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ble as perjury. The act which violates the official duty
should be declared criminal, and the punishment should
be affixed to the act itself.

ity in

121. It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury Irregularthat the oath was administered or taken in an irregu- administerlar manner.

NOTE.-3 Wharton's Cr. Law, Secs. 2205-7. Two classes of cases are important to be considered. One class is, where an oath is administered in an irregular manner, but the person taking it supposes at the time that all the formalities of law are being complied with. Such were the circumstances in People vs. Cook, 4 Seld., p. 67, where challenged voters were sworn upon a copy of Watts' Psalms and Hymns, the book being supposed to be the Bible. As to these cases, the decision in People vs. Cook is, that the oath is valid, and the party is as amenable to the consequences of perjury as if it had been administered in strict conformity to the statute. Another class of cases is, where the person taking the oath evades some formality of the oath with intent to escape its obligation; as where he kisses his thumb instead of the book. In these cases his fraud should not be permitted to secure him against punishment. The section in the text therefore prescribes the same rule for both classes.

ing.

tency of

no defense.

122. It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury Incompe that the accused was not competent to give the testi- witness mony, deposition, or certificate of which falsehood is alleged. It is sufficient that he did give such testimony or make such deposition or certificate.

NOTE.-3 Wharton's Cr. Law, Secs. 2209, 2224;
Montgomery vs. State, 10 Ohio, p. 220; Van Steen-
berg vs. Kortz, 10 Johns., p. 167; Rich vs. Newell, 3
Yea., p. 414.

knowledge

materiality

of his

testimony

123. It is no defense to a prosecution for perjury Witnesses' that the accused did not know the materiality of the of false statement made by him; or that it did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding.

not

necessary.

Making deposi

tions, etc.,

when deemed

complete.

Statement of that

which one does not

know to be true.

Punishment of perjury.

Subornation of perjury.

Procuring

the

124. The making of a deposition or certificate is deemed to be complete, within the provisions of this Chapter, from the time when it is delivered by the accused to any other person, with the intent that it be uttered or published as true.

125. An unqualified statement of that which one does not know to be true is equivalent to a statement of that which one knows to be false.

NOTE.-See, in support of the rule prescribed in this section, People vs. McKinney, 3 Park Cr., p. 511; Bennett vs. Judson, 21 N. Y., p. 238; Commonwealth vs. Cornish, 6 Binn., p. 249; Steinman vs. McWilliams, 6 Penn. St., p. 170; 3 Wharton Cr. Law, Sec. 2201; and opposed to it, United States vs. Shellmire, Baldw., p. 370.

126. (§ 82.) Perjury is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison not less than one nor more than fourteen years.

127. ($82.) Every person who willfully procures another person to commit perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he would be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured.

NOTE. The party charged must procure the commission of perjury, by inciting, instigating, or persuading the witness to commit the offense.-2 Russ. on Crimes, p. 596; Com. vs. Douglass, 5 Met., p. 341; 3 Wharton's Cr. Law, Sec. 2283; 2 Bishop's Cr. Law, Sec. 887. Though the party charged with subornation of perjury knew that the testimony of a witness whom he called would be false, yet if he did not know that the witness would willfully testify to a fact knowing it to be false, he cannot be convicted.-Com. vs. Douglass, 5 Met., p. 241.

128. (§ 83.) Every person who, by willful perjury execution or subornation of perjury, procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person, is punishable by death.

of innocent

person.

NOTE. This section is founded on the 83d of the crimes and punishment Act, which declares that any

person so procuring the conviction and execution of
an innocent person "shall be deemed guilty of mur-
der." The offense certainly does not fall within any
known definition of murder, and is repugnant to the
definition of murder given in our statutes. The Com-
mission have therefore deemed it advisable to omit the
words quoted, and to affix the punishment to the act
itself.

CHAPTER VI.

FALSIFYING EVIDENCE.

SECTION 132. Offering false evidence. 133. Deceiving a witness.

134. Preparing false evidence.

135. Destroying evidence.

136. Preventing or dissuading witness from attending.
137. Bribing witnesses.

138. Taking or offering to take bribes.

false

132. Every person who upon any trial, proceed- Offering ing, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized or evidence. permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any book, paper, document, record, or other instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.

a witness.

133. Every person who practices any fraud or Deceiving deceit, or knowingly makes or exhibits any false statement, representation, token, or writing, to any witness or person about to be called as a witness upon any trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, with intent to affect the testimony of such witness, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

false

134. Every person guilty of preparing any false Preparing or ante-dated book, paper, record, instrument in evidence. writing, or other matter or thing, with intent to produce it, or allow it to be produced for any fraudulent

Destroying
evidence.

Preventing

or

witness

or deceitful purpose, as genuine or true, upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry whatever, authorized by law, is guilty of felony.

NOTE.-The Tracy Peerage case (10 Cl. & F., p. 154), though involving no points of criminal law, supplies an illustration relevant to this subject. In that case a claimant to a peerage produced manuscript entries in a prayer book, alleged to be of ancient date; and, at a very late stage of the proceeding, called witnesses to testify to an inscription upon a tombstone, tending to make out the pedigree necessary to the claimant's case. The tombstone itself could not be produced; and, the circumstances of the case involving suspicion, the claim was dismissed; Lord Campbell expressing his conviction that the case was founded on fraud and forgery.

135. Every person who, knowing that any book, paper, record, instrument in writing, or other matter or thing, is about to be produced in evidence upon any trial, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized by law, willfully destroys or conceals the same, with intent thereby to prevent it from being produced, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

136. Every person who willfully prevents or disdissuading suades any person who is or may become a witness, from attending upon any trial, proceeding, or inquiry, authorized by law, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

from
attending.

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137. Every person who gives or offers, or promises to give, to any witness, or person about to be called as a witness, any bribe, upon any understanding or agreement that the testimony of such witness shall be thereby influenced, or who attempts by any other means fraudulently to induce any witness to give false or to withhold true testimony, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

138. Every person who is a witness, or is about to be called as such, who receives or offers to receive any bribe, upon any understanding that his testimony shall be influenced thereby, or that he will absent himself

from the trial or proceeding upon which his testimony is required, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

NOTE.-The preceding Chapter is founded upon Section 3 of the Act of April 27th, 1863 (Stats. 1863, p. 645), and Sections 84 and 86 of the Crimes and Punishment Act, as amended by the Act cited.

CHAPTER VII.

OTHER OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC JUSTICE.

SECTION 142. Officer refusing to receive or arrest parties charged with

crime.

143. Public Administrator, neglect of duty or violation of

duty by.

144. Receiving fee or compensation for services rendered in arresting fugitives from justice.

145. Delaying to take person arrested before a magistrate. 146. Making arrests, etc., without lawful authority.

147. Inhumanity to prisoners.

148. Resisting public officers in the discharge of their duties. 149. Assaults, etc., by officers, under color of authority.

150. Refusing to aid officers in arrest, etc.

151. Taking extra-judicial oaths.

152. Administering extra-judicial oaths.

153. Compounding crimes.

154. Debtor fraudulently concealing his property.
155. Defendant fraudulently concealing his property.
156. Fraudulent pretenses relative to birth of infant.

157. Substituting one child for another.

158. Common barratry defined. How punished.
159. What proof is required.

160. Misconduct by attorneys.

161. Buying demands or suit by an attorney.

162. Attorneys forbidden to defend prosecutions carried on by their partners or formerly by themselves.

163. Limitation of preceding section.

164. Grand juror acting after challenge has been allowed. 165. Bribing members of Common Councils, Boards of Supervisors, or Trustees.

166. Criminal contempts.

167. False certificates by public officers.

168. Disclosing fact of indictment or presentment having

been found or made.

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