ment been restricted to the adjacent lots, there might, perhaps, have been no difficulty in sustaining it, as has been done in some cases.1

in the act or in the nature of things to prevent a lot being assessed several times in different districts, as often as a sewer is constructed which, in the opinion of the common council, is productive of benefit to the neighborhood. This might not be unjust if each assessment was laid upon an estimate of actual benefits; but when it is levied by an arbitrary standard which requires the burden to be laid upon lands far from the sewer and only slightly benefited, equally with those fronting upon it and greatly benefited, it is manifest that it must not only work injustice, but that in some cases it may amount to actual confiscation. It is not, therefore, legally possible that such an apportionment of the cost of sewers can be just or equal, or in proportion to benefits." See, for a similar case, Kennedy v. Troy, 14 Hun, 308. And for a like principle, Preston v. Roberts, 12 Bush, 570.

1 See Grinnell v. Des Moines, 57 Ia., 144; Gillette v. Denver, 21 Fed. Rep., 822.

An assessment according to frontage made by the water commissioners against property not using water but in front of which the pipes are laid is neither a local assessment nor a specific tax, and does not comply with any rule of uniformity, and is therefore void. Jones v. Water Commissioners, 34 Mich., 273. That it is competent to assess for sewers by special benefits is unquestionable. See Wolf v. Philadelphia, 105 Pa. St., 25. An assessment for a sewer by frontage was held in Clapp v. Hartford, 35 Conn., 66, too unreasonable to be sanctioned; while in Hungerford v. Hartford, 39 Conn., 279, one by special benefits was upheld.

A statute authorizing commissioners to assess the cost of a sewer on lands benefited thereby in such proportions as they should deem just and equitable was held invalid in New Brunswick Rubber Co. v. Commissioners, 38 N. J., 190, as failing to lay down any definite rule of apportionment. This was followed in Barnes v. Dyer, 56 Vt., 469, where a sidewalk assessment came in question. The common council was empowered by statute to assess upon the owners of abutting property so much of the expense as they should deem just and equitable. Teazey, J., said: "The only question here is whether the phrase, as they shall deem just and equitable,' is sufficiently certain as a standard of assessment. If it could be properly construed as meaning only what was just and equitable in view of the benefit to the premises fronting on the improved sidewalk, it would possibly be sufficient. The exceptions do not state upon what view or theory the assessment in question was made. If said clause is fairly liable to a different construction from the one above stated, then it furnishes no certain legal standard of assessment. Did the court or common council determine the amount of this assessment in view of the benefit to the abutting land, or of its value, or of the personal convenience to the defendant, or of the ability of the defendant to pay, or of all of these combined? Who can say? Why might they not under this clause assess one man in one view and another in another view? Just and equitable in respect to what? The words import no special limitation." See, also, Whiteford v. Probate Judge, 53 Mich., 130.

The legislative authority in respect to assessment districts is sometimes exercised by making several districts for a single work. This indeed is often done in the case of street improvements; it being equally within the power of the legislature to prescribe one district over which the whole cost of the improvement shall be spread, or to make separate districts for the improvement along the several blocks. It has even been held that the improvement of several streets may be treated as one work for the purposes of a special assessment, and the whole cost apportioned by uniform rule throughout one district, and this may perhaps be equally competent with the general assessment throughout a city of the cost of such improvements.

Where the legislature prescribes no limits to the taxing district, but authorizes an assessment on such property as shall appear to be benefited, the report of the assessors or commissioners can alone determime what the district shall be. The

Scoville v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St., 126; Creighton v. Scott, 14 Ohio St., 438; Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich., 322; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36' Pa. St., 29.

2 See ante, p. 150. In Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass., 352, the expense of constructing sidewalks on two streets was levied by one assessment, and apportioned among the lots abutting on the two streets. The only authority under which this could be done was the statute which empowered the mayor and aldermen, whenever they should deem it expedient to construct sidewalks "in any street," to assess the expense on the abuttors in just proportions. By this the court thought "it was evidently intended by the legislature that the case of each street should be considered separately, and with a view to its own special circumstances;" and that. consequently, "the power to treat two sidewalks in two distinct streets as one for the purposes of assessment [was] not given by the statute." Compare Hager v. Burlington, 42 Ia., 661. In England it is held that separate lines of sewers ought not to be included in one district, when they are on a different level, and no one is of benefit to the district drained by the other. Rex v. Tower Hamlets, 9 B. & C., 517. For a very peculiar case in which the case of Arnold v. Cambridge was held not applicable, see Cuming v. Grand Rapids, 46 Mich., 150. An assessment for a sewer is not invalid because of the sewer being constructed along more than one street, if the improvement is a unity. Grimmell v. Des Moines, 57 Ia.. 144; Kendig v. Knight, 60 Ia., 29. As to when two sewers may be provided for by one assessment see Matter of Ingraham, 64 N. Y., 310. It is not competent to assess for two separate and distinct public improvements as an entirety, and assess the cost together, unless the statute provides therefor or there are special reasons making it proper. Mayall v. St. Paul, 30 Minn., 294. For a proper case see Stoddard v. Johnson, 75 Ind., 20.

subject is referred to them as a matter depending on judgment, after actual inspection; but as they only pass upon the question of fact, the district is to be considered as prescribed by the legislature, when the principle is settled which is to determine it. And when once prescribed under competent legislative authority, the levy must embrace all the property within the district to which the principle of the assessment is applicable. To omit any would be to defeat the rule of apportionment."

Assessments by the Foot Front. In many instances where streets were to be opened or improved, sewers constructed, water pipes laid, or other improvements entered upon, the benefits of which might be expected to diffuse themselves along the line of the improvement in a degree bearing some proportion to the frontage, the legislature has deemed it right and proper to take the line of frontage as the most practicable and reasonable measure of probable benefits; and making that the standard, to apportion the benefits accordingly. Such a measure of apportionment seems at first blush to be perfectly arbitrary, and likely to operate in some cases with great injustice; but it cannot be denied that in the case of some improvements, frontage is a very reasonable measure of benefits; much more just than value could be; and perhaps approaching equality as nearly as any estimate of benefits made by the judgment of men. However this may be, the authorities are well united in the conclusion that frontage may lawfully be made the basis of apportionment.3

1 As to districts depending on the estimates of commissioners, see Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich., 504; Matter of Ward, 52 N. Y., 395; Raymond v. Cleveland, 42 Ohio St., 522.

2 Hassan v. Rochester, 67 N. Y., 528; In re Prot. Epis. School, 75 N. Y., 324. See Matter of Churchill, 82 N. Y., 288. If the assessment fails to embrace all the property of the district, the legislature cannot validate it. People v. Lynch, 51 Cal., 15; Brady v. King, 53 Cal., 44; People v. McCune, 57 Cal., 153. See People v. Houston, 54 Cal., 536.

3 Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle, 291; McGonigle v. Alleghany City, 44 Pa. St., 118; Magee v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. St., 308; Spring Garden v. Wistar, 18 Pa. St., 195; Stroud v. Philadelphia, 61 Pa. St., 255; Covington v. Boyle, 6 Bush, 204; State v. Elizabeth, 30 N. J., 365; Same v. Same, 31 N. J., 547; State v. Fuller, 34 N. J., 227; Ernst v. Kunkle, 5 Ohio St., 520; Upington v. Oviatt, 24 Ohio St., 232; Wilder v. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St., 284; Barnes v. Atchison, 2 Kan., 455: Parker v. Challiss, 9 Kan., 155; St. Joseph v. An

Occasional hardships must inevitably result from the adoption of such a basis, but the question is fairly a debatable one, whether they are likely to be more serious or more frequent than those which are to be anticipated from the selection of some other rule; and this question must be deemed settled by the statute.1

thony, 20 Mo., 537; Fowler v. St. Joseph, 37 Mo., 228; Neenan v. Smith, 50 Mo., 525; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal., 497; Whiting v. Quackenbush, 54 Cal., 306; Palmer v. Stumpf, 29 Ind., 329; Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt., 174; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich., 560; Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich., 495; King v. Portland, 2 Or., 146; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I., 50; White v. People, 94 Ill., 604; Whiting v. Townsend, 57 Cal., 515; Sheley v. Detroit, 45 Mich., 431. A corner lot may be charged with the cost of improving the intersection of the two streets. Wolf v. Keokuk, 48 Ia., 129. See Sands v. Richmond, 31 Grat., 571.

1 In Terry v. Hartford, 39 Conn., 286, the opening of the street for which a special assessment was made left a narrow strip of land on each side belonging to Terry; so narrow as to be incapable of use, except in connection with the adjacent lands. It was nevertheless assessed heavily for benefits. The case showed that both this and the adjacent land would be largely benefited if used together. The court say, "when we consider that here is land that would be benefited to an amount of more than $3,600 by the laying out of this street, should the annexation be made, and the land adjoining would likewise be benefited to a large amount under the like circumstances, and that no benefit would be conferred on either tract so long as they remain the property of different proprietors, is it reasonable to suppose that there can be any serious obstacle to prevent the one owner from selling and the other from buying, when so great an advantage would result to both from such sale and purchase? A consideration of this character, no doubt, had its proper effect in the determination of the question, whether the land was benefited or not, and the extent of that benefit." See, also, Same v. Same, 39 Conn., 291.

The frontage rule, as applied to rural lands, is "unequal, unjust and unconstitutional; and in thus saying we but repeat what has been said over and over again in a long series of cases commencing with the Washington Avenue Case, 69 Pa. St., 352, and ending with Craig v. City of Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St., 268." Gordon, J., Philadelphia v. Rule, 93 Pa. St., 15. See Seely v. Pittsburg, 82 Pa. St., 360. Where an assessment by the foot front covers a whole lot, it will not be held objectionable because of the fact that a part of the lot, if assessed by itself, would be unjustly assessed. Moale v. Baltimore, 61 Md., 224. Where an assessment is to be by benefits, one by the lineal foot is not necessarily wrong. State v. Passaic, 37 N. J., 65. As to statutory correction of errors in an assessment by frontage, see Griswold v. Pelton, 34 Ohio St., 482. Where the legislature has invested a municipal body with power to provide by ordinance for assessing the cost of an improvement upon the property benefited, if such body adopts the rule of frontage as the rule of apportionment, the courts cannot, without statutory

The principle of these statutes is the same with that which supports assessments made through the intervention of assessors or commissioners. The benefits, actually or presumptively received, support the tax. Apportioning the cost by the frontage on the improvement is adopted by the legislature as constituting, in the judgment of its members, an apportionment in proportion to benefits as nearly as is reasonably practicable. This we understand to be substantially the view taken by the authorities.

In some instances a somewhat different method has been adopted for levying the cost of local works. Instead of establishing a taxing district, and apportioning the cost throughout it by some standard of benefit, actual or presumptive, the case of each individual lot fronting on the improvement has been taken by itself, and that lot has been assessed with the cost of the improvement along its front; or perhaps with one-half the cost, leaving the opposite lot to be assessed for the other half. If such a regulation constitutes the apportionment of a tax, it must be supported when properly ordered by or under the authority of the legislature. But it has been denied, on what seem the most conclusive grounds, that this is permissible. It is not legitimate taxation because it is lacking in one of its indispensable elements. It considers each lot by itself, com

authority to do so, interfere with the determination, unless a clear case of abuse is made out. Baltimore v. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md., 1; overruling Baltimore v. Scharf, 54 Md., 499.

The fact that a town lot is used by a railroad for its purposes will not exempt it from a street assessment by the foot front. Ludlow v. Trustees, 78 Ky., 357.

The following cases are important: "Bounding or abutting" on a street will include the soil of a private road opening into the street. Pound v. Plumstead Board of Works, Law Rep., 7 Q. B., 183. "Adjoining" means touching or contiguous, as distinguished from lying near or adjacent. Matter of Ward, 52 N. Y., 395, citing Rex v. Hodge, 1 M. & M., 371; Peverelly r. People, 3 Park. C. R., 59; Holmes v. Carley, 31 N. Y., 289. "In front" of a lot construed to embrace, in case of a corner lot, not only the front, commonly so called, but the line of the lot on the side street also. Des Moines v. Dorr, 31 Ia., 89; Morrison v. Hershire, 32 Ia., 271. A lot is not "fronting" on a street when it is separated from it by a narrow strip. Philadelphia v. Eastwick, 35 Pa. St., 75.

I See State v. Fuller, 34 N. J., 227, 232, per Bedle, J.; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St., 29, 57, per Strong, J.; Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St., 159, 165, per Peck, J.