capital are exempt from taxation by laws of limited application.1 In assessing the shares it is not necessary to make a deduction in respect to capital invested in national securities. The state may tax the shares at the place where the bank is located without regard to the residence of shareholders, and may require the tax to be paid by the bank.

2

3

Assessment of real property. Tax laws in general give very careful and specific directions for the assessment of real property, and in doing so have in view for the most part the interests of those who are responsible for or may be concerned in their taxation. Very simple proceedings might suffice to enable the state to collect its revenues from lands if only its own interests were to be regarded; but as rights in any particular parcel of land are liable to be diversified and numerous, and as the duty to pay the tax, if neglected by the party primarily liable, is likely to fall secondarily on others who may be in ignorance of the neglect, a government careful of the interests of its individual citizens will not fail to make such provisions as will be reasonably certain to notify every party concerned of any default, and give him ample opportunity to protect his interest from sacrifice or forfeiture. The duty to do this becomes particularly manifest when it is remembered that real estate when sold for taxes seldom brings more than a

1 Everitt's Appeal, 71 Pa. St., 216. See Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S., 19; Albany, etc., Bank v. Maher, 19 Blatch., 175.

2 First Nat. Bank v. Concord, 59 N. H., 75; First Nat. Bank v. Peterborough, 56 N. H., 38; First Nat. Bank v. Farwell, 10 Biss., 270; S. C., 7 Fed. Rep., 518; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Miller, 19 Fed. Rep., 372.

3 Williams v. Weaver, 75 N. Y., 30: McIver v. Robinson, 53 Ala., 456; Kyle v. Fayetteville, 75 N. C., 445. See Buie v. Fayetteville, 79 N. C., 267. 4 National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall., 353; Lionberger v. Rowse, 9 Wall., 468.

That national banks may be compelled to make disclosure of property, etc., as in other cases, see First Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 6 Fed. Rep., 737; Waite v. Dowley, 94 U. S., 527. That the ordinary process for collection may be applied to them, see National Bank v. Morrison, 1 McCrary, 204. And see, in general, Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 19 Wall., 490; Providence Inst. v. Boston, 101 Mass., 575; First Nat. Bank v. St. Joseph, 46 Mich., 526; Charleston v. National Bank, 5 Rich. (N. S.), 103; People v. Moore, 1 Idaho, 504.

The property of a national bank continues exempt after insolvency as before. Rosenblatt v. Johnston, 104 U. S., 462.

small fraction of its real value. It may be assumed, therefore, as the general fact, that the directions given are intended to be carefully observed.

General Course. It is not customary to assess the owners of land for a sum in gross, estimated to be the value of the real estate owned or possessed by them; but the land is described and valued in parcels, in order that, if the owner fails to make payment, the land itself may be proceeded against. No one can be taxed in respect to his ownership of land unless the land itself is within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority; his personal liability depending on the right to reach and tax the land. Government lands, we have seen, are not taxable at all; but when they are sold by executory contract it is customary to provide for the taxation of the purchaser's interest-sometimes as real and sometimes as personal estate. In other cases of sales by executory contract the vendor is owner until the vendee becomes entitled to a conveyance, and if the law requires an assessment to the owner, it is complied with by assessing the vendor.2

Classification of Lands. Among the most useful of the provisions for the protection of persons taxed is one that unoccupied, unseated or non-resident lands, as they are variously designated, shall be assessed on a different list from the occupied or seated lands; or if not on a different list, then on a different part of the same list. The purpose is that the two distinct classes of land shall be assessed separately, so that the owner or other person interested in any parcel, knowing its character as occupied or unoccupied, shall know exactly where to look for his assessment, and shall thus be more certain to dis

1 See Prescott v. Beebee, 17 Kan., 320; Bentley v. Barton, 41 Ohio St., 410. As to assessment of Indian lands after the Indian title is extinguished by treaty, see Fellows v. Denniston, 23 N. Y., 420; State v. Miami County, 63 Ind., 497; Franklin County v. Pennock, 18 Kan., 579; Kansas Indians, 5 Wall., 737; Peck v. Miami Co., 4 Dill., 370; Pennock v. Commissioners, 103 U. S., 44.

2Sherwin v. Mudge, 127 Mass., 547. Property bought with borrowed money is to be considered the property of the purchaser though the lender holds a lien upon it for the money. Lyle v. Jacques, 101 Ill., 644.

In Iowa, if a vendee by contract has paid a part, he should be taxed for the land and the vendor for the money due. Meyer v. Dubuque Co., 49 Ia., 193. Compare Willey v. Koons, 49 Ind., 272; Henderson v. State, 53 Ind., 60

cover any claim made upon him by reason of his interest and be enabled to discharge it before anything shall be lost to him in consequence of a default.1

The terms "seated," "resident" and "occupied" lands may not convey precisely the same idea as they are employed in the several state statutes, and probably do not. They will in general, however, be found sufficiently explained in the several statutes. The general idea of the statutes classifying lands for taxation is, that those which are cultivated or occupied, so that some one within the taxing district is personally in charge and therefore liable for taxation in respect to them, shall be taxed in a list by themselves. There are very essential distinctions, however, to be observed in considering the several statutes. The custom in most of the states is that, when the

1 See Burd v. Ramsey, 9 S. & R., 109; Ritter v. Worth, 58 N. Y., 627. 2 As to what are to be regarded as "seated" lands in Pennsylvania, see Wilson v. Waterson, 4 Pa. St., 214, in which it is held that lands having a house upon them and some improvements, though not occupied, are not to be regarded as unseated without unequivocal marks of the abandonment of the improvement, and its permissive return to its natural state. The improvement of part of a tract makes the whole seated, though divided by a county line. Ellis v. Hall, 19 Pa. St., 292. Where a number of unoccupied tracts are to be used in the supplying a mill with timber to cut, this does not make them seated. Heft v. Gephart, 65 Pa. St., 510. Lands are seated when occupied, even though the occupant is an intruder. Campbell v. Wilson, 1 Watts, 503; Larimer u. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133. And the occupation and cultivation of part of a warrant fixes the character of the whole. Biddle v. Noble, 68 Pa. St., 279. Residence without cultivation, or cultivation without residence, will preclude land being sold as unseated. George v. Messenger, 73 Pa. St., 418. As to what will constitute seated lands in general, see Campbell v. Wilson, 1 Watts, 503; Sheafer v. McCabe, 2 Watts, 421; Fish v. Brown, 5 Watts, 441; Kennedy v. Dailey, 6 Watts, 269; Wallace v. Scott, 7 W. & S., 247; Larimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133; Mitchell v. Bratton, 5 W. & S., 451; Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Pa. St., 169; Jackson v. Sassaman, 29 Pa. St., 106; Hathaway v. Ellsbree, 54 Pa. St., 498; Lackawana Iron, etc., Co. v. Fales, 55 Pa. St., 90; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St., 374; Green v. Watson, 34 Pa. St., 332; Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Pa. St., 444; George v. Messenger, 73 Pa. St., 418; Watson v. Davidson, 87 Pa. St., 270; Jackson v. Stoetzel, 87 Pa. St., 302; Arthurs v. King, 95 Pa. St., 167; Earley v. Euwer, 102 Pa. St., 338.

Whether land is to be taxed as scated or unseated depends altogether upon the appearance it may present to the eye of the assessor. If there appears

to be such permanent improvement as indicates a personal responsibility for taxes, the land should be returned and taxed as seated. Occasional occupation by miners and the digging of coal by trespassers do not make it seated. Stoetzel v. Jackson, 105 Pa. St., 562.

periodical assessments are made, the lands are examined or their condition inquired into, and they are classed irrespective of any former assessment; while in Pennsylvania the rule is that lands once seated are presumed to continue so, and nothing but an unequivocal abandonment by the occupier, without the intention of returning, will warrant their being changed to the unseated list. And the abandonment of part of an entire tract while the occupation of the remainder continues will not prevent the whole being regarded as seated. So, again, the general rule is that while the owner or occupant is taxed personally for the land he owns or occupies, the tax is also made a lien upon the land, which will be sold for its satisfaction in case the tax is not collected of the person. In Pennsylvania, on the other hand, while the tax on seated lands is a personal charge, that on the unseated lands alone has until recently been made a lien to be enforced by sale. And even since the recent law which makes seated lands liable to sale for taxes, the proceedings are different, personal notice to the owner being required.3

Under all the statutes, however, the requirement of a classification of lands as seated and unseated, resident or non-resident, etc., is probably to be considered imperative. It has been so held in Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New

5

1 Harbeson v. Jack, 2 Watts, 124; Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Pa. St., 169; Negley v. Breading, 32 Pa. St., 325; Arthurs v. Smathers, 38 Pa. St., 40, 44; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St., 374.

?Patterson v. Blackmore, 9 Watts, 104. See Ellis v. Hall, 19 Pa. St., 292. See Broughton v. Journeay, 51 Pa. St., 31; Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 Me., 377.

4

* Possibly Connecticut is an exception. See Adams v. Seymour, 30 Conn., 402.

5 The law required improved lands to be assessed to the owner. Held, that an assessment to person unknown was void. Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me., 359; Barker v. Hesseltine, 27 Me., 354. To same effect are Carmichael v. Aiken, 13 La. An., 205; Bidleman v. Brooks, 28 Cal., 72. An assessment of a whole lot to a person, and a sale of the whole, is void if a part was never owned or possessed by him. Barker v. Blake, 36 Me., 433; Greene v. Walker, 68 Me., 311. For a case of resident land assessed as non-resident, see Lunt v. Wormell, 19 Me., 100.

If non-resident land is given in by a resident agent for assessment to him as agent it may be so assessed. Williams v. Young, 51 Ga., 463.

6 Rising v. Granger, 1 Mass., 48; Desmond v. Babbitt, 117 Mass., 233.

7 Bowles v. Clough, 55 N. H., 389; Perley v. Stanley, 59 N. H., 587; Thompson v. Ela, 60 N. H., 562.

2

York, Pennsylvania, and in so many other states that any question that might once have been an open one must now be regarded as finally settled.'

Assessment of Occupied Lands. There is a general concurrence of authority that, when the statute provides for the assessment of occupied or seated lands to the owner or occupant, the requirement that it shall be so assessed is imperative.*

1 Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N. Y., 281; Crooke v. Andrews, 40 N. Y., Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y., 486; Ritter v. Worth, 58 N. Y., 627.

547;

2 Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Pa. St., 169. As to the effect of consent to land being assessed in the wrong list, see Larimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133; Milliken v. Benedict, supra; Negley v. Breading, 32 Pa. St., 325; Hathaway v. Ellsbree, 54 Pa. St., 498. And as to erroneous listing in general, see Commercial Bank v. Woodside, 14 Pa. St., 404; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St., 374. Lands assessed as seated cannot be transferred to the unseated list without notice to the owner where practicable. Larimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S., 133; Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Pa. St., 169; Commercial Bank v. Woodside, 14 Pa. St., 404; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St., 374; Bechdle v. Lingle, 66 Pa. St., 38. But if a parcel has been on no list for several years, the owner has no such right. Bechdle v. Lingle, supra. Nor generally, it seems, in case of abandonment. Laird v. Hiester, 24 Pa. St., 452.

3 See Messenger v. Germain, 6 Ill., 631; Green v. Craft, 28 Miss., 70; Raynor v. Lee, 20 Mich., 384; Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 29 Wis., 51, 56; Washington v. Pratt, 8 Wheat., 681. Where the law requires the land to be assessed to the patentee when the owner is unknown, any other assessment is invalid. Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Tex., 408; Thompson v. Ela, 60 N. H., 562.

Putting to an assessment of non-resident lands the name of a former owner, held immaterial. Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick., 418. See Miller v. Hale, 26 Pa. St., 432; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. St., 440; O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal., 287; O'Neal v. Virginia, etc., Co., 18 Md., 1. In Louisiana it is held that vacant property may be validly assessed in the name of its deceased non-resident owner if it still belongs to his estate. Sewell . Watson, 31 La. An., 589. But if it never belonged to him the assessment is void. Fix v. Succession of Dierker, 30 La. An., 175. If one is owner when proceedings are commenced, an assessment to him is not rendered invalid by a change in ownership, before they are confirmed, of which the assessors have no notice. Morange v. Mix, 44 N. Y., 315.

It need not be so assessed unless the statute requires it. Thompson v. Carroll's Lessee, 22 How., 422; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall., 210, 219. The rule has been applied with great strictness in Wisconsin in holding that an assessment of the wife's separate estate to the husband, he living with her upon it, was void under a statute requiring lands to be assessed to the owner or occupant. Hamilton v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis., 496. Listing of land belonging to an estate to "widow and heirs" of the deceased person held sufficient. Wheeler v. Anthony, 10 Wend., 346. But a listing to the