cation, that what is contained in the publication must be neither defamatory of an individual, tending to excite disaffection, nor calculated to offend the morals of the people 2. It has, however, never been solemnly decided, whether, in an action for a libel, it is a good defence, under all circumstances, that the publication complained of, was a fair and accurate report of what took place in a court of justice. In Curry v. Walterb, the court considered that it was; but as that matter was not specially pleaded, they doubted whether the defendant could avail himself of it under the general issue, and no judgment was given. Lord Ellenborough, however, and Bayley, J., on different occasions dissented from the doctrine laid down in Curry v. Walter, observing, "that it must be understood with very great limitations." The question was lately discussed in the court of Exchequer in an action for a libel, which was comprised in the speech of counsel, severely reflecting upon the present plaintiff in a cause in which he was not a party, but in which he made an affidavit; the defendant pleaded that the publication complained of was a fair and accurate report of the proceedings which had taken place in the court of King's Bench, to which the plaintiff demurred, whereby the broad question was raised. During the argument, Lord Lyndhurst, C. B., intimated a strong opinion that the plea was a good answer to the action. Bayley, B., hesitated. The court not being able to agree, the case was directed to be argued a second time; but both these learned judges shortly afterwards retired from the bench, and the case dropped. Such publication, however, to be privileged, must be a fair, accurate, and unvarnished statement of what took place at the trial, the least misrepresentation of the facts, or even any high colouring of the circumstances, will deprive it of the protection which the law affords to reports of judicial proceedings. "It is an established principle," said Tindal, C. J., "upon which the privilege of publishing a report of any judicial proceed ings is admitted to rest, that such report must be strictly confined to the actual proceedings in court, and must contain no defamatory observations or comments from any quarter whatever, in addition to what forms strictly and properly the legal proceedings." Thus, where a libel, which was contained in a report of proceedings before the lord mayor at the Mansion House, after stating the evidence, set forth an observation made by the chief clerk, as follows, "that it was exceedingly improper, under any circumstances, to obtain the signature of the complainant, a mere boy, to bills of exchange;" held, not to be justifiable, as it was a substantive reflection on the character of the plaintiff, and not made in the course of any judicial proceeding by any one whose duty called upon him to make it; for the chief clerk for that purpose must be considered as an entire stranger b. So where the defendant justified, as being a fair and accurate report, &c., and the paragraph was headed by the words "shameful conduct of an attorney;" it was held, that the justification could not be supported. A publication of the result of the evidence is not privileged, the evidence itself should be published". Neither is a publication of a counsel's speech, unaccompanied by the evidence ®. The publication of preliminary or ex parte proceedings in a police office, or before a justice of the peace, or before a coroner, is not privileged; for such publications have a tendency to impede the due administration of justice, by preventing a fair trial. e Flint v. Pike, 4 B. & C. 473. Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bing. 213. f Duncan v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 556. Rex v. Lee, 5 Esp. 123. Rex v. Fisher, 2 Camp. 563. And see M'Gregor v. Thwaites, 3 B. & C. 24. In Delegal v. Highley, supra, the court evaded this point, though it was raised, it not being necessary to give their opinion on it. Rex v. Fleet, 1 B. & A. 379. SECTION IX. DISCLOSING THE NAME OF THE AUTHOR OF THE SLANDER. It was ruled, in a very early case, that if a party, in repeating slanderous words, which he has heard from another, discloses the name of the author, he will not be liable to an action for such slander; but if he asserts the slander generally, without stating who told him, it is actionable a. It has been held, that in order to exempt the repeater of slander from liability, he should mention the name of the party from whom he heard it, at the time; that it was not sufficient to disclose the name in a plea to an action for such slander; and that he should also give the very words used by the author, the effect of the words not being sufficient, in order that the party injured might have a cause of action against him o. In The doctrine laid down in Lord Northampton's case, has, however, been frequently disapproved of in modern times. De Crespigney v. Wellesley, it was held not to apply to written slander; and it has at length been overruled by a recent case, wherein it was decided, that it is no answer to an action for oral slander, for the defendant to shew that he heard it from another, and named the person at the time, without shewing that he believed it to be true, and that he spoke the words on a justifiable occasion. Parke, J., expressly stated that the resolution in Lord Northampton's case could not be law, and that in this respect no satisfactory distinction could be made between oral and written slander e. "Lord Northampton's Case, 12 Co. 133. b Davis v. Lewis, 7 T. R. 17. Woolnoth v. Meadows, 5 East, 463. Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East, 426. Mills v. Spencer, Holt, 533. 5 Bing. 392. See Lewis v. Wal ter, 4 B. & A. 605. * M Pherson v. Daniels, 10 B. & C. 263. 5 M. & R. 251. And see Bennett v. Bennett, 6 C. & P. 586, where Alderson, B., held that stating the name of the author was no justification; but he admitted evidence of the fact in mitigation of damages. Saunders v. Mills, 6 Bing. 213. SECTION X. THE DECLARATION. THE venue in an action for defamation is transitory, and Venue. may be laid in any county. If however, it be laid in a county in which the slander was not published, it may be changed on affidavit. But if a libel be written or printed in one county, and circulated in others, the court will not change the venue to the first; for as every publication is a fresh offence, the defendant cannot swear that the cause of action was confined to any one county. Where a libel was written in England, and published abroad, the venue was changed on an affidavit, that the cause of action arose in the county in which it was written, and not elsewhere in the kingdom b. action. Two or more persons may join in this action, if their joint Parties to interest has been affected by the defamation, so that if slanderous words be spoken, or a libel published of partners in the way of their trade, they may join in the action. But unless their joint interest he affected, they cannot sue jointly, each must bring a separate action. Where an act of parliament empowered a company to commence actions for enforcing claims due to them, and to prefer indictments in the name of their chairman, it was held, that the chairman might institute an action in his own name for a libel on the company, though it was not a corporate body e. Husband and wife must join in an action Husband for words actionable in themselves spoken of the wife, if there be no special damage laid, for the action survives to the wife'. But where the words are not actionable in themselves, but are and wife. The inducement. attended with special damage, the wife must be joined, for the damage resulting to the husband is the sole ground of action. Therefore, where the wife lived separate from the husband, and supported herself by keeping a boarding-house, and the defendant spoke defamatory words of her, imputing to her insolvency and prostitution, whereby she lost her credit, and was otherwise injured in her business; it was held, that the words being only actionable in respect of the damage to the business, and that damage being solely the husband's, the wife ought not to be joined in an action for the slandera. If a libel be published by two or more persons jointly, as where it is contained in affidavits made by two, but so connected as to form but one charge, they may be sued jointly b. But two cannot be sued jointly in an action for words. Even though the husband and wife speak the same words, a joint action will not lie against them d It is usual, but unnecessary, to preface the declaration with an inducement of the plaintiff's good character and his innocence of the crime imputed to him. Such allegation is, however, not traversable. If the words or libel do not per se convey the meaning which the plaintiff wishes to assign to them, or if the charge be not necessarily slanderous, or requires explanation with reference to some extrinsic fact, to render it actionable, the plaintiff must, by way of an introduction or inducement, state that some matter existed or fact had taken place to which the defendant alluded; as, if the imputation be that the plaintiff was forsworn, which we have seen 8 does not necessarily imply perjury, it should be stated by way of an inducement, that there had been a suit or some judicial proceeding in which the plaintiff was a witness, and that the defendant in speaking the words referred to such matter in using the term "forsworn." But where the words or libel are clearly actionable in themselves; as where the words were "he is a thief * Saville v. Sweeny, 4 B. & Ad. 514. b Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East, 426. B. N. P. 5. Swithen v. Vincent, 2 Wils. 227. * Com. Dig. Action for Defam. G. 9. Strachey's Case, Sty. 118. |