vision of this nature must be strictly complied with. Nothing can be substituted for it by the officers; the right to it cannot be waived by one who chances to be in possession of the land but who has no interest in it, and the owner may rely on his

3

1 Thompson v. Burhans, 61 N. Y., 52; Blackstone v. Sherwood, 31 Kan., 35. ? Where a leasehold interest was sold and was to be conveyed at the expiration of two years from the sale, but the statute required the corporation, at least six months before the expiration of two years from the sale, to cause an advertisement to be published at least twice in each week, for six weeks successively, that unless the lands were redeemed by a certain day they would be conveyed, held, that this was imperative, and that the six weeks must be completed six months before the expiration of two years. Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 594. See Jackson v. Estey, 7 Wend., 148; Comstock v. Beardsley, 15 Wend., 348; Westbrook v. Willey, 47 N. Y., 457; Jenks v. Wright, 61 Pa. St., 410; Wilson v. McKenna, 52 Ill., 43; Hendrix v. Boggs, 15 Neb., 469; Zahradnicek v. Selby, 15 Neb., 579; Seaman v. Thompson, 16 Neb., 546; Merrill v. Dearing, 32 Minn., 479. And compare Wright v. Sperry, 21 Wis., 331. If lands are improperly grouped and sold, this does not affect the right to redeem in parcels. Penn v. Clemans, 19 Ia., 372.

Where notice is required to be served on the party in possession, if it is served on the owner, it will be presumed, in the absence of showing, that he has possession. Hall v. Guthridge, 52 Ia., 408. See Ellsworth v. Low, 62 Ia., 178. As to what will constitute compliance with the statute as to the contents of the notice in Kansas, see Long v. Wolf, 25 Kan., 522, limiting Sharp v. Union, etc., R. Co., 24 Kan., 547; Watkins v. Inge, 24 Kan., 612. Where proof of notice of the expiration of the time to redeem is required to be filed ninety days before such expiration, a deed given before the ninety days has expired is void. Swope v. Prior, 58 Ia., 412; Cummings v. Wilson, 59 Ia., 14. And the land owner may rely on the official entries, in the absence of anything to warn him of their incorrectness for the date of the expiration of the ninety days. Ellsworth v. Green, 59 Ia., 622. As to the proof of notice, see American, etc., Ass'n v. Smith, 59 Ia., 704; Ellsworth v. Cordrey, 63 Ia., 675.

If a notice to redeem is insufficient, so that he gets a void deed, he may give a new notice. If the owner of the land instead of redeeming obtains an injunction staying the issue of a deed until the time to redeem has expired, his right to redeem is gone. Long v. Smith, 62 Ia., 329.

So held under the New York statute. The statute required notice to be given to the party in possession, if any; but it was held that an occupant who had no interest in it could not waive the right to the notice. Jackson v. Estey, 7 Wend., 148. As to who is to be deemed in possession, see Comstock v. Beardsley, 15 Wend., 348; Bush v. Davison, 16 Wend., 550. The occupation intended by the statute is that at the time notice is given. Hand v. Ballou, 12 N. Y., 541.

In Illinois notice to the occupant of the date when the right to redeem expires is a condition precedent to the making of a valid deed, and a notice

right to it, and wait until he receives it before taking proceedings to redeem. Notice, when to be given by an officer, is an official act, and should be put in writing; but whether in writing or not must be distinct and full, and the evidence of giving it should be preserved in the proper office.2

6. Who May Redeem. The determination of this question may to some extent depend upon the phraseology of the statute. The general rule is, that any one may redeem who has in the land an interest which would be affected by the tax conveyance. A statute giving the right to redeem to the "owner' will be construed to embrace the case of the original owner, notwithstanding there is an outstanding tax title. It may also embrace any one who has a substantial interest in the premises; even a wife having a homestead right in her hus

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is fatally defective which states a wrong date of the expiration of the time, and when it may be by publication not more than five nor less than three months before the expiration of such time if there is no occupant, the property must appear to be unoccupied at the time of publication; i. e., up to within five months of such expiration of time. Gage v. Bailey, 100 Ill., 530. 1 Arthurs v. Smathers, 38 Pa. St., 40; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio, 594; Dentler v. State, 4 Blackf., 258. In Iowa a statute required notice to redeem to be given to the owner personally or by publication. The land was erroneously listed to owners unknown" and notice given by publication accordingly. Held not a good notice. Hartley v. Boynton, 17 Fed. Rep., 873; S. C., 5 McCrary, 453. In Illinois it has been decided that where by law notice to redeem was required to be served on the person who was assessed, and the notice was not given, the tax deed was void even though the person assessed had no interest in the land, and though the purchaser had pul lished notice in a newspaper three months before the time to redeem had expired, describing the land, stating his purchase, and also when the redemption would expire. Barnard v. Hoyt, 63 Ill., 341. In Missouri the statute required the certificate of purchase to be recorded, and gave the owner two years after the sale in which to redeem. It was held that recording the certificate was essential. Morton v. Reeds, 9 Mo., 868.

2 Broughton v. Journeay, 51 Pa. St., 31.

3 Dubois v. Hepburn, 10 Pet., 1; Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dillon, 267; McBride v. Hoey, 2 Watts, 436. A bankrupt under the act of congress has been held entitled to redeem land which belonged to him before going into bankruptcy. Hampton v. Rouse, 22 Wall., 263. One in possession and to whom the tax was assessed may redeem. Campbell v. Packard, 61 Wis., 88.

46

4 Lancaster v. County Auditor, 2 Dill., 478. owner" within the meaning of such a statute. An., 207.

A mortgagee held to be

Alter v. Shepherd, 27 La.

8

band's lands,' or a lien creditor, or a purchaser by executory contract. A purchaser at sheriff's sale of the right of one in possession may redeem, though he shows no title in the occupant. And so may a husband who claims in right of his wife; or a dowress; or a mortgagee or his assignee; or a lessee; or a guardian or other person acting for another under disability. It has even been held in a number of cases that one in possession of land by mere color of title may redeem; 10 but this can hardly be universally true under the statutes of different states, which after all, it must be borne in mind, are to control in respect to the persons who are to have the privilege of redeeming as well as in other respects." It is held that one interested in lands sold in solido may redeem for all," and

1 Adams v. Beale, 19 Ia., 61.

2 Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dill., 267; Basso v. Benker, 33 La. An., 432.

3 Rich v. Palmer, 7 Or., 133: Woodward v. Campbell, 39 Ark., 580. In Massachusetts it has been held that one who has bought the land by executory contract may compel the purchaser for taxes to assign to him on receipt of the redemption money. Rogers v. Rutter, 11 Gray, 410.

4 Shearer v. Woodburn, 10 Pa. St., 511.

5 Dubois v. Hepburn, 10 Pet., 1.

6 Rice v. Nelson, 27 Ia., 148.

7 Faxon v. Wallace, 101 Mass., 444; Montgomery v. Burton, 31 La. An., 330; Lloyd v. Bunce, 41 Ia., 660; Ellsworth v. Low, 62 Ia., 178; Duncan v. Smith, 31 N. J., 325.

Where the statute gave the right to redeem to a "mortgagee of record," it was held sufficient if the mortgage was on record at the time of the offer to redeem. Hawes v. Howland, 136 Mass., 267.

8 Byington v. Rider, 9 Ia., 566.

9 Witt v. Mewhirter, 57 Ia., 545.

10 See Brown v. Day, 78 Pa. St., 129; Foster v. Bowman, 55 Ia., 237. The redemption will inure to the benefit of the true owner, and the party paying cannot after the time for redemption expires withdraw the money. Levick v. Brotherline, 74 Pa. St., 149.

11 In Mississippi by a recent statute "the owner or any one interested in lands" sold for taxes is not allowed to redeem, but is given the right for twelve months, in preference to all other persons, to enter the lands as purchaser from the holder of the tax title. See Bonds v. Greer, 56 Miss., 710. But this purchase is in effect a redemption. Faler v. McRae, 56 Miss., 227. In Iowa the holder of any right in lands, legal or equitable, perfect or inchoate, may redeem from a tax sale, and the officer, it seems, should receive the money of any one coming in apparent good faith to make redemption, leaving the question of his right to be determined afterwards if disputed. Cummings v. Wilson, 59 Ia., 14. See Chapin v. Curtenius, 15 Ill., 427.

12 Loomis v. Pingree, 43 Me., 299. When an undivided interest in lands the whole of which is subject to a tax sale is sold on execution, the sheriff

probably he would be compelled to redeem for all unless the statute under which the sale was made provided otherwise; for the purchaser seems to be equitably entitled to have either all the land he bought, or all the purchase money refunded.1 But no one can be entitled to go farther in redemption than may be necessary under the law for the protection of his interest.

7. Who May Not Redeem. A stranger to the title cannot defeat a tax purchase by redemption. The purchaser has acquired a title which is subject only to the right of those interested to redeem; and no payment of the amount by a stranger. and no acceptance of it by any official from a stranger, can affect this right. Probably the acceptance of the redemption money by the purchaser himself would preclude his afterwards claiming rights under his purchase; but nothing short of his own recognition of the unauthorized act of one who, if he had no interest, would be a mere intermeddler, could conclude him in such a case.1

8. Imperfect Redemption. It has sometimes happened that, by reason of fraud or other fault on the part of the officer or purchaser, a party who has in good faith attempted to redeem, and who has done all that was required of him by the party enti tled to receive the money, has nevertheless failed in exact and literal compliance with the law. In such a case equity will take notice of the facts as entitling the party to relief, and

may pay the whole tax from the proceeds of sale. Dungan's Appeal, 88 Pa. St., 414.

1 Rich v. Palmer, 6 Or., 339. It appears to be the rule in Iowa that one must redeem all he has a right to redeem, and cannot compel the purchaser to accept less. Curl v. Watson, 25 Ia., 35; Jacobs v. Porter, 34 Ia.. 342. 345. The redemption by one lien holder is redemption for all. Ellsworth v. Low, 62 Ia., 178. See People v. McEwen, 23 Cal., 54. Part of a parcel sold as an entirety cannot be redeemed separately without a statute expressly authorizing it. State v. Schaack, 28 Minn., 358. One having only an undivided interest must nevertheless redeem the whole title. O'Reilly v. Holt, 1 Woods, 645.

2 Goodrich v. Florer, 27 Minn., 97; Lloyd v. Bunce, 41 Ia., 660.

3 See Eaton v. North, 25 Wis., 514; Cousins v. Allen, 28 Wis., 232.

4 Byington v. Bookwalter, 7 Ia., 512; Penn v. Clemans, 19 Ia., 372. The officer to whom redemption is made need have no proof that the person offering to make it is authorized to do so, unless the statute requires this. Chapin v. Curtenius, 15 Ill., 427.

will hold the redemption, which has failed in form, to have been effected for all purposes of protecting the estate against a forfeiture which, under the circumstances, the statute did not intend, and would not purposely have authorized.' But it is very justly held in all such cases, especially if the party attempting redemption has not paid all that was requisite to complete the statutory right, he shall make a clear showing that no part of the responsibility for the error justly rests upon him. If by the mutual mistake of the officer and of the party the redemption has failed, or if it is left in doubt whether the officer was in fault at all, the case presents no other ground of equity than would exist in any case where, through inadvertence or misapprehension, the party has failed to assert his right in due season; and he will be left by the law where his own negligence or inattention has placed him.2

9. Waiver of Defects in Redemption. The holder of the tax purchase may waive strict compliance with statutory conditions, either expressly by contract or indirectly by some act which is inconsistent with a purpose on his part to insist upon his purchase. Thus, if after the time for redemption has expired he receives payment, this will be a waiver by implication; 3 but a tender of the amount after redemption has expired will be of no force whatever unless the tender is accepted.*

3

1 See Price v. Mott, 52 Pa. St., 315; Dietrick v. Mason, 57 Pa. St., 40; Noble v. Bullis, 23 Ia., 559; Corning Town Co. v. Davis, 44 Ia., 622; Railroad Co. v. Storm Lake Bank, 55 Ia., 696; Gage v. Scales, 100 Ill., 218.

In Bubb v. Tompkins, 47 Pa. St., 359, it was decided that the redemption was effectual, though by mistake of the county treasurer all of the taxes were not included which should have been.

If redemption is prevented by the officer refusing to give a statement and receive the amount, the title is not cut off. Van Benthuysen v. Sawyer, 36 N. Y., 150.

2 Lamb v. Irwin, 69 Pa. St., 436.

Where a statute provides that, if land struck off to a county remains unredeemed for five years, it may be sold, the five full years must elapse before any steps can be taken towards selling again. The officer cannot make costs by advertising within the five years. Hier v. Rullman, 22 Kan., 606.

Coxe v. Wolcott, 27 Pa. St., 151; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. St., 440. 4 Thweatt v. Black, 30 Ark., 732. In Rogers v. Johnson, 70 Pa. St., 224, a written agreement given by the purchaser to the owner, agreeing to convey on being paid the amount of the bid with twenty-five per cent. additionaì, was regarded as a good redemption. So is a tender to the purchaser suffi