"which Epicharmus and Plato seem to have adopted, and which has been main"tained in the present century with great elegance, but with little public applause ; 66 partly because it has been misunderstood, and partly because it has been misap"plied by the false reasoning of some unpopular writers, who are said to have dis"believed in the moral attributes of God, whose omnipresence, wisdom, and good"ness are the basis of the Indian philosophy. I have not sufficient evidence on this "subject to profess a belief in the doctrines of the Védanta, which human reason "alone could, perhaps, neither fully demonstrate, nor fully disprove; but it is "manifest, that nothing can be farther removed from impiety than a system wholly "built on the purest devotion." (Works of Sir William Jones, Vol. I. pp. 165, 166.) From these observations (in some of which I must be permitted to say, there is a good deal of indistinctness, and even of contradiction,) it may on the whole be inferred, 1. That in the tenets of the Védánti school, however different from the first apprehensions of the unreflecting mind, there was nothing inconsistent with the fundamental laws of human belief, any more than in the doctrine of Copernicus concerning the earth's motion. 2. That these tenets were rather articles of a theological creed, than of a philosophical system; or at least, that the two were so blended together, as sufficiently to account for the hold which, independently of any refined reasoning, they had taken of the popular belief. In this last conclusion I am strongly confirmed, by a letter which I had the pleasure of receiving, a few years ago, from my friend Sir James Mackintosh, then recorder at Bombay. His good nature will, I trust, pardon the liberty I take, in mentioning his name upon the present occasion, as I wish to add to the following very curious extract, the authority of so enlightened and philosophical an observer. Amidst the variety of his other important engagements, it is to be hoped that the results of his literary researches and speculations, while in the East, will not be lost to the world. "I had yesterday a conversation with a young Bramin of no "great learning, the son of the Pundit (or assessor for Hindu law) of my court. "He told me, that besides the myriads of gods whom their creed admits, there was "one whom they know by the name of BRIM, or the great one, without form or "limits, whom no created intellect could make any approach towards conceiving; "that, in reality, there were no trees, no houses, no land, no sea, but all without "was Maia, or illusion, the act of BRIM; that whatever we saw or felt, was only "a dream, or, as he expressed it in his imperfect English, thinking in one's sleep, " and that the reunion of the soul to BRIM, from whom it originally sprung, was "the awakening from the long sleep of finite existence. All this you have heard "and read before as Hindu speculation. What struck me was, that speculations "so refined and abstruse should, in a long course of ages, have fallen through so 66 great a space as that which separates the genius of their original inventor from "the mind of this weak and unlettered man. The names of these inventors have “perished; but their ingenious and beautiful theories, blended with the most mon"strous superstitions, have descended to men very little exalted above the most ig"norant populace, and are adopted by them as a sort of articles of faith, without a "suspicion of their philosophical origin, and without the possibility of comprehend"ing any part of the premises from which they were deduced. I intend to investi"gate a little the history of these opinions, for I am not altogether without appre❝hension, that we may all the while be mistaking the hyperbolical effusions of "mystical piety, for the technical language of a philosophical system. Nothing is "more usual, than for fervent devotion to dwell so long and so warmly on the mean"ness and worthlessness of created things, and on the all-sufficiency of the Su66 preme Being, that it slides insensibly, from comparative to absolute language, "and, in the eagerness of its zeal to magnify the Deity, seems to annihilate every "thing else. To distinguish between the very different import of the same words ❝ in the mouth of a mystic and of a sceptic, requires more philosophical discrimi"nation than most of our Sanscrit investigators have hitherto shewn." and secondary qualities, asserts, that extension, figure, and impenetrability are not less inconceivable without a percipient mind, than our sensations of heat and cold, sounds and odours. According to both systems, it may undoubtedly he said, that the material universe has no existence independent of mind; but it ought not to be overlooked, that in the one, this word refers to the Creator, and in the other, to the created percipient. Note (C.) page 51. The private correspondence here alluded to, was between Mr. Hume and the late Sir Gilbert Elliot; a gentleman who seems to have united, with his other wellknown talents and accomplishments, a taste for abstract disquisitions, which rarely occurs in men of the world; accompanied with that soundness and temperance of judgment which, in such researches, are so indispensibly necessary to guard the mind against the illusions engendered by its own subtilty. In one of his letters (of which the original draft in his own hand-writing was communicated to me by the Earl of Minto,)he expresses himself thus:* "I admit, that there is no writing or talking of any subject which is of im"portance enough to become the object of reasoning, without having recourse to 66 some degree of subtilty and refinement. The only question is, where to stop, "how far we can go, and why no farther? To this question I should be extremely "happy to receive a satisfactory answer. I can't tell if I shall rightly express "what I have just now in my mind; but I often imagine to myself, that I perceive "within me a certain instinctive feeling, which shoves away at once all over "subtile refinements, and tells me, with authority, that these air-built notions are "inconsistent with life and experience, and by consequence cannot be true or solid. "From this I am led to think, that the speculative principles of our nature ought "to go hand in hand with the practical ones; and, for my own part, when the "former are so far pushed, as to leave the latter quite out of sight, I am always "apt to suspect that we have transgressed our limits. If it should be asked, how "far will these practical principles go? I can only answer, that the former difficulty "will recur, unless it be found that there is something in the intellectual part of "our nature, resembling the moral sentiment in the moral part of our nature, "which determines this, as it were instinctively. Very possibly, I have wrote "nonsense: However, this notion first occurred to me at London, in conversation "with a man of some depth of thinking; and talking of it since to your friend "Henry Home,† I found that he seemed to entertain some notions nearly of the "same kind, and to have pushed them much farther." The practical principles referred to in this extract, seem to me to correspond very nearly with what I have called fundamental laws of belief, or first elements of human reason; and the SOMETHING in the intellectual part of our nature, resembling the moral sentiment in the moral part of our nature, is plainly descriptive of what Reid and others have since called common sense ;-coinciding, too, in substance with the philosophy of Lord Kames, who refers our belief of the existence of the Deity, and of various other primary truths, to particular senses, forming a constituent part of our intellectual frame. I do not take upon me to defend the forms of expression which Mr. Hume's very ingenious correspondent has employed to convey his ideas; and which, it is probable, he did not think it necessary for him, in addressing a confidential friend to weigh with critical exactness; but his doctrine must be allowed to approximate remarkably to those parts of the works of Reid, where he appeals from the paradoxical conclusions of metaphysicians, to the principles on which men are compelled, by the constitution of their nature, to judge and to act in the ordinary concerns of life ;-as well as to various appeals of the same kind, which occur in Lord Kames's writings. My principal object, however, in introducing it here, was to shew, that this doctrine was the natural result of the state of science at the period when Reid appeared; and consequently, that no argument against his originality in adopting it, can reasonably be founded on a coincidence between his views concerning it and those of any preceding author. Of Mr. Hume's respect for the literary attainments of this correspondent, so strong a proof occurs in a letter, (dated Ninewells, March 10, 1751) that I am tempted to subjoin to the foregoing quotation the passage to which I allude. "You would perceive, by the sample I have given you, that I make Cleanthes "the hero of the dialogue. Whatever you can think of to strengthen that side of "the argument, will be most acceptable to me. Any propensity you imagine I have "to the other side crept in upon me against my will; and 'tis not long ago that I burned *The letter is dated in 1751. + Afterwards Lord Kames. ❝ an old manuscript-book, wrote before I was twenty, which contained, page after "page, the gradual progress of my thoughts on that head. It began with an anx"ious search after arguments to confirm the common opinion :-Doubts stole in,"dissipated, returned,-were again dissipated,-returned again: And it was a "perpetual struggle of a restless imagination against inclination, perhaps against "reason. "I have often thought, that the best way of composing a dialogue would be, for "two persons that are of different opinions about any question of importance, to "write alternately the different parts of the discourse, and reply to each other. "By this means that vulgar errour would be avoided, of putting nothing but non"sense into the mouth of the adversary; and, at the same time, a variety of char"acter and genius being upheld, would make the whole look more natural and un"affected. Had it been my good fortune to live near you, I should have taken "upon me the character of Philo in the dialogue, which you'll own I could have "supported naturally enough; and you would not have been averse to that of "Cleanthes." In a postcript to this letter, Mr. Hume recurs to the same idea. "If you'll be "persuaded to assist me in supporting Cleanthes, I fancy you need not take the "matter any higher than Part 3. He allows, indeed, in Part 2d, that all our in"ference is founded on the similitude of the works of nature to the usual effects of "mind: otherwise they must appear a mere chaos. The only difficulty is, why "the other dissimilitudes do not weaken the argument: And, indeed, it would "seem from experience and feeling, that they do not weaken it so much as we "might reasonably expect. A theory to solve this would be very acceptable." Note (D.) page 54. It would perhaps be difficult to mention another phrase in our language, which admits of so great a variety of interpretations, as common sense; and to which, of consequence, it could have been equally dangerous to annex a new technical meaning in stating a controversial argument. Dr. Beattie has enumerated some of these in the beginning of his Essay, but he has by no means exhausted the subject; nor is his enumeration altogether unexceptionable in point of logical distinctness. On this point, however, I must allow my readers to judge for themselves. (See Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, p. 37, et seq. 2d edit.) The Latin phrase sensus communis has also been used with much latitude. In various passages of Cicero it may be perfectly translated by the English phrase common sense; and, in the same acceptation, it is often employed in modern latinity. Of this (not to mention other authorities) many examples occur in the Lectiones Mathematicae of Dr. Barrow; a work not more distinguished by originality and depth of thought, than by a logical precision of expression. In one of these, he appeals to common sense, (sensus communis,) in proof of the circumference of the circle being less than the perimeter of the circumscribed square. (Lect. 1.) On other occasions, the sensus communis of classical writers plainly means something widely different;-as in those noted lines of Juvenal, so ingeniously illustra ted by Lord Shaftesbury, in his Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour. "Haec satis ad juvenem, quem nobis fama superbum "Some commentators (says Shaftesbury) interpret this very differently from "what is generally apprehended. They make this common sense of the poet, by From the above quotations it appears, that Mr. Hume's posthumous work, entitled Dialogues concerning Natural Religion was projected, and, in part at least, executed, twenty-five years before his death. VOL. II. ↑ Yet amply this suffic'd the youth, as fame 36 MARSH. "a Greek derivation, to signify sense of public weal, and of the common interest; "love of the community or society, natural affection, humanity, obligingness, or "that sort of civility which rises from a just sense of the common rights of man"kind, and the natural equality there is among those of the same species. "And, indeed, if we consider the thing nicely, it must seem somewhat hard in the poet to have deny'd wit or ability to a court such as that of Rome, even under a "Tiberius or a Nero. But for humanity or sense of public good, and the common "interest of mankind, 'twas no such deep satire to question whether this was pro"perly the spirit of a court. 'Twas difficult to apprehend what Community sub"sisted among courtiers; or what Public among an absolute Prince and his slave"subjects. And for real society, there could be none between such as had no oth"er sense than that of private good. "Our poet, therefore, seems not so immoderate in his censure; if we consider it "is the heart, rather than the head he takes to task: when reflecting on a court"education, he thinks it unapt to raise any affection towards a country; and looks "upon young Princes and Lords as the young masters of the world; who, being "indulged in all their passions, and trained up in all manner of licentiousness, "have that thorough contempt and disregard of Mankind, which Mankind in a "manner deserves, where arbitrary power is permitted, and a tyranny adored.” While I entirely agree with the general scope of these observations, I am inclined to think, that the sensus communis of Juvenal might be still more precisely rendered by sympathy; understanding this word (in the appropriate acceptation annexed to it by Mr. Smith) as synonymous with that fellow-feeling which disposes a man, in the discharge of his social duties, to place himself in the situation of others, and to regulate his conduct accordingly. Upon this supposition, the reflection in question coincides nearly with one of Mr. Smith's own maxims, that "the great never "look upon their inferiours as their fellow-creatures;"*-a maxiin which, although sufficiently founded in fact to justify the sarcasm of the satirical poet, must (it is to be hoped for the honour of human nature) be understood with considerable limitations, when stated as a correct enunciation of philosophical truth. It yet remains for me to take some notice of the sensus communis of the school men; an expression with is perfectly synonymous with the word conception, as defined in the first volume of this work. It denotes the power whereby the mind is enabled to represent to itself any absent object of perception, or any sensation which it has formerly experienced. Its seat was supposed to be that part of the brain (hence called the sensorium, or the sensorium commune) where the nerves from all the organs of perception terminate. Of the peculiar function allotted to it in the scale of our intellectual faculties, the following account is given by Hobbes. "Some say the senses receive the species of things, and deliver them to the Com"mon Sense; and the Common Sense delivers them over to the Fancy; and the "Fancy to the Memory; and the Memory to the Judgment;-like handing of "things from one to another, with many words making nothing understood." (Of Man, Part I. Chap. 2.) Sir John Davis, in his poem on the Immortality of the Soul (published in the reign of Queen Elizabeth,) gives the name of common sense to the power of imagination (see Sections XIX. and XX. ;) and the very same phraseology occurs, at a later period, in the Philosophy of Des Cartes: (see, in particular, his Second Meditation, where he uses Sensus Communis as synonymous with Potentia Imaginatrix.) Both of these writers, as appears evidently from the context, understand by Imagination what I have called Conception. To the power now denoted by the word Imagination, Sir John Davis gives the name of Fantasy.-Gassendi seems disposed to consider this use of the phrase Sensus Communis as an innovation of Des Cartes, (see his objection to Des Cartes' Second Meditation, § 6.) but it had been previously adopted by various philosophical writers; and, in the English schools, was at that time familiar to every ear. The singular variety of acceptations of which this phrase is susceptible; and the figure which, on different occasions, it has made in the history of philosophy, will, I trust, furnish a sufficient apology for the length as well as for the miscellaneous nature of the foregoing remarks.t Theory of Moral Sentiments, Vol. I. p. 136. 6th edit. It has been observed to me very lately by a learned and ingenious friend, that in one of the phrases which I have proposed to substitute for the common sense of Buffier and Note (E.) page 61. The Arithmetical Prodigy, alluded to in the text, is an American boy (still, I believe, in London,) of whose astonishing powers in performing, by a mental process, hitherto unexplained, the most difficult numerical operations, some accounts have lately appeared in various literary Journals. When the sheet containing the reference to this Note was thrown off, I entertained the hope of having an opportunity, before reaching the end of the volume, to ascertain, by personal observation, some、 particulars with respect to him, which I thought might throw light on my conclusions concerning the faculty of attention, in the former volume of this work. In this expectation, however, I have been disappointed; and have, therefore, only to apologize for having inadvertently excited a curiosity which I am at present unable to gratify. [Since the first edition of this volume was published, I have seen the boy here alluded to; but for too short a time, and under too unfavourable circumstances, to be able to form any satisfactory conclusions concerning the nature of his arithmetical processes. Whatever opinion may be entertained on this point, every person who has witnessed his public exhibitions must allow, that his powers of Memory and of concentrated Attention, when contrasted with his very tender years, and with the constitutional playfulness of his disposition, entitle him to a conspicuous place among the rare phenomena of the intellectual world. Nor can I forbear to add, that the general character of his own mind seems to be simple, amiable, and interesting. When farther advanced in life, he may probably have it in his power to communicate some curious information with respect to the origin and history of his peculiar intellectual habits. In the mean time, I must decline, for obvious reasons, to say any thing farther on the subject.] Note (F.) page 95. Εν τούτοις ή ισότης ενοτης. "In mathematical quantities, equality is identity." (Arist. Met. x. c. . 3.) This passage has furnished to Dr. Gillies (when treating of the theory of syllogisms, (the subject of the following comment, in which, if I do not greatly deceive myself, he has proceeded upon a total misapprehension of the scope of the original. "In mathematical quantities, (Aristotle says, that) equality is sameness," because ὁ λόγος ὁ της πρώτης ουσίας εις εστι. "The definition of any particular object de"noted by the one is precisely the same with the definition of any particular ob"ject denoted by the other." Gillies's Aristotle, Vol. I. p. 87.) In order to enable my readers to form a judgment of the correctness of this paraphrase, I must quote Aristotle's words, according to his own arrangement, which, in this instance, happens to be directly contrary to that adopted by his interpreter. Ετι δε αν ὁ λόγος ο της πρώτης ουσίας εις η, οσον ας ίσαι γραμμαι ευθείαι αι αυται, και τα ίσα και τα ισογωνία τετραγωνα, και τοι πλείω· αλλ' εν τούτοις ή ισότης ένο της. The first clause of this passage is, from its conciseness, obscure; but Aristotle's meaning, on the whole, seems to be this ;-"That all those magnitudes which "bear the same ratio to the same magnitude, though in fact they may form a "multitude, yet, in a scientific view, they may be regarded as one; the mathema"tical notion of equality being ultimately resolvable into that of unity or iden"tity." It was probably to obviate any difficulty that might have been suggested "Where Reid, I have been anticipated, two hundred years ago, by Sir Walter Raleigh. natural reason hath built any thing so strong against itself, as the same reason can hardly assail it, much less batter it down; the same, in every question of nature, and infinite power may be approved for a fundamental law of human knowledge." (Preface to Raleigh's History of the World.) The coincidence in point of expression, is not a little curi ous; but is much less wonderful than the coincidence of the thought with the soundest logical conclusions of the eighteenth century.-The very eloquent and philosophical pas sage which immediately follows the above sentence, is not less worthy of attention. * Τα προς το αυτο τον αυτόν έχοντα λόγον, ισα αλληλοις εστι Euc. Elem. Lib. V. Prop. ix. |