ing series of cases, most of them decided since the Spanish war, has furnished the material for answers. § 262. Prohibitions applicable in states and incorporated territories. (a) All constitutional prohibitions upon the action of the Federal government apply in the states. This was the principal object in placing them in the Constitution. (b) In the incorporated territories all constitutional prohibitions apply to the Federal government, except those meant to be applicable to the states only. For instance, the question arose recently whether persons could be tried for crime in Alaska without a jury (of twelve men) required by the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. It was held that the terms of the treaty by which Alaska was acquired and the subsequent legislation of Congress had the effect of incorporating Alaska into the United States, and that the Sixth Amendment therefore applied, even though it concerned merely a matter of judicial procedure (12). A similar decision has been made regarding the District of Columbia, which is at least in as favorable a situation as incorporated territory, inasmuch as it once formed a part of the state of Maryland and was then certainly a part of the United States (13). § 263. Judiciary article applies in states only. One Mo important part of the Constitution, though not made expressly applicable to the states alone, has been held not (12) (13) p. 261. Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U. S., 516. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S., to apply to incorporated territory. This is the first clause of the judiciary article: "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the Supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office" (14). This clause has always been interpreted as applying only to United States courts in the states. In the incorporated territories Congress has habitually created courts whose judges hold office for short terms of years instead of during good behavior (15). These territorial courts exercise a local territorial jurisdiction which is derived from the power of Congress to govern the territories, not from the specific grant of judicial power to the United States. in the judiciary article. The latter was designed only to regulate the exercise of Federal judicial power in the states which already had judicial systems of their own. As soon as a territory is admitted to the Union as a state its former territorial courts lose all jurisdiction whatever, and cannot even dispose of pending cases (16). § 264. Unincorporated territory. (c) Unincorporated territory, not being a part of the United States, is of course not entitled to the benefit of such prohibitions upon Federal action as apply to that action merely in (14) Art. III, sec. 1. (15) American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet., 511. (16) Benner v. Porter, 9 How., 235. the United States. Federal taxes and bankruptcy laws, for instance, must be uniform throughout the United States, but unincorporated territory may be treated differently. Similarly, the provision that all persons born in the United States shall be citizens would seem not to apply to unincorporated territory. In Downes v. Bidwell it was urged by counsel that if the United States could annex territory without making it a part of the United States, then it would not be bound by any of the prohibitions of the Constitution and could govern such unincorporated territory in any arbitrary manner it saw fit. These general prohibitions upon the Federal government are contained mainly in Article I, section 9, and Amendments I to X, XIII, and XV. They are not specifically confined to actions of the United States within the United States, but are general prohibitions, as for instance that Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise of religion; that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that all criminal trials shall be by jury; and the like. On the other hand it was urged that if all of these prohibitions applied to the United States in the Philippines, for instance, it would be very embarrassing, as the people there were quite unaccustomed to jury trials as a part of civil and criminal procedure. Upon this point Mr. Justice Brown said: "We suggest, without intending to decide, that there may be a distinction between certain natural rights, enforced in the Constitution by prohibitions against inter ference with them, and what may be termed artificial or remedial rights, which are peculiar to our own system of jurisprudence. Of the former class are the rights to one's own religious opinion and to a public expression of them, or, as sometimes said, to worship God according to the dictates of one's own conscience; the right to personal liberty and individual property; to freedom of speech and of the press; to free access to courts of justice, to due process of law, and to an equal protection of the laws; to immunities from unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as cruel and unusual punishments; and to such other immunities as are indispensable to a free government. Of the latter class are the rights of citizenship, to suffrage, and to the particular methods of procedure pointed out in the Constitution which are peculiar to AngloSaxon jurisprudence, and some of which have already been held by the states to be unnecessary to the proper protection of individuals. "Whatever may be finally decided by the American people as to the status of these islands and their inhabitants-whether they shall be introduced into the sisterhood of states or be permitted to form independent governments-it does not follow that, in the meantime, awaiting that decision, the people are in the matter of personal rights unprotected by the provisions of our Constitution, and subject to the merely arbitrary control of Congress. Even if regarded as aliens, they are entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be protected in life, liberty, and property. . . . We do not desire, however, to anticipate the difficulties which would naturally arise in this connection, but merely to disclaim any intention to hold that the inhabitants of these territories are subject to an unrestrained power on the part of Congress to deal with them upon the theory that they have no rights which it is bound to respect" (17). These important suggestions have been applied in two recent cases, in which it was held that the requirement of grand and trial juries for the prosecution of criminals did not bind the United States government in Hawaii (18), or in the Philippines (19). § 265. Foreign territory temporarily occupied. (d) As regards territory temporarily occupied by this country, though not annexed, probably the Constitution does not apply at all. During the American occupation of Cuba after the Spanish war, the entire government was adminstered under American control. An American citizen who was alleged to have committed a crime in Cuba was arrested in this country to be sent back there for trial. The contention of the defendant and the answer of the court appear in the following quotation: "It is contended that the act of June 6, 1900, is unconstitutional and void in that it does not secure to the accused, when surrendered to a foreign country for trial in its tribunals, all of the rights, privileges, and immunities that are guaranteed by the Constitution to persons charged with the commission in this country of crime against the United States. Allusion is here made to the |