king Augustus makes an absolute cession of the crown of Poland, renounces any title to it, acknowledges Stanislaus; and then both he, and the king of Sweden, join in desiring the guarantee of England and Holland. The queen did not indeed give this guarantee in form; but, as a step toward it, the title of king was given to Stanislaus by a letter from her majesty; and the strongest assurances were given to the Swedish minister, in her majesty's name, and in a committee of council, that the guarantee should speedily be granted; and that in the mean while it was the same thing as if the forms were passed. In 1708, king Augustus made the campaign in Flanders: what measures he might at that time take, or of what nature the arguments might be that he made use of, is not known: but immediately after, he breaks through all he had done, marches into Poland, and reassumes the crown. After this we apprehended that the peace of the empire might be endangered; and therefore entered into an act of guarantee for the neutrality of it. The king of Sweden refused, upon several accounts, to submit to the terms of this treaty, particularly because we went out of the empire to cover Poland and Jutland, but did not go out of it to cover the territories of Sweden. Let us therefore consider what is our case at present. If the king of Sweden return, and get the better, he will think himself under no obligation of having any regard to the interests of the allies; but will naturally pursue, according to his own expression, his enemy wherever he finds him. In this case, the corps of the neutrality is obliged obliged to oppose him; and so we are engaged in a second war, before the first is ended. If the northern confederates succeed against Sweden, how shall we be able to preserve the balance of power in the north, so essential to our trade as well as in many other respects? what will become of that great support of the protestant interest in Germany, which is the footing that the Swedes now have in the empire? or who shall answer, that these princes, after they have settled the north to their minds, may not take a fancy to look southward, and make our peace with France according to their own schemes? And lastly, if the king of Prussia, the elector of Hanover, and other princes whose dominions lie contiguous, are forced to draw from those armies which act against France, we must live in hourly expectation of having those troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this recall may happen in the midst of a siege, or on the eve of a battle. Is it therefore our interest to toil on in a ruinous war, for an impracticable end, till one of these cases shall happen, or get under shelter before the storm? There is no doubt but the present ministry (provided they could get over the obligations of honour and conscience) might find their advantage in advising the continuance of the war, as well as the last did, although not in the same degree, after the kingdom has been so much exhausted. They might prolong it, till the parliament desire a peace; and in the mean time leave them in full possession of power. Therefore it is plain, that their proceedings at present are meant to serve their country, directly against their private interest; whatever clamour may be raised by those, who, for the vilest ends, would move Heaven and earth to oppose their measures. But they think it infinitely better to accept such terms as will secure our trade, find a sufficient barrier for the States, give reasonable satisfaction to the emperor, and restore the tranquillity of Europe, although without adding Spain to the empire; rather than go on in a languishing way, upon the vain expectation of some improbable turn for the recovery of that monarchy out of the Bourbon family; and at last, be forced to a worse peace, by some of the allies falling off, upon our utter inability to continue the war. P.S. I have in this edition explained three or four lines, which mention the succession, to take off, if possible, all manner of cavil; though, at the same time, I cannot but observe, how ready the adverse party is to make use of any objections, even such as destroy their own principles. I put a distant case of the possibility, that our succession, through extreme necessity, might be changed by the legislature in future ages; and it is pleasant to hear those people quarrelling at this, who profess themselves for changing it as often as they please, and that even without the consent of the entire legislature. AN AN APPENDIX TO THE CONDUCT OF THE ALLIES*. Nihil est aliud in fœdere, nisi ut pia et æterna pax sit." CICERO, pro C. Balbo. Jan. 16. 1712-13. I BEGIN to think, that though perhaps there may be several very exact maps of Great Britain to be had at the shops in Amsterdam or The Hague; and some shining genii in that country can, it may be, look out the most remarkable places in our island, especially those upon the seacoast or near it, as Portsmouth, Chatham, Torbay, and the like; yet it is highly necessary, that "Chamberlaine's Present State," or some other good book of that sort, were carefully translated into Dutch, in usum illustrissimorum ordinum, or with any other sounding and pompous title, only signifying, that it was done for the use of our good allies, and to set them right in the nature of our government, constitution, and laws; " I gave the Examiner a hint about this prorogation; and to praise the queen for her tenderness to the Dutch, in giving them still more time to submit. It suited the occasion at present." Journal to Stella, Jan. 15, 1712-13. N. |
