gives a lien merely,' and provision has been made in some cases for a suit to foreclose this lien, in which suit all questions affecting the validity of the sale might be passed upon.2 Pending the right to redeem, the purchaser would doubtless have the same rights to protect his interests which would exist in analogous cases of purchases at judicial sales.3

In general, a right to assign his certificate will be found given by statute, and when exercised, the assignee becomes entitled to all the rights acquired by the purchase; to the redemption money if redemption is made, and to a deed if it is not.* But he will acquire no rights superior to those of his assignor.5

the purchaser has no title until he gets his deed. Johnson v. Smith's Adm'r, 70 Ala., 108. See to the same effect, Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick., 359; Hightower v. Freedle, 5 Sneed, 312; Alexander v. Bush, 46 Pa. St., 62; Stephens v. Holmes, 26 Ark., 48.

A statute making a tax certificate of sale under a judgment prima facie evidence that all the requirements of the law in respect to the sale have been complied with, does not make it evidence of the judgment. Sanborn v. Cooper, 31 Minn., 307. In Nebraska the certificate is presumptive evidence of the regularity of all the prior proceedings (Bryant v. Estabrook, 16 Neb., 217), and it is not invalid because of being made out several months after the sale. Otoe Co. v. Brown, 16 Neb., 394.

See Phillips v. Myers, 55 Ia., 265; Spratt v. Price, 18 Fla., 289.

2 See Manseau v. Edwards, 53 Wis., 457. The statutory suit may be resorted to even though a deed has been given, if the deed proves to be void. Potts v. Cooley, 56 Wis., 45.

3 See Ferguson v. Miles, 3 Gilm., 358; Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. (Mich.), 184. Under the Missouri statute it has been held that the tax deed does not relate back to the sale, where redemption was allowed afterwards. Donohoe v. Veal, 19 Mo., 331. See Hemingway v. Drew, 47 Mich., 554. A statute giving a tax purchaser an action for waste committed between the time of the sale and the giving of the deed will not entitle him to the timber cut in that period, but only to damages. Lacy v. Johnson, 58 Wis., 414, citing Northrup v. Trask, 39 Wis., 515.

The tax deed when given relates back to the time of sale for all purposes of substantial justice, but the fiction of relation will not be suffered to work a wrong. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bulte, 45 Mich., 113.

4 See McCauslin v. McGuire, 14 Kan., 234; Smith v. Stephenson, 45 Ia., 645. Where a tax certificate has been assigned, a second assignment by the purchaser is void, and a deed based thereon is void, even as against the original owner. Smith v. Todd, 55 Wis., 459, citing State v. Winn, 19 Wis., 301; Horn v. Garry, 49 Wis., 464.

5 He cannot bring ejectment before obtaining his deed. Hibbard v. Brown, 51 Ala., 469; Costley v. Allen, 56 Ala., 198. Unless the statute expressly authorizes it. See Billings v. McDermott, 15 Fla., 60. He takes the certificate subject to all infirmities. Light v. West, 42 Ia., 138; Besore v. Dosk,

Report of sale. A report of the sale by the officer who has made it is commonly provided for, sometimes for the pur poses of a record exclusively, and sometimes, also, because some other officer than the one who made the sale is to execute the deed. The making of this report is important to the land owner if his right to redeem is to depend upon or to be ascertained by it, and then the failure to make it would be fatal.1 If made, it should be filed in proper time, and conform in its recitals to the statutory requirements, and the deed, if one is subsequently given, must follow the report. But where the case is such that a report is of no importance to the land owner, he would probably not be heard to complain of a failure to make return, or of errors or imperfections in it.

The deed. The deed is the last act in the execution of the statutory power, and all conditions precedent must be complied with before it can lawfully be given. One of the most important of those sometimes provided for is, that notice be served upon the owner of the record title; and in respect to such a requirement observance of the statute must be strict and particular. The deed when given must be officially exe

43 Ia., 211. It is not good unless officially signed. Billings v. Stark, 15 Fla., 296. If the tax purchaser was incompetent to buy and hold a tax title, he cannot make a valid assignment. Jackson v. Jacksonport, 56 Wis., 310. After assignment the purchaser cannot be reinvested in his ownership by procuring the certificate to be redelivered to him and erasing the assignment. Bird v. Jones, 37 Ark., 195. But this would probably not be held in all the states. A tax deed issued to one as assignee when he is not is void. Smith v. Todd, 55 Wis., 459; Dreutzer v. Smith, 56 Wis., 292. But defects in the assignment cannot be alleged after the statutory period of limitation has run. Haseltine v. Simpson, 58 Wis., 579. In Kansas a tax deed to one as assignee proves the assignment, and the land owner cannot disprove it. Gardenhire v. Mitchell, 21 Kan., 83.

1 De Quasie v. Harris, 16 W. Va., 345; Jones v. Dills, 18 W. Va., 759; Barton v. Gilchrist, 19 W. Va., 223; Orr v. Wiley, 19 W. Va., 150. See Burlew v. Quarrier, 16 W. Va., 108.

2 Barton v. Gilchrist, 19 W. Va., 223; De Quasie v. Harris, 16 W. Va., 345.

Burlew v. Quarrier, 16 W. Va., 109.

4 See Denike v. Rourke, 3 Biss., 39; Potts v. Cooley, 51 Wis., 353; Wilson v. Crafts, 56 Ia., 450; Reed v. Thompson, 56 Ia., 457; Le Blanc v. Blodgett, 34 La. An., 107. Service upon an occupant of the land is not sufficient when personal notice is required. Gage v. Schmidt, 104 Ill., 106. See Heaton v. Knight, 63 Ia., 686; Blackstone v. Sherwood, 31 Kan., 35. If the

cuted;1 and a deed made after the officer's term has expired is void unless expressly authorized by law.2

The tax deed should conform to the statute in the formalities of execution, such as signing, witnessing and acknowledgment,3 and it is generally held that, if it is defective or erroneous in these or any other particulars, a bill will not lie in equity to reform it. What recitals the deed shall contain may or may

statute requires affidavit of the fact of notice to be made before the deed issues, the affidavit must show the manner of giving notice. Price v. England, 109 Ill., 394.

If a tax deed shows on its face that it is prematurely executed it is void. Neal v. Spooner, 20 Fla., 38. If the statute provides that the deed shall be given on production of the certificate, this production is a condition prece dent. Thompson v. Merriam, 15 Neb., 498.

1 In Nebraska the deed must be under seal: Reed v. Merriam, 15 Neb., 323; and this means a real seal. Hendrix v. Boggs, 15 Neb., 469. The mistake in the date of acknowledgment of a deed will neither invalidate it nor preclude its being recorded. Yorty v. Paine, 62 Wis., 154.

The statute in force when a deed is given will determine its formal sufficiency. McCann v. Merriam, 11 Neb., 241; Covell v. Young, 11 Neb., 510; Baldwin v. Merriam, 16 Neb., 199. It will be void if it fails to show where the sale was made, and the officer cannot issue a second deed on the canceled certificate. Baldwin v. Merriam, 16 Neb., 199. See Shelley v. Towle, 16 Neb., 194.

2 Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Pa. St., 444. It is no objection that it was executed after the tax payer's death. Currie v. Fowler, 3 A. K. Marsh., 504. For some peculiar questions arising under what was called the Kansas compromise act of 1879, see Ide v. Finneran, 29 Kan., 569. In general the statute will provide in what name as grantor the deed shall be made. When it does not, a deed on a sale for a city tax should be in the name of the city. Sams v. King, 18 Fla., 557.

3 Tilson v. Thompson, 10 Pick., 359; Stierlin v. Daley, 37 Mo., 483; Dalton v. Fenn, 40 Mo., 109; Gabe v. Root, 93 Ind., 256; Dunlap v. Henry, 76 Mo., 106. See Little v. Herndon, 10 Wall., 26; Sibley v. Smith, 2 Mich., 486; Elston v. Kennicott, 46 Ill., 187; Wetherbee v. Dunn, 32 Cal., 106; Large v. Fisher, 49 Mo., 307. In McMichael v. Carlyle, 53 Wis., 504, a tax deed was held not void for want of a date. See Phelps v. Meade, 41 Ia., 470. It is void without the county seal when the statute requires it. Sutton v. Stone, 4 Neb., 319. A deed covering two sales may be good if either sale was good. Hunt v. Chapin, 42 Mich., 24. Where by the statute the land was to be conveyed, a deed of the right, title and interest of the state was held ineffectual. Hodgdon v. Burleigh, 4 Fed. Rep., 111.

4 Keepfer v. Force, 86 Ind., 81; Bowers v. Anderson, 52 Miss., 596. Contra, Hickman v. Kempner, 35 Ark., 505. The tax deed is void if it gives no name of purchaser. Knowlton v. Moore, 136 Mass., 32; Eaton v. Lyman, 33 Wis., 34. But a deed to a partnership is not void for that reason. Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis., 324.

not be determined by the statutes of the state. If a forin is given by statute and is followed, it must be held sufficient;1 but if none is given enough should appear to show that the

1 Bell v. Gordon, 55 Miss., 45; Bowers v. Chambers, 53 Miss., 259. Slight departures from the statutory form will be overlooked. Bowman v. Cockrill, 6 Kan., 311; Haynes v. Heller, 12 Kan., 381; Geekie v. Kirby, etc., Co., 106 U. S., 379. See Hardie v. Chrisman, 60 Miss., 671; Brigins v. Chandler, 60 Miss., 862. But the deed is void if recitals required by statute are omitted. Haller v. Blaco, 10 Neb., 36.

If the form as given by the statute contains recitals which would make the sale invalid, they should be omitted. Magill v. Martin, 14 Kan., 67; McCauslin v. McGuire, 14 Kan., 234; Morrill v. Douglass, 14 Kan., 294. A deed in the statutory form, but containing recitals not required by the statute, is no evidence of the truth of such recitals. Millikan v. Patterson, 91 Ind., 515. A deed of resident lands in the form required for non-resident lands held void. Jacks v. Dyer, 31 Ark., 334.

It has been held in California that, if the recitals in a deed show the proceedings in any part defective, the deed cannot be helped by showing that, in fact, they were good. Grimm v. O'Connell, 54 Cal., 522; Hubbell v. Campbell, 56 Cal., 527. But see Caruthers v. McLaren, 56 Miss., 371. Recitals in a deed not required by statute to appear may be treated as surplusage. Flannagan v. Grimmet, 10 Grat., 421; Hobbs v. Shumates, 11 Grat., 516; Harper v. Rowe, 55 Cal., 132. Where the statute requires the date of execution or of the order of the county court authorizing a sale for taxes to be recited in the deed, this must appear, or the deed will be void. Williams v. McLanahan, 67 Mo., 499. See Sabattie v. Baggs, 55 Ga., 572; and, as to statutory form and compliance therewith, Adams v. Mills, 126 Mass., 278. Omission of recitals required by statute held to avoid the deed. Haller v. Blaco, 10 Neb., 36; Lunenberg v. Walter, etc., Co., 118 Mass., 540; Reed v. Crapo, 127 Mass., 39; Thompson v. Merriam, 15 Neb., 498.

One who claims under a tax deed is concluded by its recitals as to the person to whom the land was assessed. Brady v. Dowden, 59 Cal., 51; Grimm v. O'Connell, 54 Cal., 522. Compare Hickman v. Kempner, 35 Ark., 505. In Arkansas erroneous recitals in a tax deed may be corrected in equity. Ibid. But the recitals are presumptively true. Thweatt v. Black, 30 Ark., 732. And so they are in Kansas. Hobson v. Dutton, 9 Kan., 477.

It seems to be settled in Pennsylvania that a deed of county commissioners given on a sale for taxes, reciting the facts which would make out a good sale, is prima facie evidence of those facts. Lee v. Jeddo Coal Co., 84 Pa. St., 74, reviewing prior cases. See, as to New York, Rathbone v. Hooney, 58 N. Y., 463. In Maine recitals are not evidence of the facts recited when not made so by statute. Nason v. Ricker, 63 Me., 381. Where a deed is made evidence only of its own recitals, important facts not recited must be proved. Lawrence v. Zimpleman, 37 Ark., 643. If the deed 'recites that the land sold was offered separately, this in Iowa is conclusive. Chandler v. Keiler, 44 Ia., 371.

deed is made in execution of the statutory power. Here again description becomes important; the description should, in substance at least, follow that in the assessment when the whole parcel assessed was sold, and if less than the whole, then the connection between what was assessed and what was sold should appear. In either case the description should be one that with reasonable certainty identifies the land. If the deed is to one as assignee of the purchaser, there must be evidence, by recital therein or otherwise, of the fact of the assignment."

The form of the deed may be changed by legislation after the purchase is made, and the purchaser cannot object when it does not injure him."

1 In Rhode Island it seems that the facts going to show a regular sale may be proved by parol if the return of sale which the statute provides for is not made. Thurston v. Miller, 10 R. I., 358. If the recitals in the deed do not conform to the facts a second and correct deed may be given. Douglass v. Nuzum, 16 Kan., 515; Gould v. Thompson, 45 Ia., 450. But when the first deed was right, a second cannot be given to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations. Corbin v. Bronson, 28 Kan., 532.

2 See Quivey v. Lawrence, 1 Idaho, 313; Blair Town, etc., Co. v. Scott, 44 Ia., 143. In West Virginia it was held, if the whole tract is reported sold, a deed of a part only is invalid. Williamson v. Russell, 18 W. Va., 612.. As to setting off the land in that state when only a part is sold, see Delany v. Goddin, 12 Grat., 266; Nowlin v. Burwell, 28 Grat., 883.

3 For illustrations see Wendell v. Whitaker, 28 Kan., 690; Martz v. Newton, 29 Kan., 331; Jacks v. Chaffin, 34 Ark., 534; Judd v. Anderson, 51 Ia., 345. Latent defects in description may be explained by parol evidence. Brown v. Walker, 11 Mo. App., 226; Nelson v. Brodhack, 44 Mo., 596; Judd v. Andersen, 51 Ia., 345. A tax deed of one hundred acres of a tract of six hundred is void, and does not entitle the grantee to have a hundred acres surveyed out as the land granted. Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St., 395. 4 Florida Sav. Bank v. Brittain, 20 Fla., 507.

5 Gardenhire v. Mitchell, 21 Kan., 83. In Kansas the purchaser is entitled to his deed when the regular time for redemption has expired, even though there may be a contingent right to redeem by minors, but he will take subject to such contingent right. Ibid.

The fact that both parties in ejectment claim under the state through successive tax titles cannot preclude either from denying the validity of the other's deed. Wadleigh v. Marathon Co. Bank, 58 Wis., 546.

For cases passing upon particular defects as defeating or not defeating a tax deed, see Wing v. Hall, 47 Vt., 182, 215; Renshaw v. Imboden, 31 La. An., 661; Madland v. Benland, 24 Minn., 372; Coxe v. Deringer, 82 Pa. St., 236; Austin v. Holt, 32 Wis., 478; Lybrand v. Haney, 31 Wis., 230; Cutler v. Hurlbut, 29 Wis., 152; Marshall v. Benson, 48 Wis., 558; Jenkins v. McIngree, 22 Fed. Rep., 148; Woodward v. Sloan, 27 Ohio St., 592; Coleman t. Shattuck, 62 N. Y., 348; Earle v. Simons, 94 Ind., 573.