taxing district to the same relative standard, so that no one of the parts may be compelled to pay a disproportionate part of the tax. To accomplish this purpose town assessment rolls are equalized by county courts, boards of supervisors or commissioners, and the aggregate of the county assessments by a state board established for the purpose. This is not done by changing individual assessments, but by fixing the aggregate sums for the several districts at what, in the opinion of the board, they should be, so that general taxes may be levied according to this determination, instead of on the assessor's footings. These boards act judicially in equalizing, and their decision is conclusive. They are commonly composed of popular representatives, and they act upon their own judgment of what is equal and just. They are not bound to give notice to taxpayers before raising the assessment of a district except as the statute may provide for it. In raising or reducing the assessment of a district, it is sufficient for the board to designate a percentage of increase or reduction. A failure of the board to sit from day to day as directed by the statute will not invalidate the taxes if, in fact, full opportunity to be heard and make objections was given to all."

3

In some states the state board of equalization is made a

1 As to the equalization and the necessity therefor, see County Commissioners v. Parker, 7 Minn., 207; Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 579; Tallmadge v. Supervisors of Rensselaer, 21 Barb., 611; State v. Allen, 43 Ill., 456; People v. Nichols, 49 Ill., 517. As to how equalization is made in Illinois, see Mix v. People, 72 Ill., 241. In Colorado, People v. Lothrop, 3 Col., 608. As to increasing valuations in California, see People v. Dunn, 59 Cal., 328. In Illinois, Buck v. People, 78 Ill., 560. In Iowa, Harney v. Supervisors, 44 Ia., 203.

2 New York v. Davenport, 92 N. Y., 604, citing Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y., 610, and other cases.

See Wells v. State Board, 56 Cal., 194; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich., 12.

4 Hallo v. Helmer, 12 Neb., 87. See Gilbert v. Lyon Co., 30 Kan., 166. 5 Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich., 146.

6 Wolfe v. Murphy, 60 Miss., 1. As to what is sufficient to make the equalization formally correct, see Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich., 561. If a board of equalization raises the assessment without jurisdiction, its action being void, there is a good defense at law to the tax upon the increase. State v. Washoe Co., 14 Nev., 149; Coolbaugh v. Huck, 86 Ill., 600; Avery v. East Saginaw, 44 Mich., 587. If, without authority, a municipal board reduces the assessment of some property, its action is void. Sherlock v. Winnetka, 68 Ill., 530.

special board of assessors for railroad property, and it is to apportion the valuation between the several counties through or into which the roads run. Such boards are also sometimes given power to add omitted persons or property for taxation

or assessment.2

Extending the tax. The subjects of taxation having been properly listed and a basis for apportionment established, nothing will remain to fix a definite liability but to extend upon the list or roll the several proportionate amounts, as a charge against the several taxables. When that is done, but not until then, will a liability for any particular sum be fixed. When the sum to be raised is settled, and the assessment is completed, the calculation of the percentage of the tax and the determination of the sum chargeable to each taxable are clerical acts, and may be performed by any one.*

1 Their authority is exclusive of that of the county boards. People v. Sacramento Co., 59 Cal., 321. Where the state board finds that assessors have disobeyed the constitutional requirement to assess at the fair cash value and have assessed at half the value only, they may assess railroad property in like proportion. Law v. People, 87 Ill., 385. See Bureau Co. v. Railroad Co., 44 Ill., 229; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Livingston Co., 68 Ill., 458.

Where in taxing a railroad the value is apportioned among the counties, a provision that the auditor shall not thus apportion the value until after equalization is mandatory. State Auditor v. Jackson Co., 65 Ala., 142; Perry County v. Railroad Co., 65 Ala., 391.

2 See Wallace v. Jaeger, 39 Ia., 228. Property omitted from the roll may still be taxed though it has since changed hands. New Orleans v. Railroad Co., 35 La. An., 679.

'Greenough v. Fulton Coal Co., 74 Pa. St., 486, 500.

4 State v. Maginnis, 26 La. An., 558. When a railroad tax is measured by gross receipts, determined by the annual report of the company, the computation is ministerial, and may be made by a clerk. Phila. & Reading R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. St., 86.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE COLLECTOR'S WARRANT.

Necessity for. Before the officer who is designated by law for the duty of collecting the taxes can lawfully proceed to do so, he must have his warrant for the purpose, in due form of law. This, in different states, may be the assessment roll or list, with the tax extended upon it, or it may be a duplicate of the list with a like extension, or it may be either of these, with a formal warrant attached, particularly indicating. what are his duties under it, and commanding their performance.2 Whatever the statute provides for, in this regard, the collector must have, and he is a trespasser if he proceeds to compulsory action without it. Upon this point the decisions are numerous and uniform. In a case arising under a statute which required that a warrant should be attached to the tax duplicate, the following remarks have been made: "The authority of a collector of taxes to collect is his warrant. The duplicate is but a memorandum of the amount he is to collect from the parties therein named respectively. Without a warrant, the collector becomes a trespasser as soon as he intermeddles with the property of the tax payer. There must also be a law authorizing the issue of a warrant, and some person appointed to issue it, and it must conform to the law authorizing it, and be issued by the proper person designated by law, or it is no protection to a collector." No question is made anywhere of the correctness of this doctrine.

4

1 Taft v. Barrett, 58 N. H., 447; Pearson v. Canney, 64 Me., 188; Donald v. McKinnon, 17 Fla., 746.

2 The tax roll is void if made out before the tax is voted. Gale v. Mead, Hill, 109.

3 Blackwell on Tax Titles, 168, and cases cited. In the absence of a warrant the due performance of all other acts prescribed by statute cannot make out a valid sale for taxes. Donald v. McKinnon, 17 Fla., 746.

4 Hilbish v. Horner, 58 Pa. St., 93, citing Pearce v. Torrence, 2 Grant's Cases, 82; Stephens v. Wilkins, 6 Pa. St., 260. And see Chalker v. Ives, 55 Pa. St., 81; Falconer v. Shores, 37 Ark., 386. The same doctrine is declared under a different law, in Slade v. Governor, 3 Dev., 365; Kelley v. Craig, 5 Ired., 129. And see Brown v. Wright, 17 Vt., 97. If a warrant for colle

Statutory requisites. Whatever may be the requisites for the warrant under the statute, care must be taken that they be observed. One of the most important of these is that it be directed to the proper officer. Where the law has indicated one officer to perform the duty of collection, the officer who issues the warrant is without power to designate a different one; and if even by inadvertence the process were to be directed to the sheriff when the lawful collector is the township treasurer, or vice versa, it would be void on its face. But the naming of the collector's predecessor in the address instead of the collector himself is an immaterial error," and so in the case of a township is the omission of the name of the township if it elsewhere appears in the warrant. In Maine, where the statute gave a form to be followed "in substance," it was held that the omission of that part of the form which directed the treasurer to levy distress in default of payment was an omission of matter of substance which rendered the warrant nugatory, and the treasurer might refuse to execute it. In Vermont it is said that a collector to justify his attempt to make collection must show a legal tax, a legal list, and that his process is legal; but in Vermont, as elsewhere, all mere informalities even in this important process will be overlooked; and an error in the date of the warrant will be held immaterial." New Hampshire also the warrant is deemed sufficient if in substance the statute prescribing the form is followed. And in Maine the omission from the warrant of the words, "In the name of the state of Maine," which are a part of the

6

In

tion not required by law is signed and attached to a highway list, this is a sufficient signing of the list. Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich., 422.

1 Stephens v. Wilkins, 6 Pa. St., 260; Cannell v. Crawford Co., 59 Pa. St., 196; Dinsmore v. Westcott, 25 N. J. Eq., 470. Where a tax is imposed for police purposes the execution of the tax warrant may by law be committed to some other officer than the one named as collector of taxes in the constitution. Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich., 406.

Wilson v. Seavey, 38 Vt., 221.

3 First. Nat. Bank v. St. Joseph, 46 Mich., 526.

* Bachelder v. Thompson, 41 Me., 539. See Pearson v. Canney, 64 Me., 188.

'Clove Springs Iron Works v. Cone, 56 Vt., 603.

Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt., 388; Spear v. Braintree, 24 Vt., 414; Goodwin v. Perkins, 39 Vt., 598; Wing v. Hall, 47 Vt., 182.

'Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt., 590.

Bailey v. Ackerman, 54 N. H., 527.

statutory form, is held of no moment. In Massachusetts, where the statute provides that "the assessors shall commit the tax list, with the warrant under their hands, to the collector for collection," a failure to attach them, if both are delivered to the collector, is immaterial. And in the same state an error in the command of the warrant, by which the collector was directed to arrest the person taxed within twelve days, instead of fourteen, as it should have been, after demand of the tax, if the same should not be paid, etc., will not vitiate the warrant, nor become material, unless the direction to arrest is acted upon. In Connecticut, it is very properly held that if the warrant is not attached to the tax list when its command is to collect of the persons "named in the annexed list," there is nothing to which these words can apply, and the command of the warrant is nugatory, so that the collector can take the property of no one by virtue thereof. An error in the direction to the collector by which he is commanded to account to the wrong officer is immaterial; this being a matter that does not concern the tax payers. The same is true of a failure to limit by the warrant the time within which the treasurer shall collect the tax. In Illinois, it is said that the omission from the warrant of a power to distrain in case of non-payment will not so far vitiate it as to excuse the failure to pay and entitle the person taxed to have relief in equity. In Maine, a warrant exempting from distress for non-payment other property in addition to the exemptions allowed by law has been held to confer upon the officer no authority and to impose upon him no duty. And probably in any state it would be held as it

1 Mussey v. White, 3 Me., 290. In other states a constitutional provision that all process shall run "in the name of the people," etc., is held not applicable to a collector's warrant. Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 579; Wisner v. Davenport, 5 Mich., 501; Curry v. Hinman, 11 Ill., 420; Scarritt v. Chapman, 11 Ill., 443; Sprague v. Birchard, 1 Wis., 457.

2 Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met., 85.

3 Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met., 85, citing King v. Whitcomb, 1 Met., 328. 4 Picket v. Allen, 10 Conn., 146.

5 Clemons v. Lewis, 36 Vt., 673. 6 Walker v. Miner, 32 Vt., 769.

Compare Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich., 579. Such a warrant may be defective as be

tween the collector and the public he acts for, but the defect does not invalidate any action taken to collect the tax under it. Ibid.

7 Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 Ill., 346.

Boothbay v. Giles, 64 Me.. 403.