modities now on hand; all such delays being highly injurious to public credit.

"We desire and instruct you to promote a strict enquiry into the expenditure of public money, and the bringing to speedy account and punishment all public delinquents and defaulters.

"We desire and instruct you to endeavour to procure ample justice to the officers and soldiers of the American army; who though constantly surrounded with uncommon distress and difficulties, have so bravely defended the rights and liberties of their country. "We desire and instruct you that you assent not to, and that you oppose repealing the law for preventing extensive credits upon open accounts; and also that you assent not to, but oppose the imposition of any greater duty upon imported iron or cordage than shall be imposed upon other imported goods, for the reasons respectively given in our petitions to the Assembly upon these subjects.

"We desire and instruct you strenuously to oppose all encroachments of the American Congress upon the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the separate States; and every assumption of power, not expressly vested in them, by the Articles of Confederation. If experience shall prove that further powers are necessary and safe, they can be granted only by additional articles to the Confederation, duly acceded to by all the States; for if Congress, upon the plea of necessity, or upon any pretence whatever, can arrogate powers not warranted by the Articles of Confederation, in one instance, they may in another, or in an hundred; every repetition will be strengthened and confirmed by precedents.

"And in particular we desire and instruct you to oppose any attempts which may be made by Congress to obtain a perpetual revenue, or the appointment of revenue officers. Were these powers superadded to those they already possess, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitutions of Government in the different States would prove mere parchment bulwarks to American liberty,

"We like not the language of the late address from Congress to the different States, and of the report of their committee upon the subject of revenue, published in the same pamphlet. If they are carefully and impartially examined, they will be found to exhibit strong proofs of lust of power: They contain the same kind of arguments which were formerly used in the business of

CONGRESS NO POWER TO LEVY TAXES.

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ship money, and to justify the arbitrary measures of the race of Stuarts in England. And the present king and council of Great Britain might not improperly adopt great part of them, to prove the expediency of levying money without consent of Parliament. After having reluctantly given up part of what they found they could not maintain, they still insist that the several States shall invest the United States in Congress assembled with a power to levy, for the use of the United States, the following duties, &c., and that the revenue officers shall be amenable to Congress. The very style is alarming. The proposed duties may be proper, but the separate States only can safely have the power of levying taxes. Congress should not have even the appearance of such a power. Forms generally imply substance, and such a precedent may be applied to dangerous purposes hereafter. When the same man, or set of men, holds both the sword and the purse, there is an end of liberty. As little are we satisfied with the resolution of Congress of the 10th of October, 1780, lately renewed, engaging that the unappropriated lands that may be ceded or relinquished to the United States by any particular States, shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States.' Who is to judge of the quality and legality of pretended appropriations? And will this vague resolution be a sufficient bar to Congress against confirming the claims under Indian purchases, or pretended grants from the Crown of Great Britain, in which many of their own members are interested as partners, and by which great part of the ceded lands may be converted to private, instead of public purposes? The intrigues of the great land companies, and the methods by which they have strengthened their interest are no secret to the public. We are also at a loss to know whence Congress derives the powers of demanding cessions of lands and of erecting new States before such powers have been granted them by their constituents.

And finally we recommend it to you (for in this we will not presume to give positive instructions) to endeavour to obtain an instruction from the General Assembly to the Virginia delegates in Congress, against sending ambassadors to the courts of Europe; it being an expence which (in our present circumstances) these United States are unable to support. Such appointments can hardly fail of producing dangerous combinations, factions, and ́ cabals, in the great council of America. And from the great

distance and the difficulty of knowing and examining their conduct, there is danger, too, that some of the persons so sent, may be corrupted and pensioned by the courts where they reside. We are of opinion, that consuls to superintend our trade (at less than a tenth part of the charge of ambassadors) will be sufficient to answer every good purpose. And nature having separated us, by an immense ocean, from the European nations, the less we have to do with their quarrels or politics, the better. Having thus, Gentlemen, given you our opinions and instructions, upon such subjects as we deem at this time most important, we remain, with sentiments of great respect and esteem, your friends and fellowcitizens.'

Thomson Mason was in the Assembly during this session, and his views upon public affairs were given to his constituents in the following letter:

To the Freeholders of Stafford County:

GENTLEMEN :

RICHMOND, June 10th, 1783.

I return you my sincere thanks for the confidence you have placed in me, in electing me a delegate to represent you in the General Assembly; and I shall now, in return, lay before you the views and motives which induced me to offer myself a candidate at your late election. It is needless to assert, that no private interest of my own actuated me, because from your acquaintance with me from my youth, you know it did not. The fears of some of you, that I would endeavour to prevent the Treaty of Peace from being ratified, or the payment of British debts, were groundless; no man was more desirous of a peace, or entertained a more fixed regard for the strict rules of justice than myself, and my disposition is not vindictive; but I think the safety of my country depends upon excluding from the rights of citizenship those who joined the enemy and not only deserted us in the hour of distress, but by their arms and false councils assisted our enemies in prolonging the war against us. And those who remained among us, and avowed principles incompatible with American liberty, I think also

The Virginia Gazette, June 7, 1783.

THOMSON MASON TO HIS CONSTITUENTS.

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ought never to be trusted with any office, civil or military, nor even to be allowed to vote for any man who is to guide our public councils. I wished also to suspend all executions on judgments obtained for debts contracted before the war, so as to issue for one fourth or fifth part of the debt annually, till the whole was discharged, in order to place the debtor as near as we could in the same flourishing situation that he was when that debt was contracted; for I really dreaded, that if Tory and refugee creditors were suffered to return and harass their debtors with that rapacious and vindictive spirit which we have reason to suppose they will, that those citizens who had been most active in defence of the liberties of their country would be the devoted victims of their fury, and in the present scarcity of money, great part of the property of this country would centre in the hands of the avowed enemies to liberty; and as power is the constant, the necessary attendant on property, that after all the struggles of the virtuous, the wicked would at last prevail, and introduce a more slavish dependence upon Britain than that from which we have just emerged.

I wished also to prevent the money paid into the Treasury, either for British debts or loans, from being accounted for on any other terms, than at the real depreciation at the time it was paid in. I wished to introduce some regular system into our revenue laws, so as to pass several distinct laws establishing separate substantial funds; first for the support of our civil government, secondly, for the annual payment of the interest of our foreign debt, thirdly, for the payment of the annual interest of the debt. due to the army, and fourthly, for that due to our own citizens; that these funds should be most sacredly applied to the separate purpose for which each was designed, and the overplus go towards sinking the principal of each; and I was not without hopes that the increase of our inhabitants, commerce, and wealth would be so rapidly great, that the excess of each fund would pay off that principal in less than twelve years.

I wished to encourage the culture of hemp, by giving a bounty to the makers of it, and laying such a duty on imported cordage as would pay that bounty, that we might not be altogether dependent upon foreigners for the means of fitting out vessels, either for necessary defence or the extension of our commerce.

And I wished to place our bay and river trade, and above all

our fisheries, on such a foundation, as to render them useful nurseries of free seamen; on the increase of which our naval strength and the extension of our commerce so materially depend.

Whether I shall succeed in all or any of these views, I shall be better able to inform you when I return; in the meantime think me not guilty of inconsistency, if you find by the journals that I should often vote against measures which by them seem to be proposed by myself; for where there are a large number to deliberate upon any measure, in which a majority are to agree, the measure is often so altered as to make it exceedingly different from what it was first intended to be.

I am, gentlemen, with the highest sentiments of gratitude and esteem, your sincerely affectionate,

THOMSON MASON.'

The great question before the Assembly, in the estimation of Madison, Jefferson, and Joseph Jones was the report on the federal impost. The duty law passed at a previous session had been repealed, it was said through the agency of the Lees, Richard Henry, and Arthur, but it was now hoped that it would be re-enacted. Jefferson wrote to Madison, on the 3d of May, giving a somewhat cynical sketch of the House, and the attitude of its prominent members in regard to the articles proposed by Madison covering this subject. The Lees were against them: "Henry, as usual, is involved in mystery"; Thomson Mason "is a meteor whose path cannot be calculated. All the powers of his mind seem at present to be concentrated in one single object-the producing a convention to new-model the State constitution. This is a subject much agitated, and seems the only one they will have to amuse themselves with till they shall receive your propositions." Joseph Jones hurried from his seat in Congress to attend the Assembly, and he wrote regularly to Madison while in Richmond to report the progress of affairs. Patrick Henry and Richard Henry Lee he describes as the

2

'Virginia Gazette, June 14, 1783.

Bancroft's "History of the Constitution," vol. i., Appendix, p. 310.