satisfaction of a jury by a description that would be extremely likely to mislead the owner himself; the jury having their attention called to the errors or defects which exist, and the owner not being aware that there are any, but having a right to assume, until notified to the contrary, that all descriptions. in the list have accurate application to some particular pieces of property, and fit some others when not appearing to fit his. A more satisfactory rule would seem to be that "the designation of the land will be sufficient if it afford the means of identification, and do not positively mislead the owner," or be calculated to mislead him. It is thus expressed in a New York case: "An assessment of non-resident land is fatally defective and void if it contain such a falsity in the designation or description of the parcel assessed as might probably mislead the owner and prevent him from ascertaining by the notices that his land was to be sold or redeemed. Such a mis

land. When the law requires it to be assessed to the owner, it must be so assessed, as preceding cases show.

An assessment to N. of "land, forty acres in road district No. 21, in the township of Woodbridge," is good where N. owns no other land in the district. State v. Woodbridge, 42 N. J., 401. Where land is assessed as six acres in the corner of a tract, it will be taken to be six acres in square form, and the assessment held good. Immegart v. Gorgas, 41 Ia., 439. Land assessed as the east end of a block, etc., held to be the east half. Chiniquy v. People, 78 Ill., 570. Where the statute provides that for the assessment of railroad property the assessment shall be sufficient "by metes and bounds or other description sufficient for redemption," an assessment of the roadway is sufficient which gives the termini, courses and distances. San Francisco, etc., R. Co. v. State Board, 60 Cal., 12.

When a part of a city plat has been vacated, the assessment can no longer be made of the land as city lots. Stebbins v. Challiss, 15 Kan., 55. Where a plat has been made by some one besides the owner, an assessment by it is bad. Gage v. Rumsey, 73 Ill., 473.

1 Thompson, J., in Woodside v. Wilson, 32 Pa. St., 52, 55.

2 See Curtis v. Supervisors of Brown County, 22 Wis., 167, in which it is denied that a description sufficient as between parties will be sufficient always in an assessment, or that particulars in it which are erroneous can be rejected as surplusage. To the same point is Dike v. Lewis, 4 Denio, 237. See, also, Orton v. Noonan, 23 Wis., 102, in which it is said words cannot be supplied by intendment. It is to be observed of this case, however, that the words it was proposed to supply would have wholly changed the apparent meaning. A description is said to be sufficient if by it a competent person could identify the land. Sloan v. Sewell, 81 Ind., 180. See Oldtown v. Blake, 74 Me., 280; Law v. People, 80 Ill., 268; Fowler v. People, 93 Ill.,

take or falsity defeats one of the obvious and just purposes of the statute that of giving to the owner an opportunity of preventing the sale by paying the tax." Under this rule each case must depend so much upon its own special facts that little service could be done by giving the decided cases in detail here. Several are given in the note and others are referred to.2

1 Ruggles, J., in Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y., 66, 71. See, also, Lafferty v. Byers, 5 Ohio, 458; Turney v. Yeoman, 16 Ohio, 24; Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush., 260; Amberg v. Rogers, 9 Mich., 332; Green v. Lunt, 58 Me., 15; State v. Union, 36 N. J., 309. In Hill v. Mowry, 6 Gray, 551, the rule is laid down that a tax deed, taking effect only as the execution of a statute power, should be construed with some strictness, so as to enable the grantee to identify the land, and to enable the owner to redeem it. And it was held that a deed which bounds the land correctly on two sides bounds it on the third by land on which, in fact, it is bounded in part only, and on the fourth by land from which it is separated by the land of a third person, is void for uncertainty.

Where the only description was "William Bush's heirs, 2560 acres," ," held insufficient. Bush v. Williams, Cooke (Tenn.), 274. So where the description was "Moses Buffum, house and land," Buffum not being the occupant. Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush., 260. Compare Coombs v. Warren, 34 Me., 89. So where the description is part of a lot without showing how much, or giving boundaries. Detroit Young Men's Society v. Detroit, 3 Mich., 172; Massie v. Long, 2 Ohio, 287, 289; Green v. Lunt, 58 Me., 518; Naltner v. Blake, 56 Ind., 127; Roberts v. Deeds, 57 Ia., 320; Cogburn v. Hunt, 54 Miss. 675; Yandell v. Pugh, 53 Miss., 295; State v. Elizabeth, 39 N. J., 689. But a description, as "that part of private claim 61, lying east of the north branch of the river Ecorse," in a township named, is sufficient. Gilman v. Riopelle, 18 Mich., 145. Error in stating the quantity of the land, however great, will not vitiate. Brown v. Hays, 66 Pa. St., 229; Williston v. Colkett, 9 Pa. St., 38; Gilman v. Riopelle, 18 Mich., 145. Omission of the number of a town lot, or the name of the owner, is fatal where the law requires them to be given. Thacher, Ex parte, 3 Sneed, 344. Description in the notice of tax sale, as "Tract No. 8, S. D., advertised, 4197," held wholly insufficient. Griffin v. Crippen, 60 Me., 270. Compare Glass v. Gilbert, 58 Pa. St., 266. 290. An assessment as definite as the grant under which the land is held is sufficient. People v. Crockett, 33 Cal., 150. A description, “one hundred varas square," with definite boundaries on three sides, is sufficient. Garwood v. Hastings, 38 Cal., 216. An assessment of a large tract of land, which describes it by metes and bounds, and then excepts from the tract parcels of the same which have been previously conveyed, but does not describe the excepted portions by metes and bounds, nor in any manner but by a reference to recorded deeds, is void on its face. People v. Cone, 48 Cal., 427: People v. Hyde, 48 Cal., 431. See, also, People v. Hancock, 48 Cal., 631. A description of the land by well understood abbreviations is sufficient, thus: "E. 4, S. W. 1, Sec. 24, Town 3 South, of Range 7 West," etc. Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich., 486, 503. See, also, Long v. Long, 2 Blackf., 293; Jordan,

Valuation. Where the grouping of lands for assessinent is inadmissible, the valuation of several parcels in gross is equally so. No useful purpose could be subserved by separate descriptions if the parcels, though separately described, were to be grouped in valuation.1

It is elsewhere shown that valuation is in its nature a judicial act, and the assessors in making it are entitled to the

etc., Association, etc., v. Wagoner, 33 Ind., 50; Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437; Olcott v. State, 5 Gilm., 481; Blakely v. Bestor, 13 Ill., 714; Stevens v. Hollister, 18 Vt., 294; Goodell v. Harrison, 2 Mo., 124; Hodgdon v. Burleigh, 4 Fed. Rep., 111; Paris v. Lewis, 85 Ill., 597; Buck v. People, 78 Ill., 560; State v. Newark, 36 N. J., 288. Further, as to what is a sufficient description, the following cases are instructive: Ronkendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet., 349; Lafferty's Lessee v. Byers, 5 Ohio, 458; Trevor v. Emerick, 6 Ohio, 391; Larrabee v. Hodgkins, 58 Me., 412; Griffin v. Crippin, 60 Me., 270; Orono v. Veazie, 61 Me., 431; Currie v. Fowler, 5 J. J. Marsh., 145; Le Fever v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 586; Wright v. Dunham, 13 Mich., 414; Atwell v. Zeluff, 26 Mich., 118, 121; Jaques v. Kopman, 6 La. An., 542; Woolfolk v. Fonbene, 15 La. An., 15; Latchman v. Clark, 14 Cal., 131; High v. Shoemaker, 22 Cal., 363; Bosworth v. Danzien, 25 Cal., 296; People v. Flint, 39 Cal., 670; Ainsworth v. Dean, 21 N. H., 400; Bidwell v. Webb, 10 Minn., 59; Bidwell v. Coleman, 11 Minn., 78; St. Peter's Church v. Scott County, 12 Minn., 395; Shaw v. Orr, 30 Iowa, 355; Jefferson Co. Com'rs v. Johnson, 22 Kan., 717; Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala., 529; Anderson v. Hancock, 61 Cal., 88; Sullivan v. Davis, 29 Kan., 28; Person v. O'Neal, 32 La. An., 228; Kelley v. Herrall, 20 Fed. Rep., 364; Bowers v. Chambers, 53 Miss., 259; Selden v. Coffee, 55 Miss., 41; Johnson v. Lumber Co., 52 Wis., 458; Vaughan v. Swayzie, 56 Miss., 704; Scheiber v. Kaehler, 49 Wis., 261; Whiting v. Gunderson, 31 Wis., 359; Dolan v. Trelevan, 31 Wis., 359; Jenkins v. Scharpf, 27 Wis., 472; Jefferson City v. Whipple, 71 Mo., 519; Keith v. Hayden, 26 Minn., 212; Bowyer v. O'Donnall, 29 Minn., 135; McMillan v. Wehle, 55 Wis., 685; Judd v. Anderson, 51 Ia., 345; Jenkins v. McTigue, 22 Fed. Rep., 148; People v. Mahoney, 55 Cal., 286; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich., 28; Taylor v. Youngs, 48 Mich., 268; Law v. People, 84 Ill., 142; People v. Stahl, 101 Ill., 346; Blair, etc., Co. v. Scott, 44 Ia., 143; Bingham v. Smith, 64 Me., 450; Whitmore v. Learned, 70 Me., 276; Thibodaux v. Kellar, 29 La. An., 508; Hannah v. Collins, 94 Ind., 201; Dane v. Glennon, 72 Ala., 160; People v. Chicago, etc., Co., 96 Ill., 369; Sanford v. People, 102 Ill., 374; Campbell v. Packard, 61 Wis., 88; Stewart v. Coulter, 31 Minn., 385.

1 People v. Mining Co., 39 Cal., 511; People v. Hollister, 47 Cal., 408. In this last case there was a separate valuation of each parcel in the column with the descriptions, but not carried into the appropriate column. "Value," it is said, "can only be determined by the ordinary selling and buying prices, for cash, at the time." Caruthers, J., in Brown v. Greer, 3 Head, 695, 697, This is a criterion which, it is safe to say, is very seldom applied.

2 See chapter XXIV.

customary protection which the law accords to officers exercising corresponding judicial functions. The party injured by their errors, committed without fraud or malice, has in general only such remedy as the statute may afford him. And in no proceeding is one to be heard who complains of a valuation which, however erroneous it may be, charges him only with a just proportion of the tax. If his own assessment is not out of proportion, as compared with valuations generally on the same roll, it is immaterial that some one neighbor is assessed too little and another too much. This is a rule which has been applied when assessors are found to have systematically undervalued all the property of their district, though the statute in most positive terms required an assessment at the actual value. The wrong of a disregard of the statute in such a case is a public and not an individual wrong.2

The legislature cannot make the valuations of property for taxation. The nearest approach to the exercise of such an authority by the legislature is where it definitely fixes the basis for a local assessment, by the acre, by frontage, etc. But in such cases the considerations which affect benefits are matters of notoriety, and may well be taken notice of by the legislative body when prescribing a rule which, at least in the particular case, is to operate generally and with uniformity. In a majority of the states the rule prescribed by the statutes is that lands and other real estate shall be valued as such, irrespective of the separate estates that individuals may have in them. Under such a practice, he who, for the time being,

1 Chicopee v. County Commissioners, 16 Gray, 38. See Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Livingston Co., 68 Ill., 458; Pelton v. National Bank, 101 U. S., 143: Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S., 153; Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S., 689As to actual value, and how it is to be got at, see State v. Ferris, 23 N. J., 546; State v. Randolph, 25 N. J., 427; Oswego Starch Factory v. Dolloway, 21 N. Y., 449; People v. Dolan, 36 N. Y., 59, 62; People v. Ferguson, 38 N. Y., 89; People v. Barker, 48 N. Y., 70.

2 Moss v. Cummings, 44 Mich., 359. See Monroe v. New Canaan, 43 Conn., 309; Gamble v East Saginaw, 43 Mich., 368; Blanchard v. Powers, 42 Mich., 619.

In Wisconsin it has been held that assessments intentionally made at onethird the real value are void. Hersey v. Supervisors, 37 Wis., 75; Marsh v. Supervisors, 42 Wis., 502; Goff v. Supervisors, 43 Wis., 55; Schettler v. Fort Howard, 43 Wis., 48; Salscheider v. Fort Howard, 45 Wis., 519. 3 People v. Hastings, 39 Cal., 449.

enjoys the possession of the real estate and the pernancy of the profits may be charged with the tax. The practice, however, has not been universal; in some states, and particularly in some special proceedings, the statutes have required separate interests to be separately assessed. When the whole is assessed as an entirety, provision is usually made under which the respective owners may pay their proportions of the tax, and have their respective interests discharged of the lien.3

1 Turner v. Smith, 14 Wall., 553; Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gilm., 437, 449; Parker v. Baxter, 2 Gray, 185; Willard v. Blount, 11 Ired., 624; Brown v. Austin, 41 Vt., 262; Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark., 331; Briscoe v. Coulter, 18 Ark., 423; Blackwell on Tax Titles, ch. 38 and notes.

2 Separate interests in Pennsylvania assessed and sold separately. See McLaughlin v. Kain, 45 Pa. St., 113. As to Mississippi, see Dunn v. Winston, 31 Miss., 135. As to Kentucky, see Oldhams v. Jones, 5 B. Monr., 464. In the case of special assessments it has been more usual to assess distinct interests separately, sometimes, however, providing for a sale of the fee. See Jackson v. Babcock, 16 N. Y., 246; Matter of De Graw St., 18 Wend., 568. And see, further, Williams v. Brace, 5 Conn., 190. The case of Jackson v. Babcock, 16 N. Y., 246, was this: The statute provided for proceedings in court under which, in street-opening cases, where there were distinct interests in lands which were subject to a lien for the assessment, one owner of an interest might proceed in the supreme court against all the others, including unknown owners, for an equitable apportionment of the assessment, and, after advertising for the appearance of the unknown owners, obtain an order for an absolute sale of the fee; the proceeds to be applied, so far as necessary, to the discharge of the assessment. This statute was held to be valid, and effectual to cut off all contingent as well as vested rights.

3 There are some cases in which it has been held that the omission of the dollar mark as a prefix to the figures which represent the value of the property in the assessment roll will render the assessment nugatory; there being nothing in its absence by which to determine what the figures indicate. Braley v. Seaman, 30 Cal., 610; People v. Savings Union, 31 Cal., 132. And see People v. Empire, etc. Co., 33 Cal., 171; Tilton v. Railroad Co., 3 Sawy., 22. The contrary has been held in New Hampshire. Cahoon v. Coe, 52 N. H., 518, 524. And see State v. Eureka, etc., Co., 8 Nev., 15; Chickering v. Faile, 38 Ill., 342; Elston v. Kennicott, 46 Ill., 187, 202; Sawyer v. Gleason, 59 N. H., 140; Jenkins v. McTigue, 22 Fed. Rep., 148; Bird v. Perkins, 35 Mich., 28; First National Bank v. St. Joseph, 42 Mich., 526; New Orleans v. Day, 29 La. An., 416; People v. Owyhee Co., 1 Idaho, 420.

In Illinois it is decided that a judgment for taxes in which the sums are expressed in figures without a dollar mark prefixed is void for want of certainty. Lawrence v. Fast, 20 Ill., 338; Lane v. Bommelmann, 21 Ill., 143; Epinger v. Kirby, 23 Ill., 521, 523; Dukes v. Rowley, 24 Ill., 210; Chickering v. Faile, 38 Ill., 342; Cook v. Norton, 43 Ill., 391; Potwin v. Oades, 45