who loved to keep the people in darkness and enslavement of ignorance." That is a common statement, but is highly unjust to the medieval church. The author uses both San Jago of Compostella, p. 136, and Santiago de Compostella (misprinted Compastello), p. 169, which is confusing to young readers. On p. 126, the rare, and obsolete "forbears" is used for forefathers, which is hardly advisable in view of these same young readers. The illustrations are deserving of the highest praise. No book in the series is superior to it in this respect. As the author does not mention the previous histories of the League, it may be of interest to state the most convenient sources where further information may be found. The old work of Sartorius is not yet altogether superseded although an immense amount of light has been thrown on the subject since he wrote. For the reader of French, Worms's book "La Ligue Hanséatique" is the best modern statement. For the reader of German, Barthold's "Geschichte der Deutschen Hansa" will be very serviceable. Miss Zimmern seems to have used it enough to make some expression of obligation appropriate. Stieda's Revaler Zollbücher contains a wealth of interesting detail about the processes of the Hansa trade. The best short account that we know of is in Falke's Geschichte des Deutschen Handels, vol. i., 144-205. Either of these will supplement Miss Zimmern's narrative with matter of interest to the student. For the general reader her book is of value. It deserves success as a pioneer work, and as an earnest attempt to interest young readers in a most instructive department of history, but it is deficient in grasp of the subject and in knowledge of the Middle Ages. We wish it might impel some competent scholar to work up the modern material, and write a complete history of the League for students. EDWARD G. BOURNE. PHILOSOPHIA ULTIMA.*-A work so serious and elaborate as this of Professor Shields, having at the same time a theme so important and lofty, cannot easily fail, if for these reasons alone, to win a large reward of respectful consideration. We can credit the author's statement that he has devoted thirty years of hard labor to its accomplishment. The number of different authors to whose works reference is made is more than five hundred. Nor * Philosophia Ultima, or Science of the Sciences; by CHARLES WOODRUFF SHIELDS, D.D., LL.D., Professor in Princeton College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Two volumes. Vol. I., 1888. Vol. II., 1889. does the consultation of this large amount of literature of so many kinds appear to have been superficial. We regret that the author has followed the practice of rarely or never giving an express citation of volume, page, or exact language, and has thus put it out of the reader's power to follow and verify him. The use made of the references, however, appears to indicate that they are in the main correct and at first hand. They therefore show an unusually wide and careful reading upon the separate subjects handled in the entire treatise. The term "Ultimate Philosophy" does not, of necessity, indicate clearly the purpose and scope of the book. Of course, we are not to understand Professor Shields as supposing for a moment that he has in these volumes propounded the final and ultimate form which is to be taken by the solution of all philosophical problems. The work of true philosophy is the "umpirage between science and religion," or rather we should say between the exact sciences and the theology of revelation. Now the positive philosophy is a theory of nescience and ignores revelation. The absolute philosophy is a theory of omniscience and attempts to supersede revelation. But the true philosophy is perfected science and art as concurring with revelation. The attainment of this is the mature effort and final task of the human mind. It may be anticipated under the name of "the Ultimate Philosophy, or that last summative science which is to be the fruit and goal and crown of all the sciences, as well as the means of their highest use and grandeur" (I., p. 377). The first volume of this work consists of two Parts. (It may be remarked by the way that Professor Shields is very precise and perhaps rather excessively minute in his subdivisions.) Part First describes the philosophical parties as to the relations between science and religion. Here, in the various chapters, a brief sketch is given of the different earlier and modern attitudes of the scientific mind toward religion,-whether of antagonism, indifferentism, eclecticism, or skepticism. In Part Second the true philosophical theory of the harmony of science and religion is introduced by being contrasted with other forms of philosophy. What this theory substantially is has already been indicated in the definition given of what the author understands by the ultimate philosophy. In the second volume, after an introductory chapter on "the aim and scope of philosophy," the author proceeds to elaborate his concept of what the true and ultimate philosophy should be. Since it is "science of the sciences," we are required first of all to purify and survey the particular forms of science. As an essential part of the "purification of the sciences" their definition and classification is introduced. Afterward follow the points of agreement and difference between the rational and the revealed aspect of the six sciences-astronomy, geology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, theology-to which all forms of positive knowledge are to be reduced. We confess that much of all this seems to us to have but slight bearing on the discussion of a true philosophy, and that the classification of the sciences adopted is certainly very defective. On this latter point: what shall we say of a classification of the sciences in which biology has no place, geology figures but physics and chemistry do not appear, anthropology and psychology both stand (although the former includes and depends upon the latter), and sociology is given a primary and independent rank? In the chapter next following, Professor Shields puzzles us still further by distinguishing philosophic science from metaphysic science, and putting realism and idealism under the former, and monism and dualism under the latter. Under the latter also belongs the "doctrine of revealed being," although naturalism and supernaturalism are assigned to a new kind of science which is neither philosophic nor metaphysic, but "theosophic." In spite of all this the candor, dignity, and learning, with which each of the topics introduced is treated, prevent us from losing our interest in the treatment or our high respect for the author. Part Second of this volume considers "philosophy as the art or logic of the sciences." Thus considered, philosophy is that General or Universal Logic which formulates the intellectual processes and products of the sciences, not only of the special sciences in both their empirical and metaphysical provinces, but of that supreme Science of the Sciences, which has been projected as the "Ultimate Philosophy." The treatment of the logic of the empirical sciences is deferred to the third volume, which is expected to follow the two already published. The logic of the metaphysical sciences concerns the evidences of theism, theology, and natural and revealed religion. The logic of the science of sciences-by which we must understand the evidence upon which ultimate philosophy founds itself-has regard to the fundamental relations of reason and revelation. The third volume which, as has already been said, may be expected, will treat of the ends and uses of knowledge as applied in common life. In this volume we are promised chapters on agriculture, mining, and navigation, and on music, painting, sculpture, etc. It will readily be seen that the plan of the work is vast, and-it must be added-somewhat too comprehensive and indefinite. It is a noble conception, however, which is followed. And if Professor Shields expands rather too widely the wings of philosophy to permit of a strong and lofty flight, he makes it move at an easy rate and altitude over an immense and varied landscape. HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY.*-This volume is the first part of a proposed general treatise on psychology, the author intending to follow it with another volume discussing the emotions and the will. Prof. Baldwin, recently called from the chair of philosophy at Lake Forest University to a similar chair in Canada, is a former pupil of Dr. McCosh of Princeton, Prof. Wundt of Leipzig, and Prof. Rabier of Paris, to each of whom he frankly acknowledges philosophical indebtedness. The conception of the science with which the author writes is that psychology is a science of fact, its questions, questions of fact, and that the treatment of hypothesis must be as rigorous as competent scientists are accustomed to demand in other departments of research. In this subordination of theory to fact the work differs from the recent Psychology of Prof. Dewey. Yet care is taken not to fall into the opposite extreme of attempting to construct a science without presuppositions. In the The book is confined to a discussion of the intellect. introductory chapters the nature of psychology and the psychological method are discussed, the true relation of psychology to physiology and to metaphysics pointed out, and the external aids. as correctives to a purely introspective treatment are enumerated. The classification of the intellectual functions into Presentative, Representative (including memory, combination and elaboration) and Rational (intuitive) is, we think, no improvement on the ordinary classification in which the elaborative, discursive, or thought function is carefully separated from the merely representative (memory, imagination). *Handbook of Psychology: Senses and Intellect. By JAMES MARK BALDWIN, Ph.D. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1889. 8vo, pp. 343. After the introduction follow two chapters on the general characteristics of mind-consciousness and attention. The positive statement of the nature of consciousness is less full and satisfactory than the criticism of others' views. The two chapters treating of Sensation and Perception are among the best in the book and present the subjects in the light of the recent contributions from physiological and psycho-physical researches. The theory of perception which is taught is nativism of process as held, with some differences of detail, by Wundt and Lotze. This is distinguished from the nativism of product taught by Kant and from the empiristic theory. The discussion of the last named theory although brief is good. In the chapters on Memory (Retention, Reproduction, Recognition and Localization) and Combination (Association, Imagination) the influences of the author's studies in physiological psychology is most marked. We are of opinion that too much is made of the physiological element in representation. Take, for instance, the view given of Retention. "I saw, for example, a house yesterday or last year; I was conscious of the presentation. I recall the image of the house to-day, or a year hence; I am conscious of the representation. But where has it been in the meantime, while I was not conscious of it? (p. 152)." This is the problem of Retention. The true answer to the question, as to where the presentation is in the time between the perception and memory, is Nowhere. The only thing which has perdured is a habit or tendency to reproduce it. This habit may be explained psychologically as a mental habit, or physiologically as residing in the sensorium. "Retention," says Prof. Baldwin, "is physical, a matter of the modification of brain and nerve structure or function; such modification persisting and giving rise to a physiological habit or tendency (p. 157)." The other theory is rather summarily dismissed. "If we were able," it is said, "at this point to make the assumption of a substance called mindwhich was above forbidden-we would be justified in resting in the law of habit in respect to it, as we are in resting in the physiological law of habit to which appeal is made below [above] (p. 155)." The closing chapters on Elaboration or discursive thought and the Rational Function or intuition, are less satisfactory than the other parts. This is mainly due to the brevity of the discussion. But thirteen pages are devoted to the rational function, and but |