edge of the conditions, in the case of infant employés, it is not always so. As was said by this court in Williamson v. Sheldon Marble Co., supra, a person of mature years and experience might fully comprehend the perils of his position, while a youth, from lack of entitled to warning and instruction, which were not given him, and therefore he cannot be held to have assumed the risk. It is said in Hayes v. Colchester Mills, 69 Vt. 1, 37 Atl. 269, 60 Am. St. Rep. 915, in recognition of well-established principles, that it is the duty of one who employs an immature and inex-years, experience, or capacity, might wholly perienced person for a dangerous service to explain to him the perils incident to his work, and instruct him how to avoid them. Various reasons have been assigned by the courts as the basis of this rule. The one which seems most satisfactory, to the writer at least, is that which regards it as a special application of the general rule that the degree of care which one who owes another a duty is bound to exercise varies with the circumstances, and must be commensurate with the dangers to be guarded against. One whose intelligence or experience falls under the average is more likely to be injured in a given occupation than one not so deficient. A minor usually fails to come up to the standard in these respects, a fact of which the master is bound to take notice. Special caution is therefore required of the master in such cases. Logically the special caution which the law requires is that the inadequate information and understanding of the immature serv ant be supplemented with sufficient information to place him as regards the work in hand on a parity with a servant of mature years. But it matters little what the true rationale of the rule is. It is firmly established, and everywhere recognized. It does not, however, apply to every minor servant who receives an injury. The sole purpose of the rule is to give information of unknown or unappreciated dangers. When, therefore, the minor knows and appreciates all the hazards of his employment, the law does not require of the master so idle a thing as his warning and instruction. Minority alone is not enough to put this requirement onto the master. The burden of proof, then, was on the plaintiff, though he was under age and inexperienced, to show that he was in need of a warning of the perils involved in the operation of the mangle and of instructions as to avoiding them. Williamson v. Sheldon Marble Co., 66 Vt. 427, 29 Atl. 669. That he was fully acquainted with all the physical conditions surrounding him is too plain to admit of denial. But it does not necessarily follow that he appreciated the hazards which these conditions involved. The doctrine of assumption of risk involves a sufficiently exact appreciation of the nature and extent of the danger to enable the servant to estimate the possibilities of his surroundings so far as they affect his safety. Labatt, Mast. & Serv. § 279a. In the case of youthful servants it involves more a sufficient mental and physical capacity to so regulate his conduct as to secure his safety as effectually as the circumstances admit. Bolton v. Ovitt, 80 Vt. 362, 67 Atl. 881. So, while a comprehension of fail to comprehend. In the case in hand the plaintiff testified that he did not know that the canvas and cylinder would draw his hand in. We need not inquire what effect is to be given to this statement, for actual knowledge was not necessary to an assumption of the risk. The general rule is that a servant is presumed to see and understand all that a prudent and intelligent person, with the same means and opportunities for acquiring a knowledge of the material facts and the same capacity for estimating their significance, would see and understand. The true test is, not whether he actually knows and comprehends, but whether, in the circumstances, he ought to know and comprehend the dangers which beset him. And this rule, as is plain from a careful reading of our own cases above cited, applies to a minor servant to the same extent as to an adult when the dangers are so apparent that one of his age, experience, and capacity would in the circumstances and by the exercise of due care know and appreciate them and how to avoid them. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Marcan, 106 Fed. 645, 45 C. C. A. 515, 54 L. R. A. 258; Strattner v. Wilmington City Electric Co., 3 Pennewill (Del.) 245, 50 Atl. 57; Cunningham v. Bath Iron Works, 92 Me. 501, 43 Atl. 106; note to Noden v. Verlenden Bros., 3 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. at page 375. In applying this test to the plaintiff (there being no evidence to the contrary), we must assume, as did the court below, that he had of his age usually have. Williamson v. Shelthe intelligence and understanding that boys be had of the character and condition of the machine, the nature of the work required of him, the place where and the circumstances in which it was to be performed, his age, experience, and capacity, and his opportunity to observe and comprehend his surroundings. Upon a careful consideration of the whole case, we think the danger to which he fell a victim was so apparent that the law will impute to him knowledge and appreciation of it, and therefore that he assumed it. Everything about the machine and its operation was so simple that it seems incredible that he should not have understood that his hand, if caught, would be drawn into the machine just as the garment was. The very purpose of the machine was to seize and carry in whatever came within its grasp. It cannot be that this would not almost at a glance be fully understood by a reasonably bright boy of practically 16 years-not a child of tender years, but one who by his age should have don Marble Co., supra. Consideration must Something was said in evidence and much in argument about a tendency in the machine to draw the operator's hands into it. This testimony obviously related to the natural operation of the machine merely. It is not possible that the slowly revolving parts could have created any suction to increase the hazards of its operation. The tendency existed only so long as the operator kept his hold of the garment. It was obviated by the simple act of letting go. Many cases are to be found wherein the courts have applied the principles herein discussed to cases involving accidents resulting from the operation of ironing and similar machines. Some sustain our conclusion, and some do not. The rules are sufficiently established, but an attempt to apply them to actual cases results in some confusion. This comes principally from the varying estimates which different courts put upon the intelligence of the party injured. While each case must, in a large measure, depend upon its own facts, and for that reason caution should be exercised in selecting prece dents, the following are near enough in their facts to the one under consideration to be cited in support of our conclusion. Lowcock v. Franklin Paper Co., 169 Mass. 313, 47 N. E. 1000; O'Keefe v. Thorn (Pa.) 16 Atl. 737. Judgment reversed, and judgment for the defendant to recover its costs. (83 Vt. 396) 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 967*)-TAXATION-EXEMPTION-TOWN VOTE. voted March 26, 1898, to exempt from taxation Where a town, as authorized by V. S. 365, all manufacturing establishments investing over $5,000, established and put in operation in the town during the then succeeding 12 months, with its requirements, did not forfeit its right orator, having accepted such vote and complied. to exemption by ceasing to do business and leasing its real estate to another corporation, which. was organized and conducting a different business long before the vote was passed, and not itself entitled to exemption. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 967.*] 4. CONtracts (§ 168*)-CONSTRUCTION. The rule that necessary implications of a written contract are as much a part thereof as though plainly expressed therein does not apply unless the implications arise from the language employed in the instrument, or are indispensable to effectuate the intention. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 751; Dec. Dig. § 168.*] 5. CONTRACTS (§ 168*)-CONSTRUCTION. The court may not, by implication, put into a written instrument what the parties have left out of it, though by mistake, nor reject what they have put into it, unless repugnant to some other part. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contracts, Cent. Dig. § 751; Dec. Dig. § 168.*] 6. TAXATION (§ 204*)—EXEMPTIONS—FORFEIT URE. When by constitutional, statutory, or municipal action, an exemption from taxation is made dependent upon a continuance of the business, use of property for designated purposes, or other conditions, the exemption is forfeitable on condition broken. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, CAVERLY-GOULD CO. v. VILLAGE OF Cent. Dig. § 333; Dec. Dig. § 204.*] SPRINGFIELD et al. (Supreme Court of Vermont. Windsor. May 7, 1910.) 7. TAXATION (8 204*) - EXEMPTION -CON STRUCTION. While legislative contracts exempting from taxation are to be construed in favor of the 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 967*)-TAXA- state when their meaning is reasonably doubtTION-EXEMPTIONS CONTRACT CONSIDERA-ful, yet they are to be fairly construed; and, if not reasonably doubtful, they should be con strued so as to effectuate the intent of the parties. TION. Where a town offers a tax exemption for a period of years for the location of business interests therein, as authorized by V. S. 365, such exemption, if based on a sufficient consideration, is a binding contract between the town and the corporation to which the exemption is accorded. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 2062-2067; Dec. Dig. 967.*] 2. MUNICIPAL Corporations_(§ 967*)—TaxA TION-EXEMPTIONS-TOWN VOTE. V. S. 365, provides that manufacturing establishments, quarries, mines, and such machinery, tramways, appliances, and buildings as are necessary for prosecuting the business, machinery put into unoccupied buildings, and all capital and personal property used in such business, if the amount invested exceeds $1,000, may be exempt from taxation for 10 years from the commencement of business if the town so votes. Held, that the statute was general, and that a general vote of the town extending such exemption to all business locating in the town within the statute was sufficient; it not being necessary to vote an exemption to each particular concern to which the exemption was accorded. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 322; Dec. Dig. § 204.*] 8. TAXATION (8 201*)-EXEMPTIONS-LEGISLATIVE POWER-DELEGATION. Towns and villages being governmental agencies, and as such subject to legislative control and subordination, the Legislature, having the power to tax when not restrained by the Constitution, can confer that power on munici palities in such measure as it pleases, and also the included power to exempt from taxation; and, if it does so, the exercise of such right by the municipality has the effect of statute law. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Dec. Dig. § 201.*] 9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 967*)-TAXA TION- EXEMPTIONS RIGHTS OF VILLAGE "GENERAL TAXES' "SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS. Where a town voted to exempt certain busisuch vote precluded a village within the town ness organizations from taxation for 10 years, from levying general taxes on such exempt property, but did not preclude the levy of special assessments thereon for municipal improvements; "general taxes" being based on the fact [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal that the government must have revenue, and Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 967.*] on the principle that all citizens and property *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes within its jurisdiction should contribute, with- sawed lumber or charcoal), quarries, mines, out special benefit, while "special assessments" are based on the theory of a special benefit to the property assessed, by means of a local im provement. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 967.* For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, vol. 4, p. 3079; vol. 7, pp. 6567-6569.] Appeal in Chancery, Windsor County; Alfred A. Hall, Chancellor. Bill by the Caverly-Gould Company against the Village of Springfield and another. Decree for orator pro forma on bill and answer, and defendants appeal. Affirmed and remanded. and such machinery, tramways, appliances and buildings as are necessary for prosecuting the business, machinery put into unoccupied buildings, and all capital and personal property used in such business, if the amount invested exceeds one thousand dollars may be exempt from taxation not exceeding ten years from the commencement of business if the town so votes. Such real and personal estate shall be appraised and set in the grand list and the termination of the exemption noted against it." The defendants say that exemptions of this class are binding contracts when regularly granted The pleadings show that defendant Fair- and accepted, whether the statute so provides banks is collector of taxes of the village of or not. And we think this is so, if they Springfield; that the orator is a corporation are supported by a consideration, which is organized under the laws of this state on as essential here as in contracts between June 1, 1898; that at a special meeting duly private parties. 1 Cooley on Taxation (3d held on March 26, 1898, the town of Spring- Ed.) 114; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, field voted "to exempt from taxation for a 8 Wall. 430, 437, 19 L. Ed. 495; Grand Lodge, period of ten years all manufacturing estab- etc., v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143, 17 Sup. lishments investing a capital of over five Ct. 523, 41 L. Ed. 951. But they claim that thousand dollars which may be established the exemption in question was not regularly and put in operation during the next twelve granted, as the vote was a blanket vote, put months"; that, "relying upon and intending out to any one who concluded to take adto accept and meet the provisions and condi- vantage of it, and that the statute did not tions of said vote," and before the expira- authorize such a vote, and therefore it is tion of the 12 months therein limited, the void. They rely on Cox Needle Co. v. Gilorator put in operation in the village of ford, 62 N. H. 503, in support of the claim. Springfield, in the town of Springfield, a But that case is not in point. There the manufacturing establishment, consisting of statute was that towns might vote to exempt land, buildings, shafting, machinery, and from taxation any establishments therein, "or power, at a cost of $50,000, whereof $20,000 proposed to be erected or put in operation was for machinery; that the orator operated therein," etc., and that the vote should be a this plant as a factory for about four years, contract binding for the term specified thereand since that time it has been operated as in. The vote was to exempt "all capital of such by the orator's tenants, and is still $5,000 or upwards that might thereafter be owned by the orator; that on June 18, 1903, invested in the town for manufacturing purthe trustees of the village of Springfield "as- poses." The court said the vote was too gensessed against and upon said real estate of eral to be good; that if the statute was conthe orator a village tax of $50, and a village strued to authorize exemption by a sweeping highway tax of $20," which taxes, with the vote of all establishments that might thereproper warrant for their collection, have after be erected, no force would be given to regularly come into the hands of defendant the word "proposed," which pointed to such Fairbanks as such collector, who has regu- particular and specific establishments as were larly advertised said real estate of the orator at the time of the vote proposed by some for sale in satisfaction of said taxes and person or persons to be erected and put in costs. The bill prays for an injunction re-operation; that if the Legislature intended straining defendants from further proceed- to confer such sweeping authority, it would ings in the collection of said taxes. A temporary injunction issued. Argued before ROWELL, C. J., and MUNSON, WATSON, HASELTON, and POWERS, JJ. Fred H. Spaulding and Charles Batchelder, for appellants. Blanchard & Tupper and Stickney, Sargent & Skeels, for appellees. ROWELL, C. J. Section 365 of the Vermont Statutes, under which this case arose, reads as follows: "Manufacturing establishments (except for manufacturing pulp, rough have expressed its purpose by omitting the It may be noticed in this connection that when our statute was first passed in 1867 (Laws 1867, No. 60), it was like the New Hampshire statute in respect of establishments that it might be proposed to locate in the town, and in giving the assent of the town the force of a contract. But in 1869 (Laws 1869, No. 26), those provisions were eliminated, and have never been restored. So there is nothing in our statute restricting towns as the New Hampshire statute does, but its language is general, and the vote may be as general as the statute, and with good reason, for a general vote might call in investors that the town would not otherwise learn about. Such a vote is like an offer of reward to the public at large for certain information, which becomes obligatory as soon as one, with a view to the reward, renders the specified service, if the offer was not previously withdrawn. And in the New Hampshire case the court virtually said that the vote would have been good had the statute been general. We hold, therefore, that the vote here was authorized by the statute, and that the town was bound by it when the orator acted upon it, as it did, with a view to the exemption. And the town evidently so understood it, for the property was appraised and set in the grand list, and the termination of the exemption noted against it as the statute required. But it is said that this construction ought not to be put upon the statute because a general vote might call in an undesirable business. But the answer is that the town can protect itself against that by its vote. in But the defendants say that though the vote is valid, yet, when the orator ceased doing business and leased its real estate to the Machine Company, which was organized and conducting a different business Springfield long before the vote was passed, and not itself entitled to exemption, it ceased to be a manufacturing concern, established and put in operation within the time limited, and therefore lost its right to further exemption; that the vote should be construed to exempt only such property as should be dedicated to a new industry, for that its purpose must have been to encourage the establishment of such industries with the expectation that they would become permanent, and ultimately increase the taxable property of the town. Several cases from other jurisdictions are referred to in support of this claim. Thus, in Waterbury Co. v. Atlas Cordage Co., 42 La. Ann. 723, 7 South. 783, the Constitution of the state exempted from taxation factories, property, and machinery employed in the manufacture of cordage, and it was held that when the factory in question was leased for the purpose of closing it to the manufacture of rope, and of stopping competition and reducing the supply, the declared purpose of the Constitution was thereby directly contravened, and the property made taxable. So where a statute exempted municipal property from taxation, it was held to be its unmistakable intention that the exemption should extend only to such property as was actually used in the exercise of municipal functions, and not to property leased by the municipality, though the money realized therefrom was applied to a public purpose. Cincinnati v. Lewis, 66 Ohio St. 49, 63 N. E. 588. And where a municipality undertook to contract with a manufacturing company to exempt it from taxation on condition that it would conduct a certain specified business continuously to its full capacity for such a time, and give a mortgage to secure performance on its part, neither of which it did, but suspended operations and went out of business entirely, it was held that, even if the contract was binding on the municipality, there was such a failure on the part of the corporation to meet its requirements as would avoid the exemption. Power Co. v. Havre De Grace, 102 Md. 33, 61 Atl. 662. It is manifest that none of these cases are in point. In one, the declared purpose of the Constitution of the state was directly contravened; in another, the property was not used as the statute required; and in another, there was a breach of an express condition. Nor are the Kentucky cases referred to any more in point. They are Mengel Box Co. v. City of Louisville, 117 Ky. 735, 79 S. W. 255, and Continental Tobacco Co. v. City of Louisville, 123 Ky. 173, 94 S. W. 11. There the ordinance, in order to induce the location of more manufacturing establishments in the city, exempted any person, firm, or corporation that should permanently locate and conduct such establishments therein. The plain. tiff in each of those cases had bought out concerns that were exempt under the ordinance, and the question in each was whether the plaintiff had located a new plant within the meaning of the ordinance, or was conducting the old plant; and it was held in one case that the plaintiff had located and was conducting a new plant, and therefore was entitled to exemption, and in the other case that the plaintiff had not located a new plant, but was conducting the old plant, and therefore was not entitled to exemption. There, the grantees of the property were the ones claiming exemption, while here, it is the original investor who is still the owner. But the case at bar does not involve any of these questions, but is to be governed by the contract between the town and the orator, evidenced by the offer made by the vote of March 26, 1898, and its acceptance by the orator. The vote was to exempt from taxation for 10 years all manufacturing establishments investing a capital of over $5,000 that might be established and put in operation during the then next 12 months. the offer, and the orator accepted it by complying with its requirements in every particular therein expressed. But we are asked to read into it an unexpressed condition that the orator should continue the business or forfeit its right to exemption. This was The rule undoubtedly is that the necessary implications of a written contract are as much a part of it as though plainly expressed in it. But in order to apply this rule, the implication must arise from the language employed in the instrument, or be indispensable to effectuate the intention of the parties. When the language employed is obscure, imperfect, or ambiguous, the instrument is open to construction, and then the prime object is to ascertain the intention of the parties. But in that case the court can go no farther than to collect the intention from the language employed as applied to the subjectmatter in view of the attendant circumstances. Nor can the court by implication put into a written instrument what the parties have left out of it, though by mistake; nor reject what they have put into it, unless repugnant to some other part. Hudson Canal Co. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 8 Wall. 276, 288, 19 L. Ed. 349. It is undoubtedly true that when by constitutional provision, legislative enactment, or authorized municipal vote, exemption is made to depend upon a continuance of the business, the use of property for designated purposes, or other condition, the exemption is forfeitable on condition broken. And while it is true that legislative contracts of this class are to be construed most favorably to the state when their meaning is reasonably doubtful, yet it is also true that they are to be fairly construed; and, if their meaning is not reasonably doubtful, they are to be construed so as to effectuate the intention of the parties, the same as are contracts between private persons. Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430, 437, 19 L. Ed. 495. Following these rules, as we must, it is obvious that we cannot read into this vote what we are asked to, for there seems to be no reasonable doubt about its meaning. Its language is neither obscure, imperfect, nor ambiguous, but is plain, complete, and explicit, and was evidently chosen with care and consideration, so it is not fairly open to construction, and we see no warrant for saying that the town left, or intended to leave, anything to implication, but think that it expressed, and intended to express, all it wanted to ask of those who accepted its offer, and that the orator had a right to understand it So. tion, and when not restrained by the Constitution, as the town is not here, the Legislature, having the power itself to tax, can confer that power upon municipalities in such measure as it pleases; and, as the power to tax includes the power to exempt from taxation, it may confer that power upon them in like measure, and if it does, and the municipality exercises it in a legal way, its action in that behalf has the force and effect of a statute law. Colton & Moore v. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413, 45 Atl. 1039; Town School District v. School District, 72 Vt. 457, 48 Atl. 697. So the vote of the town precludes the village, unless the taxes are assessments, and therefore not within the exemption. As between taxes, or general taxes as they are sometimes called by way of distinction, and special taxes, or special assessments, there is a clear distinction. Taxes proper, or general taxes, are based upon the fact that the government must have revenue, and upon the principle that all citizens, and all property within its jurisdiction, should contribute, but for which the government renders no return of special benefit to any property, but only secures to the citizen that general benefit that results from protecting his person and property, and the promotion of those various schemes that have for their object the welfare of all. While on the other hand, special taxes, or special assessments, are based upon the theory that when a local improvement enhances the value of neighboring property, that property should pay for the improvement. These are the kind of taxes that are not embraced in a general exemption. Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 13 Sup. Ct. 293, 37 L. Ed. 132. The taxes in question do not belong to this class, but to the former class, and so are embraced in the exemption. Decree affirmed, and cause remanded. All concur. STATE v. CABAUDO. (83 Conn. 160) (Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut. May 4, 1910.) COMMENT ON EVIDENCE. Nor has the town ever indicated to the contrary, as far as appears, but has always remained content. And this suggests the 1. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 755%*)-INSTRUCTIONS— question, not made in argument, whether the village has any standing to enforce a forfeiture of the right of exemption, if any there is. But it is not necessary to consider that question. It is further objected that the The court in submitting a case may at its discretion call the attention of the jury to the evidence, or lack of evidence, bearing on any point of issue, and to comment on the weight of the evidence so long as it does not advise the jury how to decide the case. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 1731-1765; Dec. Dig. § 7552.*] 2. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 756*) — INSTRUCTIONS COMMENT ON EVIDENCE. vote of the town does not bind the village, for that the town has no interest in nor control over the taxes in question, as the village is an independent organization, and its needs for which assessments are An instruction that the testimony of acmade are entirely local; and for that the cused shows that the firing of the shot was actaxes are not within the exemption, which is cidental; that he put his hand into his pocket general. But towns and villages are govern- where his pistol was to frighten decedent, and mental agencies, and as such are peculiarly bringing the pistol, which in some way was that by some one his hand was pulled out, subject to legislative control and subordina- discharged without any intent to fire; that the |