has been in Illinois, that if the warrant is for the collection of a municipal tax which is void because the ordinance which assumed to impose it was not authorized by law, the warrant itself is void also.1

2

Signing. The warrant should be properly signed; but it is sufficient that it be signed by a majority of a joint board of assessors; and if signed by supervisors as required by law, the signing is sufficient though they fail to add to their names their official titles.3

In Iowa a warrant is not required, the authority to collect being conferred by the statute itself when the proper tax list is made out and delivered. Probably this is true of some other states.

Different rolls for different taxes. It is not always the practice to have one assessment and tax roll for the state taxes and another for the local taxes. On the contrary, for what may be called the general taxes of the municipality, it is customary to provide that, when voted, they shall be certified to such state or county officer or board as is authorized to issue the tax warrant for state or county taxes, and by such officer or board shall be spread upon the same roll or list, though in à separate column, and be collected by authority of the same warrant. The regulation may be the opposite of this: that the state taxes shall be certified to county or town officers, and by them spread upon the roll. Such provisions do not give the state or county functionaries any power to review, revise or set aside the local action, but they must levy what has been voted, and may be compelled to do so."

1 Butler v. Nevin, 88 Ill., 575.

2 Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick., 436.

3 Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 2 N. Y., 473.

5

540; Litchfield v.

Parker v. Sexton, 29 Ia., 421; Rhodes v. Sexton, 33 Ia., Hamilton Co., 40 Ia., 66; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Carroll Co., 41 Ia., 153; Tallman v. Cooke, 43 Ia., 330. And see Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich.,

422.

5 Where the law gives a city full authority to vote money for the support of the poor, etc., and requires the supervisors to " cause the same to be raised, assessed and collected," the supervisors have no discretion to refuse on the ground that funds for the like purposes have previously been misapplied. Ex parte Common Council of Albany, 3 Cow., 358. Compare Will

Delivery of warrant. A provision of statute that the officer or board making out the warrant shall deliver it to the collector by a day named is only directory. But any such delay as would leave the collector insufficient time for compulsory proceedings under the statute would of course preclude their being taken.

Exhausting authority. The issue of a void tax warrant would not exhaust the authority to issue a valid one. In some states by statute, or by a customary course of procedure, when one valid process does not result in the collection of all the tax, another may issue. For personal taxes which remain uncollected suits are sometimes provided for, especially where the failure to collect is in consequence of a removal of the party taxed from the treasurer's jurisdiction.

Blending taxes. A very common provision of statute, where several taxes are to be spread upon the same roll, is that they shall be kept separate and placed in distinct columns on the roll. This advises the tax payer of the nature of the several demands that are made upon him, and enables him to pay or tender the amount of any one the justice and legality of which he concedes, and to decline to pay any other if he considers it unwarranted. Such provision is mandatory, and if not obeyed, the taxes cannot be enforced. A custom to

iams v. School District, 21 Pick., 75. Sometimes the auditing of accounts is made by law equivalent to the vote of a tax. See People v. Supervisors of Queens, 1 Hill, 195. Where different rolls are required for different taxes, the placing of a tax on the wrong roll is fatal to the tax. Folkerts v. Power, 42 Mich., 283.

1 Alvord v. Collins, 20 Pick., 418; Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich., 146; Smith v. Crittenden, 16 Mich., 152. The case of Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H., 182, is contra.

2 See Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt., 362. The warrant is sometimes extended or renewed, under statutes providing therefor. See Griswold v. School District, 24 Mich., 262. The extension is for the benefit and convenience of the collector, not of the tax payer. The latter cannot complain if the officer makes his return before the expiration of the extended time. Drennan v. Beierlein, 49 Mich., 272. The issuing of a new warrant while the period of extension of the old one is unexpired, if both the new and the old are attached to the roll, will be immaterial: a levy being then good if either warrant is valid. Bird v. Perkins, 33 Mich., 28.

3 Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick., 482; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich., 12; People v. Moore, 1 Idaho, N. S., 662. See Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich., 561. It would

blend them cannot make the roll valid.' But separating the taxes when the statute does not require it will not affect the roll; as this deprives no one of any right whatever.2 And no doubt the rule as to the effect of blending taxes might be changed by statute, as in some states has been done.

Excessive taxes. All statutes are mandatory which expressly or by implication limit the amount of taxes which may be levied. When these are exceeded by a sum which is spread upon the whole roll, the whole levy is void. The levy is in excess of the jurisdiction of the officers, and will be as deficient in the legal competency to make out a valid charge as if made without any authority whatever. This would not defeat a separate tax lawfully placed in a separate column on the roll, but it would invalidate whatever is blended with the excessive levy, and incapable of being separated.

Excess in a levy may happen from a sum which has been voted for an unauthorized purpose being included with others that are authorized, or from imposing more than is permitted for lawful purposes, or from the addition of unauthorized

be otherwise in Illinois under a statute of that state. See Thatcher v. People, 79 Ill., 597. What blending not fatal in New Jersey, see State v. Saalmann, 37 N. J., 156.

1 State v. Falkinburge, 15 N. J., 320; Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Hillegas, 18 N. J., 11. But now it is provided by statute in New Jersey that no assessment of taxes shall be set aside on certiorari because the state and local taxes are blended together. See State v. Saalmann, 37 N. J., 156. 2 Wall v. Trumbull, 16 Mich., 228. Compare Torrey v. Milbury, 21 Pick., 64. 3 Commonwealth v. Savings Bank, 5 Allen, 428, 430. See Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass., 272; Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass., 144; Joyner v. School District, 3 Cush., 567: School District v. Merrills, 12 Conn., 437; Hubbard v. Brainard, 35 Conn., 563; First Ecclesiastical Society v. Hartford, 38 Conn., 274; Elwell v. Shaw, 1 Me., 339; Huse v. Merriam, 2 Me., 375; Lacy v. Davis, 4 Mich., 140; Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen, 319; Goodrich v. Lunenburg, 9 Gray, 38; Stone v. Bean, 15 Gray, 42; Kemper v. McClelland, 19 Ohio, 308; Mason v. Roe, 5 Blackf., 98; Hutchins v. Doe, 3 Ind., 528; Drew 1. Davis, 10 Vt., 506; Johnson v. Colburn, 36 Vt., 693; Wells v. Burbank, 17 N. H., 393; Kinsworthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark., 145; Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal., 67; Tucker v. The Justices, 34 Ga., 370. As to levy of excessive fees, see Mosher v. Robie, 11 Me., 135; Buell v. Irwin, 24 Mich., 145; Prindle v. Campbell, 9 Minn., 212. See Marsh v. Supervisors, 42 Wis., 502; Edwards r. Taliafero, 34 Mich., 13; Hammontree v. Lott, 40 Mich., 190; State v. Gosper Co. Com'rs, 14 Neb., 22; Workman v. Worcester, 118 Mass, 168; Goldsmith v. Rome R. R. Co., 62 Ga., 468.

charges, or from errors of the officers, whereby either the aggregate is made too large, or individuals are charged more than their lawful proportion. In the latter case the individual taxes which were unjustly increased would alone be void; in the others the whole levy. The excess, however, may be insignificant and inappreciable in an individual tax, and when it is so, it should be disregarded, on the maxim de minimis lex non curat. A case where the excess was but one dollar in $450,000, the whole levy, is plainly one for the application of this maxim.1 But the maxim is one to be applied with caution. It has been said of it in a case where a tax was but slightly in excess of authority: "The maxim is so vague in itself as to form a very unsafe ground of proceeding or judging; and it may be almost as difficult to apply it as a rule in pecuniary concerns as to the interest which a witness has in the event of a cause; and in such case it cannot apply. Any interest excludes him. The assessment was therefore unauthorized and void. If the line which the legislature has established be once passed, we know of no boundary to the discretion of the assessors." The like rule has been adopted in another case, which has held that anv addition perceptibly increasing an individual tax avoids it."

In any case where a party comes into equity for relief against a tax, it will be as proper to make relief depend upon his paying what is just in a case in which the levy was excessive as in any other. But a tax sale for the excessive tax must

1 Workman v. Worcester, 118 Mass., 168. See Thatcher v. People, 79 Ill., 597.

2 Mellen, Ch. J., in Huse v. Merriam, 2 Greenl., 375, 376.

3 Case v. Dean, 16 Mich., 12. But an unintentional error may not have this effect. Kelley v. Corson, 8 Wis., 182; O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal., 287, 296. See State v. Newark, 25 N. J., 399. In Iowa there is a statute that a tax sale shall be upheld if any portion of the tax for which the sale was made was legal. See Parker v. Sexton, 29 Ia., 421. Where part is legal and part is illegal the former will be sustained if they are capable of being distinguished. See O'Kane v. Treat, 25 Ill., 557; Briscoe v. Allison, 43 Ill., 291; State v. Allen, 43 Ill., 456; Allen v. Peoria, etc., R. R. Co., 44 Ill., 85; People v. Nichols, 49 Ill., 517; Mix v. People, 72 Ill., 241; State v. Plainfield, 38 N. J., 93. And as to sale on judgment for taxes, see Reeve v. Kennedy, 43 Cal., 643. An excess inserted to cover possible contingencies in collecting, held not to render assessors liable in trespass where they had acted in good faith, and only erred in judgment. Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass., 105.

4 Connors v. Detroit, 41 Mich., 128; Neenan v. Smith, 60 Mo., 292. If the law limits the amount to be levied to one per cent., and three per cent. is

be void; at least unless some statute expressly provides to the contrary. And the levy at an excessive percentage upon the assessment cannot be sustained by showing that the valuation was greatly too low, and that the rate would not have been excessive had the valuation been in accordance with the statute.2

levied, it is said the levy to the legal limit may be upheld. McPherson v. Foster, 43 Ia., 48. Compare Worthen v. Badger, 32 Ark., 496. It has been held in Kansas that a slight addition to the roll may be made to provide for contingencies in collection, and if it proves too much the tax will not be void in consequence. Marion Co. Com'rs v. Harvey Co., 26 Kan., 181. 1 Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich., 561.

2 Wattles v. Lapeer, 40 Mich., 624.