be even in such cases at least as far as they affected an interest assessed-if the statute so declared.

The time when the lien will attach to land must be determined by the terms of the statute. Sometimes the statute names a day as that from and after which the tax shall be a lien; and when that is done, it may determine, as between subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers, the liability for the tax.'

1 Harrington v. Hilliard, 27 Mich. 271. See Rundell v. Lakey, 40 N. Y., 513; Gormley's Appeal, 27 Pa. St., 49; Densmore v. Haggarty, 59 Pa. St., 189; Baldwin v. Mayne, 42 Ia., 131.

Ill.,

In Illinois taxes upon real estate are a lien or charge upon the land itself from the 1st day of May in the year they are levied. Cooper v. Corbin, 105 224. As to taxes on personalty becoming a lien on realty, see Belleville Nail Co. v. People, 98 Ill., 399; Binkert v. Wabash R. Co., 98 Ill., 205; Parsons v. Gas Light Co., 108 Ill., 380; Ream v. Stone, 102 Ill., 359; Saup v. Morgan, 108 Ill., 326.

In Missouri taxes, both state and county, constitute a lien on real estate from and after the first Monday in September. McLaren v. Sheble, 45 Mo., 130; Blossom v. Van Court, 34 Mo., 390.

In New York there is no lien on real estate for taxes until notice and demand of the tax and neglect or refusal to pay, and no right to seize and sell until there is a failure to find personal estate. Brown v. Goodwin, 75 N. Y., 409. See Barlow v. National Bank, 63 N. Y., 399.

As to tax liens upon land in Pennsylvania, see Russell's Appeal, 59 Pa. St., 401; Smith v. Simpson, 60 Pa. St., 168; Townsend v. Prowattain, 81* Pa. St., 139; Philadelphia v. Meager, 67 Pa. St., 345; Appeal of Second Nat. Bank, 85 Pa. St., 528; Dungan's Appeal, 88 Pa. St., 414.

In Vermont taxes become a fixed incumbrance on the land on which they are assessed as soon as the officer having the collection in charge proceeds officially so far as to manifest his intention to pursue the land to enforce collection.

In the case of non-residents, taxes become an incumbrance on the land when the constable has made a list of the land and the taxes assessed thereon, and deposited the same in the town clerk's office for record. Hutchins v. Moody, 34 Vt., 433.

As to Nebraska see Wilhelm v. Russell, 8 Neb., 120; Pettit v. Black, 8 Neb., 52; Miller v. Hurford, 12 N. W. Rep., 833.

The following are decisions as to the liability to taxes under special agreements: A clause in a mortgage that the mortgage moneys should be paid "without any deduction, defalcation or abatement to be made of anything for or in respect to any taxes," held to refer to taxes on the land and not on mortgage security. Clopton v. Phila., etc., R. R. Co., 54 Pa. St., 356. A covenant to pay "all assessments for which the premises shall be liable" will embrace an assessment only authorized by a law passed after the covenant. Post v. Kearney, 2 N. Y., 394. One who conveys by warranty after an assessment is completed is liable on his covenant for a tax laid in pursuance of this assessment. Held, therefore, the vendee who had paid it

Where no time is thus expressly named the lien should attach at the time when by an extension of the tax upon the roll a particular sum has become a charge upon a particular parcel of land.1

Municipal corporations, it need hardly be said, have no authority to create liens, by ordinance or otherwise, when none has been expressly conferred upon them.2

Suit to Enforce a Lien. It is not uncommon to provide by statute for the enforcement by suit, either in the law courts or in equity, of the lien for taxes. When suit is thus provided. for, mere delay in instituting it has been held not to extin

might recover the amount of the vendor on an agreement of the latter to repay "in case he was legally liable to pay it." Rundell v. Lakey, 40 N. Y., 513. A vendee taking possession under a contract to pay taxes should pay those for the current year if they were not a lien when he went in. Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Jaques, 20 Kan., 639. A covenant to pay all taxes and duties held to cover an assessment provided for by a subsequent law. Si. monds v. Turner, 120 Mass., 328.

1 See Hutchins v. Moody, 30 Vt., 655; Same v. Same, 34 Vt., 433; Post v. Leet, 8 Paige, 337; Kern v. Towsley, 45 Barb., 150; Dowdney v. New York, 54 N. Y., 186; Cochran v. Guild, 106 Mass., 29. Compare Holmes v. Taber,

9 Allen, 246; Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala., 529. In California, a lien for taxes relates to the time of the assessment. Reeve v. Kennedy, 43 Cal., 643. In Connecticut, it seems that taxes are not a lien on real estate so long as there is personalty from which it may be made. Briggs v. Morse, 42 Conn., 258. In Iowa, a tax on personalty may become a lien on real estate acquired subsequent to the assessment. If it becomes delinquent, it is brought forward on the books for a subsequent year, the same as if it were assessed against the land. Cummings v. Easton, 46 Ia., 183. If not thus brought forward it ceases to be a lien. Jiska v. Ringgold Co., 57 Ia., 630.

The purchaser at a sheriff's sale of lands subject to a lien for taxes does not become personally liable for the taxes, and they cannot be collected from his personalty unless perhaps from emblements which were attached to the land. Blodgett v. German, etc., Bank, 69 Ind., 153; Foresman v. Chase, 68 Ind., 500; Volger v. Sidener, 86 Ind., 545.

2 Philadelphia v. Greble, 38 Pa. St., 339. As to what will give the power, see Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md., 71. The lien cannot exist where the statutory steps have not been taken, and a simple allegation in a proceeding to en-. force a lien, that the taxes are due and unpaid, is not sufficient to show a lien. Louisville v. Bank of Kentucky, 3 Met. (Ky.), 148. As to the liability of land for personal assessments in Indiana, see Bodertha v. Spencer, 40 Ind., 353.

A judgment creditor cannot garnish funds derived from taxation while they are in process of collection. Underhill v. Calhoun, 63 Ala., 216.

guish the lien.' But where a tax is a mere debt with a lien for its security, if lapse of time bars the debt, the lien is gone also.2

In considering this remedy by suit, it is to be kept in mind that it exists only by force of the statute." The statute must therefore be carefully followed in the proceedings, and if there are taxes for which no lien exists they must not be united in a

1 Swan v. Knoxville, 11 Humph., 130, 132. An act of congress made a tax a lien on land for two years. Held that this did not preclude the land being sold for the tax after the two years had expired, the title not having changed. Holden v. Eaton, 7 Pick., 15. Where by law taxes are a lien on land, but subject to be divested by a subsequent judicial sale, except as to any sum which the proceeds of the sale should be insufficient to pay, a sale sufficient prima facie to pay all taxes, and the bringing the money into court, divests the tax lien, though the money is not applied to the satisfaction of the taxes. Smith v. Simpson, 60 Pa. St., 168. A personal action brought for a tax does not divest the lien. Eschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md., 71. If a time is limited by statute for proceedings to enforce a lien, it is sufficient if they are begun within the time, and they may proceed to judgment afterwards. Randolph v. Bayue, 44 Cal., 366; Dougherty v. Henarie, 47 Cal., 9; Himmelman v. Carpenter, 47 Cal., 42. Where the statute provided that "taxes assessed on real estate shall constitute a lien thereon for two years after they are committed to the collector," this is held to mean the first committing to the collector, and the time is not extended by the recommitting to a subsequently appointed collector. Russell v. Deshon, 124 Mass., 342. That a statute giving a lien is to be strictly construed, see Creighton v. Manson, 27 Cal., 613; United States v. Pacific R. Co., 4 Dill., 71.

A personal judgment against the land owner will not discharge a lien on lands. People v. Stahl, 101 Ill., 346.

2 San Francisco v. Jones, 20 Fed. Rep., 188. See Sherwin v. Savings Bank, 137 Mass., 444.

3 Caress v. Foster, 62 Ind., 145; Brown v. Fodder, 81 Ind., 491; Bowen v. Striker, 87 Ind., 317; Montgomery v. Aydelotte, 95 Ind., 144; Preston v. Roberts, 12 Bush, 570; People v. Biggins, 96 Ill., 481; Board of Education v. Old Dominion, etc., Co., 18 W. Va., 441, citing Cooper v. Savannah, 4 Ga., 68; Alexander v. Helber, 35 Mo., 334; People v. Latham, 53 Cal., 386. See Peet v. O'Brien, 5 Neb., 360.

In Missouri it seems that in a statutory suit to enforce a tax lien the proceedings are not void because only the owner of a life estate is made a party, but a valid judgment may be obtained as against him. Hogan v. Smith, 11 Mo. Ap., 314. There is no constitutional objection to providing for the enforcement of a tax by foreclosure of the lien instead of by sale of property. Pritchard v. Madren, 24 Kan., 486.

4 Webb v. Bidwell, 15 Minn., 479; Clegg v. State, 42 Tex., 605. See Jefferson City v. McCarty, 74 Mo., 55; Whipple's Case, 71 Mo., 519.

suit to enforce a lien for others. Equity cannot give assistance when the statute has provided another remedy, but the officer will be left to follow it. The right to enforce a municipal tax cannot be assigned by the municipality so as to enable the assignee to institute proceedings for its enforcement;3 nor can tax executions against lands be transferred to a person who has paid the taxes to the state.

In Tennessee it seems that the chancery courts have inherent jurisdiction for the enforcement of liens for taxes, and a statute creating a new remedy, without expressly repealing the old, will be understood as giving a cumulative remedy."

Payment or Tender of Tax. If the owner, or any other person entitled to make payment of a tax, shall do so, the lien will not only be thereby absolutely discharged, but authority to proceed further against the property will be at an end. The per

1 Howard v. Augusta, 74 Me., 79. The benefit of the lien does not inure to the benefit of public creditors. Barkley v. Levee Com'rs, 93 U. S., 258. 2 People v. Biggins, 96 Ill., 481.

3 Board of Education v. Old Dominion, etc., Co., 18 W. Va., 441. See McInerny v. Reed, 23 Ia., 410; State v. Wingfield, 59 Ga., 202. This of course assumes that there is no statute authorizing it.

4 Johnson v. Christie, 64 Ga., 117. Executions in tax suits are to be served as in other cases. Georgia v. Atlanta, etc., R. Co., 3 Woods, 434. It is held in Missouri that a statute requiring a suit to enforce the lien to be brought against the owner of the land means the record owner. State v. Sack, 79 Mo., 661. See Vance v. Corrigan, 78 Mo., 94.

5 State v. Duncan, 3 Lea, 679. See Nashville v. Cowan, 10 Lea, 209; Memphis v. Looney, 9 Bax., 130; Edgefield v. Brien, 3 Tenn. Ch., 673.

6 Dougherty v. Dickey, 4 W. & S., 146; Hunter v. Cochran, 3 Pa. St., 105; Montgomery v. Meredith, 17 Pa. St., 42; Ankeny v. Allbright, 20 Pa. St., 157; Laird v. Heister, 24 Pa. St., 452; Jackson v. Morse, 18 Johns., 441; Den v. Terrell, 3 Hawks, 283; Rowland v. Doty, Har. Ch., 3; Johnstone v. Scott, 11 Mich., 232; Rayner v. Lee, 20 Mich., 384; Curry v. Hinman, 11 Ill., 420; Morrison v. Kelley, 22 Ill., 610; Jones v. Burford, 26 Miss., 194; Brown v. Day, 78 Pa. St., 129; Davis v. Hare, 32 Ark., 386; Walton v. Gray, 29 Ia., 440; Sprague v. Cœnen, 30 Wis., 209; Wallace v. Brown, 22 Ark., 118; Bennett v. Hunter, 9 Wall., 326. This held to be so, though not made to the officer who had the tax list and to whom payment should have been made. Jones . Dils, 18 W. Va., 759.

It has been held that if a purchaser of land is given, by the proper officer, a certificate that there are no back taxes, he is protected in relying upon it, although the officer is mistaken. Jiska v. Ringgold Co., 57 Ia., 630; Breisch v. Coxe, 81 Pa. St., 336. See Hickman v. Kempner, 35 Ark., 505. But if it

2

sons who, besides the owner, would be entitled to make payment, would include any who may have been assessed for the tax, and any others whose interests would be injuriously affected by a sale, either because of liens they may have, or of contract relations; and any one having the right may depute another to make it for him. Whether any third person may make payment is not so clear; but as the state is only interested in obtaining the revenue it has called for, it would seem that, before any sale, and consequently before any rights of third parties have intervened, any mere volunteer may pay the tax if he chooses; and the payment would be effectual, so far, at least, as to terminate the lien of the tax upon the land; though if the statute undertook to give the person making the payment rights in the land by reason thereof, the payment might not be effectual to confer such rights; for no one can assume to stand in the place of the owner for the purpose of performing an act which the owner himself sees fit not to perform, and claim thereby to establish rights against the owner or his property by what, under such circumstances, would be an officious intermeddling. It has therefore been held that the lien which the statute gives to one who pays a tax on land attaches only in case the person paying had an interest, either personally or as agent; though if he were a mere intermeddler, and the owner should subsequently claim the benefit of the payment, there would be no injustice in holding that he thereby adopted the act of payment with all the statutory consequences. The

is no part of the officer's duty to give information respecting payments, his mistake in saying there is no back tax will not preclude its collection. Elliott v. Dist. Columbia, 3 MacA., 396. Payment after a sale is of no avail, even though made in ignorance of the sale. Jones v. Welsing, 52 La., 220.

1 See Bennett v. Hunter, 18 Grat., 100; Same Case in error, 9 Wall., 326; Tacey v. Irwin, 18 Wall., 519. As to what is such color of title as to give one a right to pay taxes, see Brown v. Day, 78 Pa. St., 129. As to the proof of payment see Coxe v. Deringer, 78 Pa. St., 271.

2 See Reading v. Finney, 73 Pa. St., 467; Martin v. Snowden, 18 Grat., 100; Kinsworthy v. Austin, 23 Ark., 375. If the officer, by his own fault, receives the tax on the wrong description, and applies it, the payment nevertheless will preclude a sale of the description on which the party applied to pay. Hickman v. Kempner, 35 Ark., 505.

3 Peay v. Field, 30 Ark., 600.

4 Goodnow v. Stryker, 61 Ia., 261.