Of the occupations upon which license fees are usually imposed, the most conspicuous has already been mentioned; that, namely, of the manufacture and vending of spirituous and malt liquors. Few persons dispute the necessity for the regulation by law of this business; when the legislation has gone to the extent of the entire prohibition, the judiciary has not deemed itself competent to interfere.2

Illustrations of other occupations which are commonly supposed to require special regulations are those of hackmen, draymen, hawkers, auctioneers, etc. A license fee imposed upon "all transient persons keeping stores" in the town imposing it has been sustained as a police regulation, though called a tax

Forehand, 100 Mass., 136; Morey v. Brown, 42 N. H., 373; Mitchell v. Williams, 27 Ind., 62.

For a construction of the Indiana statute for the taxing of dogs, see Shelby v. Randles, 57 Ind., 390. A specific tax for the privilege of keeping dogs may be imposed, and it may be provided that, on failure to pay, the dog may be killed.

That a constitutional provision for the taxation of property by value will not preclude a per capita tax on dogs, see Holst v. Roe, 39 Ohio St., 340; Van Horn v. People, 46 Mich., 183; Cole v. Hall, 103 Ill., 30; Woolf v. Chalker, 31 Conn., 121; Ex parte Cooper, 3 Tex. Ap., 489, and the cases above cited. Contra, Washington v. Meigs, 1 MacAr., 53; Mowery v. Salisbury, 82 N. C., 175.

1 In Keller v. State, 11 Md., 525, an act requiring manufacturers of beer to take out a license for retailing was objected to as compelling them to pay more than their fair proportion towards the expense of the government; but the court say, "the system of legislation to which this act belongs may be vindicated on the plainest grounds of public policy." As to the right in general, see Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga., 586; Thomasson v. State, 15 Ind., 449; Aulanier v. Governor, 1 Tex., 653; Smith v. Adrian, 1 Mich., 495; Gardner v. People, 20 Ill., 430; License Cases, 5 Kow., 504; License Tax Cases, 5 Wall., 472.

2 It has been held in Illinois that the corporate authorities of towns, when empowered by their charters to suppress the sale of intoxicating liquors, might declare the unlicensed selling a nuisance. Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill., 588; Byers v. Olney, 16 Ill., 35; Jacksonville v. Holland, 19 Ill., 271; Pekin v. Smelzel, 21 Ill., 464; Block v. Jacksonville, 36 Ill., 301. In Texas a fee of $250 required of retailers of liquors has been sustained as only a regulation of police, and not a tax. Baker v. Panola County, 30 Tex., 86.

3 Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio, 625; Nightingale's Case, 11 Pick., 168; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St., 550; Adams v. Somerville, 2 Head, 363; State v. Crawford, 2 Head, 460; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend., 99; Brooklyn v. Breslin, 57 N. Y., 591.

2

in the legislation which permitted it. The license of street railway cars has been supported under the police power; and so has been the licensing of insurance. Inspection fees are to be referred to the same authority, and are not taxes.1

3

Issuing the license. This is usually done by some administrative officer or board under general regulations. It has been held in Georgia that one applying for a license is entitled to it of right if he complies with the statutory conditions." But this cannot be universally true. In some cases the purpose of the legislation is to limit the number, and then a discretion will be allowed to grant or refuse, just as is done in England in the case of applicants for license to sell liquors. In others the regulations are often made exceedingly stringent. In addition to the payment of the tax a bond for good behavior is often re

1 Wilmington v. Roby, 8 Ired., 250. See Wilmington v. Patterson, 8 Jones, Law, 182. A statute forbidding sales by sample in the city of Louisville without a license was sustained against an objection on constitutional grounds in Commonwealth v. Smith, 6 Bush, 303; Mork v. Commonwealth, 6 Bush, 397.

2 Frankford, etc., R. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 58 Pa. St., 119; Johnson v. Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St., 445; State v. Herod, 29 Ia., 123. Railroad companies may be required to light such part of their track as is within a city or village, and on failure the cost may be made a lien on their real estate. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 32 Ohio St., 152.

3 Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis., 136. An ordinance provided for a license fee of $100 to be paid by every person or company doing an insurance business in the city. Held that although more than the cost of issuing the license the amount was collectible. Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kan., 627. Where the law imposes a special tax on foreign insurance companies, and a tax on all insurance companies, the two taxes may be collected from the former class. Leavenworth v. Booth, supra.

24.

4 Charleston v. Rogers, 2 McCord, 495; O'Maley v. Freeport, 96 Pa. St., It was decided in East St. Louis v. Wider, 46 Ill., 351, that a license fee required of merchants could not be discharged by a tender of evidences of indebtedness of the police commissioners, though that indebtedness was made receivable for taxes. A license tax on a business in a city for the benefit of the county in which it is, if regarded as a police regulation, may be upheld though not uniform throughout the district, since the price of the license may be graduated by the populousness of the community or by the profitableness of the business licensed. Ex parte Marshall, 64 Ala., 266. A city may be empowered to exact a license from every meat-packing establishment in it or within a mile of its limits. Chicago Packing, etc., Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill., 221.

5 State v. Justices, 15 Ga., 408; Hill v. Decatur, 22 Ga., 203.

quired, and sometimes a satisfactory showing of good moral character.1

Recalling licenses. Under some statutes licenses are perImitted to be recalled or revoked for the misbehavior of those who hold them. This in some cases is a very salutary power. They are subject also, like all other statutory privileges, to be terminated by changes in the laws; as a retailer's license, for instance, is terminated by a law totally prohibiting sales.2

Collection of license fees. What has already been said regarding the collection of taxes will preclude the necessity for any extended remarks regarding the collection of these fees. As has been remarked, the payment is usually required in advance. If they are not paid, and the privilege is nevertheless exercised, the statute or ordinance imposing the fee will determine what the consequence shall be, and what proceedings shall be taken. It has been decided that a municipal corporation empowered to grant licenses and to impose a fee therefor may lawfully make the failure to take out a license and pay

1In Whitten v. Covington, 43 Ga., 421, a requirement that the applicant for a license to sell liquor should produce the recommendation of four of his nearest neighbors was sustained; a requirement not always possible to be complied with.

The order of a county court to its clerk to issue license to retail spirituous liquors to an applicant does not, of itself, authorize the applicant to retail, but only authorizes the issuance of the license to do so after the applicant has complied with all the prerequisites of the law. Brown v. State, 27 Tex., 335.

2 On this subject, see Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass., 19; Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass., 70; Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick., 184; Brick Presb. Church v. New York, 5 Cow,, 538; Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow., 585; People v. Morris, 13 Wend., 325; Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y., 657; State v. Holmes, 38 N. H., 225; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St., 15; Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo., 606; State v. Sterling, 8 Mo., 697; Gatzweller v. People, 14 Ill., 142; Phalen v. Virginia, 8 How., 163; Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How., 402. Some courts have been inclined to hold that a license, unless for misconduct, cannot be revoked except on a return of the fee: see Adams v. Hackett, 27 N. H., 289, 294; State v. Phalen, 3 Harr., 441; Boyd v. State, 46 Ala., 329; and certainly repayment would generally be equitable.

When a city has power to suppress the sale of liquors, it may revoke a license for failure to observe an ordinance. Schwuchow v. Chicago, 68 Ill.,

the fee subject the offender to the penalty of fine and imprisonment.1

Federal licenses. The licenses issued by the federal government for revenue purposes do not supersede state regulations, and consequently must be received subject to all such requirements of license fees as the state may have seen fit to impose.2 The federal government does not issue licenses under the police power, but may do so in some cases under the power to regulate commerce, and in the exercise of other federal powers; but such cases seem to call for no special remark.

1 See Cincinnati v. Buckingham, 10 Ohio, 257; White v. Kent, 11 Ohio St., 550; Vandine, Petitioner, 6 Pick., 187; Nightingale, Petitioner, 11 Pick., 168; Shelton v. Mobile, 30 Ala., 540; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich., 43; Brooklyn v. Cleves, Lalor, 231; Buffalo v. Webster, 10 Wend., 99. ler's Appeal, 73 Pa. St., 448.

Contra, But

2 McGuire v. Commonwealth, 3 Wall., 387; Purvear v. Commonwealth, 5 Wall., 72; Commonwealth v. Thorniley, 6 Allen, 445; Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 10 Allen, 200; Commonwealth v. Keenan, 11 Allen, 262; Black v. Jeffersonville, 36 Ill., 301; State v. Carney, 20 Ia., 82; State v. Stutz, 20 Ia., 488.

CHAPTER XX.

TAXATION BY SPECIAL ASSESSMENT.

A very important species of taxation is that which is laid in the form of special assessments. This is done upon a system the general principles of which have long been recognized and acted upon in England, though perhaps not to so great an extent, nor with such distinct recognition of the proper sphere for its application, as they now are in the American states. It will be convenient to consider the general subject of special assessments under the following heads:

1. The principles which underlie them.

2. The cases in which it is customary to levy them.

3. The objections which are made to them in point of policy. 4. The objections which constitutional principles or provisions are sometimes thought to oppose.

5. The principles of apportionment.

6. The proceedings in levying and collecting them.

1. The principles underlying them. Special assessments are a peculiar species of taxation, standing apart from the general burdens imposed for state and municipal purposes, and governed by principles that do not apply universally. The general levy of taxes is understood to exact contributions in return for the general benefits of government, and it promises nothing to the persons taxed, beyond what may be anticipated from an administration of the laws for individual protection and the general public good. Special assessments, on the other hand, are made upon the assumption that a portion of the community is to be specially and peculiarly benefited, in the enhancement of the value of property peculiarly situated as regards a contemplated expenditure of public funds; and, in addition to the general levy, they demand that special contributions, in consideration of the special benefit, shall be made by the persons receiving it. The justice of demanding the special contribution is supposed to be evident in the fact that the persons who are to make it, while they are