Nov. Term, 1856. MAXWELL. v. COLLINS It is a settled rule of interpretation of statutes, that the application of the words of a single statute may be enlarged or restrained to bring the operation of the act within the intention of the legislature, when violence will not be done by such interpretation to the language of the statute. Murphy v. Barlow, 5 Ind. R. 230. If a man goes from Montgomery to Wayne county and purchases horses or bills of goods, promising to pay for them before leaving town, but does not, we see no reason why, if he return there at a subsequent day, the debt not being paid, he should not be there sued for it, as, also, if he came there a debtor from a foreign State. This being the case, we need not inquire as to the waiver of the question of jurisdiction here by appearance (2). Per Curiam.-The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remanded, &c. J. B. Julian, for the appellant. J. S. Newman and J. P. Siddall, for the appellee. (1) Section 13, 2 R. S. p. 453, provides that, "No person shall be sued before any justice out of the township where he resides, except as hereinafter specified, unless such suit is commenced by a capias ad respondendum, or where there shall be no justice competent to act in such township." Section 9, 2 R. S. p. 451, enacts that, "The jurisdiction of justices in civil cases, shall, unless otherwise provided by law, be limited to their townships respectively." Section 75, 2 R. S. p. 465, provides that, "In all cases not in this act specially otherwise provided, proceedings before justices shall be governed by the practice and usages of Circuit Courts, and the rules of the common law, so far as the same are in force in this State." The civil procedure act, after reciting what actions must be commenced in the county where the subject of the action, or some part of it is situated or arose, provides,-2 R. S. p. 34, s. 33,-that, "In all other cases, the action shall be commenced in the county where the defendants, or one of them, has his usual place of residence. Where there are several defendants, residing in different counties, the action may be brought in any county where either defendant resides, and a separate summons may be issued to any other county where the other defendants may be found; and in all cases of non-residents, or persons having no permanent residence in the State, action may be commenced and process served in any county where they may be found." (2) But see, on this point, Thomas v. Winters, 4 Blackf. 161.-M' Cormick v. Maxwell, 4 Blackf. 168.-Perkins v. Smith, 4 Blackf. 299.-Allison v. Hedges, 5 Black f. 546, cited by counsel for the appellee. MAKEPEACE, Administrator, and Another . THE STATE on the relation of QUARLES, Executrix. A cause had been two terms at issue, and at a third term an amendment was made to the answer, putting the defense on an entirely new ground, owing to which, on the application of the plaintiff, the Court below granted a continuance, and taxed the costs to the defendant. Held, that the Court might, in its discretion, grant the continuance, and that, under section 97, 2 R. S. p. 48, the costs were properly taxed. Nov. Term, 1856. MAKEPEACE V. THE STATE. APPEAL from the Madison Court of Common Pleas. Monday, PERKINS, J.-Suit against the sureties of an adminis- November 24. trator upon his bond. Divers breaches were assigned. The defendants answered at the October term, 1853. At the January term, 1854, the plaintiff filed a bill of particulars of the demand sued for, and the defendants answered as to that, by way of addition to their former answer. The plaintiff replied, putting the cause at issue, and, on the application of the defendants, it was continued to the next term. At the April term, the defendants obtained leave to file an additional answer, alleging that the administrator, whose surety they were, had resigned his office as such, before any assets came to his hands, &c.; whereupon the plaintiff asked, upon proper affidavit, for a continuance to enable her to ascertain the fact, &c., which the Court granted at the cost of the party amending. In vacation following the plaintiff dismissed her suit. It is claimed that the Court erred in granting the continuance and taxing the costs to the defendants. Where the Court below refuses a continuance, this Court will scrutinize the ground of the refusal more closely than where one is granted; for the reason that the granting leaves to the parties all their chances for a fair trial at a later day, while the refusal may not. In many courts, however, even the refusal of a continuance is matter of discretion and cannot be assigned for error. Our statute, 2 R. S., p. 48, s. 97, provides V. Downs. Nov. Term, that the party amending shall pay the costs of the Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed with costs. Monday, THE STATE v. Downs. A writ performs its office in arresting the defendant, and a motion to quash it after he has entered into recognizance, is nugatory. APPEAL from the White Court of Common Pleas. Per Curiam.-This was a prosecution, under the act of 1853, for selling spirituous liquors without license. The defendant, having been arrested, was admitted to bail, upon recognizance taken by the sheriff. At the following term the cause was continued, and he entered into a recognizance of record, to appear at the next term, at which term he moved to quash the writ. The motion was sustained and the defendant was discharged. This was erroneous. The writ had performed its office by arresting the defendant, and it was immaterial whether it was good or bad. He stood upon his recognizance, and was not held by the writ: the quashing of it, therefore, did no harm. But the order to discharge the defendant cannot be revised. It was not excepted to. Hornberger v. The State, 5 Ind. R. 300. The transcript contains no placita, and we cannot learn from the record where or by whom the Court was held. Nov. Term, 1856. NORTON V. We THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF HUNT affirm the judgment, because, although the record abounds in errors, they are not so presented as to enable INGTON COUNus to review them. The judgment is affirmed. L. Reilly, for the State. TY. NORTON V. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF HUNTINGTON COUNTY. This case comes within the case of Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. R., 327. APPEAL from the Huntington Circuit Court. Per Curiam.-On the 15th day of March, 1853, the appellant commenced an action of assumpsit against the appellees in the Huntington Common Pleas. The cause was tried in April following, and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. An appeal was taken by the defendant to the Circuit Court on the 2d day of May, 1853. At the February term, 1854, of the Circuit Court, the plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal, which motion was overruled. There was a trial by jury, verdict for the defendant, motion for a new trial overruled, and judgment, from which the plaintiff appeals to this Court. This case comes within the case of Langdon v. Applegate, 5 Ind. R. 327. The Circuit Court should have dismissed the appeal on the plaintiff's motion. The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause remand Monday, November 24. Nov. Term, ed to the Circuit Court, with instructions to dismiss 1856. KITTERING PARKER. the appeal. L. P. Milligan and J. R. Coffroth, for the appellant. Monday, KITTERING v. PARKER and Others. Creditor's bill to set aside a conveyance alleged to have been fraudulently made. Uncorroborated testimony of one witness to fraud in the vendee, and that witness implicated by his own testimony as a participant in the fraud. Held, that, under the R. S. 1843, p. 89, s. 44, the evidence did not sustain the bill. Held, also, that the testimony of such a witness ought to be strongly corroborated, to authorize a decree upon it against the defendant's answer under oath. The payment of a full price will not purify a fraudulent transaction; but such payment will be entitled to great weight where the proof of fraud is not clear. ERROR to the Warren Circuit Court. GOOKINS, J.-This was a creditor's bill, brought by Parker and others, to set aside a conveyance of land, alleged to have been fraudulently made by Stewart to Kittering, and to subject the land to the payment of Stewart's debts. Stewart made default. Kittering answered denying the fraud; The Circuit Court sustained the bill upon the proofs, and set aside the conveyance as fraudulent. Kittering being dead his representatives prosecute this writ of error. The bill was filed March 20, 1846. It states that on the 10th of September, 1838, Stewart, jointly with Isaac and Henry High, made to Parker and Baily, the principal creditors, his notes amounting to 1,373 dollars, due 25 days after date. That suit was brought on these notes, August 12, 1839, in the Warren Circuit Court; |