitted to tax payers only. In Minnesota and Louisiana, by reason of special provisions in the state constitutions, it is held not competent thus to restrict the vote; but in other states such submissions have been supported.5

1 Phelps v. Alfred Bank, 13 Wis., 432; Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wis., 378. 2 People v. Supervisors of St. Clair, 11 Mich., 63; Campbell Co. Ct. v. Taylor, 8 Bush, 206.

3 Covington, etc., R. Co. v. Kenton Co. Ct., 12 B. Monr., 144.

Where a board is empowered, after a popular vote, to levy a tax, the board must take positive action to levy it after the vote is had. Iowa R. Land Co. v. Woodbury Co., 39 Ia., 172.

4 Harrington v. Plainview, 27 Minn., 224; Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn., 249; Duperier v. Viator, 35 La. An., 957.

5 See Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.), 171; Gould v. Sterling, 23 N. Y., 439; Duanesburgh v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y., 177; Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt., 178; Venice v. Murdock, 92 U. S., 494.

In Texas it is held that, under a constitutional authority to levy a tax, "if two-thirds of the tax payers of such city or town shall vote for such tax," this does not mean two-thirds of those who vote, but that all must be counted. Fort Worth v. Davis, 57 Tex., 225. But an election having been held, and a favorable result declared, the courts would inquire into the truth of the declaration only in a direct proceeding to contest the election; not in a suit by a tax payer to contest the tax. Dwyer v. Hackworth, 57 Tex., 245.

Where conditions precedent to the levy of a railroad aid tax are not com

Calling Popular Meetings. A popular assemblage for any legal purpose must be regularly convened in such manner as the law may have prescribed. The coming together of a majority of the people of a municipality, or even of all the people, at a time and in a manner not provided for by law, and the voting upon the levy of a tax, will have no legal force or validity whatever. In levying taxes, or in exercising any other function of government, the local community can only act under regular forms and according to customary legal regulations; and one of the conditions invariably is, that the power shall be exercised in an orderly manner, at a meeting assembled after due notice, and conducted according to legal forms, in order that there may be full opportunity for reflection, consultation and deliberation upon the important work to be done. Nothing short of this will insure deliberative meetings, or prevent popular gatherings degenerating into mobs, and thereby defeating the purposes for which they are authorized.

Corporate meetings may be appointed by general statute which names a certain day in the year on which they are to be held. In this manner provision is usually made for annual town and school district meetings. Of such statutes every citizen is required to take notice, and a meeting assembled at the time and place appointed is a lawful meeting. This is probably the rule even where the notice of the meeting, which some statutes require to be given by publication, has been omitted; the notice by publication being provided for, not as

plied with, if the railroad company assigns its right to the tax the assignee takes it subject to all equities. Sully v. Drennan, 113 U. S., 287.

When, as a condition to a tax, a favorable vote of a "majority of the electors of the township" is required, this means a majority of those who vote at the same election, whether voting on the tax proposition or not. Enyart v. Trustees, 25 Ohio St., 618. As to when a vote for city levies is not required in North Carolina, see Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C., 748; Incher v. Raleigh, 75 N. C., 267. And when for school taxes in Arkansas and California, see County Court v. Robinson, 27 Ark., 116; Cole v. Blackwell, 38 Ark., 271; People v. Castro, 39 Cal., 65.

It has been decided in North Carolina that the legislature may authorize less than a majority to vote taxes. State v. Woodside, 9 Ired., 496; Same v. Same, 8 Ired., 104, 106. As to what is a majority vote, see Sanford v. Prentice, 28 Wis., 358.

1 It fixes the hour also unless it is otherwise determined,

an essential step, but only by way of additional precaution, to remind the people of the statutory provision which they are nevertheless bound to take notice of, whether the publication takes place or not. The right to hold the meeting comes from the statute, not from the published notice.1 The same statute will commonly specify the subjects which may be considered at such meetings, and will limit any power to levy taxes which is permitted to be exercised. But to make the statutory notice sufficient, it would be necessary that the place of meeting be fixed, either by the statute itself or by some public act of which the electors were bound to take notice, and that the meeting be held as appointed.2

All special meetings must be regularly called as the statute may have prescribed, for no one is under obligation to pay heed to any but the legal notice, and those who come together in pursuance of any other, do not, for legal purposes, represent the electors. The following are customary regulations: That

1 People v. Cowles, 13 N. Y., 350; People v. Brenham, 3 Cal., 477; State v. Jones, 19 Ind., 356; People v. Hartwell, 12 Mich., 508; Dishon v. Smith, 10 La., 212; State v. Orvis, 20 Wis., 235; State v. Gates, 22 Wis., 203. See Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646.

2 A meeting adjudged to be valid under peculiar circumstances, though not held at the place designated. Wakefield v. Patterson, 25 Kan., 709. But a meeting held out of the state would be a nullity. Marion Co. Com'rs v. Barker, 25 Kan., 258.

3 Thatcher v. People, 93 Ill., 240, and 98 Ill., 632; State v. Railroad Co., 75 Mo., 526. That a tax can only be voted at a meeting legally warned, see Bowen v. King, 34 Vt., 156; People v. Jackson County, 92 Ill., 441; State v. Van Winkle, 25 N. J., 73; McPike v. Pen, 51 Mo., 63; State v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co., 75 Mo., 526; Township Board v. Hastings, 52 Mich., 528. Where the officers fix the place of meeting, it must be referred to in the notice. Hodgkin v. Fry, 33 Ark., 716. As to what is a sufficient warning, see Allen v. Burlington, 45 Vt., 202. A school district tax voted at a meeting not legally called is void. Haines v. School District, 41 Me., 246; Rideout v. School District, 1 Allen, 232; People v. Castro, 39 Cal., 65. A tax voted for a purpose not specified in the notice of special meeting is void. Holt's Appeal, 5 R. I., 603. Construction of particular notices. Williams v. Larkin, 3 Denio, 114; Torrey v. Milbury, 21 Pick., 64. A tax voted at a meeting warned without naming the hour of the meeting in the warrant is void, and it will not justify the collector in an action of trespass against him for taking property to satisfy the tax. Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt., 439. The return of a freeholder upon a warrant from the selectmen for warning a meeting of the inhabitants of a school district, that he had warned them according to law, was held to be conclusive in an action by one of the inhabitants against the assessors for assessing a tax on him which had been

the meeting shall be called by the officers of the municipality, either on their own motion or on the application of a certain number of the voters or freeholders; that it shall be notified either by a warning1 delivered or its contents stated to the

voted at such a meeting. Saxton v. Nimms, 14 Mass., 315. Under a statute which provided that "every town meeting shall be held in pursuance of a warrant under the hands of the selectmen," a warrant signed by one only was held void, and a tax voted at a meeting held pursuant thereto was invalid, and one who had paid it might recover back of the town. Reynolds v. New Salem, 6 Met., 340. As to the effect of fraudulent neglect to give notice or giving misleading notice, see People v. Allen, 6 Wend., 486; People v. Peck, 11 Wend., 604; Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill, 646; Randall v. Smith, 1 Denio, 214; Jewett v. Van Steenburgh, 58 N. Y., 85. That in proving notice of a meeting it is not sufficient to state in the affidavit or return that the notice was given "in accordance with the act," but it should state the facts, see State v. Hardcastle, 26 N. J., 143; Hardcastle v. State, 27 N. J., 551; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H., 182; Tuttle v. Cary, 7 Greenl., 426. Compare People v. Highway Commissioners, 14 Mich., 528. But see Briggs v. Murdock, 13 Pick., 305; Houghton v. Davenport, 23 Pick., 235; Bucksport v. Spofford, 12 Me., 487. Where the defendants in an action of trespass justified as assessors, and showed by the records of the town that they were duly elected at a town meeting legally warned, they were held not bound to go behind the records to show that the proceedings of the warning office had been regular. Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick., 109.

1 Difference between "calling" a meeting and "warning" it. See Stone v. School District, 8 Cush., 592; Rideout v. School District, 1 Allen, 232 And see as to the call, George v. School District, 6 Met., 497.

Where the warrant for a meeting specified as the object "to adopt such measures in relation to their ministerial concerns as may then and there seem expedient, and to act thereon as they see cause," held sufficient to support a vote of money in fulfillment of a contract between the minister and a committee, under which he was to discontinue the pastoral relation. Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick., 97. A warrant "To choose a district committee and to act on other business that may be thought necessary " does not authorize prescribing a method for calling subsequent meetings by the clerk, and therefore a subsequent meeting called by the clerk cannot legally vote taxes. Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick., 543. A warning for a school meeting which stated the object to be "to take into consideration the expediency of raising for the use of schooling for the year ensuing," held sufficient. A vote was taken "to raise one cent and five mills on the dollar" on the list for the year, without naming any time of payment. Held to be sufficiently definite, and the tax would be payable on demand, or within a reasonable time. Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15 Conn., 327. As to the effect of custom on the construction of votes of town meetings, see Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570, 578-9. An article in the warning of a school meeting, to see whether the district will have a school the ensuing winter, and to see what method the district will take to pay the expenses of said school, is sufficient to