powder and ball, with intent, of malice aforethought, to kill and murder A.-People vs. English, 30 Cal., p. 214. BURGLARY.-See notes to Secs. 459, 460, 461, and 463 of this Code, and People vs. Long, April Term, 1872. Burglary, under our statute, can only be committed with intent to commit a felony; therefore, an indictment charging an intent to steal certain goods, must specify the value of the goods intended to be stolen.People vs. Murray, 8 Cal., p. 519. An indictment for breaking and entering a house in the night-time, with intent to commit a larceny, is good, without charging whose goods the defendant intended to steal, or that there were any goods in the house which the defendant could steal.-People vs. Shaber, 32 Cal., p. 36. An indictment for "entering a room or apartment with the intention to commit larceny," rightly charges the ownership of the room to be in him who rented it from one who had the supervision and control of the whole house.-People vs. St. Clair, 38 Cal., p. 137. The hour of the night need not be charged in the indictment, and if charged, need not be proved as charged.People vs. Burgess, 35 Cal., p. 115. COUNTERFEITING.-In an indictment for having in possession counterfeit coin, with intent to utter it, the knowledge of the defendant of the spurious character of the coin is sufficiently charged in the words, the defendants willfully, feloniously, and knowingly did have in their possession," etc.-People vs. Stanton, 39 Cal., p. 698. 66 FORGERY.-See Secs. 470 and 965 of this Code. An indictment for forging an instrument, in a foreign language need not contain a copy of the original in the foreign language-a translation is sufficient.-People vs. Ah Woo, 28 Cal., p. 205. If the instrument is set out in full, a misnomer of its technical designation is immaterial.-Id. If the intent to defraud by a forgery is described in the statute by different terms stated disjunctively, the indictment may state these terms conjunctively. Id. It must appear from the indictment that the forged instrument is one which, if genuine, would injure another. This fact may appear from a recital or description of the instrument, but if it does not, it must be made to appear by the averment of matter aliunde which will show it to be of that character.-People vs. Tomlinson, 35 Cal., p. 503. LARCENY.-See Secs. 484 and 967 of this Code. An indictment charging the defendant with feloniously taking three head of cattle, without showing the par ticular species of cattle taken, is sufficient.-People vs. Littlefield, 5 Cal., p. 355. An indictment describing the property stolen as fifteen twenty-dollar gold pieces need not aver the value of each particular piece of coin.-People vs. Green, 15 Cal., p. 512; see, also, People vs. Cohen, 8 Cal., p. 42; and People vs. Poggi, 19 Cal., p. 600. An indictment describing the property as "a black or brown mare or filly, branded with a small mule shoe on the left shoulder," is sufficiently particular in description. Stating the color in the alternative is not a fatal objection, when other terms are given which identify the property.—People vs. Smith, 15 Cal., p. 408. In People vs. Bull, 14 Cal., p. 101, it was held that an indictment for larceny, describing the money as "three thousand dollars, lawful money of the United States," was insufficient, and that the particular denomination or species of coin must be set forth. The rule laid down in this case is abrogated by Sec. 967 of this Code. In The People vs. Bogart, 36 Cal., p. 245, it is said that if the species of coin is unknown to the Grand Jury they may so state in lieu of specifying it. An indictment for larceny which states that A. B. & Co. are the owners of the property is sufficient.-People vs. Ah Sing, 19 Cal., p. 598; but see People vs. Bogart, 36 Cal., p. 247. An indictment charging the accused with the larceny of two hundred and fifty sheep, of the value of one thousand dollars, is not insufficient, because the value of each sheep is not separately stated.-People vs. Robles, 34 Cal., p. 591. The allegation of value in "dollars," without adding "lawful money of the United States," is sufficient.People vs. Winkler, 9 Cal., p. 234. Under the statute of March 28, 1868, it is not necessary in an indictment for stealing a horse, mare, etc., to state the value thereof.-People vs. Townsley, 39 Cal., p. 405. The principle of the statute referred to in People vs. Townsley is embodied in Subdivision 8 of Sec. 487 of this Code. An indictment for entering a house with intent to steal need not aver the value of, nor give more than a general description of, the property the defendant intended to steal.-People vs. Ah Yee, 31 Cal., p. 451. An indictment charging that the defendant "did feloniously, willfully, and unlawfully steal, take, and carry, lead, and drive away," contains a sufficient statement of the intent.-People vs. Brown, 27 Cal., p. 500. An indictment which charges the defendant with "stealing, taking, leading, or driving away," is not defective as charging the offense in the disjunctive. People vs. Smith, 15 Cal., p. 408; see note to Sec. 958. The venue may be laid in any county into which the stolen property is conveyed. It is not necessary to state facts showing the commission of the larceny in another county.-People vs. Mellon, 40 Cal., p. 648. LARCENY BY BAILEES.-Under an indictment charging larceny in the usual form, the proof was that the defendant hired a horse, promising to return it by evening, but never did so. It was held that the defendant could not be convicted without proving that he intended to steal the horse at the time he took it; that the indictment was not good for the statutory offense of converting property of which the defendant was bailee.-People vs. Jersey, 18 Cal., p. 337. Indictments against bailees should distinctly set forth the character of the bailment, the mode of conversion, the description of the property, and its value.-People vs. Cohen, 8 Cal., p. 42; People vs. Patterson, 9 Cal., p. 313; People vs. Poggi, 19 Cal., p. 600. MURDER. An indictment for murder should not state the degree; if it does, it does not vitiate it, but the statement may be treated as surplusage.-People vs. King, 27 Cal., p. 507; People vs. Lloyd, 9 Cal., p. 54; People vs. Dolan, 9 Cal., p. 576; People vs. Vance, 21 Cal., p. 400. It is sufficient to describe the deceased by the name he was commonly known.-People vs. Freeland, 6 Cal., p. 96. The time when the crime was committed need not be stated if the indictment shows that it was before the finding of the indictment, and within one year and a day before death ensued from the wound.-People vs. Kelly, 6 Cal., p. 210; People vs. Aro, Cal., p. 207. A description of the weapon used, the length and depth of the wounds, and the part of the body on which they were inflicted, is not necessary. People vs. Stevenson, 9 Cal., p. 273; People vs. Cronin, 34 Cal., p. 191; People vs. King, 27 Cal., p. 507; People vs. Judd, 10 Cal., p. 313; People vs. Chosier, 10 Cal., p. 310. The crime of murder consists in the killing of a human being unlawfully with malice aforethought. The manner and means of its accomplishment need not be stated.-People vs. Cronin, 34 Cal., p. 191; People vs. Murphy, 40 Cal., p. 52. An indictment containing a statement of the venue with the formal commencement prescribed by statute which avers "that A., on the 29th of July, 1866, at the County of Marin, within said State, feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, did kill and murder B.," etc., contains all the ultimate or issuable facts that need be stated under our system.-People vs. Cronin, 34 Cal., p. 191; see, also, People vs. Nichol, Indictment not insufficient for defect of form not tending to prejudice defendant. 34 Cal., p. 211. The allegation of premeditation or malice aforethought is necessary.—People vs. Urias, 12 Cal., p. 325. It is not, however, essential that the words "with malice aforethought " be used, provided terms of equivalent import are used. The words "willfully, maliciously, feloniously, and premeditatedly" are equivalent.-People vs. Vance, 21 Cal., p. 400; People vs. Ybarra, 17 Cal., p. 166. The absence of the word "deliberate" where the crime is alleged to have been committed "with malice aforethought" is immaterial.-People vs. Dolaro, 9 Cal., p. 576; People vs. Murray, 10 Cal., p. 509. The allegation of " express malice" is not necessary in an indictment, and if made need not be proved in order to justify a verdict of murder in the first degree. The proper allegation is of "malice aforethought."-People vs. Bonilla, 38 Cal., p. 699. PERJURY.-See Sec. 966 of this Code. An indictment, charging the offense in the words of the statute, is held sufficient in People vs. Parsons, 6 Cal., p. 487. RAPE. An indictment, charging that the defendant "did unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of a certain female child named A., she, the said A., being under ten years of age, to wit, of the age of nine years and upwards," is valid.-People vs. Mills, 17 Cal., p. 276. It is not necessary to aver the age of the person charged with committing the rape.-People vs. Ah Yek, 29 Cal., p. 575. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.-People vs. Hawkins, 34 Cal., p. 181. ROBBERY.-An indictment is not invalid because it charges that the property was forcibly and violently taken from one person and against his will, and that another person was the owner of it, though it fails to aver that it was taken without the consent or against the will of the owner, and also fails to aver the character of the possession of the person from whom it was taken.-People vs. Shuler, 28 Cal., p. 490. An indictment, which merely states that the property was taken from "another person," is fatally defective; it must state that it was taken from "the person of another." People vs. Beck, 21 Cal., p. 385. An indictment must allege that the property taken was the property of some person other than the defendant.-People vs. Vice, 21 Cal., p. 344. 960. (§ 247.) No indictment is insufficient, nor can the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection in matter of form which does not tend to the prejudice of a substantial right of the defendant upon its merits. NOTE.-People vs. Dick, 37 Cal., p. 277. 961. (§ 248.) Neither presumptions of law nor matters of which judicial notice is taken, need be stated in an indictment. Presump tions of law, etc.. need not be stated. ments, etc., pleaded. 962. (§ 249.) In pleading a judgment or other Judg determination of, or proceeding before, a Court or offi- how cer of special jurisdiction, it is not necessary to state the facts constituting jurisdiction; but the judgment or determination may be stated as given or made, or the proceedings had. The facts constituting jurisdiction, however, must be established on the trial. 963. .(§ 250.) In pleading a private statute, or a right derived therefrom, it is sufficient to refer to the statute by its title and the day of its passage, and the Court must thereupon take judicial notice thereof." 964. (§ 251.) An indictment for libel need not set forth any extrinsic facts for the purpose of showing the application to the party libeled of the defamatory matter on which the indictment is founded; but it is sufficient to state generally that the same was published concerning him, and the fact that it was so published must be established on the trial. 965. (§ 252.) When an instrument which is the subject of an indictment for forgery has been destroyed or withheld by the act or the procurement of the defendant, and the fact of such destruction or withholding Private how statutes, pleaded. Pleading in for libel. indictment Fleading in for forgery, strument indictment where in has been destroyed or withheld by is alleged in the indictment and established on the defendant. trial, the misdescription of the instrument is immaterial. 966. (§ 253.) In an indictment for perjury, or subornation of perjury, it is sufficient to set forth the |