special privileges or immunities shall be passed," and if it means what the men who wrote it intended, then the General Assembly ought, first, to revise the Horse and Dummy Act by at least striking out the words "not exceeding twenty years," and, second, to harmonize the Mueller Municipal Ownership Law with the cardinal principle that, within the limitations of our written Constitutions, the successful majority in a fair, stand-up fight must be permitted to rule.

It does look very much as if, in disregard of the law of Illinois as evidenced by the State Constitution, State statutes and decisions of the highest court of the State, and of the United States, the people of Chicago have been immolated for eight years upon the altars of those twin rival fetishes, so far as the present law of Illinois is concerned, the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case, and the abstract principle and policy of municipal ownership.

TOPIC VIII

THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT TO PUBLIC

OFFICE

THE STATE CIVIL SERVICE ACT AND THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT

THE STATE CIVIL SERVICE ACT AND THE

POWER OF APPOINTMENTa

The selection of persons to fill them is the essence of the power of appointment to public offices and employments. Election by the people is a mode of appointment, i. e., selection.1

The State Civil Service Act of 1911 lodges the power of appointment to "all the offices and places of employment in the state service," except those enumerated in section. 11, in the State Civil Service Commission, to be exercised by that body on the basis of merit, ascertained by competitive tests, open to all, the highest man to have the office or employment in question.

In People v. McCullough, the constitutionality of this act, as applied to the offices or employments known as "assistant chief clerk," "chief corporation clerk," and "bookkeeper" in the department of the Secretary of State, was assailed on the ground that this legislative grant of the power of appointment to the State Civil Service Commission collides with a superior constitutional grant of the power of appointment to the Secretary of State. Since the act prescribes the selection of the highest man, it collides with the constitution if it is true the constitution grants the power of appointment to the Secretary of State. Hence the question of constitutionality turned on the point whether the constitution grants the Secretary of State power to appoint the aids and subordinates

a [7 Ill. Law Rev., 329, January, 1913.]

1 People v. Mosher, 163 N. Y., 32.

? 254 Ill., 9.