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NOTE.-Stats. 1855, p. 275. Removal of place of trial a matter over which the Court exercises a large discretion. If the Court be satisfied of the fact that the defendant cannot have a fair trial in the county, a change of venue should be granted.-People vs. Congleton, July Term, 1872 (No. 3382.) There is no limitation of time within which one who commits a murder, whether in the first or any less degree, must be prosecuted. It was not intended by graduating the punishment to change the offense against which the Statute of Limitation did not run.-People vs. Haun, July Term, 1872 (No. 3397.)

Subd. 1.-Prisoner must be present the entire time which the trial of a felony consumes. Reading a deposition to the jury in the absence of the defendant, either before or after retiring, is error for which a new trial will be granted.-People vs. Kohler, 5 Cal., p. 72. Though the requirements of the Code providing the mode of trial in criminal cases should appear wholly immaterial, they ought, in justice to the defendant, to be complied with; a failure so to do subjects the people to the probability of a new trial. This view is sustained in The People vs. Arnold, 15 Cal., p. 476.

Subd. 2.-This opening is a simple statement of the theory of the case and the circumstances attending it, as understood by the prosecution, under the discretion of the Court, and without argument or elaboration, and the introduction of the proofs deemed necessary to support the allegations of the indictment. See People vs. Williams, Oct. Term, 1872, given in Subd. 5, post.

Subd. 3.-This is the same on the part of the defense that is indicated in the note supra for the people-giving the theory of the defense and the proofs supporting such theory or negativing the direct proofs of the people; and may consist in stating any defense adopted in the plea and the grounds thereof.-See People vs. Williams, Oct. Term, 1872, and cases cited in note to Subd. 5, post.

Subd. 4.-As examples of cases wherein the Court should allow the introduction of other testimony: 1. When surprised by the introduction of witnesses other than those indorsed on the indictment; and 2. When the Court strikes out testimony already given upon which the defense relied.-People vs. Freeland, 6 Cal., p. 96; People vs. Bealoba, 17 Cal., p. 389. Rebutting testimony.-See People vs. Kelly, 28 Cal., p. 423; People vs. Henderson, 28 id., 1. 465. See, also, cases cited in note to Sec. 1102, post.

Subd. 5.-Courts may limit counsel to a proper and

reasonable consumption of time in presenting cases to juries. This discretion, which is necessarily large, should be carefully, if at all, exercised in capital cases, and only then under extraordinary circumstances.— People vs. Keenan, 13 Cal., p. 581. Such limitation of time must in no case deprive the defendant of an opportunity to present his full defense.-Id. It is error to disallow the reading of law to the jury by counsel in the way of illustration, when it is so stated, and in deference to the instructions of the Court as to what the law is.-People vs. Anderson, July Term, 1872 (No. 2655). The Court correctly refused to allow the prisoner's counsel to make his argument upon the case made by the prosecution, in opening the case of the prisoner. The argument is to be made when the evidence is concluded.-People vs. Williams (No. 2883), April Term, 1872, Sup. Ct. Cal.

Subd. 6.-It is proper to preface this note by stating that prior to 1855 this subdivision read: "The Court shall then charge the jury, if requested by either party." May 7th, 1855, it was amended by inserting the words "in writing," in the sentence. It is here allowed to be orally given, by mutual consent. The Judge, under this section, "may state the testimony" to the jury; and this may be done at their request on returning into Court for that purpose.-People vs. Ybarra, 17 Cal., p. 169. And, when it is done, it is presumed to have been done properly in the absence of any showing to the contrary. To "state the testimony" is a constitutional provision.-Const., Art. VI, Sec. 17. But to do more, such as to state that "if the evidence of one of the witnesses was true, the defendants were guilty of the offense charged,” as was done in People vs. Ah Fung, et al., 16 Cal., p. 137, is error; and it was so held in the case of Ybarra, supra, by the Court in commenting on that case, where it appears to have been admitted that there was no controversy on the point.-See instructions in murder case, People vs. Williams, Oct. Term, 1872, on capacity to deliberate. It is not such irregularity as to authorize a new trial for a Judge, other than the one who tried the case, by consent to charge the jury and receive the verdict.-People vs. Henderson, 28 Cal., p. 471. Nor is it such error for the Judge of the district to resume his seat and pass upon a motion without objection.-Id. The presumption is always that the Judge's charge is in writing, unless the contrary appears.-People vs. Shuler, 28 Cal., p. 496; People vs. Chung Lit, 17 Cal., p. 322; People vs. Garcia, 25 Cal., p. 531. Contradictory

instructions not tolerated.-People vs. Valencia, Oct.
Term, 1872 (No. 3131). That the Court may not
charge the jury orally, without express consent of the
defendant, is settled by a uniform series of decisions, as
well as by this section.-People vs. Sandford, January
Term, 1872; People vs. Kearney, April Term, 1872.
An instruction that "circumstantial evidence should
be such as to produce nearly the same degree of cer-
tainty as that which arises from direct testimony."-
People vs. Cronin, 34 Cal., p. 201; People vs. Padilla,
January Term, 1872 (No. 3011); and People vs. Mur-
ray, 14 Cal., p. 159. In the Padilla case, supra, the
Court say: "The true medium is that the evidence
shall satisfy the jury to a moral certainty, and beyond
a reasonable doubt-that they shall be entirely satis-
fied-of the guilt of the accused." The following is
erroneous: "If the defendant, having charge of the
house, had reason to believe that the person trying to
enter the house by the window, at the midnight hour,
did so for the purpose of committing a felony, or other
unlawful act, then the jury will acquit."-See Sec.
197, ante (229), et al.; People vs. Walsh, April Term,
1872 (No. 2912).

ORAL INSTRUCTIONS.-For fifteen years, and in all
the cases of People vs. Beder, 6 Cal., p. 246; People vs.
Pagar, 8 Cal., p. 423; People vs. Ah Fong, 12 Cal., p.
345; People vs. Shaw, 26 Cal., p. 78; People vs. Trim,
37 Cal., p. 274, it has been held, "that cases are numer-
ous and uniform to the point, that the giving of an oral
charge or instruction to the jury in a criminal case,
without the consent of the defendant, is error, and that
his consent cannot be presumed from his presence and
failure to make the objection when the oral instruction
is given." In fact, in one case Judge Baldwin said an
oral instruction is per se error, and an offer to reduce
it to writing afterwards would not cure it.-People vs.
Sandford, January Term, 1872 (No. 2916). To same
point.-People vs. Kearney, April Term, 1872 (No.
2123); People vs. Prospero, July Term, 1872 (No.
3392). These decisions were all under the amendment
of May, 7th, 1855, which is here changed again.

1094. (§ 363.) When the state of the pleadings requires it, or in any other case, for good reasons, and in the sound discretion of the Court, the order scribed in the last section may be departed from.

pre

NOTE.-Stats. 1854, p. 81, Sec. 4. See note to Sec. 1095, post. The first proof of the Penal Code prepared

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Number of

counsel who may argue the

case to the jury.

by the Commission gave the close of the argument to the defense. This gave rise to opposition and discussion, one of the Commission favoring the section as it here stands, with a section requiring the "law officer" of the people, the District Attorney, in "propria persona," to close, in all cases where there was paid counsel assisting the prosecution; but since the control of this matter of opening and closing was within the sound discretion of the Court in all cases, it was finally concluded to leave the statute in this respect unchanged, believing that in all proper cases this power of the Court would be exercised, and not left a dead letter. Encouragement for this hope is founded in the case of The People vs. Butler, 8 Cal., p. 435, where Burnett, J. (Field, J., concurring), holds the following language: "The State never asks anything but justice. On the part of the State the prosecution is but a fair and just inquiry into the guilt or innocence of the accused. She can have no interest in convicting the innocent or in releasing the guilty. She stands perfectly impartial as between the community and the individual. Prose cuting attorneys should, therefore, do their duty faithfully, but no more. They should never act as employed counsel. No advantage should be taken of temporary public excitement against the prisoner, or of any prejudice against him arising from any cause whatever. And if such attempts are made, the Court before whom the prisoner is tried should put a stop to them."

1095. (§ 364.) If the indictment is for an offense punishable with death, two counsel on each side may argue the cause to the jury. If it is for any other offense, the Court may, in its discretion, restrict the argument to one counsel on each side.

NOTE. This section, before the adoption of the Codes, after the word "jury," at end of first sentence, read as follows: "in which case they must do so alternately." The recent famous case of Laura D. Fair, on the construction of this original section, as also upon other points, was appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court, in an able and elaborate opinion, decided, at the October Term, 1872, that the beginning of the argument must be determined under the two preceding sections, and that "by whomsoever begun, it should proceed by alternation between the counsel engaged," and concluding also, that one side should open and the other close the argument. It was also determined under the

language of this original section left undisturbed, that
when demanded by the defense, two counsel should be
heard in capital cases, and that in such case they must
present their arguments alternately, so that in all cases
the one should open and the other side close. It will
be observed that by the omission of the latter portion
of the first sentence, supra, the order of argument is
subject to the discretion of the Court under Sec. 1094,
ante.

presumed until the

1096. (§ 365.) A defendant in a criminal action Defendant is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.

NOTE.-See" Presumption," note to Sec. 1102, post,
and Whar. Am. Cr. Law, Sec. 707, et seq.

BENEFIT OF DOUBT.-The defendant is entitled to
benefit of any reasonable doubt, whether a fact is shown
against him, while preponderance of evidence is suffi-
cient to prove a fact in his favor.-People vs. Milgate,
5 Cal., p. 127. "The hypothesis contended for by the
prosecution must be established to an absolute moral
certainty, to the entire exclusion of any rational proba-
bility of any other hypothesis being true, or the jury
must find the defendant not guilty."-People vs. Strong,
30 Cal., p. 154. Mr. Justice Shaw's definition of reason-
able doubt is: "It is that state of the case which, after
the entire comparison and consideration of all the evi-
dence, leaves the minds of jurors in that condition that
they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge, *
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding,
and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it."-Com. vs. Web-
ster, 5 Cush., p. 320; indorsed in People vs. Ashe, July
Term, 1872 (No. 3413), and many other California
Rule of reasonable doubt is that as against the
defendant facts must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. In his favor preponderating proof only is neces-
sary. People vs. Milgate, 5 Cal., p. 127; the charge of
Chief Justice Shaw, supra, in the famous Webster case,
approved in People vs. Strong, 30 Cal., p. 151; People
vs. Lachanais, 32 Cal., p. 433.

cases.

*

a

1097. (§ 366.) When it appears that the defendant has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two or more

innocent contrary is

proved. Reasonable doubt.

When reasonable

doubt as to

degree, he

can be

convicted

only of

lowest.

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