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several voters, or by notice published or posted in a manner particularly indicated by the statute; and that the subjects to be considered at the meeting shall be specified in the warning or notice. With all these provisions there must be careful compliance, and the meeting when held must confine itself strictly to the subjects indicated in the notice or warning.1

Voting the Tax. In voting the tax the people will be acting in their political capacity, and their action is to be favorably construed, and not to be overruled or set aside by judicial or any other authority, so long as they keep within the limits of the power bestowed upon them. Technical defects and irregularities should be overlooked, so long as the substance of a good vote sufficiently appears, for the obvious reason that local business is largely and of necessity in the hands of plain people who are unskilled in the technicalities of law and unaccustomed to critical or even accurate use of language. strict construction of their doings would inevitably be mischievous, and would defeat the collection of the revenue in very many cases. It will be found, therefore, that the courts sustain such action wherever sufficient appears to make plain the intent of the voters, provided the intent is warranted by the law. On this principle a town vote, taken under a

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authorize the district to vote a tax upon the grand list to defray the expenses of the school. Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt., 416. A warning to see if a town will vote a tax for the purpose of paying a bounty does not authorize a vote to borrow money for that purpose. Atwood v. Lincoln, 44 Vt., 332. 1 Where it is prescribed that an election to vote taxes shall be held as nearly as practicable in conformity with the general election law, and the general law requires the polls to be kept open from an hour after sunrise till sunset, a tax is void which is voted at an election held only from 1 to 6 o'clock P. M. People v. Scale, 52 Cal., 71. Compare Holland v. Davis, 36 Ark., 446. 2 Irwin v. Lowe, 89 Ind., 540; Taymouth v. Koehler, 35 Mich., 22. "F. moved to levy a tax," etc., "motion prevailed," held to amount to a present levy, the intent being clear. Snell v. Fort Dodge, 45 Ia., 564. And see Shontz v. Evans, 40 Ia., 139. At a school meeting it was voted "that there be an appropriation sufficient to build a house on," etc., and also that “$800 be levied as a school-house tax." Held that a tax was voted to build a schoolhouse at the place named in the first resolution. Benjamin v. Malaka, 50 Ia., 648.

3 See School District v. Garvey, 80 Ky., 159.

4 In New Jersey, towns have no authority to vote money to meet contingencies, but only for specified purposes. A vote for "incidental expenses"

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statute requiring a vote for town purposes to be definite, has been sustained where it specified various purposes particularly, and then in general terms mentioned such other expenses as the town might have to defray for the year. So the vote of "all the law will allow for school purposes" has been held sufficient the law fixing a limit. So a vote "for court-house bonds" may support a tax where the board of supervisors by resolution submitted to the people the question of taxation for a new court-house and prescribed the form of ballot. So a vote to levy a railroad tax of five mills on the assessment will be held sufficient if the particular object of the vote is ascertainable by reference to the remainder of the record. cases are mentioned in the margin.

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is of no validity. State v. Saalman, 37 N. J., 156. A town cannot by vote delegate its authority to levy taxes to a committee. State v. Koster, 38 N. J., 308.

1 Wright v. People, 87 Ill., 582. See the same case for the right of towns in Illinois to tax in advance to create a sinking fund.

2 State v. Sickles, 24 N. J., 125. See further as to the sufficiency of a vote for a school tax, Adams v. Hyde, 27 Vt., 221; West v. Whittaker, 37 Ia., 598. As to voting school taxes in West Virginia, see Wells v. Board of Education, 20 W. Va., 157.

3 Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kossuth Co., 41 Ia., 57. See, further, Tallman v. Cook, 43 Ia., 330; Brandirff v. Harrison Co., 50 Ia., 164; Hurt v. Hamilton, 25 Kan., 76; Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich., 561; Brunswick v. Finney, 54 Ga., 317.

In levying a tax "for judgment fund," or "for city judgment tax," there is no latent ambiguity, and parol evidence is not admissible in a suit brought by a judgment creditor to show that the city council did not intend the tax for the payment of his judgment. Rice v. Walker, 44 Ia., 458. For an exceedingly liberal construction of a vote see Casady v. Lowry, 49 Ia., 523.

Shontz v. Evans, 40 Ia., 139. As to voting a sum in gross or voting a percentage, see Marion Co. Com'rs v. Harvey Co. Com'rs, 26 Kan., 181; Buck v. People, 78 Ill., 560; Reed v. Millikan, 79 Ind., 86.

5 A school tax nominally levied for building purposes, but neither needed nor intended for that purpose, will be enjoined. Conner's Appeal, 103 Pa. St., 356. In New Jersey it is necessary that school district meetings set apart specifically the sums voted by them to the several purposes, and the vote is void if they do not. State v. Padden, 44 N. J., 151. In Connecticut, in a vote of a school district laying a tax for its purposes, it is not essential to its validity that the particular object for which it was laid should be specified. West School District v. Merrills, 12 Conn., 436. A school-house having been erected under invalid votes, the district may lawfully vote a tax to pay for it. Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt., 207. As to such meetings in general, their regularity and powers, see Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick., 97; Perry v.

If a proposition for a tax is voted down by the electors, it may be submitted a second time unless the statute in terms or by clear implication forbids.'

Record of Votes. In every case of the levy of taxes, whether they be voted by representative bodies or by the people, it is requisite that the action which authorizes the levy or determines anything of importance concerning it should appear of record. This is very justly and properly insisted upon in the decisions of courts. "Every essential proceeding in the course of a levy of taxes," it is said in one case, "must appear in some written and permanent form in the record of the bodies authorized to act upon them. Such a thing as a parol levy of taxes is not legally possible under the laws." And in another, in which the action of a convention of town delegates in voting a county tax was in question, "a record of the doings of such a convention is the only evidence to show a county tax duly granted."

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Dover, 12 Pick., 206; Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick., 543; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick., 75; School District v. Atherton, 12 Met., 105; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H., 182; Nelson v. Pierce, 6 N. H., 194; Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H., 206; Lisbon v. Bath, 21 N. H., 319; Schoff v. Gould, 52 N. H., 512; Hunt v. School District, 14 Vt., 300; Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt., 147; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt., 337; Wyley v. Wilson, 44 Vt., 404; Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt., 207; Allen v. Burlington, 45 Vt., 202; Lander v. School District, 33 Me., 239; Jordan v. School District, 38 Me., 164; Belfast, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brooks, 60 Me., 568; State v. Hardcastle, 26 N. J., 143; Hardcastle v. State, 27 N. J., 551. The officers or the inhabitants merely treating the proceedings of an invalid meeting as valid does not make them so. Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt., 147.

A warrant for a town meeting stating the object, among other things, "to raise such sums of money as may be necessary to defray town charges for the ensuing year,” is sufficient to legalize the voting of a tax for interest on town debt. West Hampton v. Searle, 127 Mass., 502. As to the particularity required in stating the purpose of a town tax, see Blodgett v. Holbrook, 39 Vt., 336

1 Supervisors v. Galbraith, 99 U. S., 214.

Town boards in some states are given authority to levy taxes for certain necessary purposes where the people have neglected to vote. See Ryerson v. Laketon, 52 Mich., 510.

2 Campbell, J., in Moser v. White, 29 Mich., 59, 60. See, also, Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich., 504; Doe v. McQuilkin, 8 Blackf., 335; Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wy., 368.

3 Richardson, J., in Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H., 182, 191. See Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H., 268, 277. Fowler, J., says: "The records of taxes were properly received to prove the taxation, which, being matter of record,

The importance of the record is seen in the fact that it is intended by the law not only for evidence but for the only evidence of the action taken; and that when properly made up its recitals are conclusive; evidence to disprove them not being receivable. The records ought to be duly authenticated on their face by the officers who make them, though if they have been kept in the proper custody and are identified beyond question this is probably not essential. If the record is lost or destroyed its contents are subject to parol proof as in other cases, after the necessary preliminary showing has been made.3 But in the absence of evidence that a record ever existed, the fact cannot be made out by presuming it.1

could be proved in no other way, unless the loss of the records were first shown." See, also, Paul v. Linscott, 56 N. II., 347; Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wy., 368.

In Pennsylvania, in Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St., 224, 228, it is said of the record of a school tax, that " where it was defective, it might be explained or supplied by parol testimony. . . The law does not require school directors to keep a record of their proceedings, although it is better that they should do so." Compare Moor v. Newfield, 4 Me., 44.

In Nebraska, if the record fails to show that a school district tax was one authorized to be voted, it cannot be collected; but the mere failure to specify in the tax duplicate all the uses to which the moneys are to be applied is not fatal. Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 4 Neb., 293.

The omission from the record of a levy of the words "on the dollar," after the specification of the number of mills in case of some of the taxes voted, is a mere irregularity and will not vitiate the proceedings. Jefferson Co. Com'rs v. Johnson, 23 Kan., 717.

1 Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick., 397; Bissell v. Jeffersonville, 24 How., 287; Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt., 362; Halleck v. Boylston, 117 Mass., 469, and cases cited.

2 A failure of the officers to sign the record of the board of supervisors does not vitiate a tax levied by it. Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140; People v. Eureka, etc., Co., 48 Cal., 143; Martin v. Cole, 38 Ia., 141. In Kansas it is said if the proper officer has failed to record a levy of a tax, the neglect will not be suffered to defeat it. Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Tontz, 29 Kan., 460.

3 Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H., 268; Quinby v. North American, etc., Co., 2 Heisk., 596; Irwin v. Miller, 23 Ill., 318. As to helping out defective records by proof, see McReynolds v. Longenburger, 75 Pa. St., 13.

4 Hilton v. Bender, 69 N. Y., 75.

Where the statute requires a levy of a special tax to appear of record in a book kept in the office of the city recorder, the tax deed, though prima facie evidence, is defeated by showing that no record was made. Mere memorandum by city recorder is not enough. Hintrager v. Kiene, 62 Ia., 605.

In Michigan, by statute, proof in tax cases that no record can be found is

When taxes are voted by a city council or other local body, a common and very useful provision is one that the yeas and nays shall be entered on the journal, so that no member shall escape his proper share of responsibility for the vote. Such a provision is mandatory,' and if disregarded, a subsequent amendatory resolution passed after a change in the membership of the body will not save it. But without such a provision it would be necessary only that the record should show a quorum present and the proposition adopted.3

Adherence to the Vote. When a proposition is required to be submitted to the people, and is actually submitted and passed upon, any subsequent modification by the officers who are to act upon it is ultra vires and nugatory. Those officers must obey and keep within the vote taken."

Certifying the Vote. A tax, when voted by the people or by a local board, is sometimes required to be certified to some other authority by which final action in the case is then taken. This in several states is the case with school taxes, the votes for which are required to be certified by the proper school district officer to the township or county officers for the levy of

It has been held in several cases that the certificate was jurisdictional, and that a levy without it could not be supported. But if the certificate is given and is sufficient in sub

not proof that it was never made, and the presumption in favor of a tax title may sustain the proceedings. See Upton v. Kennedy, 36 Mich., 215. A highway tax is void where the town records do not show it was voted, and especially where it exceeds the legal limit. Flint, etc., R. Co. v. AuditorGeneral, 41 Mich., 635.

1 Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich., 104. Compare Tobin v. Morgan, 70 Pa. St., 229.

2 Pontiac v. Axford, 49 Mich., 69.

3 Where the record stated that A., B., C. and others, justices of the county court, were present, held not enough, as it did not affirmatively appear that a majority was present. Dudley's Ex'rs v. Oliver, 5 Ired., 227. Compare State v. McIntoch, 7 Ired., 68; Insurance Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen, 217; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140.

4 Platteville v. Galena, etc., R. Co., 43 Wis., 493; Hodgman v. Railroad Co., 20 Minn., 48; State v. Daviess Co., 64 Mo., 30.

5 Sullivan v. Walton, 20 Fla., 552.

6 Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Saunders Co., 16 Neb., 123. So if given, but not complying in its essentials with the statute. State v. Duryea, 40 N. J., 266. The county authorities cannot levy for one year a school tax that

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