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a series of communications to the press, intended to dispel the prevalent ignorance on the subject of the situation and resources of America. He also bent his efforts in conversation with the most intelligent people in the French capital, to the same end, and soon received an intimation from Vergennes, that the latter would be glad to receive any information he might have to convey. Taking this to be quite as much a direction as a request, he sent the minister newspapers and extracts from letters, which were acknowledged, with a request for more. Among the matter later sent, was a portion of a letter from Adams' brother-in-law, in which he referred to a proposal of Congress to redeem the emissions of continental currency, by the payment of one dollar in silver for forty in paper. This was made clear by a subsequent letter dispatched by Adams to the minister, explaining the difference between the domestic currency referred to, and loan certificates, many of which were held by French creditors of the United States. Before the receipt of this second letter, Vergennes, in great excitement, called upon Adams, upon whom he had no official claim, to use his efforts for the prevention of such partial repudiation. Adams could not well keep silence, thus apparently confirming Vergennes' erroneous impression, and hence replied with a full explanation. The minister, probably finding himself in error, was irritated, and denounced the communication and the former transmissions of intelligence as gratuitous and impertinent, as if they had been voluntary and not expressly requested by himself. He avowed a design to communicate to Congress, through the minister of France, his objection to the proposed measure, and, when Adams procured Franklin to suggest a delay of such action until the matter could be more fully discussed, repelled this suggestion and criticised Adams, -as he did later to Congress,-for interfering in the affair. Franklin was probably a little piqued at Adams' course, for he went out of his way to say that he was not responsible for the latter's action, and, when he drew a report to Congress, made no effort to set him right. Congress, however, did not regard Adams' action as worthy of condemnation, but, on the contrary, passed a resolution expressing its approval and thanks. In spite of all these facts, well recognized at the time, there has been a tendency to charge him with having gratuitously provoked a contest with the French minister.

Once more Adams proposed to Vergennes the opening of communication with England, urging the existence of a popular discontent in that country, which, in the event of a failure to properly consider his proposals, might well result in overturning the ministry of Lord North; again he met a rebuff, accompanied by a threat to appeal to Congress, should he persist in endeavoring to carry the plan into effect. He asked permission to go to Holland, desiring to open certain financial negotiations in that country. This, too, was refused. The menace of Vergennes was uncalled for, ill-timed

and directed at a man so secure in the sense of his own integrity, that he was not to be in any manner intimidated. It drew from him a manly, full, and convincing statement of the condition of affairs in America, upon which was predicated the statement that his countrymen would scarcely forgive a failure to embrace any opportunity for an honorable peace, consistent with treaty obligations. Vergennes found, to his surprise, that he had encountered a man who would not be subservient, even to the representative of the crown of France. France was, at that time, more than inclined to favor a long truce, rather than the recognition of independence, as the basis of negotiation between England and America. Franklin had countenanced the idea, and the French alliance for a time bade fair to defeat, rather than to forward, its original purpose.

Having at last obtained a modification of Vergennes' orders, Mr. Adams, on the 27th of July, left Paris for the Hague. His prime object in this journey was to obtain materials which should permit of his forming a judgment as to the probability of obtaining an American loan from the Dutch. His first impression was very favorable. The principal obstacle seemed to lie in the perverted ideas regarding America, which the friends of England had instilled into the minds of the Dutch. To counteract this, Mr. Adams made his usual free use of the journals of the day, and also took every occasion to disseminate in private, such facts as would tend to forward his wishes. As the result of his representations, he was formally empowered by Congress to effect a loan in Holland.

Mr. Laurens had been appointed, by Congress, minister to Holland, and had set sail for Amsterdam. At this critical moment of Mr. Adams' negotiation, when the bankers seemed favorably interested in America, came news that Laurens had been captured by a British cruiser, and with him a draft of a proposed treaty between the United States and Holland, which seriously compromised the latter with Great Britain. A panic at once seized the merchants and bankers, and negotiations were, for the time, brought to a stand-still.

On the 1st day of January, 1781, came a commission to Adams, as plenipotentiary to Holland. No sooner was this received than he began. to labor for recognition. The arrogant action of England toward Holland, had left only the choice between resistance and abject surrender. The Dutch were not prepared for the latter, and the eagerness of England to find cause for quarrel, indirectly served the ends of America. The stadtholder and the court were known to be inclined to the English view of the subject, but the people were strongly tinctured with the spirit of liberty, and among them Mr. Adams found his best friends. In the midst of this negotiation, and before it had been prosecuted to a result, there came to Adams a message from the Count de Vergennes, requesting his presence in France, in his capacity of commissioner for the negotiation of a peace.

This was accompanied by no explanation of the attitude of affairs, and the American envoy had been studiously kept ignorant of the progress of the negotiation. Nevertheless he set out, and arrived in Paris on the 6th day of July, 1781.

The immediate reason for summoning Adams to Paris, was the necessity of considering a proposal of accommodation, made by Russia and Austria, and forwarded to the respective ministers of those powers at Paris, London, and Madrid. The proposal provided for a wholly separate negotiation between Great Britain and the United States, without the intervention of France, or of mediators, unless such should be requested; no treaty was, however, to be executed or signed, except simultaneously with a peace between the belligerents for whom the mediation was proposed. The fourth article provided, in the event of the acceptance of this proposal by all parties, the belligerents should call upon the mediating powers to open the congress, and should at once commission representatives to attend it. This fourth and last article, which involved the standing of the United States in the negotiation, was kept secret from Mr. Adams, -the Count de Vergennes fearing that the American envoy might demand so much for his country, and for himself in his representative capacity, as to defeat his own plan of reducing America to the ignominious position of holding a seat in the congress, without a vote, thus juggling with her interests and leaving her powerless to act.

It is not necessary to go into particulars regarding this effort at mediation, for the reason that it failed—principally because of the obstinacy of England's doting old king, who could not brook an interference of France. between Great Britain and her colonies. Even had this stubborn resistance failed of wrecking the project, it would have been gravely imperiled by the fact that America, in spite of Franklin's leaning, would assuredly have insisted upon independence, absolute and unqualified, as its ultimatum, refusing to accept the prolonged truce proposed by Spain, and would have withdrawn unconditionally from the negotiation, unless regarded as a bellig. erent power, rather than an insurgent praying succor from Europe. While the proposals of Russia and Austria were pending, Adams wrote Vergennes in no uncertain tone, foreshadowing this policy, and evoked an angry answer from that minister, in which it was stated that preliminaries were to be arranged before the United States could be fully recognized, and which closed with something very like a threat that Adams should lose his place, did he insist upon making such demands. The letter was addressed and franked by Vergennes, in his own hand, to Adams, as agent of the United States of North America. In spite of this pointed rebuff, Adams supple mented his letter to Vergennes with two others, in which he respectfully and clearly reiterated his arguments for the recognition of America in the congress, and to such effect that the minister, without previously consulting

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