therefore we are compelled to hold that none of these ten grantees were actual, bona fide owners of land in the district, and that all of the ten should be disregarded in computing the total number of landowners.

question. They filed objections as to the suf-, number of adult landowners who would not ficiency of the petition. These objections sign the petition to dissolve the district, and were overruled, whereupon they filed an answer to the petition, thereby, in effect, waiving all questions as to jurisdiction. Furthermore, the answer did not raise the question as to the ownership of the land by the petitioners. Fairly construed, it raised only the Even leaving said 10 names out of considquestion whether the petition to dissolve was eration, we find it somewhat difficult from signed by not less than four-fifths of the the record to ascertain the number of adult adult landowners of the district, owning at landowners in the district. Some of the least three-fourths in area. Under the rea- original owners who signed the petition for soning of the court in Hollenbeck v. Detrick, the district have died, leaving widows and 162 Ill. 3S8, 44 N. E. 732, Town of Somonauk heirs at law who are entitled to various v. People, 178 Ill. 631, 53 N. E. 314, and shares not clearly shown, and several transPeople v. Kankakee & Seneca Railroad Co., fers of property by deed have been made 248 Ill. 114, 93 N. E. 773, the classification since the formation of the district. Appelroll and other files of the organization of the lants claim that there are 76 adult landowndistrict introduced on this hearing were suf-ers, while appellees insist the record shows ficient prima facie to show title in the peti- 79, not counting, in either case, the 10 grantioners. On that issue, unless evidence was offered contradicting this showing of title, the only duty of the court would be to ascertain whether the signers were four-fifths of the adult landowners of the district, owning three-fourths of the assessed land. In ascertaining whether four-fifths of the landowners of the district signed the petition for dissolution, it is necessary to decide whether the grantees in two certain deeds should be counted.

[5] It appears that T. W. Edds, who owned quite a large amount of land in the district and was opposed to its dissolution, executed a quitclaim deed some three weeks before the filing of the petition to dissolve, conveying, for a consideration of $1, to his wife, three children, and daughter-in-law, a five-acre tract of land, and that he conveyed by another quitclaim deed, about a week before the petition was filed, for a consideration of $25, a strip of land four rods wide and containing one acre, to five other grantees, who appeared from the evidence to be related in some manner to him or his wife. It is argued by counsel for appellants that these deeds were not made in good faith, and that therefore the grantees therein should not be counted in computing the total number of adult landowners. It is shown by the evidence that both of these tracts were swampy, with a few trees, and that neither of the tracts has been set off by a fence; that at the time of the hearing no change in the character of usage had been made as to either of these small pieces described in the deeds. Appellees did not attempt to make any proof as to the good faith of these transfers. While drainage districts are created and dissolved by statutory authority, statutes must be given a reasonable construction. The provision of the statute as to the number of signatures of adult landowners necessarily has reference to actual, bona fide owners. We think it is clear from this record that

tees above referred to and the highway commissioners of the three townships. The appellants claim that 66 adult landowners signed the petition, whose signatures were duly proved from the evidence in the record, leaving out the highway commissioners. Appellees admit that, if certain signatures by agents and attorneys are included, the signatures as to 59 names were properly proven on the trial below.

[6] The formation or dissolution of a drainage district does not involve a freehold, as that term is used in the statutes and decisions. Drainage Com'rs v. Harms, 238 Ill. 414, 87 N. E. 277; Funston v. Hoffman, 232 Ill. 360, 83 N. E. 917, and other like cases cited by appellees, are not in point. A petition to dissolve a drainage district may be signed by an attorney or agent. Merritt v. City of Kewanee, 175 Ill. 537, 51 N. E. 867; McVey v. City of Danville, 188 Ill. 428, 58 N. E. 955; Theurer v. People, 211 Ill. 296, 71 N. E. 997; Tibbetts v. West & South Towns Street Railway Co., 153 Ill. 147, 38 N. E. 664.

[7, 8] We will now proceed to consider the signatures concerning which there is a dispute. The appellees contend that Felicite Oglesby's signature was not valid, because the power of attorney to John G. Oglesby. under which it was signed, is torn and not all preserved in the record. The evidence shows that this was torn in opening the envelope in which it was returned. Disregarding the torn portion, there is still sufficient to make a valid power of attorney. Therefore it must be held that Felicite Oglesby's name should be counted. It also appears from the evidence that the signatures of R. J. Oglesby, W. P. Wakeman, and C. A. Wakeman were properly proven. The record shows that Margaret Ellis owned a dower interest in certain land included in the district, and that she signed the petition. We think she was properly counted as one of the adult landowners and signers. One I. H.

cuit court alleging the mistake in the description of the S. W. 4 and praying the court to correct the same by expunging the second and superfluous "southwest quarter" found in the description of the land; that the complainants might "have the legal as well as the equitable title to said lands vested in them according to the true intent, meaning and design of said testator," and for other and further relief, as the nature of the case might require. All of the persons interested or entitled to participate in the distribution of the estate of Robert Rowan were made parties and served with process. Some grandchildren were minors and answered the bill by their guardian ad litem. Certain adult defendants were defaulted, and the cause was referred to a master in chancery, who took the evidence and reported to the court recommending a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill. At said March term, 1881, a decree was entered in that cause by the court finding that a mistake had been made in the description of the S. W. 4 of section 29 by the person who wrote the will by writing "southwest quarter" more than once, and adjudging and decreeing that Alexander Rowan and McFar

undivided one-half; that Alexander Rowan died intestate on February 15, 1906, leaving no widow or child or descendant; that McFarland Rowan died in October, 1909, intestate, leaving no widow, child, or descendant, and that the lands passed by inheritance to their collateral heirs. The appellant Joseph Rowan and others answered the bill, alleging that the lands, except a 40-acre tract, became the property of said Joseph Rowan by virtue of the last will and testament of Robert Rowan, deceased, and denying that the heirs at law of Alexander Rowan and McFarland Rowan had inherited the lands. The bill merely alleged ownership of the lands by the heirs at law, without setting up anything further, but on the hearing the record of a prior suit in equity respecting the title to the lands was offered and received in evidence without objection, by which the fee-simple title to the tracts of land in dispute was found by the circuit court of said Jackson county to be in said Alexander Rowan and McFarland Rowan. The court having found against the claim of Joseph Rowan and entered a decree in accordance with that finding, the defendants jointly and severally prayed and were allowed an appeal to this court, and the appeal was per-land Rowan by virtue of the will took and fected by Joseph Rowan alone.

had a fee-simple title, as tenants in common, to the S. 1⁄2 of the S. W. 4 of said section and the one acre and a half in section 32, subject to the life estate of the widow, and perpetually enjoining all the other parties from setting up any claim or asserting any right, title, or interest whatever in or to any part of said lands as the heirs of Robert Rowan, deceased.

It is contended by the appellees that said decree is conclusive upon appellant as to the construction of the will of Robert Rowan, and also that, independent of the question of res judicata, the appellant Joseph Rowan, one of the complainants, having procured the court to give such construction to the will in 1881, and having never questioned it since, is now estopped to question such construction. If the circuit court had jurisdiction to construe the will, the decree construing it, which invested Alexander Rowan and McFarland Rowan with a fee-simple title to the lands in dispute, is conclusive upon all the parties to that suit and those claiming under them; and that is the question to be determined.

Robert Rowan owned the S. W. 14 of section 29, in township 10 S., range 1 W., and a tract of 1% acres in section 32. He died on January 17, 1879, leaving a last will and testament, by which he gave his widow, Ellen Rowan, a life estate in all of his real estate, but in describing the quarter section the words "southwest quarter" were duplicated through a mistake of the scrivener, and the tract was described as the S. W. 4 of the S. W. 4. The testator intended to devise the N. 1⁄2 of the quarter section to his sons Joseph Rowan and Samuel Rowan subject to the life estate of the widow, and to devise the S. 12, together with the acre and a half in section 32, to his two sons Alexander Rowan and McFarland Rowan, but in each of the three paragraphs of the will making the devises the same mistake was made, and "southwest quarter" was written twice, so as to describe only 40 acres of the quarter | section. Substantially the same provision or condition was annexed to each devise to the sons, and the claim of Joseph was based on this provision following the devise to Alexander Rowan and McFarland Rowan: [1] A judgment or decree is not binding “And in case of the death of the said Alex-upon any one unless the court rendering the ander or McPharlin Rowan said described same had jurisdiction of the parties and the lands shall revert to Joseph and Samuel subject-matter of the cause. The court did Rowan. In case they should die leaving wid- have jurisdiction of the parties, and the apow or widows to the widow while she re- pellant, who is disputing the binding effect mains their widow or widows then to their of the decree, was one of the complainants, heirs if any living." Joseph Rowan claimed Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the title under this provision by way of execu- power to adjudge concerning the general tory devise. In 1881 Ellen Rowan, the wid-question involved, and, if a bill states a ow, Joseph Rowan, the appellant, and Alex- case belonging to a general class over which ander Rowan and McFarland Rowan, filed a the authority of the court extends, the juris

the court can render the judgment void. If all. In a note he says that the true meanthe court has jurisdiction, it is altogether ing of "jurisdiction" is so often misunderimmaterial, when the judgment is collateral- stood and the word is so often misapplied ly called in question, how grossly irregu- that he quotes a passage from an opinion lar or manifestly erroneous its proceedings in Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217, 28 Am. Rep. may have been. The judgment cannot be 129, as a clear and convincing explanation regarded as a nullity, and cannot, therefore, of the matter. The author of the chapter be collaterally impeached. Such a judgment is binding on the parties and on every other court, unless reversed or annulled in a direct proceeding, and is not open to collateral attack. If there is a total want of jurisdiction in a court, its proceedings are an absolute nullity, and confer no right and afford no protection, but will be pronounced void when collaterally drawn in question. Buckmaster v. Carlin, 3 Scam. 104; Swiggart v. Harber, 4 Scam. 364, 39 Am. Dec. 418; People v. Seelye, 146 Ill. 189, 32 N. E. 458; Clark v. People, 146 Ill. 348, 35 N. E. 60; O'Brien v. People, 216 Ill. 354, 75 N. E. 108, 108 Am. St. Rep. 219; People v. Talmadge, 194 Ill. 67, 61 N. E. 1049.

on jurisdiction in the Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, after giving a correct definition of the word "jurisdiction," calls attention to the fact that there is perhaps no word in legal terminology so frequently used as the word "jurisdiction," so capable of use in a general or vague sense, and used so often by men learned in the law without due regard to precision in its application, and he points out the distinction between an error of judgment and the usurpation of power, the former being reversible by an appellate court while the latter is an absolute nullity. Mr. Justice Mulkey, in Richards v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co., 124 Ill. 516, 16 N. E. 909, [2] While jurisdiction in its proper sense commenting on the statement in Story's means authority to hear and decide a cause, work on Equity Pleading that a bill must it is common to speak of jurisdiction in equi- state a case within the jurisdiction of a ty or the jurisdiction of a court of equity court of equity. said that the author was as not relating to the power of the court to doubtless speaking of jurisdiction in the hear and determine a cause, but as to strict sense in which it is understood in whether it ought to assume the jurisdiction courts of law and as applicable to a certain and hear and decide the cause. In Scott v. class of cases in equity which under no cirWhitlow, 20 Ill. 310, it was said that, al- cumstances are ever cognizable in a court though the decree of a court might not be of equity, such as would be a bill to recover void for want of jurisdiction and the court damages for slander or for an assault and had power to make the decree it did, it was battery, which are wholly foreign to equity not a proper exercise of its chancery pow- jurisdiction. That is not the case here. ers. And in Curtiss v. Brown, 29 Ill. 201, [3] Courts of equity have power to conthe court called attention to the confusion strue wills and declare the titles of litigants arising from the use of the word "juris-under them, and the subject is not foreign diction" as applied to courts of equity. The to the jurisdiction of such courts. The court said: "We often find the jurisdiction power, however, ought not to be exercised denied where the power exists but ought except under certain conditions, and it is not to be exercised, and in this sense is the error to assume jurisdiction where there is word 'jurisdiction' usually used when ap- an adequate remedy at law. A court of eqplied to courts of chancery. Where there is uity will not entertain a bill for the conwant of power the decree is void collateral-struction of a will which only deals with ly, but, where there is said to be a want of or disposes of purely legal estates, and jurisdiction merely, it is only meant that it would be erroneous to exercise the power and the decree would be reversed on appeal. It means a want of equity and not a want of power." Mr. Pomeroy, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence (volume 1, § 129) points out the fact that the term "equity jurisdiction" is used in contradistinction to jurisdiction in general and to common-law jurisdiction in particular; that the term "jurisdiction," in the sense of power residing in the court, may be applied to courts of equity as well as to any other tribunals; that with this signification an equity court has no jurisdiction to try a criminal cause; that this strict meaning is not always given to the term "equity jurisdiction" as it is ordinarily used; and that, when ordinarily speaking of the equity jurisdiction, we do not thereby refer to the general power in

which makes no attempt to create any trust relation with respect to property devised. Strubber v. Belsey, 79 Ill. 307; Harrison v. Owsley, 172 Ill. 629, 50 N. E. 227; Longwith v. Riggs, 123 Ill. 258, 14 N. E. 840; Minkler v. Simons, 172 Ill. 323, 50 N. E. 176; Mansfield v. Mansfield, 203 Ill. 92, 67 N. E. 497; Fletcher v. Root, 240 Ill. 429, 88 N. E. 987. The jurisdiction is an incident of the general jurisdiction of courts of equity over the subject of trusts, which are beyond the power of courts of law, and a decree merely finding legal titles would be erroneous and subject to reversal by an appellate tribunal. But it does not follow that such a decree would be void and subject to collateral attack.

[4] The objection that the remedy sought belongs properly to the domain of the law courts, which furnish a complete and ade

the defendant at the commencement of the suit or else it will be regarded as waived, and, if the question is not raised in the proceeding, the decree will not even be erroneous. This was decided in Parsons v. Millar, 189 Ill. 107, 59 N. E. 606, where a bill for the construction of a will was filed, and it was contended in this court that the circuit court had no jurisdiction because no trust was involved. We held that, the jurisdiction in that regard not having been challenged in the circuit court, the question could not be raised in this court. The appellant was one of the complainants in the suit in which the fee-simple title was declared to be in Alexander Rowan and McFarland Rowan, and the rule applicable to a defendant, it seems, ought to be applied to him.

[5] There is another doctrine of equity that, where there is any ground of equity jurisdiction, a court of equity having acquired jurisdiction to grant equitable relief will retain the case to do complete justice between the parties, although it becomes necessary to declare legal titles and enforce purely legal remedies. City of Peoria v. Johnston, 56 Ill. 45; Rawson v. Fox, 65 Ill. 200; Pool v. Docker, 92 Ill. 501; County of Cook v. Davis, 143 Ill. 151, 32 N. E. 176. In any view of the case the decree was not void and subject to collateral attack as a mere nullity.

The decree is affirmed.
Decree affirmed.

owned, the will in this clause, through a mistake of the scrivener, described only the S. W. 4 of the S. W. 4 of section 29 and 11⁄2 acres in section 32. The third clause of the will is as follows: "Third-At the death of my wife, Ellen Rowan I give and devise unto my sons Joseph and Samuel Rowan their heirs and assigns the north half of the south-west quarter of the south-west quarter of section 29, in township 10, south of range one west Jackson county, containing eighty acres more or less. And in case of the death of the said Joseph or Samuel Rowan the said described land shall revert to Alexander and McPharlin Rowan. In case they should die and leave a widow or widows and heirs to her will while their widow then to their heirs. Samuel Rowan is to have the west half and Joseph Rowan the east half of said tract of land. To be divided giving each half of the cleared land and each half of the timber, with the appurtenances thereunto belonging."

The next clause, which is also designated as "Third," but which is, in fact, the fourth clause of the will, is the clause which disposes of the particular lands that are in controversy in this suit, and on the construction of which the rights of the parties depend, and reads as follows: "Third-At the death of my wife, Ellen Rowan, I give and devise unto my two sons Alexander and McPharlin Rowan their heirs and assigns the south half of the south-west quarter of the south-west quarter of section 29 and one acre and a half of the north-east fourth of the north-west quarter of section thirty-two all in township 10, south, range one west in Jackson county, Illinois, containing 81% acres and a half more or less. And in case of the death of the said Alexander or McPharlin Rowan the said described land shall revert to Joseph and Samuel Rowan. In case they should die leaving widow or widows to the widow while she remains their widow or widows then to their heirs if any

belonging or in anywise appertaining.”

VICKERS, J. (dissenting). I do not concur in the opinion agreed to by the majority of the court, and I shall state the reasons for my dissent therefrom as concisely as the nature of the questions involved will permit. While the binding effect of the decree of 1881 is not dependent upon its being free from error, I am of the opinion that such a decree is not only void for want of jurisdiction of the court to render it, but that the effect of upholding it is to deprive ap-living, with all the appurtenances thereunto pellants of the title to real estate devised to them under the will of Robert Rowan. It will be noted that the same mistake in In order to show that the decree defeats the description of the premises occurs in the the will of the testator and takes his real third and fourth clauses that was made by estate from his children and their descend- the scrivener in the second clause. Robert ants and distributes it as intestate property, Rowan owned the S. W. 4 of section 29, and it is only necessary to examine the provi- he clearly attempted to dispose of the 160 sions of the will in the light of well-estab-acres by his will, but the scrivener wrote lished rules of law relating to real prop- "south-west quarter" once too often in each erty. clause of the will. The most serious differRobert Rowan died on January 17, 1879 ence between the parties relates to the conleaving surviving him his widow, Ellen Row-struction to be given to the third (fourth) an, who died in September, 1895. He also clause of the will of Robert Rowan. Appelleft four sons, Alexander, McFarland, Sam- lants' contention is that under this clause uel, and Joseph Rowan, who are mentioned Alexander and McFarland Rowan took a as devisees in his will. By the second clause base or determinable fee, subject to an exof his will Robert Rowan gave his wife, El-ecutory devise to Joseph and Samuel Rowlen Rowan, a life estate in all of the real estate he might own at his death, but in attempting to describe the S. W. 1⁄4 of sec

an, or the survivor of them, in case Alexander and McFarland died leaving no widow or child surviving them, and that since both