solicitous about the nicety with which it shall be expressed. Mankind is so vain a thing, that it is not willing to derive from another, and though it cannot have every thing from itself, yet it would seem at least to mingle something of its own with what it derives elsewhere: therefore when you have set your sentiment in the fullest light, and proved it in the most effectual manner, an opponent will bring in some frivolous and useless distinction, on purpose to change the form of words in the question, and acknowledge that he receives your proposition in such a sense, and in such a manner of expression, though he cannot receive it in your terms and phrases. Vanillus will confess he is now convinced, that a man who behaves well in the state ought not to be punished for his religion; but yet he will not consent to allow an universal toleration of all religions that do not injure the state, which is the proposition I had been proving. Well, let Vanillus therefore use his own language, I am glad he is convinced of the truth; he shall have leave to dress it in his own way.

To these directions I shall add two remarks in the conclusion of this chapter, which would not so properly fall under the preceding directions.

I. Rem. WHEN you have laboured to instruct a person in some controverted truth, and yet he retains some prejudice against it, so that he doth not yield to the convincing force of your arguments, you may sometimes have happy success in convincing him of that truth, by setting him to read a weak author who writes against it. A young reader will find such pleasure in being able to answer the arguments of the opposer, that he will drop his former prejudices against the truth, and yield to the power and evidence of your reasons. I confess this looks like setting up one prejudice to overthrow another; but where prejudices cannot be fairly removed by dint of reason, the wisest and best of teachers will sometimes find it necessary to make a way for reason and truth to take place by this contrast of prejudices.

II. Rem. WHEN our design is to convince a whole family or community of persons of any mistake, or to lead them into any truth, we may justly suppose there are various reigning prejudices among them; and therefore it is not safe to attempt, nor so easy to effect it, by addressing the whole number at once. Such a method has been often found to raise a sudden alarm, and has produced a violent opposition even to the most fair, pious, and useful proposal; so that he who made the motion could never carry his point.

We must therefore first make as sure as we can of the most intelligent and learned, at least the most leading persons amongst them, by addressing them apart prudently, and offering proper reasons, till they are convinced and engaged on the side of the truth: and these may with more success apply themselves to others of the same community; yet the original proposer should not neglect to make a distinct application to all the rest, so far as circumstances admit.

Where a thing is to be determined by a number of votes, he should labour to secure a good majority, and then take care that the most proper persons should move and argue the matter in public, lest it be quashed in the very first proposal by some prejudice against the proposer.

So unhappily are our circumstances situated in this world, that if truth, and justice, and goodness could put on human forms, and descend from heaven to propose the most divine and useful doctrines, and bring with them the clearest evidence, and publish them at once to a multitude whose prejudices are engaged against them, the proposal would be vain and fruitless, and would neither convince nor persuade. So necessary is it to join art and dexterity, together with the force of reason, to convince mankind of truth, unless we came furnished with miracles or omnipotence to create a conviction *.

The conduct of Christ and his apostles, (armed as they were with supernatural powers), in the gradual openings of truth, against which the minds of their disciples were strongly prejudiced, may not only secure such an address from the imputation of dishonest craft, but may demonstrate the expediency, and in some cases the necessity of attending to it.

CHA P. IV.

Of Authority, of the Abuse of it, and of its real and
proper Use and Service,

THE influence which other persons have upon our opinions is usually called authority. The power of it is so great and widely extensive, that there is scarcely any person in the world entirely free from the impression of it, even after their utmost watchfulness and care to avoid it. Our parents and tutors, yea, our very nurses, determine a multitude of our sentiments; our friends, our neighbours, the custom of the country where we dwell, and the established opinions of mankind, form our belief; the great, the pious, the learned, and the ancient, the king, the priest, and the philosopher, are characters of mighty efficacy to persuade us to receive what they dictate. These may be ranked under different heads of prejudice, but they are all of a kindred nature, and may be reduced to this one spring or head of authority.

"

I have treated of these particularly in Logic, part II. chap. iii. sect. 4th. Yet a few other remarks occurring among my papers, I thought it not improper to let them find a place here.

Cicero was well acquainted with the unhappy influences of authority, and complains of it in his first book, De natura Deorum. "In disputes and controversies (says he) it is not so much the author, or patrons of any opinion, as the weight and force of argument, which should influence the mind. The authority of those who teach is a frequent hindrance to those who learn, because they utterly neglect to exercise their own judgement, taking for granted whatsoever others whom they reverence have judged for them. I can by no means approve what we learn from the Pythagoreans, that if any thing asserted in disputation was questioned, they were wont to answer, Ipse dixit, i. e. He himself said so, meaning Pythagoras." So far did prejudice prevail, that authority without reason was sufficient to determine disputes, and to establish truth.

All

All human authority, though it be ever so ancient, though it hath had universal sovereignty, and swayed all the learned and the vulgar world for some thousands of years, yet has no certain and undoubted claim to truth: nor is it any violation of good manners to enter a caveat with due decency against its pretended dominion. What is there among all the sciences that has been longer established and more universally received ever since the days of Aristotle, and perhaps for ages before he lived, than this, that all heavy bodies whatsoever tend toward the centre of the earth? But Sir Isaac Newton has found that those bulky and weighty bodies, the earth and all the planets, tend toward the centre of the sun, whereby the authority of near three thousand years or more is not only called in question, but actually refuted and renounced.

Again, Was ever any thing more universally agreed among the nation of the poets and critics, than that Homer and Virgil are inimitable writers of heroic poems? And whoever presumed to attack their writings or their reputation was either condemned for his malice, or derided for his folly. These ancient authors have been supposed to derive peculiar advantages to aggrandize their verses from the Heathen theology, and that variety of appearances in which they could represent their gods, and mingle them with the affairs of men: yet within these few years Sir Richard Blackmore (whose prefaces are universally esteemed superior in their kind to any of his poems) has ventured to pronounce some noble truths in that excellent preface to his poem called Alfred, and has bravely demonstrated there, beyond all possible exception, that both Virgil and Homer are often guilty of very gross blunders, indecencies, and shameful improprieties: and that they were so far from deriving any advantage from the rabble of Heathen gods, that their theology almost unavoidably exposed them to many of those blunders; and that it is not possible, upon the foot of Gentile superstition, to write a perfect epic poem : whereas the sacred religion of the Bible would furnish a

poem with much more just and glorious scenes, and a nobler machinery.

Mr Dennis also had made it appear in his essays some years before, that there were no images so sublime in the brightest of the Heathen writers as those with which we are furnished in the poetic parts of the holy scripture: and Rapin, the French critic, dared to profess the same sentiments, notwithstanding the world of poets and critics had so universally and unanimously exalted the Heathen writers to the sovereignty for so many ages. If we would find out the truth in many cases, we must dare to deviate from, the long-beaten track, and venture to think with a just and unbiassed liberty.

Though it be necessary to guard against the evil influences of authority, and the prejudices derived thence, be cause it has introduced thousands of errors and mischiefs into the world, yet there are three eminent and remarkable cases wherein authority, or the sentiments of other persons, must or will determine the judgements and practice of mankind.

I. PARENTS are appointed to judge for their children in their younger years, and to instruct them what they should believe, and what they should practise in the civil and religious life. This is a dictate of nature, and doubtless it would have been so in a state of innocence. It is impossible that children should be capable of judging for themselves, before their minds are furnished with a competent number of ideas, before they are acquainted with any principles and rules of just judgement, and before their reason is grown up to any degrees of maturity and proper exercises upon such subjects.

I will not say that a child ought to believe nonsense and impossibility, because his father bids him; for so far as the impossibility appears, he cannot believe it: nor will I say he ought to assent to all the false opinions of his parents, or to practise idolatry and murder, or mischief, at their command: yet a child knows not any better way to