declared a præmunire. By 6 Anne, c. 7, the assertion maliciously and directly, by "preaching, teaching, or advised speaking" of the right of the Pretender to the throne, or that the King and Parliament cannot limit the succession to the Crown, was made a præmunire. By 11 Vict. c. 12, compassing to depose the Queen, to levy war against her in order by force or constraint to compel her to change her measures or counsels, or to put force against or restraint upon Parliament, or to incite invasion of this realm and its dependencies, are declared felony, if expressed by publishing any printing or writing, or by open and advised speaking.

The offence of "sedition "(a) does not appear to be very exactly defined. It has been said to include all contemptuous, indecent, or malicious observations upon the King's person or government, whether by writing, or speaking, or by tokens, calculated to lessen him in the esteem of his subjects, or weaken his government, or raise jealousies of him among the people (b). Blackstone gives nearly the same. definition of "contempts and misprisions against the King's person and government "(c). But here a most important question arises,-What is the boundary between seditious speeches and lawful discussion and criticism of political measures? It is very difficult to draw the line with absolute precision. Perhaps it cannot be drawn more clearly

(a) Sedition is not usually included in the division of offences in our law, but as coupled with other offences; and it is said there is no instance of an indictment for the crime of sedition singly. In the English law, sedition is not often spoken of substantively, but the adjective of the word is common, as in "seditious libel," "seditious and slanderous news," etc. (See proceedings against Stroud and others, 5 Car. I., 3 State Trials, 235.) But by the law of Scotland sedition is recognized as a distinct crime: verbal sedition, or leasing-making, is inferred from the uttering of words tending to create discord between the King and his people; real sedition is generally committed by unlawfully convoking a considerable number of people under the pretence of redressing some public grievance. (Erskine, 'Law of Scotland,' book 4, tit. 4, § 14.)

(b) East's 'Pleas of the Crown,' ch. 2, § 1. (c) 4 Blackstone, 123.

than has been done by a learned writer in the following remarks on the subject:-" It is the undoubted right of every member of the community to publish his own opinions on all subjects of public and common interest, and so long as he exercises this inestimable privilege candidly, honestly, and sincerely, with a view to benefit society, he is not amenable as a criminal. This is the plain line of demarcation. . . . Where public mischief is the object of the act, and the means used are calculated to effect that object, the publication is noxious and injurious to society, and therefore criminal" (a).

3. Political Societies and Meetings.-We next proceed to consider how far political societies and meetings are prohibited by law.

The law on this subject is too copious and complex to be fully stated here. That law has undergone repeated changes during many centuries, has been debated and disputed in a vast number of political prosecutions; and to add to the difficulty of the subject, many doctrines respecting it, which were authoritatively established in former times, have in our own more tranquil age been suffered to become almost obsolete, though not positively overruled. It will be sufficient to consider here some few principal propositions respecting political meetings and assemblies under the following heads:-constructive treason; riot; conspiracy; and the statutes passed in the last and the earlier part of the present century respecting unlawful societies.

In the first place, let us consider how far political assemblies are liable to the operation of the law of treason. One kind of treason defined by the Statute of Treasons of Edward III. is, "if a man do levy war against our Lord the King, in his realm;" and by a construction of this statute, the levying of war against the King may be by taking arms, not only to dethrone the King, but under pretence to reform religion or the laws, to repeal a law, or remove

(a) Starkie on the Law of Slander and Libel, vol. ii. p. 184, 2nd ed.

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evil counsellors, or other grievances, whether real or pretended. For, says Blackstone, "the law does not, neither can it, permit any private man, or set of men, to interfere forcibly in matters of such high importance; especially as it has established a sufficient power for these purposes in the high Court of Parliament." The proposition here stated is unobjectionable, if due attention be paid to the word forcibly" in the quotation; but the degree of force, which is a necessary part of this species of constructive treason, has been by no means uniformly settled. In some old cases, very slight demonstrations of forces have been construed to be a levying of war; and a great authority, Justice Foster, holds that circumstances of warlike array and arms are not essential to the crime (a). The soundness of this opinion has been greatly controverted (b); but it is to be observed that Foster does not go so far as to say that exercise or display of force is not essential to the crime. It is quite clear that a strictly peaceable assembly cannot be brought within the operation of this branch of the law. The constructive treason here considered is thus explained by an eminent judge. "If there be an insurrection-that is, a large rising of the people-in order by force and violence to accomplish or avenge any private object of their own, that would not be high treason, that would not be levying war against the King; but if it be to effectuate any general public purpose, that is considered by the law as a levying of war. There must be an insurrection; force must accompany that insurrection; and it must be for an object of a general nature. But if all these circumstances concur— insurrection, force attending it, and the object of a general nature-that is quite sufficient to constitute the offence of levying war" (c).

(a) Foster's Crown Law, Discourse 1, ch. 2, p. 208.

(b) Luders, Considerations on the Law of High Treason in the Article of Levying War, p. 52.

(c) Per Lord Chief Baron Richards, in the trial of Brandreth. (32 State Trials, 928.)

One of the most celebrated trials for the constructive treason of levying

It is, as we have seen, an essential part of the offence in question that the insurrection should be for an object of a general nature. A tumult on account of a particular or private grievance amounts at the most to a riot, this being no general defiance of public government (a), The Riot Act, 1 Geo. I. st. 2, c. 5, made a great change practically in the law with respect to constructive treason; for that Act legislated with regard to offences the same in kind and effect as those which had been previously regarded as constructive treasons(b). The Riot Act defines a riot to be an unlawful assembly of twelve persons or more to the disturbance of the peace; authorizes justices and others to command them by proclamation to disperse; and renders contempt of such command a felony. It is settled that mere numbers do not constitute a riot; there must be such circumstances of violence, or tendency thereto, as to reasonably cause terror to the Queen's subjects(c).

Political meetings and assemblies are also in some cases subject to the law of conspiracies. The crime of conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an illegal act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. A conspiracy may amount to a treason, or a less offence. So far as relates to political societies and meetings, it seems clear that an agreement to endeavour, by the merely general influence of such bodies, to procure a change of the laws, does not amount to a conspiracy; there must be proof of the specific exertion or intention to exert force against some lawful authority. Lord Chief Justice Eyre, in his charge(d) to the grand jury in the cases of Hardy and war was that of Lord George Gordon, for assembling a mob which carried a petition of the protestation to the House of Parliament, and afterwards committed many outrages in different parts of London. Dr. Johnson is reported to have said, in reference to this trial, "I am glad Lord George Gordon has escaped, rather than a precedent should be established of hanging a man for constructive treason." (21 State Trials, 651.)

(a) 4 Blackstone, 94.

(b) Luders, Considerations, etc. ch. 3, p. 103.

(c) Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown, book i. ch. 65.

(d) 24 State Trials, 199.

Horne Tooke, in 1794, held that an agreement to bring about changes in the Constitution by "an usurped power, which should in that instance suspend the lawful authority of King, Lords, and Commons," would amount to a treasonable conspiracy; but he expressed a doubt whether such an offence could be inferred from "a design to collect the people together against the legislative authority of the country for the purpose, not of usurping the functions of the legislature, but of overawing the Parliament, and so compelling the King, Lords, and Commons in Parliament assembled to enact a law."

The opinion of the judges on the appeal of O'Connell and others in the House of Lords, in 1844(a), goes far to remove the doubt just mentioned, and to show how far the law tolerates large political assemblies which do not commit actual violence. The appellants had assembled enormous meetings in Ireland, which O'Connell and some of the other appellants had addressed in political speeches relating to the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, and other grievances. The appeal was from a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland, where the appellants had been convicted upon an indictment for conspiracy. Upon a reference from the House of Lords, the English judges gave a unanimous opinion as to the sufficiency of the several counts of the indictment. Some of the counts accused the appellants of an agreement to excite the Queen's subjects to discontent with and disaffection to the Government and laws of the realm, and to stir up ill-will and hostility between different classes of the Queen's subjects, particularly between the people of Ireland and the people of England. The judges held such an agreement to be a conspiracy. Other counts charged the appellants with agreeing to assemble large numbers of persons for the purpose of procuring changes in the Government and laws, "by means of the intimidation to be thereby caused, and by means of the exhibition and demonstration of the great physical force at

(a) 11 Clark and Finnelly's Reports, 155.