a warranty on the part of the assured;" "loss, if any, payable to Israel May, mortgagee, as his interest may appear." The policy contained these provisions: "The application, survey, plan, or description of the property herein insured shall be considered a part of the contract and a warranty by the assured; and any false representation by the assured of the condition, situation, or occupancy of the property, or any omission to make known every fact material to the risk, or any overvaluation, or any misrepresentation whatever, either in a written application or otherwise," shall render the policy void. If the interest of the assured in the property be any other than the entire, unconditional, and sole ownership of the property for the use and benefit of the assured, or be incumbered by any lien, whether by deed of trust, mortgage, or otherwise, or if the building insured stands on leased ground, it must be so represented to the companies and so expressed in the written part of this policy; otherwise, this policy shall be void." The application was of the same date as the policy, and was signed by the assured, and contained a great number of printed questions and written answers, and so much of it as is material to be stated was as follows: "The applicant will answer particularly the following questions, and sign the same, as descriptive of the premises, and forming a part of the contract of insurance, and a warranty on his part: 'What material is used for lubricating or oiling the bearings and machinery? Tallow, lard, and machine oils.' Will you agree to use only lard and tallow or sperm and lard oils for lubricating? Lard and tallow, or lard and machine oils.' Is the machinery regularly oiled, and by whom? Yes, by regular attendant.' Will you agree to keep all the bearings and machinery properly supplied with oil? Yes.' Yes.' Is smoking or drinking of spirituous liquors allowed on the premises? No.' 'Is there any incumbrance on the property? Yes.' If mortgaged, state the amount. $3,000.' The subscriber hereby covenants and agrees to and with the said companies that the same is a just, full, and true exposition of all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value, and risks of the property to be insured, and said answers are considered the basis on which insurance is to be effected, and the same is understood as incorporated in and forming a part and parcel of the policy; and further covenants and agrees that if the situation or circumstances affecting the risk shall be so altered or changed during the time of any policy of insurance which may be fixed upon the application, or any renewal of said policy, as to render the risk more hazardous, [he] will notify the officers of said companies, or their general agent, forthwith of such alteration." The case was tried by a jury, who returned a special verdict finding the value of the property insured and its loss by fire on August 1, 1883, and so much of the rest of which as is material to be stated was as follows: "The plaintiffs forbade smoking to go on in the mill, but smoking was done on the grinding floor." "One of them himself smoked upon and in the mill." "At the time of the application, there was due Israel May on his notes and mortgage on said premises the sum of $3,079.45." "There were taxes of the county and state on said premises for several years prior to the issue of the policy, which were delinquent and unpaid, and still remain unpaid, amounting to the sum of $329.40 on May 14, 1883." On July 2, 1885, the circuit court gave judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs brought the case to this court by writ of error, with a certificate of division of opinion between the circuit judge and the district judge upon the following questions: "First. Whether the plaintiffs or the defendants, insurance companies, are entitled in law to recover judgment on said verdict and special findings of the jury returned in said cause. Second. Whether the fact that delinquent taxes on the mill, to the amount of $329.40, were due and unpaid at the time the application for insurance on the property destroyed was made, and that fact was not disclosed by the applicants to the insurers, will defeat the plaintiffs' right to recover. Third. Whether the fact that smoking was done in the mill, the proprietor of the mill being one that smoked, notwithstanding the plaintiffs had stated in their application for insurance that smoking was forbidden therein, will defeat their right to recover, the fire that destroyed the property not having originated from that cause. T. M. Marquett and Isham Reavis, for plaintiffs in error. S. Shellabarger and I. M. Wilson, for defendants in error. Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court. If this policy is valid, each of the defendants was severally liable for no more than the sum of $4,000, and interest thereon to the date of the judgment in the circuit court. The whole amount recoverable against either defendant in that court being less than $5,000, this court has no jurisdiction of the case, except by reason of the certificate of division of opinion. Ex parte Insurance Co., 117 U. S. 367, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 772; Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158; Bank v. Knapp, 119 U. S. 357, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 274. The first question certified is too general to be answered, because it undertakes to refer the whole case to the decision of this court. Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426, ante, 193. Nothing is open for consideration, therefore, but the second and third questions, upon which the opinions of the judges of the circuit court were opposed. The whole scope of that clause of the policy which requires the interest of the assured, if "other than the entire, unconditional, and sole ownership of the property for the use and benefit of the assured," or if "incumbered by any lien, whether by deed of trust, mortgage, or otherwise," to be so represented by the assured and so expressed in the policy, is to ascertain whether his interest comes within either of these two descriptions, and not to call for information as to the nature or amount of any incumbrances. It is therefore fully satisfied by the statements in the application that there is an incumbrance on the property, and what the amount of mortgage is, and by the expression in the policy making the insurance payable to a mortgagee. Williams v. Insurance Co., 107 Mass. 377. By the terms of this policy, and of the application made part thereof, the answers to the questions in the application are doubtless warranties, to be strictly complied with. But this court is unanimously of opinion that, so far as regards either of the matters presented for its decision in the present case, these answers are direct, full, and true. The only questions put as to incumbrances are,—First, the general one, "Is there any incumbrance on the property?" which is truly answered, "Yes;" and, second, the particular one, "If mortgaged, state the amount,' in answer to which the assured states the principal sum due on the mortgage. The effect of omitting to include the additional sum due for less than half a year's interest is not presented by the certificate of division. The insurers having put no question as to the nature or the amount of incumbrances, otherwise than by mortgage, cannot object that no information was given upon that subject. Insurance Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 500. There was, therefore, no breach of warranty in not disclosing the lien for unpaid taxes, independently of the question whether such a lien was an incumbrance, within the meaning of this contract; and this case does not require a decision of that question. As to smoking, the only question put in the application, and answered in the negative, is whether smoking is "allowed on the premises, "--which looks only to the rule established upon the subject at the time of the application, and not to the question whether that rule may be kept or broken in the future. This appears by the language of the question, as well as by the circumstance that it is not, as other interrogatories as to existing precautions against fire are followed up by compelling the assured to agree that they will continue to observe the same precautions. The jury having found that the assured forbade smoking in the mill, the mere fact that other persons, or even one of the assured, did afterwards smoke there, was v.8s.c.-76 not sufficient to avoid the policy. The two cases cited by the defendants from the Illinois Reports contain no adjudication to the contrary. The point decided in each was that smoking by workmen in the mill did not avoid the policy, and the remark of the judge delivering the opinion, that in such a case the assured undertakes that he will not himself do the act, was obiter dictum. Insurance Co. v. McDowell, 50 Ill. 120, 131; Insurance Co. v. Eddy, 55 Ill. 213, 219. Judgment reversed, and case remanded to the circuit court, with directions to render judgment for the plaintiffs upon the special verdict. HOSFORD et al. v. HARTFORD FIRE INS. Co. (May 14, 1888.) INSURANCE-APPLICATION-INCUMBRANCES-TAXES. In a policy of fire insurance, a warranty concerning "incumbrances of all kinds" includes only incumbrances created by the act or consent of the parties, and not those created by law; and hence the policy is not avoided by an omission to disclose the fact that "delinquent taxes" on the premises for previous years were due and unpaid, although, by the statutes of the state, taxes are made a lien on the real estate taxed. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska. This case, which was tried, argued, and decided at the same time as Hosford v. Germania Insurance Co., ante, 1199, was substantially like it, except that no question as to smoking on the premises was presented, that the policy itself contained no provision on the subject of incumbrances, and that so much of the application as related to that subject was in this form: "(13) Incumbrance.Is there a mortgage, trust deed, lien, or incumbrance of any kind, on property? Yes. Amount, and in whose favor? $3,000; I. May. What is the entire value of property incumbered? $21,000.' And the said applicant hereby covenants and agrees to and with said company that the foregoing and diagram annexed hereto is a just, full, and true exposition of all the facts and circumstances in regard to the condition, situation, value, ownership, title, incumbrance of all kinds, insurance and hazard of the property to be insured; and the same is hereby made a condition of the insurance, a part of the contract, and a continuing warranty on the part of assured, for term of policy, or any renewal thereof, of which this survey and application form a part. T. M. Marquett and Isham Reavis, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court. In this case I am instructed by the majority of the court to announce its opinion that the warranty concerning incumbrances includes only incumbrances created by the act or with the consent of the assured, and not those created by the law; and therefore the policy was not avoided by the omission to disclose the fact that "delinquent taxes" on the premises for previous years were due and unpaid, although by the statutes of Nebraska taxes are made a lien on the real estate taxed. Judgment reversed, and case remanded to the circuit court, with directions to render judgment for the plaintiffs upon the special verdict. SATION. BARNARD v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA-BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS-CONTRACTS-ADDITIONAL COMPEN- in writing, and forbids the allowance of extra compensation, plaintiff, who had contracted to do certain grading, excavating, and refilling at specified prices, cannot claim additional compensation for grading or excavating stone or rock, where the contract was silent on that subject, and the work to be done not limited to earth free from stone or rock, though the journal of the board contained an entry that the chief engineer had been notified to allow larger pay therefor, as such entry formed no part of the contract, and the prices stated in the latter were evidently fixed upon the supposed average character of the work. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Suit by Job Barnard, as administrator of Robert H. Ryan, deceased, to recover from the District of Columbia for certain extra work done in his lifetime, under a contract with the District. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. I. H. Ford, for appellant. Atty. Gen. Garland and Asst. Atty. Gen. Howard, for appellee. FIELD, J. On the 23d day of July, 1872, Robert H. Ryan, since deceased, entered into a contract with the board of public works of the District of Columbia to do certain work for the improvement of New Jersey avenue, in the city of Washington, from B street south to the Potomac river. The different kinds of work required were stated, and the prices for each specified, among which were "grading, 30 cents per cubic yard," and "excavations and refilling, 40 cents per cubic yard, to be measured in excavating only." It is conceded that Ryan performed the work pursuant to the contract, and has been paid the amount agreed upon. The present claim is for extra work on the avenue "in grading or excavating stone or rock," for which it is contended there is no provision in the contract. The board had entered in its journal, before the contract was made, the following: "Chief engineer was notified that the following price was established for rock excavation, viz.: In ditches for sewers, etc., $1.50 per cubic yard; cutting down streets and the like, $1.00 per cubic yard. Auditor and contract clerk notified." And Ryan contended that he was therefore entitled, for all rock excavations, to one dollar a yard, instead of the price specified in the contract for grading and excavating; the difference being $4,060. To this contention there are two answers. In the first place, the "grading" and "excavation" specified in the contract are not limited to work done in sand or gravel or earth free from stone or rock. It might reasonably be expected that more or less stone or rock would be found in the progress of the work, and the price was evidently fixed upon its supposed average character. In the second place, the act of congress of February 21, 1871, "to provide a government for the District of Columbia," in force at the time, required that all contracts by the board should be in writing, be signed by the parties making the same, and a copy thereof filed in the office of the secretary of the District; and it forbade the allowance of any extra compensation for work done under a contract. 16 St. 423, c. 62, §§ 15, 37. The entry in the journal of the board was no part of the contract with the claimant, nor could it in any respect control the construction or limit the effect of such contract. The board could not in that way either make a new contract or alter the one previously made, so as to bind the District. Barnes v. District, 22 Ct. Cl. 366. Judgment affirmed. HEGLER V. FAULKNER et al. REMOVAL OF CAUSES-RECORD-JURISDICTIONAL FACTS. Where a suit was brought in a state court for the possession of a tract of land, and for rents and profits alleged to be of the value of $2,500, and then removed to the federal circuit court, and there was nothing else to show jurisdiction in that court but a short stipulation by the parties that the amount in controversy exceeded $5,000, a judgment for defendants will be set aside for want of jurisdiction in the circuit court to render it. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska. Suit by J. D. Hegler against George D. Faulkner and others for the possession of lands, etc. From a judgment for defendants in the United States circuit court plaintiff brings error. J. W. Denver and J. H. Broady, for plaintiff in error. Isham Reavis and T. M. Marquett, for defendants in error. MILLER, J. This is a writ of error to the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska. There is in the record presented here a transcript showing that the action was first brought October 4, 1878, in the district court of Richardson county, in the state of Nebraska, in which the original petition or declaration was filed. The suit was to recover the possession of a tract of land situated in that county, containing 320 acres, and for rents and profits alleged to be of the value of $2,500. The defendants entered their appearance on May 6, 1879, and leave was granted them to answer in 30 days. The plaintiff was ruled to reply in 50 days, and the cause continued. An answer was filed May 17, 1879, and this appears to have been done in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Nebraska, in which all the subsequent proceedings in the progress of the cause were taken. There is no evidence of any petition or order for the removal of the case into this latter court from the state court sitting in the county of Richardson, nor is there any statement anywhere of the citizenship of the parties. It appears that a trial was thereafter had and a verdict rendered for the defendants. The only attempt made to show any jurisdiction in the circuit court, in which that trial took place, is a short stipulation between the parties made in that court December 8, 1882, by which it was agreed that the amount in controversy in the action exceeded $5,000. A judgment in favor of the defendants was entered upon this verdict, to which the present writ of error is directed. It is very clear that this verdict and judgment must be set aside, because the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the case. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings. MAHON V. JUSTICE, Jailer, etc. COURTS-FEDERAL JURISDICTION-FEDERAL QUESTION-ABDUCTION OF ESCAPED CRIMINAL FROM SISTER STATE. A criminal, having escaped from justice to another state, pending extradition proceedings, was forcibly seized by an agent appointed by the governor demanding his extradition, carried to the state where he had been indicted, and was there arrested on a legal warrant. Held, that he could not be released on petition for habeas corpus to a federal court, on account of the personal injuries received from private persons acting against the laws of one state and without authority from the other, or because of the indignities committed against the state from which prisoner was removed, the illegal mode in which he was brought from the other state violating no right secured by the constitution or laws of the United States, but solely concerning that state, which may bring the persons abducting the petitioner to justice. BRADLEY and HARLAN JJ., dissent. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kentucky. On the 9th of February, 1888, the governor of West Virginia, on behalf of that state, presented to the district court of the United States for the district of Kentucky a petition, representing that during the month of September, 1887, a requisition was made upon him as governor aforesaid, by the governor of Kentucky, for Plyant Mahon, alleged to have committed murder in the latter state, and to have fled from its justice, and to be then at large in West Virginia; that pending correspondence between the two governors, and the consideration of legal questions growing out of the requisition, and during |