that a state tax of a certain sum on every person leaving the state by public conveyance was invalid; the tendency being to embarrass the functions of the national government, by obstructing the travel of citizens and officers of the United States in the business of the government and the transportation of armies and munitions of war.1

6. Public Property. It is customary for the federal government, in receiving a new state to the Union, to require from it-though probably without necessity 2-a stipulation that

1 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall., 35. See Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S., 460. The like principle was recognized in State v. Jackson, 33 N. J., 450, where a bounty voted to relieve a town from a draft was held invalid, as tending to defeat the legislation of congress on the subject. That case was decided by a divided court, and the decision is opposed to the current of authority. In State Treasurer v. Philadelphia, etc., R. R. Co., 4 Houston, 158, a law which imposed a state tax on railroad companies of ten cents on every passenger carried within the state, excepting soldiers and sailors of the United States, was held to be not a tax upon the business of the carrier, measured by the number of persons carried, but a tax upon the persons carried, to be collected by the carrier for the state, and, consequently, so far as it operated upon persons entering into, departing from, or passing through the state, was, in effect, a regulation of commerce between the states, and, consequently, within the decision in Crandall v. Nevada. The case is reasoned by Chancellor Bates with his accustomed ability, but it will be seen from the statement of the case that some of the objections to the Nevada act could not be made to this.

2 See Blue Jacket v. Johnson Co., 3 Kan., 299. Lands purchased by the United States at a tax sale are not taxable by the state. People v. United States, 93 Ill., 30. The state has a right to tax a private corporation upon railroad property situated within the bounds of a government reservation. Fort Leavenworth, etc., Co. v. Lowe, 27 Kan., 749. And to tax equitable interests and improvements held or owned by individuals in government lands. Hodgdon v. Burleigh, 4 Fed. Rep., 111; Oswalt v. Hallowell, 15 Kan., 154; Quincy v. Lawrence, 1 Idaho, 313; People v. Mining Co., 1 Idaho, 409; Ivinson v. Hance, 1 Wy., 270. A possessory interest in public lands for mining purposes may be taxed as a species of property. People v. Shearer, 30 Cal., 615; People v. Cohen, 31 Cal., 210; People v. Donnelly, 58 Cal., 144; People v. Mining Co., 37 Cal., 54.

Property occupied for the United States, but not owned by it, was held taxable to the owner in Speed v. St. Louis County Court, 42 Mo., 382. And the fact that the government has an interest in real estate does not preclude the taxation of other interests to the owners. State v. Moore, 12 Cal., 56. As, for example, ore taken from the lands. Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S., 762. Buildings erected by the United States for government use on leased lands are not taxable by the state. Andrews v. The Auditor, 28 Grat., 115. A

the public domain, lying within its limits, shall not be taxed by the state. The disability remains effective until the United States has made sale, or other disposition, of the lands, but it then terminates, notwithstanding the title may not have passed by the actual execution and delivery of patent of conveyance; the land being actually severed from the public domain by the sale itself. But this principle will not apply in any case until the right to a patent is complete, and the equitable title fully vested in the party without anything more to be paid or any act to be done, going to the foundation of the right. Nor will it apply where, as one of the conditions of the

postoffice and custom-house cannot be assessed for a street improvement. Fagan v. Chicago, 84 Ill., 227.

A right in a railroad company to make use, for its purposes, of property owned by the United States, is not, under the statutes of Iowa, separately liable to taxation. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Davenport, 51 Ia., 451. Lands in Nebraska granted to Alabama for school purposes held not taxable until the state had sold them. Stoutz v. Brown, 5 Dill., 445.

1 Carrol v. Perry, 4 McLean, 25; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 21 Ark., 240; S. C., 4 Wall., 210; Puget Sound Agricultural Co. v. Pierce County, 1 Wash. T'y Rep., 180; Carrol v. Safford, 3 How., 441; Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McL., 107; People v. Shearer, 30 Cal., 645; Hall v. Dowling, 18 Cal., 619; Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Ia., 221; McGoon v. Scales, 9 Wall., 23; Railway Co. v. McShane, 22 Wall., 444; Hunnewell v. Cass Co., 22 Wall., 464; Colorado Co. v. Commissioners, 95 U. S., 259; Bronson v. Kukuk, 3 Dill., 490; Nor. Wis. R. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 8 Biss., 414; Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Howard, 51 Cal., 229; Ross v. Outagamie Co., 12 Wis., 38. If, previous to the passage of an act of congress confirming to a state certain lands long claimed by it, a tax is laid on such lands in the hands of grantees from the state, the confirming act makes the state's title relate to the time when the state claimed it, and makes valid the tax. Litchfield v. Hamilton Co., 40 Ia., 66. Railroad grant lands are taxable as soon as earned. Dickerson v. Yetzer, 53 Ia., 681; Railroad Co. v. Morris, 13 Kan., 302. Unless some condition precedent is to be first performed. White v. Railroad Co., 5 Neb., 393. See Railway Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall., 603; Railway Co. v. Trempealeau Co., 93 U. S., 595.

Land confirmed to a private owner under a treaty with a foreign country becomes taxable when by law or treaty the title passes, but not before. Colorado Co. v. Commissioners, 95 U. S., 259; Commissioners v. Improvement Co., 2 Col., 628.

2 Railway Company v. Prescott, 16 Wall., 603, in which case one of the conditions of the grant was, that the cost of the government surveys, selections, etc., should be prepaid by the grantee before the lands should be conveyed. See to the same effect, Cass Co. v. Morrison, 28 Minn., 257. Land purchased of the United States on a forged warrant, which is afterwards ex

grant, the lands not sold by the grantee within a time named are to be open to pre-emption and settlement like any portion of the public domain.1

7. Occasional Agencies. Railroads owned and controlled by private corporations are, in a certain sense, public conveniences and agencies, but they constitute no branch or part of the government, either state or national, and are not properly governmental agencies, even though the government may employ them for the transportation of its troops, its mails, etc., or for other purposes. The corporations owning them are consequently entitled to claim no exemption based on any implication that they are essential to the operations of the government.2 changed for money, is taxable from the time of entry. Wheeler v. Merriman, 30 Minn., 372.

The fact that lands are granted by congress for the sole purpose of constructing a railroad does not preclude the legislature from taking them after they have been earned by and become the property of the railroad company. West Wis. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 35 Wis., 257.

Or

1 Railway Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall., 603. Compare Tucker v. Ferguson, 22 Wall., 527. Land taken up under the United States homestead law is not taxable until the proofs are made which entitle the occupant to a patent. Long v. Culp, 14 Kan., 412; Chase Co. Com'rs v. Shipman, 14 Kan., 532. at least until he is entitled to make such proofs. Bellinger v. White, 5 Neb., 399; Moriarty v. Boone Co., 39 Ia., 634. And see, in general, McGregor, etc., R. R. Co. v. Brown, 39 Ia., 655; Doe v. Railroad Co., 54 Ia., 657; Grant v. Railroad Co., 54 Ia., 673; Reynolds v. Plymouth Co., 55 Ia., 90; Donovan v. Kloke, 6 Neb., 124; Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Howard, 52 Cal., 228; Bronson v. Kukuk, 3 Dill., 490; Hunnewell v. Cass Co., 22 Wall., 464; Colorado Co. v. Commissioners, 95 U. S., 259; Litchfield v. Webster Co., 101 U. S., 773. 2 Thompson v. Pacific R. R., 9 Wall., 579; Central, etc., R. R. Co. v. Board of Equalization, 60 Cal., 35. Compare People v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 43 Cal., 398; Huntington v. Same, 2 Sawyer, 503; Inhabitants of Worcester v. Western R. R. Corp., 4 Met., 564, 568; Boston & Me. R. R. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush., 237. In the case of the Union Pacific R. R. Company, chartered by congress, and in which the government has important interests with some power of control, the states have no power to tax the operations of the road, though they may tax the property. U. P. R. R. Co. v. Peniston, 18 Wall., 5. A bridge owned by the United States, over which a railroad has a right of passage as over its own track, by reason of its paying half the cost of building, is not taxable. Chicago, etc., R'y Co. v. Davenport, 51 Ia., 451.

Lands held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe are not made taxable by the fact that an individual has made a contract of purchase on which he has paid nothing. Railroad Co. v. Morris, 13 Kan., 302.

A state bank chartered for the benefit of the state, and with the faith and credit of the state pledged for its support, is not subject to taxation by a municipal corporation. Nashville v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Swan, 269.

They are therefore taxable as natural persons would be, whom the government might employ for the performance of similar services.1

2

Taxes on commerce: Imports and Exports. The federal constitution provides that "No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any state on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States." The inspection fees which may properly be imposed under this clause are in no sense a duty on imports or exports, but are a compensation for services; and the net produce of charges nominally made for inspection is for the United States only when they are imposed for revenue purposes. A charge for inspection will be void as constituting a regulation of commerce if it applies only to an article brought into the state from one or more others named and not from all."

The provision of the constitution above recited has no appli cation to articles transported merely from one state into another. Articles imported from foreign countries and the duties paid thereon do not lose their character as imports, so as to become subject to state taxation as a part of the mass of property of the state, until they have either passed from the control of the importer or been broken up by him from the original cases; and a state tax is void whether imposed upon them distinctively as imports or as constituting a part of the importer's

1 See Thompson v. Pacific R. Co., 9 Wall., 579. The right to tax a railroad company is not affected by the fact of its property being mortgaged to the United States. Ibid. As to the right to tax telegraph companies which are made use of by the federal government for its purposes, see West. U. Tel. Co. v. Richmond, 26 Grat., 1.

2 Art. 1, § 10.

3 Pace v. Burgess, 92 U. S., 372.

4 Padelford v. Mayor, 14 Ga., 438. See Turner v. State, 55 Md., 240; Addison v. Saulnier, 19 Cal., 82.

5 Higgins v. Casks of Lime, 130 Mass., 1.

6 Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall., 123; Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala., 123; S. C in error, 8 Wall., 148. See Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H., 536; Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind., 179; Brown v Houston, 33 La. An., 843; State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich., 478.

property. And a license tax imposed on the importer as such is in effect a tax on imports, and therefore forbidden." So is a tax on an auctioneer measured by the amount of goods sold, so far as it applies to imports sold for the importer in the original packages. But a tax on premiums received for invoicing imports, though they still remain in the bonded warehouse, is not to be deemed a tax on imports."

3

An article of commerce which has been purchased by the subject of a foreign country for export, and in the hands of his agent in port awaiting shipment, is to be regarded as an export, and therefore, under this provision of the constitution, not taxable by the state."

Tonnage Duties. The same clause of the constitution forbids the states to lay any duty of tonnage without the consent of congress. Notwithstanding this prohibition, vessels are taxable as property in the same manner as other property is taxed; but taxes levied by a state upon ships and vessels as instruments of commerce and navigation are forbidden; and it makes no difference whether the ships or vessels taxed belong to the citizens of the state which levies the tax or to cit

6

1 Low v. Austin, 13 Wall., 29; citing Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419; License Cases, 5 How., 575.

2 Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419.

3 Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S., 566.

4 People v. National Fire Ins. Co., 27 Hun, 188. It was held in Almy v. California, 24 How., 169, that a state stamp tax on a bill of lading for the transportation of gold and silver from any point within the state to any point without the state was a tax on exports, and therefore inadmissible. The bill in question was drawn for a carriage from one of the states to another; and it was justly said by Mr. Justice Miller in Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall., 113, 137, that "it seems to have escaped the attention of counsel on both sides and of the chief justice who delivered the opinion that the case was one of interstate commerce." The case is not reconcilable with the case last mentioned, and though followed as authority in Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal., 265, has since the decision of Woodruff v. Parham been regarded as overruled. In Ex parte Martin, 7 Nev., 140, a state stamp tax on a bill of exchange drawn in one state and payable in another was sustained. 5 Blount v. Munroe Co., 60 Ga., 61.

6 State Tonnage Tax Cases, 12 Wall., 204, 213; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 9 W. Va., 170; S. C. in error, 99 U. S., 273; The North Cape, 6 Biss., 505; Guenther v. Baltimore, 55 Md., 459; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 58 N. Y., 242.