PART 1. ing), were decided to be invalid. In The State of Rhode Island v. The State of Massachusetts (12 Peters, 657), which was a suit in equity, brought to ascertain and establish the boundary between the states, the jurisdiction was strenuously contested on the part of Massachusetts, not only on the above mentioned grounds, but also on the ground that the matter in controversy, pertaining, as it did, to the rights of sovereignty of the respective parties, was not in its nature a subject for judicial cognizance; in other words, that the question presented for decision was a political and not a judicial question. The court, in a very elaborate and able opinion delivered by Mr. Justice BALDWIN, sustained its jurisdiction over the Chief Justice TANEY, however, dissented from the opinion of the court, on the ground last above indicated, viz., that this was a contest for rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction, and therefore not a fit subject for judicial cognizance and control. Mr. Justice BARBOUR concurred in the decision, but desired to be understood as not adopting all the reasoning by which the court had arrived at its conclusion. Mr. Justice STORY did not sit in the case. A state may be sued by state. case. 4. One of the descriptions of cases to which, as we a foreign have seen, the original jurisdiction of the supreme court is declared by the constitution to extend, is that in which a state is sued by a foreign state. But cannot be sued by an Indian nation. The only case in which this branch of jurisdiction is known to have been invoked, is that of The Cherokee Nation of Indians v. The State of Georgia, 5 Peters, 1. But it was decided (Mr. Justice THOMPSON and Mr. Justice STORY dissenting), that the Cherokees were not a foreign state in the sense in which the term is used in the constitution, and that they were therefore incompetent to maintain their suit in that character. It was admitted that they were a state, having been uniformly recognized by the government CHAP. 3. of the United States as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war; of being responsible in their political character for the violation of their engagements, and for aggressions committed on the citizens of the United States by individuals of their community. But it was denied that they were a foreign state; the condition of the Indians in relation to the United States being sui generis, and such as to constitute them rather domestic dependent nations than foreign nations. 5. In order to enable the supreme court to entertain jurisdiction of a cause upon the ground that a state is a party, it is not sufficient that a state may be consequentially affected; but a state must be a party in fact, if not in name, at least substantially. Fowler et al. v. Lindsey et al., 3 Dallas, 411. See also 4 Dallas, 3, and 1 Peters, 121. The state must be the real party. congress to declare supreme current. 6. We have seen that by the thirteenth section of Whether the judicial act, congress saw fit further to enact that had power the original jurisdiction conferred by the constitution the original jurisdicon the supreme court should be in part exclusive, and tion of the in part concurrent; and the constitutionality of this court conpart of the section also has been several times drawn into question, with respect to the branch of this jurisdiction, comprising those cases in which ambassadors, other foreign ministers, or consuls, are parties, and thus indirectly, with respect also, to the other branch, embracing cases in which a state is a party. In The United States v. Ravara (2 Dallas, 297), in the circuit court for the district of Pennsylvania, upon motion to quash an indictment against a consul for want of jurisdiction, it was held by Judges WILSON and PETERS (Judge IREDELL' dissenting,) that the grant, by the constitution, to the supreme court, of 1 Formerly the circuit court was composed of three judges. PART 1. original jurisdiction, did not preclude congress from vesting a concurrent jurisdiction in other courts over the same causes. Suit in equity by a state for the removal of obstruction to naviga tion of a river held maintainable. On the other hand this decision has been considered as seriously impugned by the case of Marbury v. Madison, above referred to. (1 Cranch, 137.) See also 5 Serg. and Rawle, 545. It is observed, however, that this was not a point in judgment in case of Marbury v. Madison, and that the same great judge who pronounced the decision, has since, in the case of Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheaton, 264), strongly inculcated caution in the application of his powerful, but somewhat discursive, reasoning in that case. In The United States v. Ortega (11 Wheat., 467), this was treated and left by the supreme court, as still an open question. But in the recent case of The State of Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company et al. (13 Howard, 516), originally prosecuted in the supreme court, it is incidentally asserted in the most explicit terms, both by Mr. Justice MCLEAN in delivering the opinion of the court, and by Chief Justice TANEY in his dissenting opinion, that the suit might have been instituted in the circuit court for the western district of Virginia. 7. In the case last cited, which was a suit in equity prosecuted originally in the supreme court, the important question arose whether the judicial power of the United States extended to the case of an alleged nuisance consisting in the obstruction, by the erection of a bridge of a free navigable river, expressly recognized as such by congress. The case was held to be within the jurisdiction of the court, mainly on the ground that the only limitation to the equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, where the parties are competent, and the amount in controversy is sufficient, is that imposed by the 16th section of the judiciary act, viz.: "That suits in equity shall not be CHAP. 4. sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law;" and that the case in question was one, in its nature, falling within the scope of equity jurisdiction, according to the usage and practice of the high court of chancery of England; Chief Justice TANEY and Mr. Justice DANIEL dissented from the decision. CHAPTER IV. OF THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME tive acts. We have seen' that by the thirteenth section of the Legisla judicial act it is declared, in general terms, that "the supreme court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states in the cases hereinafter provided for." The reference here is to the twenty-second section of the act which defines the appellate jurisdiction of the court from the circuit courts; and to the twentyfifth section which defines this jurisdiction from the state courts. The provisions of these sections, except those parts of the former which will find a more suitable place in the subsequent parts of this work, now require attention, together with some subsequent enactments modifying and extending the twentysecond section. This section declares that "final judgments and decrees in a circuit court, in civil actions and suits in equity," may be re-examined and PART 1. reversed or affirmed in the supreme court, upon writ of error, which have been, 1. Brought there by original process (i. e., originally instituted there); or, 2. Removed there from the courts of the several states; or, 3. Removed there by appeal from a district court, provided the matter in dispute exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs.2 Under this provision, it will be observed, the mode of removal, whatever might be the nature of the suit, was by writ of error; and so it was held in the case of Blain v. Ship Charles Carter, 4 Dall., 22. Appeal But this was subsequently altered, and the appellate instead of writ of power of the supreme court also extended, by the act error in suits in of March 3, 1803, by which an appeal to the supreme equity and admiralty. court was given instead of a writ of error, "from all final judgments or decrees rendered, or to be rendered, in any circuit court, or in any district court acting as a circuit court, in any cases of equity, of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and of prize or no prize, where the matter in dispute, exclusive of costs, shall exceed the sum or value of two thousand dollars ;" and so it was held in the case of the San Pedro, 2 Wheat., 132. Experience having demonstrated that causes arising under the revenue laws directly involving only whatever trifling sums, nevertheless sometimes involved questions of considerable importance affecting the public revenue, an act was at length passed providing "that final judgments in any circuit court of the United States, in any civil action brought by the United States for the enforcement of the revenue laws of the Appellate jurisdiction in rev enue cases the amount in contro versy. 1 These cases are designated by the 12th section, and will be noticed in treating of the jurisdiction of the circuit court. |