struction placed upon the act of 1893 has been too early challenged to justify the courts in following the construction apparently placed upon it by the auditor general's department. We are not pointed to any opinion from the legal department of the State sustaining such construction, and which has been followed, as was the case of Attorney General v. Glaser, 102 Mich. 408. The policy of this provision in the acts of 1882, 1889, and 1893 was, as already stated, to adjudicate the validity of the taxes before sale, and also to avoid the expense of publication. The taxpayer was to be given his day in court. If the decree was against him, his only remedy was to pay; and, if he did not pay, the State was clothed with the complete title. If he appeared, the decree was conclusive. If he did not appear, it was equally conclusive, provided there were no jurisdictional defects which were not within the curative provision of the law. The State was sufficiently protected, and the legislature had prescribed the terms under which the State should part with its title. The land was still subject to be taxed, and he who purchased from the State was required to pay all the subsequent taxes assessed upon it before he could obtain his deed. If the taxpayer redeemed within the time provided from the sale in any year, the tax for the subsequent year still remained a lien upon his property. If he redeems before the filing of the petition in the subsequent year, his land can be included in such petition as delinquent for the year following the one for which it had been sold, and from which he redeemed. If he redeemed too late for inclusion in such petition, we think it may be included in the petition of the next year. If, however, there were no way provided for the enforcement of such liens, there would simply be a defect in the law. The court of chancery has only such jurisdiction in tax proceedings as the statute gives it. Section 61 alone confers that jurisdiction, and is substantially the same as in the previous acts. It differs from them only in being more explicit as to the contents of the petition. The legislature was particular to state what the petition should contain, and positively excluded certain things from it. No other section of the statute attempts to limit or define its contents, or to confer jurisdiction. Naturally, therefore, the auditor general must look to this section for his authority in preparing his petition, and that authority cannot be enlarged by the courts. 4. It is provided by section 131 that the lands mentioned in section 127 shall be subject to homestead entry. Counsel for the auditor general made a statement in their brief of the number of acres on which taxes had been canceled under this provision, and also the number that had been homesteaded, and ask what shall be done with these homesteaders, and what is to become of their improvements. The plain provisions of the law could not be set aside, even though disastrous consequences should follow; but the homesteaders are amply protected. Section 73. provides that no sale shall be set aside where the purchaser, his heirs or assigns, have been in actual, undisputed possession for five years; and, whenever such sale is set aside within five years, the court shall determine and decree the value of improvements made by the purchaser, and give judgment therefor, and issue execution to collect the same from the claimant before putting him in possession. Croskery v. Busch, (Mich.; March 15, 1898) 74 N. W. 464. See, also, section 104 of the act. So, also, in an action of ejectment, under 3 How. Stat. § 7836, if the plaintiff recover, the defendant is entitled to compensation to the extent that the buildings and improvements made by him shall increase the present value of the premises. Under these liberal statutes, no great hardships can be imposed upon the homesteader. 5. It is also urged that the State would suffer great loss in the taxes it would be compelled to refund in consequence of this decision; and a statement is furnished by the auditor general, and incorporated in the brief of his counsel, showing the amount of such anticipated losses. We do not think that the conclusion of the auditor general will necessarily follow. If, as in the present case, the taxpayer petitions the court in chancery in the auditor general's proceedings to foreclose a lien, the court will compel him to do equity. If the taxpayer is in possession, and files a bill to remove a cloud from the title, the court may then compel him to do equity. If, in an action of ejectment, the title is held void, or if the purchaser is refunded his money, it does not follow that the lien is destroyed. If the present law does not provide for that emergency, it can be amended. authorizing proceedings to foreclose such liens. 6. Other objections are raised, which are not important to consider. They affect mainly the proceedings at the time of and after the decree. They are defects attributable to the gross carelessness or negligence of those charged with the execution of the revenue laws of the State, and are without excuse. Whether they are fatal we need not discuss. They should never have occurred. There is no reason why these proceedings should not be conducted according to the law. It is equally inexcusable in landowners to permit valuable property, as in this case, to be sold for a few dollars of taxes. There is no prevailing equity in the claim of either party. It is essential to just and equal taxation that these proceedings be such as to convey a good title to the purchaser. Courts should liberally construe a revenue statute, so that the revenue shall be collected; but when the State or a purchaser rests upon the letter of the law, both must be content with the plain interpretation which the revenue law will bear. When the State takes the property of the citizen, it is not entitled to any strained construction of the law in its favor. The petitioner in this case offers to pay the taxes. Speaking for myself, I regret that the law does not provide a penalty to be imposed upon it, and also upon the officials, for such gross neglect of duty. The lands are stated to be worth about $19,000, while the taxes amount to less than $50. When the revenue officials will make just and honest assessments, and see that the proceedings to enforce them are regular, which they can easily do, there will be little difficulty in the collection of taxes. Our conclusion is that there was no authority of law for including the petitioner's lands in the petition, and that the sale was void. It is urged that adherence to our former decision will lead to confusion in the pending proceedings before the various circuit courts on the pending May sales. If any remedial legislation upon this or any other point is necessary and urgent, the legislature is now in session, and can adopt such measures as it may consider necessary, if the executive, by special message, so suggests. The decree is affirmed. No costs will be allowed the petitioner. The other Justices concurred. some A testator devised a life estate to his wife, with remainder over 2. SAME SUSPENSION OF ALIENATION-TERM NOT BASED ON LIVES. 3. SAME-DISPOSITION OF INTESTATE PROPERTY-WIDOWS. A widow who, under the terms of her husband's will, takes 4. STATUTES-ADOPTION FROM OTHER STATES-CONSTRUCTION. Appeal from Kent; Grove, J. Submitted October 5, 1897. Decided January 4, 1898. 456 |