As to the methods of arriving at the value, little is to be said. There are no definite rules on the subject unless the statute has prescribed them, but the assessor is to value the property according to his best judgment and with honest purpose.1

Authentication of the Assessment. The result of the action of the assessors is embodied in an assessment roll or list. The statutes provide how this shall be authenticated, and as the purpose is to supply record evidence that in the performance of their duty the assessors have obeyed the law, compliance with the statutory direction has generally been held imperative. Where, therefore, the statute required the roll to be signed, and a certificate to be attached, the signing of the certificate was held not to dispense with a signing of the roll, and

Ill., 366; Elston v. Kennicott, 46 Ill., 187; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 53 Ill., 80. These decisions were followed in Woods v. Freeman, 1 Wall., 398; Randolph v. Metcalf, 6 Cold., 400, 408; Coombs v. O'Neal, 1 MacA., 405. The contrary was held in Gutzwiller v. Crowe, 32 Minn., 70, distinguishing Tidd v. Rines, 26 Minn., 201.

1 An arbitrary valuation of lands according to locality, and without actual view, is void. Hersey v. Supervisors, 37 Wis., 75. See Woodman v. AuditorGeneral, 52 Mich., 28. As to valuing land on navigable waters, see State v. Carragan, 37 N. J., 264; New York, etc., R. Co. v. Yard, 43 N. J., 632. In making valuations assessors have no business to be influenced by petitions. Attorney-General v. Supervisors, 42 Mich., 72. In valuing land which is to be assessed as one parcel, the estimate should be of the whole, and not of portions separately and then added together. State v. Abbott, 42 N. J., 111. See Robertson v. Anderson, 57 Ia., 165. When property subject to stamp duty is to be valued at the purchase price, the cost of stamp is to be included in the price. Lehman v. Grantham, 78 N. C.. 115. See further, People v. Hastings, 29 Cal., 449; Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. State, 60 N. H., 133; Beeson v. Johns, 59 Ia., 166.

A city may constitutionally be empowered to adopt for city purposes the appraisement of real estate made for general taxation, or to cause a new appraisal to be made. Jones v. Columbus, 62 Ind., 421. When the general appraisement is adopted, the council has no power to make changes by way of equalizing. Ibid. As to alterations of valuations on the roll, see People v. S. & C. R. Co., 49 Cal., 414.

2 See Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich., 24; Grand Rapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich., 367; Crooks v. Whitford, 47 Mich., 283; McClure v. Warner, 16 Neb., 447; McNish v. Perrine, 14 Neb., 582; Hallo v. Helmer, 12 Neb., 87; Lyman v. Anderson, 9 Neb., 367; Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb., 236; Griggs v. St. Croix Co., 20 Fed. Rep., 341; Tunbridge v. Smith, 48 Vt., 648.

413 if that was not signed, no proceedings could be taken upon it.' The failure to attach the certificate or other statutory verification would be still more plainly a failure to comply with the statute in its essentials, the verification in express terms being, more obviously, a matter of substance than the signing." If the statute prescribes a form for the verification, the form should be observed in all essential particulars; the assessor cannot, at discretion, substitute something else. Where, therefore, the statute required the assessors to certify that they had assessed the property at its true value, according to the best of their knowledge and belief, a certificate that they had assessed it "according to the usual way of assessing" was declared void. The same was held of a certificate that the assessors had estimated the real estate "at a sum which, for the purposes of the assessment, we believe to be the true value thereof." It is to be said of the action of the assessors, in these cases, that they had endeavored to make their certificate correspond to the fact; it being notorious that, whatever they may certify, they are not in the practice of estimating property at its true value." So when the statute required the assessors in an affi

1 Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich., 486. See, also, Colby v. Russell, 3 Me., 227; Foxcroft v. Nevens, 4 Me., 72; Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired., 129; Johnson v. Elwood, 53 N. Y., 431; Walker v. Burlington, 56 Vt., 131.

As to what is a sufficient signing, see Darmstetter v. Molony, 45 Mich., 621. 2 Marsh v. Supervisors, 42 Wis., 502; Morrill v. Taylor, 6 Neb., 236; Dickison v. Reynolds, 48 Mich., 158; Griggs v. St. Croix Co., 20 Fed. Rep., 341; Walker v. Burlington, 56 Vt., 131; Tunbridge v. Smith, 48 Vt., 648; Reed v. Chandler, 32 Vt., 285.

A premature verification of the roll has been held void in New York. Westfall v. Preston, 49 N. Y., 349. Compare Dickison v. Reynolds, 48 Mich., 158. In Mississippi it is held that a statute directing the assessor to add an affidavit to the roll is not so far mandatory that the omission will defeat a tax sale. Chesnut v. Elliott, 61 Miss., 569.

3 Van Rensselaer v. Witbeck, 7 N. Y., 517. Compare Parish v. Golden, 35 N. Y., 462. See Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich., 422.

4 Clark v. Crane, 5 Mich., 151. See, also, Colby v. Russell, 3 Me., 227; Foxcroft v. Nevens, 4 Me., 72; Johnson v. Goodridge, 15 Me., 29; Kelar v. Savage, 20 Me., 199. See, for similar decisions, Hinckley v. Cooper, 22 Hun, 253; Westfall v. Preston, 49 N. Y., 319; State Auditor v. Jackson Co., 65 Ala., 142. Compare Dickison v. Reynolds, 48 Mich., 158.

5 See Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich., 461; Dickison v. Reynolds, 48 Mich., 158; Sinclair v. Learned, 51 Mich., 335.

The verification of the assessment is not void by reason of omitting any part of the statutory form that in the particular case has nothing to which

davit to the assessment roll to state that "they have together personally examined within the year past each and every lot and parcel of land, house, building or other assessable property" within the taxing district, the emission of this affidavit was held fatal. But a failure to observe literally the statutory form will not vitiate the roll if there is substantial compliance.

Return of Assessment. An assessment is completed when the assessors have performed in respect to it their whole duty it would be applicable, e. g., bank stock. But it is void if it fails to show that valuation "is the full value which could ordinarily be obtained." Plumer v. Supervisors, 46 Wis., 163; Scheiber v. Kaehler, 49 Wis., 291.

Where the statute allows three days, but only up to 5 P. M., for correcting assessments, and the assessor's certificate is dated on the third day, the presumption is that he did not attach it prematurely. Yelverton v. Steele, 36 Mich., 62.

1 Brevoort v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y., 128. In Vermont the verification of the annual list does not cure the failure to make oath to the quinquennial list. Houghton v. Hall, 47 Vt., 333. In New Hampshire the failure to have the invoice and assessment sworn to according to law has been held not fatal. Odiorne v. Rand, 59 N. H., 504. See as to the effect of acquiescence in the neglect of the certificate, Jefferson Co. Com'rs v. Johnson, 23 Kan., 717. A failure to attach a certificate to an assessment was held not fatal where the assessor was himself a member of the board of review, and was required himself to present the assessment to the board. Darmstetter v. Molony, 45 Mich., 621.

2 Parish v. Golden, 35 N. Y., 462; Buffalo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Erie, 48 N. Y., 93; Bradford v. Randall, 5 Pick., 496; People v. Mining Co., 39 Cal., 511. See Bangor v. Lancey, 21 Me., 472. In this case it appeared that the statute required the list to have the official sanction of a majority of the assessors, evidenced by their signatures. The original list was not signed, but a supplementary list referring to it as containing the assessment for the year was duly signed. Held sufficient. As to what irregularities will defeat an assessment the following cases may be consulted: Willey v. Scoville's Lessees, 9 Ohio, 44; Shimmin v. Inman, 26 Me., 228; Smith v. Davis, 30 Cal., 537; Huntingdon v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 2 Saw., 503; Albany City National Bank v. Maher, 19 Blatch., 175; Bradley v. Ward, 58 N. Y., 401. What will not avoid: Gulf R. R. Co. v. Morris, 7 Kan., 210; Smith v. Leavenworth Co., 9 Kan., 296; Hallo v. Helmer, 12 Nev., 87; Burlington, etc., R. Co. v. Saline Co., 12 Nev., 396; Marshall v. Benson, 48 Wis., 558; Morrill v. Douglass, 14 Kan., 294; Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich., 28; McCallum v. Bethany, 42 Mich., 457; Miller v. Hurford, 13 Neb., 13; McClure v. Warner, 16 Neb., 447; Merriam v. Coffee, 16 Neb., 450.

A statute that an assessor shall not be allowed to contradict or impeach any certificate made by him is valid. Plumer v. Supervisors, 46 Wis., 163; Marshall v. Benson, 48 Wis., 558. All legal presumptions favor an assessment. Richmond, etc., Co. v. Com'rs of Alamance, 84 N. C., 504.

under the statute.1 If their determination is to be entered of record, they have judicial control of the whole subject until the entry is made, and may reconsider valuations and any other matters involved in the final decision. When nothing more remains to be done by them, the assessment is to be disposed of as the statute may provide. In some states this will be by delivery to a board of review; or, if no such board is provided for, then to the officer or board by whom the tax is to be apportioned upon it. Where the assessors are required to certify it to the auditor, to be entered upon his duplicate, the certificate must be in writing, and the want of it cannot be supplied by parol. If the statute names a time for the return it should be complied with; but whether a failure in strict compliance would be fatal must depend upon whether the regulation is one for the protection of the tax payer or merely for order, regularity or official convenience."

Shifts to evade taxation. The federal revenue laws abound in provisions for circumventing and punishing frauds upon the revenue, and state legislation is not without enactments of similar nature. But it is not uncommon to encounter in the administration of tax laws shifts and devices, not amounting to legal fraud, but which nevertheless have in view the same purpose; to avoid a just share in the burdens of public taxation. Sometimes, but not always, it is possible to defeat such attempts when the facts are known.

A man may lawfully change his residence from one munici

1 As to when it is to be considered completed in New York, see Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y., 316; People v. Suffern, 68 N. Y., 321. In Nebraska, Jones v. Seward Co., 10 Neb., 154.

2 State v. Silvers, 41 N. J., 505. See State v. Crosley, 36 N. J., 425. This cannot be universally true. If by statute or otherwise a day of review is fixed at which parties may appear and be heard, the purpose of the hearing would be defeated if valuations might be increased by the assessors afterwards without opportunity for tax payers again to appear.

3 See Wells v. Smyth, 55 Pa. St., 159; Norridgewalk v. Walker, 71 Me., 181.

4 State v. Thompson, 18 S. C., 538. See Dent v. Bryce, 16 S. C., 1. Compare Darmstetter v. Molony, 45 Mich., 621.

5 In Mississippi it has been held that a failure to return the assessment in the legal time would render it and any sale made under it void. Stovall v. Connor, 58 Miss., 138; Mitchum v. McInnis, 60 Miss., 945; Fletcher v. Trewalla, 60 Miss., 963.

pality to another at pleasure; and though the purpose in changing be to avoid taxation in the town he removes from, yet the fact cannot be taken notice of for the purpose of continuing his taxation in that town.1 A man has a right to exchange money, which is taxable, for United States securities which are not taxable, even though the sole purpose in the exchange is to avoid the tax. And if he gives his note for United States securities for the like purpose, he is nevertheless entitled to be allowed the amount of the note in reduction of his assessment." In each of these cases the party is only exercising a right which the law allows to him; he may choose his own place of residence at pleasure, and he may select, as seems most for his interest, between taxable and non-taxable property; and it is. no concern of others, or even of the state which by its laws allows the choice, what may be the motive on which he acts.

Where, however, under the revenue laws land is taxable and also a mortgage upon it, if one from whom money is obtained, instead of taking a mortgage for the amount, takes an absolute conveyance and gives back a lease with a stipulation to sell back the land on repayment of the money and interest—the whole transaction being obviously only a loan and the taking of security therefor, the land may still be taxed to the borrower and the lender taxed as mortgagee. And where a tax payer borrowed $1,000 from a resident of another county, and deposited in the lender's hands securities to the amount of $12,000, it was held that if this was done in good faith and merely to secure payment of the debt, the securities were not taxable in the county of the borrower's residence; but if they were transferred for the purpose of avoiding taxation, then the transaction was in bad faith and a fraud on the revenue of the county, and the securities might be taxed at the borrower's home as if the transaction had not taken place. But this conclusion in each case was reached by the court claiming and exercising the right to look beyond the surface facts and inI Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass., 53; Thayer v. Boston, 124 Mass., 132. See Union S. B. Co. v. Buffalo, 82 N. Y., 351.

2 Stilwell v. Corwin, 55 Ind., 433. See Ogden v. Walker, 59 Ind., 460.

3 People v. Ryan, 88 N. Y., 142.

4 Waller v. Jaeger, 39 Ia., 228; Patrick v. Littell, 36 Ohio St.,

v. Nemaha Co., 6 Kan., 403.

Poppleton v. Yambill Co., 8 Or., 337.