himself and an impeachment of the motives of those who had refused to give him the independent command of the North. He and his friends were active everywhere in fomenting dissatisfaction with Schuyler, and in encouraging the belief that he had directed the evacuation of the fort. It was difficult for the people at large to understand that circumstances could arise which should warrant the abandonment without contest of works admittedly so strong, and which had cost so great a sum to the treasury. Washington's letter to Schuyler, on the 15th of July, is characteristically forbearing and hopeful. He says: "The evacuation of Ticonderoga and Fort Independence is an event of chagrin and surprise, not apprehended nor within the compass of my reasoning. The stroke is severe indeed and has distressed us much. But notwithstanding things at present wear a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of General Burgoyne's arms, and that the confidence derived from success will hurry him into measures that will, in their consequences, be favorable We should never despair. Our situation has before been unpromising and has changed for the better. So, I trust it will again. If new difficulties arise we must only put forth new exertions, and proportion our efforts to the exigency of the times.' to us. In a later communication written to Schuyler, Washington foreshadowed the course of events in these words: "I trust General Burgoyne's army will meet, sooner or later, an effectual check; and, as I suggested before, that the success he has met will precipitate his ruin. From your accounts he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which, of all others, is favorable to us. I mean acting in detachment. This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our part and expose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people and do away with much of our present anxiety." The opportunity was not long lacking; in the face of the obstructions cast in the way of his march, Burgoyne reached the Hudson, near Fort Edward, only on the 30th of July. He was most anxious to reach Albany, to make his junction with St. Leger, who, as he made no doubt, was already in possession of Fort Stanwix. His army and great burthen of baggage called, however, for means of transportation far greater than he possessed. Bateaux in which to convey his baggage by water; horses for his guns and wagons, were indispensably necessary before he could move. While pondering this problem Skene, the tory, who had accompanied him from Skenesborough, informed him that large numbers of horses and wagons, as well as military stores of great importance, were accumulated at the town of Bennington, guarded only by a small and varying body of militia. These, Skene represented, might be easily taken and it would thus be not only possible to move and sustain the army, but to mount the cavalry. Burgoyne was not well inclined toward himself and an impeachment of the motives of those who had refused to give him the independent command of the North. He and his friends were active everywhere in fomenting dissatisfaction with Schuyler, and in encouraging the belief that he had directed the evacuation of the fort. It was difficult for the people at large to understand that circumstances could arise which should warrant the abandonment without contest of works admittedly so strong, and which had cost so great a sum to the treasury. Washington's letter to Schuyler, on the 15th of July, is characteristically forbearing and hopeful. He says: "The evacuation of Ticonderoga and Fort Independence is an event of chagrin and surprise, not apprehended. nor within the compass of my reasoning. The stroke is severe indeed and has distressed us much. But notwithstanding things at present wear a dark and gloomy aspect, I hope a spirited opposition will check the progress of General Burgoyne's arms, and that the confidence derived from success. will hurry him into measures that will, in their consequences, be favorable to us. We should never despair. Our situation has before been unpromising and has changed for the better. So, I trust it will again. If new difficulties arise we must only put forth new exertions, and proportion our efforts to the exigency of the times." able to us. In a later communication written to Schuyler, Washington foreshadowed the course of events in these words: "I trust General Burgoyne's army will meet, sooner or later, an effectual check; and, as I suggested before, that the success he has met will precipitate his ruin. From your accounts he appears to be pursuing that line of conduct which, of all others, is favorI mean acting in detachment. This conduct will certainly give room for enterprise on our part and expose his parties to great hazard. Could we be so happy as to cut one of them off, though it should not exceed four, five, or six hundred men, it would inspirit the people and do away with much of our present anxiety." The opportunity was not long lacking; in the face of the obstructions cast in the way of his march, Burgoyne reached the Hudson, near Fort Edward, only on the 30th of July. He was most anxious to reach Albany, to make his junction with St. Leger, who, as he made no doubt, was already in possession of Fort Stanwix. His army and great burthen of baggage called, however, for means of transportation far greater than he possessed. Bateaux in which to convey his baggage by water; horses for his guns and wagons, were indispensably necessary before he could move. While pondering this problem Skene, the tory, who had accompanied him from Skenesborough, informed him that large numbers of horses and wagons, as well as military stores of great importance, were accumulated at the town of Bennington, guarded only by a small and varying body of militia. These, Skene represented, might be easily taken and it would thus be not only possible to move and sustain the army, but to mount the cavalry. Burgoyne was not well inclined toward the enterprise, but it offered great temptations and he eventually yielded to Skene persuasions and detached for the service Colonel Baum, with five hundred Brunswickers, a body of American loyalists and an Indian confingene. To support Baum he threw his army down the river, made a bridge of boats, and placed his advance in the village of Saratoga Lieutenant-colonel Brechman, with a strong body of troops, was drawn out still farther to reinforce Baum if such an unlikely necessity should occur. The New Hampshire militia was divided into two bodies, one commanded by the brave old General Stark, who served at Bunker Hill, the other by Colonel Seth Warner, the former associate of Ethan Allen. It happened that both Stark and Warner had reached Bennington with two thousand militia, which the latter was to lead to Stillwater to join Schuyler, and Baum came just in time to receive the attention of the whole body. He consequently entrenched himself and sent post haste for reinforcements. Brechman at once advanced his men, but the roads were so bad that it required thirtytwo hours to march the distance of twenty-four miles to Bennington. In the meantime Stark had made a furious attack upon the works from front and rear and, although they were bravely defended, almost the whole of Baum's force had been either killed, wounded or made prisoners. The undisciplined militia were carried away by their success and dispersed over the field in search of better equipments than their own. While they were thus engaged, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of August 16th, Brechman appeared and would inevitably have reversed the fortune of the battle had not Warner come up with a fresh regiment and held him in check while the main force of the Americans reformed. The fight was then renewed and maintained with great vigor on both sides until darkness fell, then Brechman retreated, leaving his artillery, baggage, and many dead and wounded upon the field. The Americans lost in this battle one hundred killed and wounded. They captured four brass field pieces, nine hundred dragoon swords, a thousand stand of arms, four ammunition wagons, a quantity of baggage, and as prisoners thirty-two officers and five hundred and sixty-four privates. The number of the British killed and wounded was very great, but has never been accurately determined. In the meantime, on the 10th of August, Schuyler had received a summons from Congress to appear before a court of inquiry, appointed to inves tigate the matter of the loss of Ticonderoga; Washington was at the same time asked to appoint an officer to the command in the North, but requested to be relieved of the duty, and Gates was named by Congress, thus at last realizing his long cherished ambition. When Schuyler received his notification, he was engrossed in his effort to reorganize the army, to relieve Fort Stanwix, and to cripple Burgoyne by cutting off his supplies. He saw that for him to at once leave his post and obey the summons to Philadelphia, would be to gravely imperil the fate of his army and the inter ests of the people. Hence he pocketed his pride and determined to remain until actually relieved, and, even after that, to co-operate with Gates, at the head of the New York militia. Fort Stanwix was invested by regulars, tories, and Indians; General Herkimer had been defeated and fatally injured in an independent effort to relieve it. General Arnold was at Albany, sore at heart on account of the promotion of other officers over his head, and without a command. He readily consented to lead a force to the relief of the fort, an adventurous and doubtful service, which well suited his mind and disposition. He set out with a body of Continentals, the strength of which he artfully caused to be much exaggerated to the enemy, and the latter, becoming alarmed at these reports and the defection of his Indian allies, fled with precipitation while Arnold was not yet within forty miles, leaving his tents standing and his baggage on the ground. Such Indians as remained with him, raised repeated false alarms, for the purpose of increasing the panic and the amount of their own plunder, and massacred such stragglers as fell into their hands. A party from the fort pursued, and, overtaking the rear guard of the retreating army, killed or captured nearly all of them. Thus, in a few weeks, was Burgoyne's exultation changed to something very closely approaching despair. Instead of expected aid from St. Leger and a body of loyalists which should constantly grow with his triumphant progress down the Mohawk; instead of ample supplies from the rebel stores. at Bennington, with another contingent of tories from New England, he received news of hopeless defeat in both quarters. His holiday march to Albany, was changed into a stern struggle for self-preservation. With no adequate means of transportation; with a sad lack of supplies; with enemies all about him, coming up like mushrooms in a night, to cut off his foraging parties; with discontent and desertion among his Indian and Canadian allies, with all these he saw that he must either fight successfully or surrender, unless succor should come from General Howe. The effect of the victory at Bennington and the failure of the movement against Fort Stanwix, was to inspire the greatest confidence among the colonists of New York and New England. Finding that, with all their glitter and display, the British troops were not invulnerable, they showed a greater readiness to answer the call to arms than ever before. Their harvests were gathered, and many were hastening to places of rendezvous, when occurred an incident which was all that was needed to spur the most timid to resolution; this was the murder of Miss McCrea by one of Burgoyne's Indian allies. The story is too familiar to need re-telling. Burgoyne caused the offending chief to be delivered up, and was at first quite determined to hang him, but it was represented that such an act would inflame the Indians, and certainly result in their secession in a body. The general was in a difficult position; with the responsibility of an army on his hands, he did not feel justified in sustaining so great a loss, and hence, while he condemned and |