supreme court, to cases in which the matter in contro- CHAP.4. versy exceeds two thousand dollars. This affirmative description of cases to which the appellate jurisdiction of the court shall extend, excludes, by implication, all cases not excepted by subsequent laws, in which the matter in dispute does not exceed the sum specified, and therefore in these cases no writ of error lies. Durousseau v. The United States, 6 Cranch, 307, 314. Difficulty, however, sometimes exists in the practical application of this test. The case of Wilson v. Daniel (3 Dallas, 401, and see S. C., 2 Dallas, 360, n.), was an action of debt, in which the judgment was for sixty thousand dollars, "to be discharged by the payment of eighteen hundred dollars," and it was held by a majority of the judges that the court possessed jurisdiction. But the reasons by which they appear to have been severally led to this conclusion are so variant as to render it difficult to deduce from the decision any rule applicable to other cases. In the case of The United States v. McDowell (4 Cranch, 316), it was decided that a writ of error would not lie to reverse a judgment for the defendant in an action of debt upon a marshal's bond in a penalty habeas corpus, is a suit within the just interpretation of the word as used in the twenty-fifth section of the judiciary act; and the question was elaborately discussed by the counsel for the plaintiff in error, and by the chief justice in pronouncing the opinion of himself and three of his associates. But the jurisdiction of the court was denied by the other justices, on the less questionable ground that the validity of no treaty or statute of the United States had been drawn in question in the suit in the state court, nor the validity of any statute of the state, on the ground of its being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, neither of which contained any express provision upon the subject. In Ableman v. Booth, also a case of habeas corpus occurring several years later, in which the decision was unanimous, jurisdiction was exercised without question, and apparently without scruple. writ of habeas cor pus, a suit. PART 1. of twenty thousand dollars, for the faithful performance of official duties, where the breach assigned was the omission to pay over the sum of three hundred and twenty-eight dollars. It is therefore to the condition and not to the penalty of the bond that the court will look. In the case of Cooke v. Woodruff (5 Cranch, 13), which was an action in trover, in which the judgment upon which the writ of error was brought, was for the defendant, it was objected that the amount of damages laid in the plaintiff's declaration was not sufficient evidence of the sum in dispute, to enable the supreme court to entertain jurisdiction in error; and the counsel for the defendant in error, in support of this objection, referred to the 13th general rule of the court by which the plaintiff in error is permitted to prove the amount in dispute by affidavit. But the objection was overruled; and Chief Justice MARSHALL said, that that rule applied only to cases where the property itself (and not damages), was the matter in dispute-such as actions of detinue, &c. If the judgment below be for the plaintiff, that judgment ascertains the value of the matter in dispute; but where the judgment below is rendered for the defendant, this court has not, by any rule or practice, fixed the mode of ascertaining that value. The only point directly adjudicated in this case, it will be perceived is, that in actions of tort sounding in damages, where the judgment is for the defendant, the question of jurisdiction, so far as it depends upon the sum in dispute, is to be determined by reference to the amount of damages claimed by the plaintiff in his declaration. But it will also be observed, that another rule is laid down in unqualified terms by the chief justice of no less importance, viz., that where the judgment below is for the plaintiff, the amount of the recovery is CHAP. 4. to govern: a rule that does not appear from any reported case to have been observed, and which seems to have been disapproved by a majority of the court in the case of Wilson v. Daniel (3 Dallas, 401), above cited. In the subsequent case, however, of Wise & Lynn v. The Columbian Turnpike Co. (7 Cranch, 276), this point was directly adjudicated; and in the cases of Gordon et al. v. Ogden (3 Peters, 33), and of Smith v. Honey (id., 469), the rule was qualified and defined in a manner obviously agreeable to the spirit of the act. It is there decided that whatever may have been the amount claimed by the plaintiff in the court below, if the judgment in his favor is for less than two thousand dollars, and the writ of error has been sued out by the defendant below, the court has not jurisdiction; but if, in such case, the writ of error is brought by the plaintiff below (provided the amount claimed in his declaration exceeds two thousand dollars), the court has jurisdiction, because should the judgment be reversed he may still recover what he claims. See, also, Knapp v. Banks, 2 Howard, 73. In the case of Lee v. Lee (8 Peters, 44), a petition for freedom, by persons who have been slaves, had been filed in the circuit court for the county of Washington, in the District of Columbia, from which court an appeal lies to the supreme court only where the matter in dispute is of the value of one thousand dollars, or upwards. The decision of the circuit court was against the petitioners. On a writ of error to the supreme court it was objected, that the value in controversy was insufficient to give jurisdiction. But the 'It is the amount for which the judgment was given that is to govern. Interest subsequently accruing, therefore, is disregarded. Knapp v. Banks, 2 How. R., 73. PART 1. matter in dispute being the freedom of the petitioners, the court entertained no doubt of its jurisdiction; and as the value of freedom was not susceptible of a pecuniary valuation, it was held not to be a case to which the rule authorizing the amount in dispute to be shown by affidavit, was applicable. Had the decision of the circuit court been in favor of the petitioners, and the writ of error been prosecuted by the party claiming to be the owner, the value of the slaves as property would have constituted the matter in dispute, and affidavits to ascertain this value would have been admissible. In the case of Barry v. Mercein (5 Howard, 103), it was, however, held that where the circuit court had refused to grant a writ of habeas corpus prayed for by a father, to take his infant child out of the custody of the mother, a writ of error would not lie. The matter in dispute, say the court, must have a known and certain value, which can be proved and calculated in the ordinary mode of business transactions. And upon this ground it was held, in Pratt v. Fitzhugh (1 Black., 271), that a writ of error will not lie to remove the judgment of a circuit court discharging a party from imprisonment on execution. When the prayer of a bill in equity shows that the complainant's demand is susceptible of computation, and that by no legal possibility it can be adjudged to exceed two thousand dollars, no appeal will lie. Sewall v. Chamberlain, 5 Howard, 6. In the case of Meredith v. McKee (1 Peters, 248), the point decided seems to be that the requisite amount must be directly in contest in the suit, and that the court will not look beyond the case before them, to see what other or further interests may be incidentally affected by the decision. The case, however, is rather peculiar in its nature, and perhaps may not fully warrant this position without qualification, CHAP. 4. as it seems not to do the abstract of it by the reporter. Combina claims not In the admiralty, seamen are permitted to sue tion of jointly for wages accruing under the same shipping admissible. articles for the same voyage. But their respective contracts are, nevertheless, to be treated as several and distinct, and the fact that several claims of this description embraced in the same suit amount, in the aggregate, to more than two thousand dollars, is insufficient to give jurisdiction on appeal to the supreme court. Oliver et al. v. Alexander et al., 6 Peters, 143. The same principle is applicable also to the case of salvage adjudged against the several owners of parts of a cargo saved, when the sum to be paid by no one of the owners exceeds two thousand dollars, although the whole amount awarded to the salvors is more than that sum. Spear, claimant, &c., v. Place, 11 Howard, 522. And also to the case of several suits consolidated by order of the court below, brought by the owners of goods to recover damages for the breach of a contract of affreightment. And where, in such case, the sum awarded to some of the libelants is more, and to others less than two thousand dollars, the appeal will be dismissed as to the latter. Rich et al. v. Lambert et al., 12 Howard, 347. In further illustration of the principles above stated, relative to this point, see Scott v. Lunt's Administrator, 6 Peters, 349; The United States v. M'Daniel et al., id., 634; The Bank of the United States v. Daniels, 12 id., 32; Ross v. Prentiss, 3 Howard, 771; Gruner v. The United States, 11 id., 163; Shields v. Thomas 17 id., 3; Udall v. Steamship Ohio, 17 id., 17; Knapp v. Banks, 2 Peters, 73; Bank of the United States v. Daniel, 12 id., 32; United States v. 84 Boxes of Sugar, 7 id., 453; Grant v. M'Kee, 1 id., 248. |