PART 3. the other hand, unreasonably trench upon the security of private rights. This I should unhesitatingly suppose to have been done, but for the great respect I entertain for the opinions of those who seem to have entertained different views of the subject, and I venture, with all suitable humility, to suggest that it would be far safer to yield implicit obedience to these legislative directions than to incur the hazard of introducing incongruity, perplexity and confusion by attempting to follow the feeble and flickering lights transmitted to us through the medium of books across the Atlantic.

It may not be amiss to add, that it is by no means intended to question the power of the court to impose costs on the claimant by interlocutory orders, as the condition upon which any favor or relief, of which he may stand in need, shall be accorded to him.

The fees which may be lawfully exacted in cases of seizure for official and professional services are prescribed by the act of February 26, 1853, ch. 80.1

SECTION X.

SETTING ASIDE CONDEMNATION BY DEFAULT

REHEARING

NEW TRIAL.

It sometimes happens that the owner of property seized, who intends to interpose a claim, is prevented by accident or misapprehension from doing so, until after condemnation on proclamation. In such cases, it is the practice in the northern district of New York, and, it is presumed, also in the other districts, on sufficient cause shown, to vacate the sentence of condemnation and receive the claim, at any time during the term at which the condemnation took place; and in an extraordinary case in the above named district, an order to stay proceedings until the 1 See Appendix.

next term was granted in vacation, to enable the CHAP. 3. owner of a vessel which had been condemned on proclamation, to move the court for relief.

When a party is dissatisfied with the decree in a cause on the admiralty side of the court, he has a right, provided the value of the thing in controversy exceeds fifty dollars, to appeal to the next circuit court, and there to have his cause heard anew. But he may also apply during the same term for a rehearing in the district court. The application for this purpose is to the equitable discretion of the court; and the principles which govern courts of equity in similar cases furnish the surest guide in the exercise of this discretion.

In suits on the common law side of the court, the unsuccessful party is entitled, under the like limitation as to amount, to a writ of error for the correction of any error of law. But he may also, as in other cases at common law, apply for a new trial.

Applications for the above mentioned or other special purposes, are brought before the court by petition or affidavit and notice to the opposite party, according to the rules or established practice of the court.

PART IV.

PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES IN CRIMINAL CASES.

The nature and general limits of the criminal jurisdiction of the national courts have already been sufficiently stated and defined in the first part of this work.

We have seen that these courts derive no criminal jurisdiction from the common law, and that it is therefore only after the national legislature, acting within the limits of its constitutional authority, has declared an act to be punishable, that the judicial tribunals can take cognizance of such act as a public offense. But we have seen also that while no resort can be had to the common law as a source of criminal jurisdiction, it nevertheless furnishes the proper, and, as the state laws are here inoperative, the only guide, in the absence of constitutional or statutory regulations, as to the principles and rules of procedure in the exercise of this branch of jurisdiction.

My design now is to point out the few constitutional and statutory provisions pertaining to the subject, and to offer such brief explanatory observations as may suffice to relieve it from embarrassment.

ᏢᎪᎡᎢ 4.

CHAPTER I.

LIMITATION OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS.

By the 32d section of the crimes act of 1790, it is enacted, "That no person or persons shall be prosecuted, tried or punished for treason or other capital offense aforesaid,' willful murder or forgery excepted, unless the indictment for the same shall be found by a grand jury within three years next after the treason, or capital offense aforesaid, shall be done or committed; nor shall any person be prosecuted, tried or punished, for any offense not capital, unless the indictment for the same shall be found within two years from the time of committing the offense aforesaid; Provided, That nothing herein contained shall extend to any person or persons fleeing from justice.”

By the act of March 26, 1804, the period of limitation for the prosecution of "any crime arising under the revenue laws of the United States," is extended to five years.3

CHAPTER II.

OF THE ARREST.

On what grounds and in what manner to be made.] By article fourth of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, it is declared, that "The

'The term "aforesaid," must, it is presumed, be considered here as referring to the capital offenses defined in the same act. If so, it would seem at least to be very doubtful whether the prescribed limitation would apply to a capital offense of a different description defined by a different act. There are several such cases, see, for example, the act of March 26, 1804, and the Post Office act of March 3, 1825. The second branch of the section, relative to offenses not capital, it will be seen, has no such qualification.

Ch. 9: 1 Stat. at Large, p. 119.

Ch. 40, § 3: 2 id., p. 290. As to other cases, vide, supra.