ment, after the satisfaction of the collateral holder's claims, merely because she has also deposited other collateral, not sought to be subjected to the payment of the judgment, with the same holders.

In Equity. Bill by James B. McMullen and George W. McMullen against Samuel J. Ritchie, Stevenson Burke, Henry B. Payne, and the executors of the Cornell estate, to subject certain collateral securities deposited by respondent Ritchie with his corespondents, after the payment of their claims, to the payment of a judgment in favor of complainants. Heard on motion of respondent Ritchie for an order on the Canadian Copper Company to produce its books and papers, and on motion by Sophronia. J. Ritchie to be made a party respondent. Both motions denied.

Williamson & Cushing, for complainants.

Burke & Ingersoll, for defendants Burke, Payne, etc.

W. S. Kerrnish and Green, Grant & Seiber, for defendant Ritchie and for Mrs. Ritchie.

RICKS, District Judge. This case is now before the court upon two motions: First, upon the application of the defendant Samuel J. Ritchie for an order upon the Canadian Copper Company to produce its books, records, and papers for the inspection of said defendant, and to make such parts of it as he may desire to offer testimony in this case; and, second, upon the application of Sophronia J. Ritchie to be allowed to become a party defendant in this

case.

As to the first motion: This is a bill filed by the complainants, as judgment creditors, against the defendant Samuel J. Ritchie, as judgment debtor, and Stevenson Burke, Henry B. Payne, and the executors of the Cornell estate, as creditors of the judgment debtor, to subject certain stocks and credits which said creditors and codefendants hold as collateral security for the indebtedness due to them from the judgment debtor. The answers of the defendants Burke, Payne, and the Cornell executors admit that there is a large indebtedness due to them from the judgment debtor, Samuel J. Ritchie. They admit that from time to time said Ritchie has deposited with them, as security for the payment of said indebtedness, a large amount of stocks in various corporations, among which is a large amount of stock issued by the Canadian Copper Company, in which said judgment debtor and his codefendants are all stockholders. To the answer filed by the executors of the Cornell estate, the defendant Samuel J. Ritchie filed what he terms a cross bill, in which he alleges that his codefendants are so managing the affairs and business of the Canadian Copper Company as to depre ciate the value of its stock, and make it valueless as security for the payment of their indebtedness, and for the purpose of injuring said Ritchie. He asks for the privilege of examining the books of said copper company, and the right to inquire into the affairs and management of said corporation. I cannot find any authority for such a proceeding in a suit of this character. The complainants file their bill as judgment creditors, as aforesaid, and have rights

which must be respected in the conduct of the case. All they seek is their right to subject whatever surplus there may be after the satisfaction of the indebtedness due Burke, Payne, and the Cornell estate to the extinguishment of the judgment which they hold against Ritchie. In determining the amount of this surplus, and in what way it shall be applied to the satisfaction of complainants' judgment, the judgment debtor, Ritchie, has no right, upon any principle of equity pleading or practice, to bring into this action any controversy he may have with the Canadian Copper Company or with his codefendants as to the corporate management of said company. That is a controversy in which the complainants have no interest. If he could bring into this suit a controversy as to the management of the Canadian Copper Company, he might likewise bring into the suit a controversy as to the management of every other corporation, the stock of which is held by his codefendants as similar security. We would thus have injected into this suit several controversies involving the management of several different corporations. In this way, this controversy might be indefinitely prolonged, and the rights of the complainants indefinitely postponed. The defendant has no right, therefore, to bring such controversy into this suit, to delay the final determination of this cause, to the great expense and vexation of the complainants. If Ritchie has any equitable relief, as against his codefendants, for the improper management of the business of the Canadian Copper Company, his remedy is by an original suit. In such a proceeding, he would be the complainant, and would have a right, if proper grounds for relief are shown, to investigate the books of that concern, and inquire into its management. But he cannot bring into this action such a controversy, which is entirely foreign to the issue properly made between the complainants and the defendants.

The motion of said Ritchie is therefore denied.

'As to the application of Sophronia J. Ritchie to become a party defendant in this case:

The collateral securities deposited with the defendants Burke, Payne, and the Cornell executors, referred to in the complainants' bill, and the surplus of which they seek to have applied to the satisfaction of their judgment, are the securities deposited with said defendants by the defendant Samuel J. Ritchie. These securities are set up in the answers filed by his codefendants. They are the only securities involved in this suit, and they are the only securities in the surplus of which the complainants are interested. In the application of Mrs. Ritchie to become a party defendant, she avers that after her husband deposited with the codefendants named the securities referred to in the complainants' bill, and in the answers of said defendants, she deposited with the said defendants other and additional securities, with her husband's consent, and at his request. It is for the protection of these securities that she now asks to be made a defendant in this case. But, as before stated, these securities are not involved in this litigation. The complainants do not seek to have any surplus that may arise from the sale

of such securities applied to the extinguishment of their debt. I therefore see no ground upon which Mrs. Ritchie can bring into this controversy any right she may have in those securities. The securities deposited by her husband will be first exhausted and applied to the extinguishment of the complainants' debt. Should they seek by this or any other proceeding to reach the additional securities deposited by Mrs. Ritchie, it will be time enough then to make her a party, and give her the opportunity to defend the same. But, until the complainants do ask for some relief or remedy as against Mrs. Ritchie and her securities, there is no issue upon which she can properly be made a defendant in this case. Her motion is therefore denied.

MCCORMICK et al. v. FALLS CITY BANK OF LOUISVILLE.
(Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit. October 17, 1892.)

No. 1.

REVIEW ON APPEAL-WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS.

Where a defendant files an amended answer after a demurrer to his answer has been sustained, and, waiving a jury, submits the cause to the court for trial, without objecting to the introduction of any of the evidence, or submitting any propositions of law to the court, he cannot question on appeal the validity of a judgment against him, since the record does not show any errors.

In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Indiana.

Action by the Falls City Bank of Louisville, Ky., against Patrick H. McCormick, Samuel Hege, A. C. White, and Joseph I. Irwin, upon a promissory note. Demurrers to defendants' answers were sustained, whereupon they filed amended answers, to which a reply was filed, and the cause was submitted for trial to the court without a jury, the trial resulting in a judgment for the plaintiff. No objections were made to the introduction of evidence, and no propositions of law were submitted to the court. Defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Lamb & Hill, for plaintiffs in error.

John T. Dye and Humphrey & Davie, for defendant in error.

Before GRESHAM, Circuit Judge, and BLODGETT and JENKINS, District Judges.

PER CURIAM. The record discloses no error, and the judgment is affirmed, with costs and interest.

MCCORMICK et al. v. FALLS CITY BANK OF LOUISVILLE et al. (Circuit Court, D. Indiana. July 24, 1893.)

No. 8,843.

1. NOTES STIPULATION FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES - - CONSTRUCTION-FEES IN AP PELLATE COURT.

A note for a given sum, with interest and "attorneys' fees," includes only the attorneys' fees incurred in the trial court, and not those in

curred by the holder in an appellate court to which the makers have carried the case.

CONTRACTS-ATTORNEYS' FEES.

A joint note was made to a bank by parties some of whom resided in Kentucky and some in Tennessee. The Kentucky makers paid their due proportion, and, being sued for the balance, agreed with the bank that if the latter would dismiss the suit and sue the Tennessee makers they would save it "harmless against all costs and expenses of said litigation, including attorneys' fees." They also gave the bank as collateral to the original note their note for the balance thereon, with "interest and attorneys' fees." The Tennessee parties were accordingly sued to judgment, but, collection being delayed, the Kentucky parties were sued on the collateral note, and judgment obtained, which was affirmed on appeal to the circuit court of appeals. Held, that the Kentucky parties were not liable to pay attorneys' fees incurred by the bank in the appellate court, for the attorneys' fees provided for in the contract related only to the Tennessee litigation, and the attorneys' fees included in the collateral note were only the fees of the trial court.

The Tennessee parties having subsequently paid the judgment against them, this operated to satisfy and discharge the judgment on the collateral note, and equity would enjoin a threatened attempt by the bank to levy execution thereon, such threat being for the purpose of compelling payment of its attorneys' fees in the appellate court.

In Equity. Suit by Patrick H. McCormick and others against the Falls City Bank of Louisville and others for an injunction and a decree declaring a certain judgment satisfied. On demurrer to the bill. Demurrer overruled.

Lamb & Hill, for complainants.

John T. Dye, W. H. Dye, and Humphrey & Davie, for defendants.

BAKER, District Judge. Bill by complainants to restrain the collection of a judgment, and to have the same decreed to be satisfied. The defendants have interposed a demurrer to the bill for want of equity. The facts exhibited by the bill are in substance as follows: On the 26th day of June, 1888, Patrick H. McCormick, Samuel Hege, and Albert C. White, citizens of the state of Indiana, and the Erin Stave & Lumber Company, H. H. Brequo, V. R. Harris, J. A. McGregor, and H. H. Milner, citizens of the state of Tennessee, executed a promissory note for the sum of $10,000, with interest and attorneys' fees, to the Falls City Bank of Louisville, Ky., payable four months after date. The Falls City Bank, after its maturity, brought suit on the note in this court against McCormick, Hege, and White. Before the commencement of the suit McCormick, Hege, and White had paid the full one-half and their full share of the $10,000 note, and for that reason they were desirous that the makers of the note, resident in the state of Tennessee, should pay the remaining one-half; and to induce the bank to bring suit against them a contract was entered into between the bank and the complainants as follows:

"Whereas, the Falls City Bank of Louisville, Kentucky, holds a promissory note dated June 26th, 1888, for ten thousand dollars, payable four months after date, executed by the Erin Stave and Lumber Company, P. H. McCormick, Samuel Hege, H. H. Brequo, V. R. Harris, J. A. McGregor, H. H.

Milner, and A. C. White; and whereas, H. H. Brequo, V. R. Harris, J. A. McGregor, H. H. Milner, and the Erin Stave and Lumber Company are residents of Tennessee, and P. H. McCormick and S. Hege and A. C. White desire said bank to bring suit in the state of Tennessee against said parties: Now, it is agreed that if said Falls City Bank shall bring suit on said note in the state of Tennessee, in the United States circuit court, against the parties to said note resident in said state, P. H. McCormick, and Joseph I. Irwin, S. Hege, and A. C. White, will indemnify said bank, and save it harmless against all costs and expenses of said litigation, including attorneys' fees. It is further agreed that the bank will prosecute said suit to judgment and collection, or, at the expiration of 90 days, upon payment of a collateral note this day executed by P. H. McCormick, Samuel Hege, A. C. White, and Joseph I. Irwin, will assign the original note and cause of action to any person indicated by P. H. McCormick. This agreement is without relief from valuation or appraisement laws of the state of Indiana."

At the same time McCormick, Hege, White, and Irwin executed a note to the bank as collateral to the $10,000 note for $5,244.46, with interest and attorneys' fees, and the suit pending in this court on the $10,000 note was dismissed upon the payment of the costs and attorneys' fees in said suit, amounting to $195, The bank then brought suit against the parties resident in the state of Tennessee in the United States circuit court for that state, and recovered judgment for the full amount due on said note, including interest, attorneys' fees, and costs. An appeal was taken from said judgment to the supreme court of the United States, which judgment was afterwards affirmed. On the 7th day of February, 1890, the bank brought suit in this court against the complainants herein on said collateral note, and such proceedings were had therein that on the 2d day of February, 1891, judgment was recovered against them for $5,989.46, including therein $200 as attorneys' fees, besides $40.05 costs of suit. Complainants herein appealed from said judgment to the United States circuit court of appeals, in which court judgment of affirmance was rendered in 1892, with costs taxed at $86.90, which was fully paid by them; as also the costs of this court. See McCormick v. Bank, 57 Fed. Rep. 107. After the rendition of the judgment on the collateral note by this court in favor of the bank, it made an assignment in favor of its creditors to the Mechanics' Trust Company, of which one Cox was manager; and after said assignment was made, and said Cox had qualified as assignee, and had taken charge and possession of the assets and property of the bank, viz. on January 12, 1893, the complainants tendered in legal tender money to the said Cox the full amount of principal and interest due on the judgment against them in this court, to wit, $6,688.40, and demanded of Cox as such assignee an assignment of said judgment recovered on said $10,000 note in the United States circuit court for the district of Tennessee, according to the terms of the foregoing contract, which assignment said Cox refused to make, and refused to accept the money so tendered, and he thereafter, on the 17th day of January, 1893, caused an execution to be issued out of this court to the marshal of this district, on the judgment taken in this court against complainants, and by virtue thereof said marshal is threatening to and will levy upon and seize their property. On the 29th day of