The Duke of Wellington to Mr Sec. Canning.-Received Sept. 24. (Extract.) Paris, Sept. 21, 1822. I HAD a long discussion with M. de Villele yesterday, on the relations of this government with Spain.

It appears, that for a considerable time past, I believe since the alarm of infectious fever in Spain, the French government have been collecting troops in the southern departments of France. They have not, however, on the immediate frontier, a larger body of men than are sufficient for the performance of the duties of the "Cordon Sanitaire," so long as that precaution is necessary, in consequence of the prevalence of the fever in the neighbouring provinces of Spain; or than can fairly be deemed necessary for the purposes of observation, of a country which is the seat of a civil war, and for the protection of the French frontier from insult, by the different parties in operation immediately on the borders.

M. de Villele said, that the assembly of the Congress at the present moment, was not a matter of indifference, in relation to the situation of affairs in Spain, or to that in which the two countries stood towards each other. There was no doubt that expectations were formed respecting the result of the deliberations of the Congress on the affairs of Spain, as well in Spain

as elsewhere; and that if the Congress were to separate, and to come to no decision on those affairs, it was probable that the existing evils would be greatly aggravated, and that the two countries might be forced into a war.

M. de Villele wished that the Con

gress should take into consideration the actual position of the French government in relation to Spain, and the hypothesis under which they might be forced into a war; and that the four other powers of the alliance should declare what line they would each take, in case of the occurrence of any of the events which they conceived would force them to war. I told M. de Villele that it would be quite impossible for us to declare beforehand what would be our conduct upon any hy. pothetical case.

I should wish to receive his Majesty's instructions what line I shall take, and what arguments I shall use, in case the French government should make the proposition at the Congress, which M. de Villele has made to me respecting a declaration by the allies.

Mr Secretary Canning to the Duke of Wellington.

(Extract.) Foreign-Office, Sept. 27, 1822. If there be a determined project to interfere by force, or by menace, in the present struggle with Spain, so convinced are his Majesty's govern ment of the uselessness and danger of

any such interference-so objectionable does it appear to them in princi ple, as well as utterly impracticable in execution, that when the necessity arises, or (I would rather say) when the opportunity offers, I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any such interference, come what may, his Majesty will not be a party.

The Duke of Wellington to Mr Sec. Canning.-Received Oct. 31.

(Extract.)

Verona, Oct. 22, 1822. We had a conference on Sunday night, at which the French minister, M. de Montmorency, read a paper, of which I enclose a copy.

I imagine that each of the ministers will answer this paper. In my answer, I shall review our line of conduct since April 1820; and shall decline to engage ourselves to adopt any measure beforehand, or till we shall have a full knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries. I propose, besides, to point out, that, considering the relative position of France and Spain, it is not probable that Spain will declare against them; if they explain, as they ought, the meaning and object of their corps of observation, and make some allowance for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain, in a state of revolution and civil war.

(Enclosure-Translation.) Questions addressed by the French Plenipotentiary to the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain.

Verona, Oct. 20, 1822. 1. In case France should find herself under the necessity of recalling her minister from Madrid, and of breaking off all diplomatic relations with Spain, will the High Courts be disposed to adopt the like measures, and to recall their respective missions?

2. Should war break out between France and Spain, under what form and by what acts would the High Powers afford to France, that moral support which would give to her measures the weight and authority of the alliance, and inspire a salutary dread into the revolutionists of all countries?

3. What, in short, is the intention of the High Powers, as to the extent and the form of the effective assistance (secours matériel) which they would be disposed to give to France, in case active interference should, on her demand, become necessary.

The Duke of Wellington to Mr Sec. Canning-Received Nov. 4.

(Extract.)

Verona, Nov. 5, 1822. Prince Metternich called together a conference of the five cabinet ministers on Wednesday evening, at which were delivered in answers to the demands of the French minister of the 20th ultimo, from the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian ministers; and that from myself, a copy of which I enclose.

(Enclosure-Memorandum.) Answer of the Duke of Wellington to the Questions of the French Plenipotentiary.

Verona, Oct 30, 1822. Since the month of April, 1820, the British government have availed themselves of every opportunity of recommending to his Majesty's allies to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain.

Without adverting to those principles which his Majesty's government must always consider the rule of their conduct, in relation to the internal affairs of other countries, they considered that to whatever degree either the origin of the Spanish revolution, the system then established, or the conduct of those who have since had the management of the internal affairs of

Spain might be disapproved of, any amelioration which might be desired in the Spanish system, for the sake of Spain herself, ought to be sought for in measures to be adopted in Spain, rather than abroad; and particularly in the confidence which the people should be taught to feel in the character and measures of the King.

They considered that an interference, with a view to assist the monarch on the throne to overturn that which had been settled, and which he had guaranteed, or to promote the establishment of any other form of government or constitution, particularly by force, would only place that monarch in a false position, and prevent him from looking to the internal means of amelioration which might be within his reach.

Such an interference always appeared to the British government an unnecessary assumption of responsibility, which, considering all the circumstances, must expose the King of Spain to danger, and the power or powers which should interfere, to obloquy, certain risks, and possible disasters; to enormous expenses and final disappointment in producing any result.

Upon these principles his Majesty has advised his allies, and has acted himself, from the month of April, 1820, to the present day.

The protocols, and other acts of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, which established the union at present existing between the five powers, so happily for the world, require the most unlimited confidence and communication on the part of each; and accordingly his Majesty has never failed to communicate to his allies, and particularly to France, every instruction which he has sent to his minister at Madrid; and all the communications made by his Majesty's commands to the minister of Spain residing in London-all in the same spirit of good will towards

the King of Spain and the Spanish nation.

It is impossible to look at the existing relations between France and Spain, adverting to what has passed from the commencement of the year 1820 to the present moment, without being sensible of the unfortunately false position in which the King of Spain is placed; and that the spirit of, party in both countries, having aggravated the national antipathy which antecedent circumstances had occasioned, is in a great measure the cause of the unfortunate irritation in Spain against France, to which his excellency the minister of France has adverted. The great object of his Majesty's foreign policy is, to preserve peace among nations; he feels the most anxious interest for the happiness of his Catholic Majesty, and the honour of his government, and it would be his sincere desire to allay that irritation.

But the British government cannot but feel, that to make any declaration on any of the three points referred to by his excellency, without a previous accurate knowledge of all the circum. stances which have occurred between the two countries, would be not only premature and unjust, but would probably be unavailing; and would in fact deprive his Majesty of the power of discussing and deciding upon the measures of his own government in this affair hereafter, when he should be better informed. His Majesty must either place himself in this painful po sition, or he must do what would be equally painful to his feelings, require from his august friend and ally, the King of France, that he should submit his conduct to the advice and control of his Majesty.

His Majesty's government cannot think either alternative to be necessary, but are of opinion that a review of the obvious circumstances of the situation of France, as well as Spain,

will shew, that whatever may be the tone assumed towards France by the ruling powers in Spain, they are not in a state to carry into execution any plan of real hostility.

Considering that a civil war exists in the whole extent of the frontier which separates the two kingdoms; that hostile armies are in movement and in operation in every part of it; and that there is not a town or village on the French frontier, which is not liable to insult and injury-there is no person who must not approve of the precaution which his most Christian Majesty has taken, in forming a corps of observation for the protection of his frontier, and for the preservation of the tranquillity of his people.

His Britannic Majesty sincerely wishes that this measure may be effectual in attaining the objects for which it is calculated; and that the wisdom of the French government will have induced them to explain it at Madrid, in such terms as will satisfy the government of his Catholic Majesty of its necessity.

Such an explanation will, it is hoped, tend to allay, in some degree, the irritation against France; and, on the other hand, it may be hoped, that some allowance will be made in France for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain, in the very crisis of a revolution and civil war.

A moment's reflection upon the relative power of the two states, will shew that the real evil to which his most Christian Majesty is exposed, is that resulting from the operations of. the civil war on the neighbouring frontier of Spain, against which the measure which his government have adopted is best calculated to preserve them. Even revolutionary madness could not calculate upon the success of a serious attack by Spain upon France, under any circumstances which it is possible to suppose to exist at present

in the latter kingdom. But the attention of the Spanish government is now occupied by a civil war, the operations of which certainly justify the formation of a corps of observation in France; and it is not probable that they would at this moment desire to break with France.

Neither is it to be believed that, in their present situation, they would not desire still to enjoy the advantage of that countenance to their system, which the presence of the French ambassador at the seat of government must afford them.

His Majesty, therefore, considers any rupture by Spain, or any measure on her part, which may render necessary the immediate discontinuance of diplomatic relations by France, very improbable; and as his Majesty is quite unacquainted with what has passed between France and Spain since the month of April, 1820, and his government cannot know upon what ground his most Christian Majesty's government may think proper to discontinue the diplomatic relations of France with Spain, or upon what grounds war may break out between the two countries; it is impossible for them now to pronounce what advice they should consider it their duty to give to his Majesty, in case either or both of those events should occur.

His Majesty most anxiously wishes that such extremities may be avoided; and he feels convinced that the government of his most Christian Majesty will find means of avoiding them.

The Duke of Wellington to Mr Sec. Canning-Received Nov. 21.

(Extract.) Verona, Nov. 12, 1822. : I have little to report as having occurred on the Spanish question, since I wrote to you on the 5th inst.

But I enclose to you a memorandum on what is passing here, which I send to Sir Charles Stuart on this occasion.