Admission was thus to be accomplished through the agency of Congress, and after Congress had been satisfied that the requirements had been met. In the case of Tennessee, admitted before Ohio, and in that of every state admitted since, Congress has interpreted the words "shall be admitted" as meaning an admission by the action of that body subsequent to the formation of the state constitution. If Ohio is an exception, the reasons for so regarding it should be made clear beyond any possible doubt.

There is another point which deserves notice in this connection. In the enabling act for Ohio there is a proviso. A constitution and state government might be formed, "provided the same shall be republican, and not repugnant to the ordinance of July 13, 1787." Who is to say whether the constitution is republican, and in accord with the ordinance of 1787? The convention that frames it, or Congress that authorizes it and requires it to possess certain features? When, under this enabling act, the convention has formed a constitution, we should expect it to be at once reported to Congress, with whom is the sole power to admit, for examination. If the constitution is found to be republican and in accordance with the ordinance of 1787, the admission would naturally follow. But the difficulties in the way of regarding the state existence as beginning on the adjournment of the convention, before any report to Congress, and before any examination by that body of the constitution, are insuperable.

What took place after the adjournment of the convention November 29? The constitution, as we might expect, was laid before Congress. The first action was in the Senate January 7:

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Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire whether any, and, if any, what, legislative measures may be necessary for admitting the state of Ohio into the Union, or for extending to that state the laws of the United States." On the 19th this committee made this report:

"That the people of the eastern division of the Territory northwest of the river Ohio, in pursuance of an act of Congress, passed on the 30th day of April, 1802, entitled 'An act to enable etc.' did on the 29th day of November, 1802, frame for themselves a constitution and state government. That the said constitution and government so formed is republican, and in conformity to the principles contained in the articles of the ordinance made on the 13th of July, 1787, for the government of the said Territory; and that it is now necessary to establish a district court within the said state, to carry into complete effect the laws of the United States, within the same." *

* This report is not found in the Annals of Congress, but was furnished me from the manuscripts in the Department of State.

Two days later the report was considered and the committee instructed to bring in a bill. This was done on the 27th; the bill was considered, amended, and passed February 7. It was passed by the House on the 12th, and approved by the President on the 19th. Its title is "An act to provide for the due execution of the laws of the United States within the state of Ohio." It was the first congressional act relating to Ohio since the convention, and it was a recognition of the new state by Congress. As such it takes the place of an act of admission in the usual form, and its date may be regarded as the date of the admission of Ohio. In the volume of Charters and Constitutions compiled by order of the Senate, and printed in 1877, it occupies the place which for every other state is occupied by the act of admission. The heading is "Act recognizing the State of Ohio1803."

The Senate committee had reported the constitution republican and in accord with the ordinance of 1787, and there was nothing to prevent the recognition of the new state. In the case of Indiana the statement that the constitution and state government are republican and in accordance with the ordinance of 1787 is in the preamble of the resolution for admission, while in the case of Ohio it is in the report of the committee already quoted. The same investigation had been made in the two cases, and the same results had been reached. Congress had satisfied itself in each case as to the constitution before it would admit or recognize the state.

Thus far the act of February 19 has been considered simply as one of recognition. As the first relating to Ohio after the formation of the constitution in November, 1802, it has been regarded as a virtual act of admission, and as determining the date of the state. While believing the reasons for taking this date instead of November 29, 1802, to be amply sufficient, the argument may be greatly strengthened by considering the subject-matter of the act of February 19, 1803. Its title is "An act to provide for the due execution of the laws of the United States within the state of Ohio." The act declares "that the said state shall be one district, and be called the Ohio district; and a district court shall be held therein, to consist of one judge, who shall reside in the said district, and be called a district judge." It provides also for the appointment of a district-attorney and a marshal.

The judicial system of the United States consisted of three classes of courts: the supreme, the circuit, and the district. By the act of 1789, estab lishing the judicial courts, each state was made a district for judicial purposes; except that Maine and Kentucky, parts of other states, were made separate districts. But the United States judiciary system did not extend

to the territories. The Northwest Territory had its own courts. So has every territory established since. A citizen of a territory could not in 1789, as he cannot now, be a party to a suit in a United States court. When, therefore, the act of February 19, 1803, declared Ohio to be a district in the judiciary system of the United States, it declared it to be a state. The establishment of a district court in it, to take the place of the territorial court, transformed it from a territory into a state. Ohio could not be a judicial district of the United States and at the same time be a territory. The two things were absolutely incompatible.

At the opening of Congress, December 2, 1816, two senators from Indiana presented themselves, and their credentials were read. As already stated, a constitution and state government had been formed by the people of that territory the preceding June. When the credentials were read, Mr. Morrow, a senator from Ohio, moved the appointment of a committee, "to inquire whether any, and if any, what, legislative measures may be necessary for admitting the state of Indiana into the Union, or for extending to that state the laws of the United States." The resolution, it will be noticed, is couched in the identical words used as to Ohio fourteen years before. The committee reported on the 4th, and on the 6th a resolution was passed, "That the state of Indiana shall be one, and is hereby declared to be one, of the United States of America," etc. It was laid before the House the same day, read twice, and referred to the committee of the whole. Some members wished to take it up that day, considering the resolution as a matter of form merely; but others thought that "so solemn an act as pronouncing on the character and republican principles of a state constitution ought to be more deliberately considered." On the 9th the constitution was read through for the further information of the House, and its verification examined. The resolution was then read a third time and passed. It was approved on the 10th, and on the 12th the senators were sworn in and took their seats.

The identity of these two resolutions of inquiry could not have been accidental. Senator Morrow in 1816 introduced an exact copy of the resolution of 1803. Each resolution suggests a choice between two measures, the committees make the same inquiries, and, as a basis for legislative action, report the same condition of facts in the two cases-the constitution and government republican and in conformity to the ordinance of 1787— but in 1803 one of the two measures is proposed, and in 1816 the other. Why did Senator Morrow introduce a resolution with an alternative? Why not limit it to measures for admission? Unquestionably because the measures were equivalent. The end in view would be accomplished by

one as well as by the other. Had the Senate committee reported a bill to extend the laws of the United States to the state of Indiana, instead of a resolution of admission, and the bill had passed, the senators would have taken their seats just the same.

If the Senate Committee in January, 1803, had reported a resolution for the admission of Ohio, and the resolution had passed the two houses and received the approval of the President, no one doubts that the date of Ohio would thereby have been determined. The day of adjournment of the convention would have been no more thought of as the date, than the analogous date as to Indiana was in 1816. But the act of February 19, 1803, making Ohio a judicial district, was an act of equal potency with an act of admission. It accomplished all that the other could have accomplished in making Ohio a state. That the Senate of 1803 and that of 1816 regarded the alternative measures proposed for transforming a territory into a state as of exact equivalence, seems to admit of no doubt. A careful study of the proceedings of Congress connected with the admission of the first six new states leaves the clear conviction that the act of February 19, 1803, was one that made, and was intended to make, Ohio a state.*

* President Jefferson's nomination to the Senate of Griffin Greene and Joseph Wood, "of Marietta, in the Territory northwest of the river Ohio," January 11, 1803, and of Messrs. Byrd, Baldwin and Ziegler, "of the State of Ohio," March 1, 1803, while in harmony with the date February 19, 1803, is, of course, inexplicable with that of November 29, 1802. With the latter as the correct date, he would, indeed, have been guilty of a blunder greater than he was ever known to commit. A certificate of marriage given by Rev. Daniel Story, of Marietta, "that Levi Barber (afterwards member of Congress) and Betsey Rouse, both of Washington County, Territory northwest of the river Ohio, were joined in the bonds of wedlock on the 15th of February, 1803," shows the opinion at Marietta. Mr. Story had, as parishioners, General Rufus Putnam and Benj. Ives Gi:man, members of the Ohio constitutional convention; Paul Fearing, territorial delegate in Con gress; and Colonel R. J. Meigs and W. R. Putnam, members of the territorial legislature.

Of like import is the letter of Edward Tiffin, president of the constitutional convention (afterwards governor of Ohio) written to the Senate in December, 1802, and dated at Chillicothe, N. W. Territory."

Donal Ward Andrews.

DANIEL WEBSTER

Thirty-five years ago Daniel Webster uttered his last words: "I still live." They are memorable and typical words. It matters not whether they were simply the expression of a mere consciousness of existence, or a prophetic forecast of the permanence of his influence and fame in the country which he so powerfully contributed to establish on its foundations. In view of the events which preceded or have followed the life of the great statesman, we are able to see a profound significance in them.

Daniel Webster still lives, because the Constitution with which he was identified has survived the greatest shock that was capable of bringing it into jeopardy. He still lives, because he was one of the few who are appropriately called men of destiny. Every age has its brilliant minds, that make a stir in the little world in which they move, and are thought by their contemporaries, and perhaps by themselves, to be men of genius born to immortality; some of them, perhaps, are exceptionally gifted. But they are soon forgotten; we see that their careers were of narrow scope, their talents scarce above the average; they have been only so many additional units coming into the world according to certain general laws that regard not individuals, but only the aggregate of our common humanity. But from time to time, in important national or cosmic crises, men appear to whom the world naturally turns as the exponents of the demands of the age. By leadership or by suffering, these men tide mankind over a great crisis; willingly or unwillingly their lives mark milestones in the progress of the race. Epochs end and begin with them, whether in the province of thought or the sphere of action. In their appearance at the opportune moment, the world feels, if it does not always acknowledge, that they are the inspired heralds of the powers that control this planet; in a word, they are men of destiny. As such they must live.

Daniel Webster was a representative of one of the most critical and important periods in the history of our Republic, the central figure in a movement which began with the adoption of the Constitution by the states, and terminated with the surrender of Lee at Appomattox Court House, although the results are destined to continue during the term of our national existence.

In order thoroughly to understand the character and appreciate the work of Webster, it is essential to consider the nature of events, the shift