Nov. Term, conditionally, and without the qualification indicated in 1856. the rule, the action of the Court must be sustained. WYATT We perceive no inconsistency between the special BRICKLEY. finding and the general verdict-hence, the latter stands uncontroverted. 2 R. S. p. 115, s. 337. The commissioners were in duty bound to allow the recorder a reasonable compensation for the services he really did perform. The jury have settled the amount to which, in their opinion, he is entitled; and the evidence not being in the record, we are not inclined to disturb the verdict. Per Curiam.-The judgment is affirmed with 8 per cent. damages and costs. A. Ellison, for the appellant. Tuesday, January 13, 1857. WYATT V. BRICKLEY. APPEAL from the Madison Court of Common Pleas. Per Curiam.-This was an action by the appellee against the appellant upon four promissory notes. The defendant filed an answer, to which the plaintiff replied. The cause was submitted to the Court, who found for the plaintiff 909 dollars. New trial refused and judg ment. In this case no errors are assigned, no briefs are filed, nor does the record show any exception to the rulings of the Court. The judgment is affirmed with 7 per cent. damages and costs. SMITH V. CARLEY. As a general rule, a default regularly taken, admits the cause of action; but the declaration or complaint must contain such a statement of facts as will, when admitted, authorize a judgment against the defendant. Thus, in assumpsit on a promissory note, if the declaration do not allege that the defendant is the maker of the note, and that the note is unpaid, a judgment upon a default cannot be sustained. Nov. Term, 1856. SMITH V. CARLEY. Tuesday, January 13, APPEAL from the Johnson Circuit Court. Per Curiam.-The record shows that Carley, on the 1857. 15th of October, 1851, filed in the clerk's office of the Johnson Circuit Court his cause of action in this case, in these words: "This is an action of assumpsit brought on a promissory note made payable to Elijah Bolander, and by him, on the 11th of January, 1851, assigned to the plaintiff, which note is as follows: 'On or before the first day of September next, I promise to pay Elijah Bolander 90 dollars, value received, without the benefit of the valuation or appraisement laws. December 7, 1850. [signed] George Smith." Upon this statement, a writ was issued to the sheriff of Johnson county, and returned not found. Afterwards another writ was awarded by the Court and issued to the sheriff of Monroe county, and by him returned served. At the September term, 1853, the defendant was duly called, and, failing to appear, was defaulted. As a general rule, a default, regularly taken, admits the cause of action; but, then, there must be a declaration or complaint containing such a statement of facts as will, when admitted, in point of law authorize a judgment against the defendant. Here, the cause of action is plainly defective. It does not allege the defendant to be the maker of the note. Nor does it aver that the note is unpaid. The proceedings were commenced under the old system of procedure, and there being no Nov. Term, 1856. RICKETTS V. sufficient declaration on which to base the judgment, it must be held erroneous. The judgment is reversed with costs. Cause re THE BOARD OF manded, &c. COMM'ERS OF D. M'Donald, W. A. McKenzie, and W. Henderson, for the appellant. Tuesday, January 13, 1857. RICKETTS and Another v. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS APPEAL from the Perry Circuit Court. Per Curiam.-This was an action on a penal bond, conditioned for the building a bridge, according to the terms and stipulations of a separate contract. Demurrer to the complaint overruled. Ricketts and Woodmansee, who were the defendants below, answered, to which answer the commissioners demurred; but their demurrer was also overruled. Verdict for the plaintiff. Motion for a new trial denied, and judgment on the verdict. The record before us contains no bill of exceptions, nor does it contain an exception to the action of the Circuit Court in any form. The case is not, therefore, properly before us. The judgment is affirmed with costs. J. Pitcher and A. L. Robinson, for the appellants. Nov. Term. 1856. WILLEY V. STRICKLAND. WILLEY V. The civil jurisdiction of a justice of the peace is all conferred by statute: STRICKLAND. at common law he was only a conservator of the peace. There is no presumption in law that a justice in a foreign state can render a judgment in a civil action. A declaration setting up such a judgment, without showing that the justice had jurisdiction of the cause, was, under the old practice, bad on general demurrer. But where such declaration was filed before the civil procedure act of 1852 took effect, and an answer was filed after it was in force,-held, that section 83 cured the defect. Still, if the declaration was silent on the subject, and the answer alleged affirmatively a want of jurisdiction, and the reply did not traverse that averment, the defendant was entitled to a judgment on the pleadings. And if the answer merely denied the jurisdiction, the plaintiff should have proved the facts which confer it. APPEAL from the Lake Circuit Court. Tuesday, 1857. GOOKINS, J.-Strickland declared against Willey in January 13, debt, on a judgment of the County Court of Cattaraugus county, in the State of New York, and also on a judgment of a justice of the peace of said county. The declaration was filed before the present code of practice was in force. An answer was filed under the code, in which the defendant averred that he had no notice of the suits in the complaint mentioned; that he did not appear thereto; that no process was served upon him; and that neither the said Court or justice had jurisdiction of either of said causes. The plaintiff replied that the defendant did appear, &c. The Court tried the cause, found for the plaintiff, refused a new trial, and gave judgment accordingly. The record contains the evidence. Evidence was given of only one judgment, which appeared to have been rendered by a justice of the peace, and a transcript of it filed in the County Court. The plaintiff's evidence consisted of a duly certified transcript from the County Court of the judgment, as it appeared of record there, as follows: "State of New York, Cattaraugus county, Justice's Nov. Term, Court. William Strickland against George Willey. Judg 1856. WILLEY V. ment rendered for the plaintiff against the defendant January 22, 1844. Judgment for plaintiff, damages 88 STRICKLAND. dollars and 4 cents. Costs 6 dollars and 40 cents. Transcript 25 cents. "I certify the above to be a true copy of a judgment now on record in my office, rendered by and before me, and now remaining unsatisfied upon my docket. Henry Foot, Justice of the peace." The defendant gave in evidence a deposition, for the purpose of proving that he did not appear to the action. This was all the proof offered by either party. The first question is, what is the effect of these pleadings? The count in the declaration which set forth a judgment before a justice of the peace, which was the one to which the proof applied, would have been bad on general demurrer, because it did not show that the justice had any jurisdiction of the cause. It does not even aver that he had; but more than that was necessary. There is no presumption in law that a justice of the peace of a foreign state has jurisdiction to render judgment in a civil action. Cone v. Cotton, 2 Blackf 82. At common law, a justice was only a conservator of the peace. All civil jurisdiction is conferred upon justices by statute, and the justice's court is a court of special and limited jurisdiction. Thomas v. Winters, 4 Blackf. 161.-Cleveland v. Rogers, 6 Wend. 438.—Brickley v. Heilbruner, 7 Ind. R. 488.-Gregg v. Wooden, id. 499. But it is provided that in actions already commenced, the pleadings and other proceedings shall, as far as practicable, conform to the provisions of the code. 2 R S. p. 223, s. 799. And a further statute enacts that in pleading a judgment or decision of a court or officer of special jurisdiction, it shall be sufficient to allege generally that the judgment or decision was duly given or made. If the allegation be denied, the facts conferring jurisdiction must be proved on the trial. 2 R. S. p. 45. s. 83. This statute cured the defect in the declaration, which |