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subversive of the fundamental principles of the rights and liberties of the people.
In the 9th section of the ist Article after the clause--no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State
Insert No law in the nature of a Navigation Act shall be passed [inserted in another hand “before the year 1808 "]
(disagreed] without the assent of two thirds of the members present in each House.
PAPER ON THE JUDICIARY-IN AN UNKNOWN HAND.
The judicial power of the United ates shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such Courts of Admiralty as Congress shall establish in any of the States. And also in Courts of Admiralty to be established in such of the States as Congress shall direct.
The jurisdiction of the supreme courts shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party, to controversies between two or more States ; between citizens of the same State claiming lands of different States, and between a State and the citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects.
In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, and suits between persons claiming lands under grants of different States the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction, and in all the other cases before mentioned the Supreme Courts shall have appellate jurisdiction as to law only, except in cases of equity and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in which last mentioned cases the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact.
In all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the Admiralty Courts appointed by Congress shall have original jurisdiction, and an appeal may be made to the Supreme Court of Congress for any sum and in such manner as Congress may by law direct.
In all other cases not otherwise provided for the Superior State Courts shall have original jurisdiction, and an appeal may be made to the Supreme federal Court in all cases where the subject in controversy or the decree or judgment of the State court shall be of the value of one thousand dollars and in cases of less value the appeal shall be to the High Court of Appeals, Court of Errors or other Supreme Court of the State where the suit shall be tried.
The trial of all crimes, except in case of impeachment shall be in the Superior Court of that State where the offence shall have been committed in such manner as the Congress shall by law direct except that the trial shall be by a jury. But when the crime shall not have been committed within any one of the United States the trial shall be at such place and in such manner as Congress shall by law direct, except that such trial shall also be by a jury.
ROUGH DRAFT OF A PAPER, APPARENTLY IN
THE HAND OF G. MASON, WITH ERASURES AND INTERLINEATIONS.
At a time when our government is approaching to dissolution, when some of its principles have been found utterly inadequate to the purposes for which it was established, and it is evident that without some material alterations it can not much longer subsist, it must give real concern to every man who has his country's interest at heart to find such a difference of sentiment and opinion in an assembly of the most respectable and confidential characters in America, appointed for the special purpose of revising and amending the federal constitution, so as to obtain and preserve the important objects for which it was institutedthe protection, safety and happiness of the people. We all agree in the necessity of new regulations; but we differ widely in our opinions of what are the safest and most effectual. Perhaps this contrariety of sentiment arises from our not thoroughly considering the peculiar circumstances, situation, character and genius of the people of America, differing materially from that of any other nation. The history of other nations has been minutely investigated, examples have been drawn from and arguments founded on the practice of countries very dissimilar to ours. The treaties, leagues, and confederacies between different sovereign, indepen
dent powers have been urged as proofs in support of the propriety and justice of the single and equal representation of each individual State in the American Union; and thence conclusions have been drawn that the people of these United States would refuse to adopt a government founded more an equal representation of the people themselves, than on the distinct representation of each separate, individual State. If the different States in our Union always had been as now substantially and in reality distinct, sovereign and independent, this kind of reasoning would have great force; but if the premises on which it is founded are mere assumptions not founded on facts, or at best upon facts to be found only upon a paper of yesterday, and even these contradictory to each other, no satisfactory conclusions can be drawn from them.
OBJECTIONS TO THIS CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT.
There is no Declaration of Rights, and the laws of the general government being paramount to the laws and constitution of the several States, the Declarations of Rights in the separate States are no security. Nor are the people secured even in the enjoyment of the benefit of the common law (which stands here upon no other foundation than its having been adopted by the respective acts forming the constitutions of the several States).
In the House of Representatives there is not the substance but the shadow only of representation ; which can never produce proper information in the legislature, or inspire confidence in the people; the laws will therefore be generally made by men little concerned in, and unacquainted with their effects and consequences. (This objection has been in some degree lessened by an amendment, often before refused and at last made by an erasure, after the engrossment upon parchment of the word forty and inserting thirty, in the third clause of the second section of the first article.]
The Senate have the power of altering all money bills, and of originating appropriations of money, and the salaries of the officers of their own appointment, in conjunction with the president of the United States, although they are not the representatives of the people or amenable to them.
These with their other great powers, viz. : their power in the appointment of ambassadors and all public officers, in making treaties, and in trying all impeachments, their influence upon and connection with the supreme Executive from these causes, their duration of office and their being a constantly existing body, almost continually sitting, joined with their being one complete branch of the legislature, will destroy any balance in the government, and enable them to accomplish what ursurpations they please upon the rights and liberties of the people.
The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England, and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.
The President of the United States has no Constitutional Council, a thing unknown in any safe and regular government. He will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed by minions and favorites ; or he will become a tool to the Senate-or a Council of State will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments; the worst and most dangerous of all ingredients for such a Council in a free country ; [for they may be induced to join in any dangerous or oppressive measures, to shelter themselves, and prevent an inquiry into their own misconduct in office. Whereas, had a constitutional council been formed (as was proposed) of six members, viz. : two from the Eastern, two from the Middle, and two from the Southern States, to be appointed by vote of the States in the House of Representatives, with the same duration and rotation of office as the Senate, the executive would always have had safe and proper information and advice ; the president of such a council might have acted as Vice-President of the Uạited States pro tempore, upon any vacancy or disability of the chief magistrate ; and long continued sessions of the Senate, would in a great measure have been prevented.] From this fatal defect has arisen the improper power of the Senate in the appointment of public officers, and the alarming dependence and connection between that branch of the legislature and the supreme Executive.
Hence also sprung that unnecessary [and dangerous] officer the Vice-President, who for want of other employment is made
president of the Senate, thereby dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers, besides always giving to some one of the States an unnecessary and unjust pre-eminence over the others.
The President of the United States has the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason, which may be sometimes exercised to screen from punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt.
By declaring all treaties supreme laws of the land, the Executive and the Senate have, in many cases, an exclusive power of legislation ; which might have been avoided by proper distinctions with respect to treaties, and requiring the assent of the House of Representatives, where it could be done with safety.
By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and navigation laws, the five Southern States, whose produce and circumstances are totally different from that of the eight Northern and Eastern States, may [will] be ruined, for such rigid and premature regulations may be made as will enable the merchants of the Northern and Eastern States not only to demand an exhorbitant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the commodities at their own price, for many years, to the great injury of the landed interest, and [the] impoverishment of the people ; and the danger is the greater as the gain on one side will be in proportion to the loss on the other. Whereas requiring two-thirds of the members present in both Houses would have produced mutual moderation, promoted the general interest, and removed an insuperable objection to the adoption of this [the] government.
Under their own construction of the general_clause, at the end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusual and severe punishments, and extend their powers (power] as far as they shall think proper; so that the State legislatures have no security for the powers now presumed to remain to them, or the people for their rights.
There is no declaration of any kind, for preserving the liberty of the press, or the trial by jury in civil eauses (cases] ; nor against the danger of standing armies in time of peace.
The State legislatures are restrained from laying export duties on their own produce.