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The doctrine of party obligations is, as we have seen, comparatively new. There is little trace of it till the corrupt times of Sir R. Walpole. Much has been said in modern times about the importance of these obligations, but little or nothing about their limits. Yet, if they exist at all, they must have limits; for no one will contend that party obligations require a member of Parliament to vote on all occasions with his leader. Then, if not, in what cases may a member use his own judgment and dissent from his leader? When, on the other hand, must he surrender his own judgment and convictions to his leader? That he must sometimes do so is clear, for otherwise party obligations would be mere nullities. The very first necessary condition of all useful controversy is wanting in the controversy about party obligations, for they are nowhere defined.

The effects of party obligations are so much matters of political controversy, that it is not within the scope of this work to answer all the arguments which are most commonly urged in favour of those obligations. One general remark may, however, be applied to those arguments, that they are founded on speculative, and not on historical, considerations; that they advert, not to evils which have resulted, but to evils which are deemed likely to result from the abolition of party government. Some have thought that if the initiation of legislative measures were not confided chiefly to ministers of the Crown, the legislature would be overwhelmed by the multitude of proposals of private members of Parliament. Others, on the contrary, among whom was Bentham (a), have thought that unless the duty of originating laws were assigned to particular persons, the legislature would be reduced to inaction. These objectors do that contained in Earl Grey's 'Parliamentary Government' (8vo, London, 1858), in which the arguments against Parliamentary government in the "British Commonwealth" are referred to and answered. But neither in Lord Grey's work, nor in any other-as far as the present writer is aware— is there any definition of the limits of party obligations; and without such a definition it seems impossible to reason strictly on the validity of those obligations.

(a) Essay on Political Tactics, ch. 7.

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not consider that in the history of Parliament only a very small space is occupied by party Government, and that it has prevailed only for comparatively short and interrupted periods of the last and present century. We look in vain for any trace of it in the best epochs of the history of Parliament, such, for example, as the latter part of the reign of James I., and the earlier part of that of Charles I.—the epochs of the Grand Committees of Grievances, and the Petition of Rights.

In the foregoing part of this chapter we have considered the King's Council principally in its relations to the legislature. It remains to add some general particulars respecting appointment, qualifications, duties, and powers of Privy Councillors.

Privy Councillors are made by the King's nomination, without either patent or grant; and upon taking the necessary oaths they become immediately Privy Councillors during the life of the King who chooses them, but subject to removal at his discretion.

Of this body, the selected members who compose the Cabinet, are the First Lord of the Treasury (Prime Minister, according to modern nomenclature derived from the French), the Lord Chancellor, the Secretaries of State, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the heads of some other executive departments, and occasionally there are members of the Cabinet who have no such offices.

As to the qualifications of Privy Councillors.-Any natural-born subject of England is capable of being a member of the Privy Council; but in order to prevent any persons under foreign attachments from insinuating themselves into this important trust, as happened in the reign of William III. in many instances, it is enacted by the Act of Settlement (12 & 13 Will. III. c. 2), that no person born out of the dominions of the Crown of England, unless born of English parents, even though naturalized by Parliament, shall be capable of being of the Privy Council. But 1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 4, goes still further; for it enacts that no

bill of naturalization shall be received without a clause incapacitating the naturalized person from being in the Privy Council, Parliament, or office under the Crown (a). When it has been intended to dispense with these incapacitating provisions in favour of any naturalized person, it has been the practice first to pass an Act for the repeal of these statutes in his favour, and then an Act of naturalization without any exception (b). This course was adopted in the case of the late Prince Albert, Consort of Queen Victoria. But the provision of the 1 Geo. I. above-mentioned has since been repealed (c).

The duties of a Privy Councillor appear from the oath of office, which consists of seven articles :—1. To advise the King according to the best of his cunning and discretion. 2. To advise for the King's honour and good of the public, without partiality, through affection, love, meed, doubt, or dread. 3. To keep the King's counsel secret. 4. To avoid corruption. 5. To help and strengthen the execution of what shall be resolved in Council. 6. To withstand all persons who would attempt the contrary. 7. To observe, keep, and do all that a good and true counsellor ought to do to his Sovereign Lord.

The powers of the Privy Councillors, as advisers of the Crown, have been already referred to. Besides these, they have also certain judicial and administrative powers, which will be described under the heads of Judicature and Administration. The judicial powers of the Privy Council are now principally exercised by the Judicial Committee of that body, the constitution and powers of which are regulated by statute, as will be explained hereafter. The administrative powers of the Council are principally exercised by committees of that body, such as the Committee on Education, and the Board of Trade, the account of which is also reserved. to a subsequent chapter.

(a) 1 Geo. I. stat. 2, c. 4, s. 2.

(b) 1 Blackstone's Comm., 230; Butler's Co. Litt. 129 a.
(c) 3 & 4 Vict. cc. 1, 2; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, s. 2.

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CHAPTER XI.

THE RIGHTS OF PETITION, PUBLIC MEETINGS, AND THE PRESS.

THE influence of public opinion in legislation is so great, that an inquiry respecting the Legislature would be incomplete without a consideration of the laws affecting the principal means of expressing public opinion. These are: -1. Petitions. 2. Political speeches. 3. Political societies and meetings. 4. The Press.

1. Petitions. We have seen in former chapters that for some time after the establishment of the two Houses of Parliament, legislation was founded upon the petitions of the Commons to the Crown, and the answers to these petitions. In this place it is intended to treat of another class of petitions, which are addressed to the Crown or either House of Parliament.

The earliest of such petitions were for the redress of merely private grievances. From the Rolls of Parliament in the reigns of Edward I., Edward II., and Edward III., it appears that petitions were exhibited by all sorts of persons upon all sorts of matters. It seems to have been thought that Parliament was an assembly for the redress of all wrongs which any man sustained either in person or property. To distinguish between those petitions which were properly within the cognizance of Parliament and those which were not, certain "Receivers and Triers" of petitions

were appointed. The office of the latter was to examine all petitions, and upon full consideration to indorse upon them what course was to be pursued to redress the petitioner; and to direct him, according to the nature of his case, either to full Parliament, or the Council, or to some other Court. The appointment of receivers and triers is still continued in the House of Lords, though their duties have long ceased (a).

The practice of petitioning Parliament for the redress of public grievances does not appear to have been common before the reign of Charles I., though there are some earlier instances of such petitions to Parliament (b). In the Long Parliament of Charles I., a multitude of public petitions were presented, and generally received with censure where the petitioners' sentiments did not agree with those of the prevailing party (c). Both Houses of Parliament came to

(a) Hale's 'Jurisdiction of the Lords' House,' ch. 12.

Among the earlier instances of the appointment of receivers and triers, the following may be cited :-In 33 Edw. I., A.D. 1305, the King appoints four persons to receive all petitions presented in Parliament at each of the two sessions in that year. (Parry's 'Parliaments,' 66, 67.) By 14 Edw. III. c. 5, at every Parliament a prelate, two earls, and two barons are to be chosen to hear, by petition, all complaints of delays in Chancery and the courts of law.

(b) Thus, in 2 Hen. V., A.D. 1414, certain landholders of Kent present a petition, complaining that lands of certain tenures are improperly exempt from the levy for wages of knights of that county. (Parry's 'Parliaments,' 171.) In 23 Eliz., A.D. 1584, three petitions are read, touching "the liberty of godly preachers to exercise and continue their ministry, and for the speedy supply of able and sufficient men into divers places now destitute of the ordinary means of salvation." (Ibid. 226.)

(c) Thus, March 2, 1642, a conference is held respecting a petition from Kent, which, praying for a restoration of the bishops and liturgy, is voted seditious and against privilege. April 21, the Commons order the actors in the Kentish petition to be brought to trial. April 11, 1646, the Commons resolve that a petition presented by the Assembly of Divines is a breach of privilege. April 11, 1649 (in the time of the Commonwealth), a petition is received from "divers well-affected persons of London, Westminster, and Southwark, etc. in behalf of Lieut.-Col. Lilburne and others." Resolved, "That the petitioners have a sharp reprehension.” April 17, 1650 : Resolved, upon a petition from the City of London, "That the scope of it is to bring scandal and reproach upon the just and necessary laws and proceeedings of Parliament, and that it be referred to the Council of State."

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