more merit than he has in reality, and fuppofing the injury he receives to be great in proportion to his imaginary worth, he feels accordingly: and besides this, perhaps, he is hurt by an injury which has no existence, but in his proud imagination. A character that occurs too frequently. But it will never follow, that whoever is very fenfible of wrong done him, is guilty of pride. Nature has given much more exquifite feelings to fome men, than to others: and unkindness and injury received (perhaps from a quarter whence we had a right to expect something very different)

different) may have rendered natural feelings more exquifite. Yet as it is the duty of every man, so it is the practice of every good man, to rule his temper. With respect to an impatience of contradiction-wrong is done, when contradiction is impertinent. And it seems, the not fuffering wrong with perfect patience, is no certain proof of pride. Nor is it, perhaps, if a man be impatient, when contradicted upon fufficient ground. It is true, he may think himself a perfon of fo much importance, as that his opinion ought not to be queftioned. And it may be, though

L

though there was room for con tradiction, it was accompanied with a faucy and impertinent manner, which affected him a little painfully. And it may be, also, that, after a great deal of labour to obtain truth, he is grieved to find he is obliged to fufpect himself in an error. And, although the case should include both these last articles, it is very evident the man might not be proud.

IT fhould feem, then, to be true, that a man may think he has a better understanding, and more knowledge than fome per

fons;

fons; that he may prefer his own judgment to theirs; that he may fhew impatience when contradicted; that he may difcover much fenfibility of unkind and injurious treatment;-and yet be chargeable with no pride: though it is exceeding probable it will be laid to his charge; for thefe are marks, which many people think to exhibit undeniable proof.

WOULD we be honeft to ourfelves, we have much more opportunity to know our own character, than any other perfon And felf-knowledge

can have.

is our indifpenfible duty. Without it, we can neither have virtue nor happiness. But much of it is not to be acquired without diligent and conftant attention. And our felf-love being fo liable to put a bias on our judgment, we ought to proceed with great fobriety and caution. Now if, on due confideration, we think our character to be fincerely good, we furely fhall think, too, that we must have been greatly, and inevitably influenced by inftinctive principles, and advantageous circumftances. Let this keep us humble.

And, inftead of think

ing how great our merit is, we

fhould