this State relating to insurance, is guilty of a misde meanor. NOTE.-See Stats. 1862, p. 243, and Acts amendatory thereof. See bonds from foreign corporations.Sec. 623, Political Code Cal. charged collection, etc.. of revenue, 440. Every officer charged with the collection, officer receipt, or disbursement of any portion of the revenue with of this State, who, upon demand, fails or refuses to permit the Controller or Attorney General to inspect his books, papers, receipts, and records pertaining to his office, is guilty of a misdemeanor. NOTE.-Stats. 1852, p. 57, Sec. 2. to permit of his refusing inspection books. Examiners, and 441. Every member of the Board of Examiners Board of and every Controller or State Treasurer who violates Controller, any of the provisions of the laws of this State relating Treasurer to the Board of Examiners, or prescribing its powers duties. and duties, is guilty of a felony. NOTE.-See "Board of Examiners."-Political Code Cal., Secs. 654-685, and notes, and the Act of 1872, p. 121, there cited in full. neglecting certain State arms, 442. Every person who unlawfully retains in his Having possession any arms, equipments, clothing, or military etc. stores belonging to the State, or the property of any company of the State militia, is guilty of a misde meanor. NOTE.-Stats. 1866, p. 735, Sec. 50. Arms, how procured, etc.-See Secs. 1963-1968; and Act of 1872, p. 122, there cited. 443. Every member of the State militia who unlawfully disposes of any arms, equipments, clothing, or military stores, the property of this State, or of any company of the State militia, is guilty of a misdemeanor. NOTE. See note to preceding section. Selling etc. State arms, TITLE XIII. OF CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY. CHAPTER I. Arson. II. Burglary and housebreaking. III. Having possession of burglarious instruments and deadly weapons. IV. Forgery and counterfeiting. V. Larceny. VI. Embezzlement. VII. Extortion. VIII. False personation and cheats. IX. Fraudulently fitting out and destroying vessels. X. Fraudulently keeping possession of wrecked property. XI. Fraudulent destruction of property in sured. XII. False weights and measures. XIII. Fraudulent insolvencies by corporations, and other frauds in their management. XIV. Fraudulent issue of documents of title to merchandise. XV. Malicious injuries to railroad bridges, highways, bridges, and telegraphs. SECTION 454. Arson of the first degree. Arson of the second degree. 455. Punishment of arson. defined. 447. Arson is the willful and malicious burning of Arson a building, with intent to destroy it. NOTE. This is also the definition of the N. Y. Penal Code.-See Sec. 521; 4 Blackst. Com., p. 220. The statutes of this State had enlarged the use of the term to include many acts of burning not involving special danger to the person. Thus, burning stacks of grain, standing crops, bridges, etc., was arson in the second degree. Stats. 1856, p. 131, Secs. 4, 5. The Code confines the term "arson" to the offense of setting on fre buildings (including ships and vessels). Other criminal acts of burning are not properly classified under the title of "Arson," but under the title of "Malicious mischief," post. See, also, "Setting woods on fire," Sec. 384, ante. The definition of the text is substantially that of the common law authorities. They, nearly all, restrict the offense to the burning of a dwelling house, or some edifice adapted for or connected with human occupation; making the gravity of the offense to consist in the peril to the person which such burning involves.-4 Blackst. Com., p. 220; 2 East P. C., p. 1015; Barb. Cr. L., p. 53; Whart. Am. Cr. L., p. 534; Coke Ch., pp. 15, 66; State vs. Roe, 12 Verm., p. 93; People vs. Cotteral, 18 Johns., p. 115; see, also, laws of Ga., p. 712; 4 U. S. Stats. at L., p. 115; Rep. Cr. Code, Mass. The legislative intent in the many Acts on this subject was good, but the Acts were very apt from their prolixity to be ineffectual. The Act of 1872, p. 895, is void under Sec. 330 of the Pol. Code, but there is ample provision in this Code for all such offenses, as will be seen. defined. 448. Any house, edifice, structure, vessel, or other "Building" erection, capable of affording shelter for human beings, or appurtenant to or connected with an erection so adapted, is a “building," within the meaning of this Chapter. NOTE.-Stats. 1856, p. 131, Sec. 6; People vs. Stickman, 34 Cal., p. 244, defines a house to be any structure having walls on all sides, and a roof. What is sufficient indictment for "arson."-See People vs. Phipps, 39 Cal., p. 331. "Inhabited 449. Any building which has usually been occu building" defined. "Night time" defined. "Burning" defined. pied by any person lodging therein at night is an "inhabited building," within the meaning of this Chapter. NOTE.-Stats. 1856, p. 131, Sec. 6. 450. The phrase "night time," as used in this Chapter, means the period between sunset and sunrise. 451. To constitute a burning, within the meaning of this Chapter, it is not necessary that the building set on fire should have been destroyed. It is sufficient that fire is applied so as to take effect upon any part of the substance of the building. NOTE.-State vs. Sandy, 5 Ired., p. 570; People vs. Butler, 16 Johns., p. 203; Commonwealth vs. Van Shaack, 16 Mass., p. 105; Reg. vs. Parker, 9 Carr. & P., p. 45; Reg. vs. Russel, 1 Carr. & M., p. 541; see, also, Hester vs. State, 17 Geo., p. 130; State vs. De Bruhl, 10 Rich. Law, p. 23. See, also, Cal. cases, cited under previous sections; also People vs. Hughes, 29 Cal., p. 329, where the burning was a fraud on the insurer; and People vs. Scott, 32 Cal., p. 200, where ownership of the land may not be questioned, if right to possess or occupy the house is shown to be in the person residing in it, and, who, in the indictment, is charged as owning and residing in it, so that it now seems to be pretty well settled that an omission to designate, or error in designating in an indictment for arson, the owner or occupant of a building, shall not prejudice the proceedings thereupon, if it appears that upon the whole description given of the building, it is sufficiently identified to enable the prisoner to prepare his defense. On this subject see Sec. 452 and note, post, and compare Martha vs. State, 26 Ala., p. 72; State vs. Fish, 3 Dutch., p. 323. It would appear but reasonable, as well as just, that malice sufficient to constitute arson should be inferred from proof that the prisoner committed an act of burning a building, and that some other person was rightfully in possession of, or actually occupying, any part thereof. It ought not to be necessary that the accused should have had actual knowledge of such possession or occupancy, or should have intended to injure another person.-See Rex vs. Farrington, Russ. & Ry. C. C., p. 207; People vs. Van Blarcum, 2 Johns., p. 105; People vs. Orcutt, 1 Park. Cr., p. 252; People vs of the 452. To constitute arson it is not necessary that a Ownership person other than the accused should have had owner- building. ship in the building set on fire. It is sufficient that at the time of the burning another person was rightfully in possession of, or was actually occupying such building, or any part thereof. NOTE.-People vs. Van Blarcum, 2 Johns., p. 105; Shepherd vs. People, 19 N. Y. (5 Smith), p. 537; State vs. Taylor, 45 Me., p. 322. At common law arson was the maliciously burning the house of another.-East P. C., p. 1015. And one could not be convicted of arson in burning his own house.-Rex vs. Pealey, Leach C. C.. p. 277; Rex vs. Breeme, id., p. 261; Rex vs. Spalding, Leach C. C., p. 248. The offense of burning insured property, with intent to defraud the insurers, is provided for in Chapter XI of this Title. See note to preceding section. 453. Arson is divided into two degrees. NOTE.-Stats. 1856, p. 132, Secs. 4, 5. 454. Maliciously burning in the night-time an inhabited building in which there is at the time some Degrees of arson. Arson of degree. the first |