the church, and could not be indicted for stealing the ropes3, On the same principle, words imputing embezzlement to a person who was not a servant, or employed in the capacity of a servant, and who, therefore, could not, in the eye of the law, commit such an offence, were held not to be actionable b. But if the intention to charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime plainly appears, no inconsistency will prevent the words from being actionable; as where the defendant's wife said, "Thou art a thievish rogue, for thou hast stolen my faggots;" it was held, that the words were actionable, though it was objected that a married woman could not have property of her own; for it was to be understood according to common intendment, that she charged the plaintiff with stealing her husband's faggots. No action lies for these words, "I will take him to Bow Street on a charge of forgery," because the words do not charge the person of whom they are spoken with felony d. But the words, "I think the present business ought to have the most rigid inquiry, for he (the plaintiff) murdered his first wife; that is, he administered improperly medicines to her for a certain complaint, which was the cause of her death," have been held to be actionable e. So the words, "He was put in the roundhouse for stealing ducks at Crowland," are actionable. Whenever the words used are calculated to impress upon the minds of the hearers a suspicion of the plaintiff's having committed a criminal act, such an inference may and ought to be drawn, whatever form of expression may have been adopted. Thus, where the defendant said of the plaintiff, that "he was under a charge of a prosecution for perjury, and that G. W. (an attorney of that name) had the Attorney-General's directions to prosecute the plaintiff for perjury;" it was held to be actionable, as calculated to convey the imputation of perjury. So, where one said of another "that his character was infamous, &c.; that delicacy forbade him from bringing a direct charge, but it was a male child who complained to him": such words were understood to mean a charge of unnatural practices, and sufficiently certain in themselves to be actionable, without the aid of an innuendo a. sensu. Formerly a doctrine prevailed that words should be construed Mitiori in their mildest sense, in mitiori sensu, even in direct opposition to the finding of the jury; as where the words were "thou art as arrant a thief as any in England, for thou hast broken up I.'s chest, and taken away 401." After verdict for the plaintiff, judgment was arrested on the grounds that the words did not shew the commission of a felony; for the money might have been taken away, and the chest broken open in the midday, and in the presence of divers; and if so, it was not a felony b. But it is now an established rule of law, that both Words are judges and juries shall understand words in that sense which the author intended to convey to the minds of the hearers, as evidenced by the circumstances of the case, and that it is the author inprovince of the jury to decide, (taking all the circumstances into consideration,) whether the words were spoken maliciously and with a view to defame the plaintiff; and for the court to determine, whether such words, taken in the sense imputed to them, form a good ground of action. to be understood in the sense which the tended to convey. SECTION II. WORDS SPOKEN IN RESPECT OF OFFICE, PROFESSION, ETC. WORDS, not otherwise actionable, may form the basis of an Words action if spoken of a party in respect of his office, profession, spoken of a trade, or business. Thus, to charge a justice of the peace with a Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East, 463. 687. Forster v. Browning, Cro. Jac. Ro- Rex v. Horne, 1 Cowp. 672. party in respect of his office, &c. Words of an attor ney. corruption, or a criminal breach of duty, is actionable, as it may tend to exclude him from that office a. But an action will not lie for calling a justice of the peace a fool, a blockhead, an ass, &c.," because," as was quaintly remarked by Holt, C. J., "it is not his fault that he is a blockhead, for he cannot be otherwise than his Maker made him, but if he had been a wise man, and wicked principles were charged upon him when he had not them, an action would lie; for though a man cannot be wiser he may be honester than he is."b Where words are spoken of a person in an office of profit, which have a natural tendency to occasion a loss of such office, or which impute the want of some necessary qualification for, or some misconduct in it, they are actionable c. This action extends to all offices of trust or profit, without limitation, provided they be of a temporal nature. Thus, it extends to that of a churchwarden, a clerk of a public company, a town clerk, &c. So, it extends to words spoken of men in their profession as barristers and physicians, if they be practising at the time. Thus, to say of a barrister, "he is a dunce," e or of a physician, that "he is no scholar," is actionable, So, it extends to words said of clergymen, if they hold a preferment &; and attornies. The words, "he is no more lawyer than the devil;"h" he deserves to be struck off the roll;" i are actionable when spoken of an attorney. But it has been held that the words, "I have taken out a warrant to tax his bill;" "I'll bring him to book, and shall have him struck off the rolls;" were not actionable k. To say to an attorney, "You are well known to be a corrupt man and to deal corruptly;" has been held actionable. So, where the words were, "Thou art a false knave, a cozening knave, and hast gotten all that thou hast by cozenage, and thou has cozened all that have dealt with thee." a So, "Thou art a common barrator." b spoken of a "You or trades man. Any words tending to injure a merchant or a tradesman, Words if or affecting a person in the particular art by which he gains merchant his livelihood, are actionable. To say of a corn factor, are a rogue and a swindling rascal; you delivered me 100 bushels of oats worse by 6d. a bushel than I bargained for," is actionable, without proof of special damage c. So, to say of a tradesman, "He lives by swindling and robbing the public," is actionable, though the transaction alluded to may amount only to a fraud d. So to say of an innkeeper, "He is a bankrupt, he will be in the gazette in a twelvemonth, he is a pauper," has been held to be actionable, though at the time he was not liable to the bankrupt laws. So to say of a stock-broker, "He is a lame duck;" of a pawnbroker, "He is a broken fellow;" to a milliner, "You are not worth a farthing ;"h of a husbandman, "He owes more than he is worth;" of a trader, "He hath nothing but rotten goods in his shop ;"k of a midwife, "Many have perished for her want of skill;" is actionable. f SECTION III. SPECIAL DAMAGE. WORDS not actionable in themselves may become so by reason of special damage resulting from them. But to sustain such action, the words must be defamatory in their nature, and the special damage must be the fair and natural result of them. Thus, where the defendant said of the plaintiff, a shopwoman, "She secreted 1s. 6d. under the till," stating "these are not times to be robbed ;" and the special damage alleged was, that by The words must be defamatory, and the special damage must sulted from have re them. The damage must be wholly attribut able to the words. Loss of marriage. reason of the words, one S. refused to take the plaintiff into his service; after verdict for the plaintiff judgment was arrested, because the words were not in their nature defamatory or injurious to the plaintiff (it not appearing whose money it was) a So, where the special damage alleged was, the refusal of another person to employ the plaintiff, and it appeared that the refusal was founded partly on the defendant's words and partly on another circumstance; it was held that the action was not maintainable, since the damage must be wholly attributable to the words b. So, where the defendant asserted that the plaintiff cut his master's cordage, and the damage alleged was that in consequence of these words the master discharged the plaintiff; held, not sufficient; for the alleged damage was not the natural consequence of the words; it was a mere wrongful act of the master, for which the defendant was no more answerable than if, in consequence of the words, other persons had thrown the plaintiff into a horse-pond by way of punishment. So where the defendant libelled a theatrical performer, in consequence of which she refused to sing; it was held, that the proprietor of the theatre could not maintain an action for the damage resulting to him from her refusal to attend; for the injury was too remote, and her refusal to sing might have proceeded from caprice or indolence d. But it is not necessary that the person whose act constitutes the special damage should have believed the defamatory charge, provided that he acted in consequence of the words having been spoken . Loss of marriage is a sufficient damage to support this action, but the plaintiff must allege and prove that a marriage with some specific person was in contemplation, and was prevented by the speaking of the words f. So is the loss of particular customers by a tradesman 8. So, to be deprived of substantial benefit arising from the hospitality of friends, is a sufficient Kelly v. Partington, 5 B. & Ad. 645. 3 N. & M. 117. b Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East, 1. • Id. Ashley v. Harrison, 1 Esp. 48. Peake, 194. See Morris v. Langdale, 2 B. & P. 284. e Knight v. Gibbs, 3 Nev. & M. 467. 1 Adol. & Ellis, 43. f Davis v. Gardiner, 4 Co. 16. 1 Roll. 36. 8 B. N. P. 7. Tilk v. Parsons, 2 C. & P. 201. |