of God's interference, much as it may conduce to animate the piety of the sober-minded, is to most men an unprofitable, and to many a dangerous occupation. The slothful finds in it an excuse for his negligence; the presumptuous man makes it the foundation of his own arrogant confidence, or of the rash judgments he is ready to pronounce on the conduct of his neighbour; while to the timid and irresolute it affords nothing better than a new cause for his groundless though overpowering apprehension. On this account it cannot too often or too earnestly be taught, that the most scrupulous caution is necessary in applying this doctrine of a Special Providence practically to the affairs of individuals, whether as appertaining to ourselves or to our neighbours. We. must not, on the one hand, be too ready to cry out, Behold a judgment! or, on the other, to argue from the temporary success of any one, that he is in the visible enjoyment of God's favour. To do this rashly or frequently is one of the worst symptoms of a most pernicious enthusiasm. But if, instead of the affairs of individuals, we consider the succession of events in the history of a mighty nation, perhaps the mind of a thoughtful man cannot be better employed than in tracing the proofs which it is calculated to furnish that there is " One over all, God blessed for ever, by whom Kings reign, and Princes decree justice.'

I have lately been led into this train of thought, while taking a review of the leading incidents in the late war which we have seen so prosperously terminated. It would be easy to show how they were made to work together for good, though they were connected together by a chain of circumstances, so intricate and minute as to baffle all the conjectures of the most refined human wisdom; but this would demand an inquiry too exact to be interesting to our general readers: I will confine myself, therefore, to the consideration of the five great Naval Victories, in the hope that while we look back upon them with all those feelings of exultation which such splendid

displays of valour and discipline must excite in us as patriots, we shall not shut our hearts to those emotions of gratitude and awe, with which as Christians we must be penetrated,-joining unaffectedly in the simple yet sublime acknowledgment of our own great commander, that it was "Almighty God who blessed his Majesty's arms."

The success which attended the first efforts of revolutionary warfare had filled the friends of anarchy and disorder with the most arrogant expectations. France saw herself able not merely to resist the attack of the combined forces, but to carry her victorious arms beyond the limits of her ancient territory, and pour the thousands whom political frenzy had brought together under her standard, like a torrent upon the territories of her neighbours. The confidence which these successes inspired was not confined to her military efforts; she looked to her fleet also as an instrument to enlarge her triumphs, and cherished a belief that the time was at last come when a limit would be set to the naval ascendancy of Great Britain. The result of her first exertions was fitted to encourage this expectation; the merchant ships of England covered the seas, and offered an easy prey to the detached cruisers and small squadrons which were first sent out:-It is said, that in the month of May, 1794, not fewer than 97 vessels were carried into the ports of France. But the ambitious republicans were not to be satisfied with these petty successes in the month of May the Brest fleet, to the amount of 26 sail of the line, ventured to sea, for the purpose of protecting a large convoy which was expected from the West Indies. Rear-Admiral VilÏaret commanded; but in compliance with the jealous spirit and practice of the new Democracy, a National Deputy, the notorious Jean Bon St. Andrè, sailed with the Admiral to watch and report upon conduct. Lord Howe, with a British fleet of 26 sail, was already at sea, in the hope of intercepting this rich West Indian convo. On the 19th instant, he

his

received information that the Brest fleet was at sea; on the 21st, certain intelligence reached him that the enemy were but a few leagues to the westward; and on the 28th, early in the morning, his advanced frigates had sight of them far distant to windward on the weather-bow. Both sides were eager for the combat; the French bore down immediately towards their opponents in loose order, and some time was lost before they could get in regular order of battle, which they did on the starboard tack. This time was employed by the British Admiral in making his arrangements; and it enabled him to place a detached squadron, under Rear-Admiral Pasley, in a situation to make an advantageous impression on the enemy's rear. Towards the close of the day the Rear-Admiral led on his division, and attacked a three-decker, the sternmost of the enemy's line. This ship (the Revolutionnaire,) was subsequently engaged with the Audacious, a British 74; and in the darkness of the night both ships were separated from their respective fleets. The Revolutionnaire having lost her captain, and suffered greatly (according to some accounts her colours were once actually struck,) was towed into Rochefort; the Audacious, nearly disabled, got into Plymouth. On the morning of the 29th, the hostile fleets were still in presence of each other, and Howe made an effort to practise the favourite British manœuvre of breaking the line; but the effort was ineffectual. In the course of these preliminary movements the British fleet had gained the weather-gage on the enemy, and they retained it until the decisive moment of action. The two following days the fleets remained separated some few miles, at times in view of each other in the intervals of a thick fog. On the 1st of June, between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, the British fleet bore up together, for the purpose of bringing the enemy to close action. The French waited for them, and sustained the attack with great steadiness. This was not an action which depended on management or manoeuvre; the fleets were of equal

strength, and it seemed to be the object of both that the issue should be made to depend on what we may call fair fighting. In less than an hour after the action commenced, the French Admiral, who had been engaged with Howe's own ship, the Queen Charlotte, crowded off, and was followed by most of the ships of his van who were in a condition to carry sail, leaving behind about ten or twelve of his crippled or totally dismasted ships, besides one sunk in the action. The conquerors were not, however, in a situation to reap the full fruits of their success ; seven ships eventually remained in their possession, one of which, Le Vengeur, sunk before her crew could be taken out.

Thus terminated the first trial of strength between the fleets of Old England and new revolutionary France. It taught these wild democrats a lesson which they did not soon forget. I shall proceed in the next number to state when and by whom similar lessons were given to the other maritime states who did not disdain to make common cause with those enemies of social order.

NO. II. BATTLE OFF CAPE ST. VINCENT.

We have seen how providentially the victory gained by Lord Howe happened when it was most wanted to quell the pride of the Republicans: the renown of this great action was not suffered to decay; in all the encounters which followed, whether between single ships or detached squadrons, St. George's red cross still triumphed over the tri-color of anarchy. But the lesson France had received was still to be taught to those neighbouring states who had degraded themselves to fight under her banner. It was for some time delayed; however, when it came it was a severe one. Spain had in the first instance offered a feeble and ill-combined resistance to the

revolutionary armies; but she was awed by their first success into submission, and that high Castilian pride, which for centuries had so nobly maintained itself, stooped to an alliance with the base progeny of the Revolution. Spain has always been remarkable for possessing the largest and worst-appointed ships in Europe: those ponderous vessels which formed the boast of her Invincible Armada were scarcely more unwieldy than the huge three and four deckers which they have recently constructed. Our Drakes and our Frobishers then showed how unavailing these floating castles were against British courage and enterprise; and the Jervises and Nelsons of our own day have told over again the same story.

In the beginning of the year 1797, the Spaniards had sent a powerful fleet to sea, for the purpose of affording to their new republican allies all the benefit of their clumsy co-operation. One four-decker of 136 guns, six three-deckers of 112, two 84s, and eighteen 74s,-in all, twenty-seven ships of the line, with ten frigates, and a brig, formed a fleet powerful enough, it was thought, to crush the British squadron, which, under the command of Sir John Jervis, was waiting off the coast of Portugal; so at least the Spanish Admiral, Don Joseph de Cordova, persuaded himself, when he learned from an American that the English had only nine ships of the line, which was actually the case when this American saw them; for Admiral Parker had not then joined with a reinforcement of five ships from England, and the Culloden had parted company.

When the morning of the 14th of February broke, and discovered the British fleet, a fog for some time concealed their numbers. The look-out ship of the Spaniards, fancying her signal was disregarded because so little notice was taken of it, made another signal that the English fleet consisted of forty sail of the line. The Captain afterwards said he did this to rouse the Admiral; but it had the effect of perplexing him, and alarming the whole