replied: "Philadelphia, beyond all question, is the object of the enemy's movements, and nothing less than our utmost exertions will prevent General Howe from possessing it. The force I have is weak and utterly incompetent to that end. I must therefore entreat you to push on with every possible succor you can bring." Lee remained at Morristown until the 11th, and then wrote again to his general, proposing to push to Burlington, and desiring that boats for his crossing be sent to that point from Philadelphia. Washington then wrote him a letter, which displayed the nearest approach to asperity of any drawn from him during the whole of this disgraceful march. "I am surprised," he says, "that you should be in any doubt respecting the road you should take, after the information you have received on that head. A large number of boats was procured and is still retained at Tinicum, under strong guard, to facilitate your passage across the Delaware. I have so frequently mentioned our situation, and the necessity of your aid, that it is painful for me to add a word on the subject. Congress has directed Philadelphia to be defended to the last extremity. The fatal consequences that must attend its loss are but too obvious to every one. Your arrival may be the means of saving it." Schuyler had, in the meantime, dispatched Gates with several regiments to reinforce Washington. Three of these regiments descended the Hudson to Peekskill and Lee, learning of their presence there, took it upon himself to order them to join him at Morristown, which they did. The four remaining joined Washington on the 20th of December.

On the 12th of December, Lee left Morristown and, after marching but eight miles, encamped his army at Vealtown, himself riding to a tavern three miles without the lines to spend the night. During the evening a tory farmer came to him with a complaint regarding a horse which had been taken from him by the army. Lee dismissed the man very curtly, and, after spending the evening until a late hour over his correspondence, retired. He slept late in the morning and finally appeared in a very slovenly dress, dispatched orders to Sullivan, his second in command, to march—in a direction, however, clearly indicating a disregard of Washington's orders-and was about to breakfast, when there came an alarm that the British were at hand. The guards had stacked their arms and were endeavoring to keep warm on the sunny side of the house. In a moment the tavern was surrounded, the general taken, mounted-attired as he was—and hurried a prisoner to the British lines, twenty miles distant. Sullivan, as soon as he learned the fate of Lee, changed the course of the march, in accordance with the orders of Washington, and joined the army of the latter on December 20th. Lee thus fell a victim to his own recklessness and to his lack of courtesy to the farmer who had called upon him on the evening of the 12th, as the latter had taken revenge by giving information of his whereabouts and of his almost defenseless condition, at the nearest post of the British army, and it

had required no argument to prevail upon the officers to take advantage of it. The capture of Lee was at that time regarded by the American people, by the Congress, by the army, and, in spite of all occurrences, by Washington himself, as a great misfortune. There was something about his dashing and arrogant manner that excited confidence; he had been successful in his only decisive campaign; he was a soldier by profession, and one of long and varied experience. That he was indeed a most able officer was then and must to-day be admitted. Then, too, he had done much talking and writing to good effect. He had predicted the British movement into New Jersey, he had openly and loudly condemned the action of Congress in attempting to hold Fort Washington, while the commander in chief, disapproving it quite as strongly, kept silence. Thus he had the people with him. Then, too, he had kept up direct communication with Congress, advising almost dictating-what should be done and what omitted. This correspondence was in direct derogation of the dignity of Washington, and its indulgence by Congress was an outrage, yet Lee had a following in that body and gained its support by this very tacit contempt of his superior officer. During the whole of his service, after rejoining the army at New York, he was engaged in writing letters to various persons, all calculated to exalt himself at the expense of Washington. One of these, written on the morning of his capture, to his confidant and sympathizer Gates, may well be quoted. It should have secured his instant dismissal from the army. He writes: "The ingenious manœuvre of Fort Washington has completely unhinged the goodly fabric we have been building. There never was so d-d a stroke; entre nous, a certain great man is most damnably deficient. He has thrown me into a situation in which I have my choice of difficulties. If I stay in this province I risk myself and army, and if I do not stay the province is lost forever. As to what relates to yourself, if you think you can be in time to aid the general, I would have you by all means go; you will at least save your army." What words are these for a soldier to use of his commander! Here are two officers, under positive orders to do a certain thing, calmly discussing the advisability of obeying the instructions of their general! If this letter means what its words fairly imply, then there was more in it than an offense against military etiquette, and Lee's ambition should have brought the blind-fold and the volley, rather than the epaulets he sought. No, the capture of Lee and his subsequent retirement from the service was unquestionably a most fortunate event for the colonies. His delay and evidently determined disobedience of Washington's orders were clearly premeditated and adopted in furtherance of a deliberate plan. He was laying the foundation for his own advancement to the supreme command, at the expense of Washington. By holding back his army he believed the commander in chief might be defeated or at least rendered incapable of resistance; he himself might by a bold move break the British cordon, come to the

succor of Philadelphia, gain the eclat of a possible victory, leaving to Washington the ignominy of certain failure and, perhaps, gain the command, risking, in its pursuit, the safety of the army and the whole future of the American cause. To this end he had sought to strengthen his army by a draft from Heath, and had afterwards wrongfully intercepted the regiments sent by Schuyler to join Washington.

The additional numerical force gained to Washington by the arrival of Gates' and Lee's men, was of very questionable advantage. The men had been so long on the march, in the dead of a very severe winter, that a very large proportion of them were absolutely unfit for duty, and the hospital was better reinforced than the line. Some hatless, coatless, many without shoes, footsore, frozen, half fed, they presented as miserable an appearance as any body of men that ever undertook a military service. Yet Washington was quite determined that service should be done, and that quickly He saw the immediate danger of his position on the Delaware, and that, more remote, involved in the freezing of the river, which would open the way to Howe. Hence he determined upon an offensive movement, and perfected arrangements to carry it into effect on the night of December 25th. The weather was bitterly cold, and the river was full of floating ice, which a day or two of such temperature would render solid. The plan contemplated a three-fold movement. General Ewing was to cross the river at Trenton ferry and hold the bridge across Assumpinck creek, below the town; General Cadwallader was to pass over at Dunck's ferry and capture the post at Mount Holly, and Washington himself was to land a force, across the river nine miles above the town, at midnight, reach Trenton at five in the morning, and, Ewing having cut off the retreat of the British, surprise and capture them. This being successful further movements were contemplated.

So

Washington took for the service two thousand six hundred men. severe was the storm and so heavy the ice in the river, it was 3 o'clock before his crossing was completed, and nearly four, before the movement toward Trenton began. Two roads of nearly the same length led to the town, and the force was divided into two divisions, one going by each. Washington commanded the upper column, and, relying upon the movement being nearly simultaneous, gave orders to the other to make an attack immediately upon reaching its destination. Washington's column arrived at the outpost precisely at 8 o'clock, and it was not more than three minutes before he heard the fire from the force which had taken the river road. picket guard made a show of defense, but was driven in at once. Hessian colonel, Rahl, formed his men in the center of the town, and several field pieces were unlimbered and directed at the approaching Americans, but were captured before they could be fired. The Hessians then droke and fled, but were reformed by their commander in an orchard with

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