SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. FRIEDMAN MFG. CO. V. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS et al. 1. MASTER AND SERVANT — WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-DECISION OF INDUSTRIAL BOARD-REVIEW-TIME. Where notice and copy of decision of Industrial Board, allowing compensation for death of employee, were sent and received by employer on a certain day, and no writ of certiorari was sued out or suit in chancery commenced within 20 days thereafter, decision of board became, in view of Workmen's Compensation Act, § 19, conclusive except for fraud, although 20 days had not expired since denial of employer's petition for modification of findings of fact. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417 [334].) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-INDUSTRIAL BOARD-JURISDICTION-INJURIES OUTSIDE OF THE STATE. Industrial Board obtained jurisdiction by application of wife alleging employment of her husband and injury causing his death suffered in course of employment, although injury occurred while employee was outside of the state. (For other cases. see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 369.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-DECISION OF INDUSTRIAL BOARD-REVIEW. Whether wife of deceased employee was entitled to award for injuries resulting in death which occurred outside of the state involved a construction of Workmen's Compensation Act, and if construction given by Industrial Board was erroneous, section 19 permitted a review (For other cases. see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[34].) 4. MASTER AND SERVANT-DECISION OF INDUSTRIAL BOARD-REVIEW. On application to circuit court for judgment for award and attorney's fees in accordance with statute, court has no jurisdiction to review decision of Industrial Board, construe the statute, or determine whether decision is correct. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 417[1].) 5. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-CONSTITUTIONALITY. There is no constitutional objection to statute providing for attorney's fees, where employer does not institute proceedings for review of decision of Industrial Board and refuses to pay compensation. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 347.) 6. MASTER AND SERVANT — FAILURE TO PAY AWARDATTORNEY'S FEES. Where employer failed to pay compensation according to award, and did not institute proceedings for review within 20 days, as provided by * Decision rendered, Oct. 21, 1918. 120 N. E. Rep. 460. Workmen's Compensation Act, § 19, circuit court, on claimant's application for judgment for award. properly allowed attorney's fees. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 420.) Error to Circuit Court, Cook County; Oscar M. Torrison. Judge. Application by Lydia Goodrode, administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Melvin Goodrode, for compensation for his death, arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Friedman Manufacturing Company, employer. The application was heard by an arbitrator, who entered an award for claimant, which was affirmed by the Industrial Board. The employer sued out a writ of certiorari from the circuit court, which dismissed writ and certified that the cause was one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and a writ of error was sued out of the Supreme Court in pursuance of that certificate. Thereafter the employer having failed to pay compensation, applicant applied to the circuit court for judgment for award, which was granted. The circuit court also certified that the cause was one proper to be reviewed by the Supreme Court, and, a writ of error being sued out, the two causes were consolidated. Judgments affirmed. Charles J. Faulkner, Jr., and Walter C. Kirk, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. MacChesney, Becker, Angerstein & Rollo and Martin C. Koebel, all of Chicago, for defendant in error. CARTWRIGHT, J. Lydia Goodrode, administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Melvin Goodrode, applied to the Industrial Board for compensation for his death arising out of and in the course of his employment by the plaintiff in error, the Friedman Manufacturing Company. The application was heard by an arbitrator, who entered an award on August 22, 1916. The Industrial Board sent by registered mail to the plaintiff in error a notice of the filing of the decision of the arbitrator and a copy of the award. The letter was receipted for in the name of the Friedman Manufacturing Company. by Mr. Lynch, assistant cashier. In pursuance of that notice so received by the plaintiff in error it petitioned for a review of the award, and a hearing was had before the board, which rendered a decision on June 20, 1917, affirming the award. On June 22, 1917, the board sent by registered mail to the plaintiff in error a copy of the decision and a notice of the time when it was filed, and the letter was receipted for in the same manner and by the same officer as before. On September 17, 1917, the plaintiff in error presented to the Industrial Board a petition for a modification of the finding of facts made in the decision. With the petition for a modification of the finding was presented an affidavit of the attorney for the plaintiff in error that the agent who received the notice and copy of the decision did not know what it was and held the decision on his desk without communicating to the attorney, who knew nothing about it until September 15, 1917. The board refused to modify the finding and gave notice of its decision on September 26, 1917. Within 20 days after the refusal of the board to modify its finding the plaintiff in error sued out a writ of certiorari from the circuit court of Cook county to review the decision of the board. The court quashed the writ of certiorari and dismissed it, and certified that the cause was one proper to be reviewed by this court. A writ of error was sued out of this court in pursuance of that certificate. The plaintiff in error having failed to pay compensation according to the award, Lydia Goodrode presented to the circuit court of Cook county her application for judgment for the award and attorney's fees in accordance with the statute. The application was resisted on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction to render any judgment, because the injury and death occurred outside the state of Illinois, and because certiorari proceedings were pending to review the record of the Industrial Board. It was stipulated that, if the applicant was entitled to attorney's fees at all, she was entitled to $400. The court held that pendency of certiorari proceedings was no defense, because the statutory period for instituting such proceedings had long since elapsed, and entered judgment on the award, with $400 attorney's fees. The court also certified that the cause was one proper to be reviewed by this court, and, a writ of error having been sued out, the two causes were consolidated by the court. [1] Section 19 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, § 144) provides that a decision of the Industrial Board shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive unless a party in interest shall, by writ of certiorari to the Industrial Board or suit in chancery commenced within 20 days after the receipt of notice of the decision of the board, obtain a review of the decision. Notice and a copy of the decision of the board were sent to and received by the plaintiff in error on June 22, 1917, and no writ of certiorari was sued out or suit in chancery commenced within 20 days thereafter. The decision of the board became conclusive except for fraud. Melvin Goodrode was dead, and no condition did or could arise by which a change of the award could be made under the statute, and it was not alleged that there was any such change, but the application was for a rehearing. Such an application could not operate to nullify or set aside the limitation of time set by the statute for a judicial review. The rule was declared in Vickers v. Tyndall, 168 III. 616, 48 N. E. 214, where a petition for rehearing was provided for, and in cases under the Workmen's Compensation Act there is no provision for such an application. [2-4] Goodrode was traveling as a salesman for the plaintiff in error and went to different places in the state of Illinois, but at the time of the accident had gone across the line to Gary, Ind. The Industrial Board in its decision found that while driving along an avenue in Gary his automobile went down an embankment into a pond of water, by means of which he and two other persons were caught under the car and drowned. The application for judgment was resisted upon the ground that the board had no jurisdiction, because the injury causing death occurred outside of this state, and, not having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the award was a nullity, which could be resisted collaterally at any time or place. Jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the controversy is conferred by law, and the statute gave to the Industrial Board jurisdiction of all claims for accidental injuries or death arising out of and in the course of employment. The board obtained jurisdiction of the particular case by the application of Lydia Goodrode alleging the employment of her husband by the plaintiff in error and the injury causing his death, suffered in the course of the employment. The question whether she was entitled to an award for an accidental injury resulting in death which occurred outside of the state involved a construction of the Workmen's Compensation Act, and if the construction given to the act was erroneous, the statute permitted a review by writ of certiorari or proceeding in chancery to be instituted within 20 days. The way was open to the plaintiff in error to have a review of the construction given to the Workmen's Compensation Act by the Industrial Board, either by writ of certiorari or suit in chancery, and it did not avail itself of the privilege. The statute does not in terms limit the right to an award to accidental injuries occurring in this state, and whether the right is so limited must depend upon the construction of the various provisions of the act. The judgment entered by the court is in the nature of an execution of the award, to the end that adequate means may be provided for its enforcement, and on such an application the court has no jurisdiction to review the decision, construe the statute, or determine whether the decision of the board was correct or not. [5, 6] The statute provides for attorney's fees where the employer does not institute proceedings for a review and refuses to pay compensation. McMurray v. Peabody Coal Co., 281 Ill. 218, 118 N. Ē. 29. There is no constitutional objection to such a statute and the facts authorized the allowance. The purpose of the statute is to provide a speedy method for the adjustment of compensation and the payment of the same, without the delays of litigation and the burden of expense and attorney's fees otherwise imposed upon claimants. The judgments are affirmed. Judgments affirmed. SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS. MEREDOSIA LEVEE & DRAINAGE DIST. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ILLINOIS et al. (No. 12093.)* 1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-RELATION OF PARTIES. The principal test as to whether one is an employee or an independent contractor lies in the degree of control retained and exercised by the person for whom the work is being done. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 367.) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-RELATION OF PARTIES. Where employer drainage district supervised a ditch-cleaning operation as to results only, while the person injured operated his own machinery, furnished his own supplies, employed his own workmen, and directed the manner of work for a per diem compensation, the latter was an independent contractor, not a servant. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 367.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS. An independent contractor is not entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 367.) Error to Circuit Court, Bureau County; Joe A. Davis, Judge. Proceeding by Clarence Glenn Renner to recover compensation for personal injuries under the Workmen's Compensation Act, opposed by the Meredosia Levee & Drainage District, the employer. From a judgment of the circuit court, confirming an award made by the Industrial Commission, the employer brings error. Reversed and remanded. Ralph Rosen and H. L. Howard, both of Chicago, for plaintiff in error. Charles C. McMahon, of Fulton, for defendant in error. * Decision rendered, Oct. 21, 1918. 120 N. E. Rep. 516. COOKE, J. The circuit court of Bureau county rendered a judgment confirming the award made by the Industrial Board to Clarence Glenn Renner, defendant in error, of $12 per week for a period of 13 weeks for a temporary total disability, and $12 per week for a period of 80 weeks for loss of the thumb and ring finger of the right hand, as a result of injuries sustained September 28, 1916. This writ of error has been sued out to review the judgment of the circuit court. Defendant in error and his father for a number of years prior to September 28, 1916, were the owners of a dredging machine, which they used and operated for various persons in different districts in digging and cleaning out ditches and doing similar work. They completed a contract with the Meredosia Levee & Drainage District on August 17, 1916. At that time the father retired from the business and defendant in error took it over. During the latter part of that month the ditch, which the father and son had just completed, became clogged and filled with sand and dirt, due to local floods, and the commissioners of the drainage district, desiring to have the sand and dirt removed, negotiated with defendant in error for the use of his dredging machine and his helpers in removing the same. Defendant in error contracted with the drainage district to do this work for $2.50 per hour, or $25 per day of 10 hours. No agreement was made as to the number of yards of earth to be removed, or that the work was to be done in a specified time. Defendant in error was to be paid for the use of his dredging machine, for his own time and the time of two helpers, at the rate of $25 per day, and he was to furnish gasoline for the engine and whatever else was necessary to properly do the work. He began working under this contract on August 30, 1916. There were no written specifications as to how the work was to be done, but, under the direction of the commissioners, Andrew Dolan, one of the commissioners for the district, was present to watch and inspect the work being done, and to see that it was done as the district desired, to tell defendant in error and his men where the work was to commence and where it was to end, how deep it was to be dug, and where the earth was to be deposited on the spoil banks. Dolan had the right to discharge defendant in error, or either of his helpers, if the work was not being done as the district desired, or, as one of the commissioners stated in his testimony "if they were laying down on the job." For his supervision Dolan was paid by the district $3 per day. Defendant in error was paid at the rate of $25 per day, by checks payable to himself, at the end of each week, and out of this he bought the gasoline, and paid all incidental expenses included in the operation of his dredging machine, and paid his men according to his own arrangement with them. Defendant in error was an expert and competent man in the dredging business, and had been a dredging contractor for some time. It does not appear from the record that Dolan ever gave any directions as to how the work should be done. The evidence discloses that he simply designated where the work was to start, how deep the earth was to be excavated from the bottom of the ditch, in order to bring it down to the original grade, and how far back the earth was to be deposited on the spoil banks. On September 28, 1916, defendant in error, while operating the dredging machine, sustained the injury for which he was awarded compensation by the Industrial Board. Thereafter he was unable to perform any further work on this contract with the drainage district. This machine and the men in his employ, however, continued the work, and completed it about a month later. Up until the time of the hearing before the Industrial Board defendant in error had not recovered sufficiently from his injury to be able to do any work. [1, 2] It is contended on behalf of the drainage district that defendant in error was not an employee, but was an independent contractor, and not within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 48, §§ 126-152i). The principal test as to whether one is an em |